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Then, starting on line 13, you have this langauge, not in the Keating bill : 6* * * or, upon the express approval of the Attorney General, to authorize their respective agents to obtain information by means of tapping"-and so on.
Mr. CELLER. That is the very nub of the bill.
Mr. WILLIS. And that is the very important difference, to my mind. There not only would the several directors have control, but then they might subdelegate that function to their agents.
Mr. CELLER. That is right.
Mr. CELLER. It is, and I thought about that. I didn't know how we could get around it.
I would prefer to have the authority limited to the heads of those bureaus, but how can you do that?
Mr. WILLIS. Well
Mr. CELLER. I mean, you can't expect, in the conditions under which we live
Mr. WILLIS. I was coming to the point of uniformity. Under those circumstances, wouldn't you have a greater disuniformity
Mr. CELLER. No.
Mr. WILLIS. In the promulgation of it by the various agents of the directors than you would by the hundred-and-some-odd Federal judges?
That is the point I wanted to ask you about. Mr. CELLER. Yes. It is possible that interpretation is possible, but I hope there also that the regulations of the Attorney General would cover that.
I will say to the gentleman from Louisiana, I think there again I would hope that the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General would cover that. We have to rely a great deal on that; otherwise, you would have to pinpoint so many factors in the bill that you would have a bill 20 pages long probably. You couldn't cover everything. You have got to lodge power somewhere.
Mr. WILLIS. I know, but what is in my mind-
Mr. WILLIS. Is that your point, to delegate authority in a Federal judge, in each instance
Mr. CELLER. Well, you could
Mr. WILLIS. Would make for nonuniformity. On the other hand, without that, it seems to me all these agents would have the bare pamphlets containing regulations and they, themselves, may be interpreting those regulations.
Mr. CELLER. Well, if you wish, you could tighten that language up and say "authorize them”—just the word “them” would mean the heads.
I have no pride of authorship there, and I only put "respective agents” in there because that is the way the bill came to me originally.
I thought about those words. I tried to weigh every word here, because it would have great meaning.
If you feel that is too broad, just substitute the word "them” for “respective agents” and then you would limit it to the heads. Mr. WILLIS. Yes. I have no particular feeling about it right now. Mr. CELLER. I understand. Mr. WILLIS. I am inclinedMr. CELLER. We want to give and take here so we get the best possible bill.
Mr. WILLIS. I am inclined to agree we should perhaps limit ourselves to criminal law and not open up wiretapping in civil litigation, unless there are some strong reasons advanced.
Mr. CELLER. I didn't hear that.
Mr. WILLIS. I say I am inclined to agree with you, at least to begin with, we should limit wiretapping evidence to be admissible in criminal law,
Mr. CELLER. Yes.
Mr. FINE. I might point out to the chairman I don't quite agree with the second part of the language-that is, the language beginning on page 15 gives the agents the power to make up their own minds; but if you go back to the language, it authorizes the directors to authorize their agents to do a certain thing. It is the directors who have to authorize their agents, not that their agents have any power given unto themselves.
Mr. WILLIS. My point was, Would you not be giving these agents the choice?
Mr. FINE. The language doesn't do that; that is the point. I think the language only gives the power to the director to authorize his agents because you can't expect the director to go out and wiretap.
Mr. CELLER. Thank you very much. Mr. KEATING. Anything further? Thank you very much, Mr. Celler. We are happy to have here this morning Mr. William Rogers from the Office of the Attorney General, representing the Attorney General, of the Department of Justice.
Mr. Rogers, we would be very happy to hear you.
(The hearing recessed at 10:55 a. m., Thursday, April 29, 1954, to reconvene subject to call.)
WIRETAPPING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
THURSDAY, MAY 6, 1954
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room F-59, the Capitol, Senator Alexander Wiley (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Wiley and Welker.
Capt. Stephen E. Jones, Chief, Security Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, will be the first witness.
Will you come up here, Captain? It is good to see you.
Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, before we start, could we offer for the record a letter received from the President of the American Bar Association, pursuant to a wire that you sent to the president of the bar association asking them if they cared to testify.
Senator Wiley. Yes. That will be made a part of the record. (The document referred to is as follows:)
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
Chicago, Ill., April 29, 1954. HON. ALEXANDER WILEY, Chairman, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C. DEAR SENATOR WILEY: I appreciate very much your wire giving us information of the public hearing to be held on wiretapping legislation on May 6.
As you perhaps know, the section of criminal law submitted a recommendation to the house of delegates at its meeting held March 5 and 6 last asking that the house approve H. R. 477. The house, however, did not adopt that recommendation but recommitted it to the section for further consideration and report at its next meeting.
In view of the above action, it is obvious that views of the association on this matter cannot be expressed at the hearing. However, I am transmitting your telegram to Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., Commerce Title Building, Memphis, Tenn., chairman of the section of criminal law, and to Senator Herbert O'Conor, chairman of the committee on Communist tactics, strategy, and objectives.
We greatly appreciate information on these matters and the opportunity to express the views of the association, when possible, or to inform those association groups who have an interest in the subject. Sincerely yours,
W.J.JAMESON, President. Senator WILEY. Carry on, Captain.
STATEMENT OF CAPT. STEPHEN E. JONES, CHIEF, SECURITY
BRANCH, OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, ACCOMPANIED BY GILBERT R. LEVY, CHIEF, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR, AND CHESTER D. SMITH, SECURITY ADVISER TO CHIEF, SECURITY DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Captain Jones. My name is Capt. Stephen E. Jones, United States Naval Reserve, on duty with the Office of Naval Intelligence. I have been designated, in response to the considerate invitation of the chairman of the Special Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, to represent the Department of Defense as well as the Navy Department at this hearing, and to express to the committee our coordinated views on the general subject of wiretapping legislation.
The interest of the Secretaries of the military departments and their respective investigative agencies in such legislation parallels that of the Attorney General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Consistent with existing agreements covering the fields of sabotage, espionage, and subversion, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence of the Navy, and the Director, Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force, are charged with the same responsibilities with respect to their own military personnel as is the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect to the civilian population, generally. In addition, the responsibilities of the investigative agencies of the Armed Forces regarding subversive activities extend into areas beyond our borders wherever United States personnel of or with the Armed Forces may be located.
Examination of bills S. 832 and H. R. 8649 indicate that they would, generally speaking, legalize the acquisition of certain communications and their admission into evidence, together with the admission into evidence of intercepted communications. These bills require that evidence so obtained must be in the interest of national security, that the agency making the interception must have had the prior written approval of the Attorney General, and finally, that for the material to be admissible in evidence, an authorized agent, prior to engaging in such activity, must have been granted a permit authorizing such acquisition or interception by a judge of a United States court.
S. 3229 makes criminal all interceptions other than those authorized in the manner provided in the act, and requires permission of a Federal judge as a condition precedent not only to admissibility in evidence, but to the interception itself.
S. 2753 would amend section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 to make possible the admission in Federal courts of the United States of evidence obtained as a result of interception of communications when the information so obtained pertains to crime involving the national security.
Parenthetically it may be noted that, where the investigative agencies of the Armed Forces are referred to in these bills, they should be designated as follows:
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army.