and in the courts of a majority of the States in which the question has arisen.1 1 Veitch v. V. B. Atkins Grocery Co., 5 Ala. App. 444, 59 So. 746; Jebeles, etc., Confectionery Co. v. Stephenson, 6 Ala. App. 103, 60 So. 437; Wendt v. Ismert-Hincke Milling Co., 107 Ark. 106, 154 S. W. 194; Wolf v. Marsh, 54 Cal. 228; Fresno etc., Co. v. Dunbar, 80 Cal. 530, 22 Pac. 275; Poirier v. Gravel, 88 Cal. 79, 25 Pac. 962; Remy v. Olds, 88 Cal. 537, 26 Pac. 355; Garberino v. Roberts, 109 Cal. 125, 128, 41 Pac. 857; Home Pattern Co. v. Mertz Co., 86 Conn. 494, 86 Atl. 19; Churchill Grain, etc., Co. v. Newton, 88 Conn. 130, 89 Atl. 1121; Landvoight v. Paul, 27 Dist. Col. App. 423; Thompson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12; Ford v. Lawson, 133 Ga. 237, 65 S. E. 444; Robson v. Hale, 139 Ga. 753, 78 S. E. 177; Fox v. Kitton, 19 Ill. 519; Follansbee v. Adams, 86 Ill. 13; Kadish v. Young, 108 III. 170, 48 Am. Rep. 548; Ballance v. Vanuxem, 191 Ill. 319, 61 N. E. 85; Engesette v. McGilvray, 63 Ill. App. 461; Kurtz v. Frank, 76 Ind. 594, 40 Am. Rep. 275; Adams v. Byerly, 123 Ind. 368, 24 N. E. 130; Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Reed, 54 Ind. App. 450, 103 N. E. 77; Crabtree v. Messersmith, 19 Iowa, 179; Holloway v. Griffith, 32 Iowa, 409; 7 Am. Rep. 208; McCormick v. Basal, 46 Iowa 235; Quarton v. American Law Book Co., 143 Ia. 517, 529, 121 N. W. 1009, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1; Sprague v. Iowa Merc. Co., (Ia.) 172 N. W. 637; Platt v. Brand, 26 Mich. 173; Sheahan v. Barry, 27 Mich. 217; Kalkhoff v. Nelson, 60 Minn. 284, 287, 62 N. W. 332; McGuire v. Neils Lumber Co., 97 Minn. 293, 107 N. W. 130; Bignall, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Pierce, etc., Co., 59 Mo. App. 673; Claes, etc., Mfg. Co. v. McCord, 65 Mo. App. 507; Vickers v. Electrozone Co., 67 N. J. L. 665, 52 Atl. 467; O'Neill v. Supreme Council A. L. of H. 70 N. J. L. 410, 57 Atl. 463; Samuel Super, 85 N. J. L. 101, 88 Atl. 954; Burtis v. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285; Ferris v. Spooner, 102 N. Y. 10, 5 N. E. 773; Nichols v. Scranton. etc., Co., 137 N. Y. 471, 33 N. E. 561; Stokes v. Mackay, 147 N. Y. 223, 41 N. E. 496; Union Ins. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 157 N. Y. 633, 643, 52 N. E. 671, 44 L. R. A. 227; Hicks v. British Am. Assur. Co., 162 N. Y. 284, 56 N. E. 743, 48 L. R. A. 424; Langan v. Supreme Council A. L. of H., 174 N. Y. 266, 66 N. E. 932; Seymour v. Warren, 114 N. Y. App. D. 813, 100 N. Y. S. 267, affd. 190 N. Y. 512, 83 N. E. 1131; Wester v. Casein Co., 206 N. Y. 506, 100 N. E. 488; Rubber Trading Co. v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co., 221 N. Y. 120, 116 N. E. 789; Matthews v. Matthews, 62 Hun, 110, 16 N. Y. S. 621 (cf. Shaw v. Republic L. Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 286, 293; Benecke v. Hæbler, 38 N. Y. App. D. 344, 58 N. Y. S. 16, affd. without opinion 166 N. Y. 631, 60 N. E. 1107); Schmitt v. Schnell, 14 Ohio C. C. 153; Diem v. Koblitz, 49 Ohio St. 41, 29 N. E. 1124, 34 Am. St. Rep. 531; Stark v. Duvall, 7 Okl. 213, 54 Pac. 453; J. K. Armsby Co. v. Grays Harbor Comm. Co., 62 Oreg. 173, 123 Pac. 32; Zuck v. McClure, 98 Pa. 541; Hocking v. Hamilton, 158 Pa. 107, 27 Atl. 836; Echard Coal & Coke Co. v. Mudge, 234 Pa. 86, 82 Atl. 1110; Mountjoy v. Metzger, 9 Phil. 10; Ault v. Dustin, 100 Tenn. 366, 45 S. W. 981; Brown v. Odill, 104 Tenn. 250, 56 S. W. 840, 52 L. R. A. 660; Kilgore v. Northwest Texas, etc., Assn., 90 Tex. 139, 37 S. W. 598; Texas Seed & Floral Co. v. Chicago Set & Seed Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 187 S. W. 2 There are strong opinions to the contrary, however, and in many States the question is still undecided.3 747; Gibson v. Wheldon, 82 Vt. 175, 72 Atl. 909; Burke v. Shaver, 92 Va. 345, 23 S. E. 749; Lee v. Mutual, etc., Assoc., 97 Va. 160, 33 S. E. 556; Mutual etc., Life Assoc. v. Taylor, 99 Va. 208, 37 S. E. 854; Davis v. Grand Rapids, etc., Co., 41 W. Va. 717, 24 S. E. 630; Chapman v. Beltz Co., 48 W. Va. 1, 35 S. E. 1013; Bare v. Victoria Coal Co., 73 W. Va. 632, 80 S. E. 941; Lewis v. West Virginia Pulp etc., Co., 76 W. Va. 103, 84 S. E. 1063; Davidor t. Bradford, 129 Wis. 524, 109 N. W. 576. See also Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co., 76 Conn. 27, 55 Atl. 599; Trammell v. Vaughan, 158 Mo. 214, 59 S. W. 79, 51 L. R. A. 854; Vandegrift . Cowles Engineering Co., 161 N. Y. 435, 55 N. E. 941, 48 L. R. A. 685. Pittman v. Pittman, 110 Ky. 306, 61 S. W. 461; South Gardner Lumber Co. v. Bradstreet, 97 Me. 165, 53 Atl. 1110 (but see Listman Mill Co. v. Dufresne, 111 Me. 104, 88 Atl. 354); Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 60 N. E. 397; Porter v. American Legion, 183 Mass. 326, 67 N. E. 238; Carstens v. McDonald, 38 Neb. 858, 57 N. W. 757; King v. Waterman, 55 Neb. 324, 75 N. W. 830; Parker v. Pettit, 43 N. J. L. 512, 517 (overruled); Stanford v. McGill, 6 N. Dak. 536, 72 N. W. 938, 38 L. R. A. 760; Markowitz v. Greenwall Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 75 S. W. 74, 317; Turner Cummings Hardwood Co. v. Phillip A. Ryan Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 201 S. W. 431. See also Warden v. Hinds, 163 Fed. 201, 90 C. C. A. 449; Perkins v. Frazer, 107 La. 390, 31 So. 773. The question is referred to but expressly left open in Day v. Connecticut, etc., Co., 45 Conn. 480, 494, 29 Am. Rep. 693 (but see later Connecticut decisions in n. 1); Sullivan v. McMillan, 26 Fla. 543, 8 So. 450 (but see Thompson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12, 63 Am. St. Rep. 193); Maltby v. Eisenhauer, 17 Kans. 308, 311; Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567, 11 Amer. Rep. 509; Pinckney v. Dambmann, 72 Md. 173, 182, 19 Atl. 450 (but see Lewis v. Tapman, 90 Md. 294, 45 Atl. 459, 47 L. R. A. 385). In Collins v. Snow, 218 Mass. 542, 106 N. E. 148, 149, the court adverted to a distinction between legal and equitable procedure. "The defendant's last contention is that under the doctrine of Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, 19 Am. Dec. 384, the decree was wrong in enforcing the plaintiff's half of the instalments which fell due after the date of the filing of the bill, to wit, September 28, 1908. But Daniels v. Newton was an action at law. In an action at law relief cannot be given founded on facts happening subsequent to the date of the writ. In equity the rule is otherwise. In equity rights accruing to the plaintiff after the filing of the bill which grow out of the matters on which the bill is founded may be made the subject of a supplemental bill. Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 275, 276; Jaques v. Hall, 3 Gray, 194. See also, in this connection, Bauer v. International Waste Co., 201 Mass. 197, 87 N. E. 637. Indeed unless the original bill is dismissed that is the only way in which they can be enforced. Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 275. By force of Equity Rule 25 all facts which at common law were the subject of a supplemental bill now can be pleaded by way of an amendment to the original bill." § 1316. Distinction between defence and right of action. 4 The reasoning in Hochster v. De La Tour, already adverted to, illustrates the importance of a distinction, which should be observed the distinction between a defence and a right of action. This seems obvious, but it is frequently lost sight of, as it was in that case. It seems to be assumed that a breach of contract by one party is the only basis for a defence on the other's part. But fraud, mistake, failure of consideration actual or prospective and all other affirmative defences to breach of contract are based simply on principles of equity and justice. Whether a breach of contract has been committed does not primarily depend on such principles, but on whether a binding promise has been broken. Every consideration of justice requires that repudiation or inability to perform should immediately excuse the innocent party from performing, or preparing to perform, nor is any technical rule violated if the excuse is allowed. But it does not follow from this that he has an immediate right of action. Indeed even if it be assumed that repudiation before the time for performance should give rise to an immediate right of action, it is impossible to make identical requirements concerning the repudiation which will furnish a defence and that which will afford ground for an action. It is a consequence of allowing such a defence that the injured party not only is free from liability if he fails to perform, but that if he brings an action he shall not be defeated by reason of his own non-performance, since that failure to perform was caused by the defendant's fault. But though the defendant cannot defeat the action on this ground, any other defence is effectual, and there is no reason precluding him from asserting that the action is prematurely brought. § 1316. Distinction between action for restitution and action on the contract. Another important and frequently neglected distinction is 42 E. & B. 678. 5 See infra, § 1331. Thus where an owner of a building refused to allow а contractor to go on with work upon it a condition of the contract requiring the con tractor to produce a certificate of an engineer showing full performance cannot be set up by the owner in answer to an action by the contractor. Smith v. Wetmore, 167 N. Y. 234, 60 N. E. 419. See supra, § 677. that between an action for restitution and an action on the contract. Since repudiation affords immediate cause for rescission it also entitles the party aggrieved to bring an immediate suit for the restitution specifically or in money equivalent of whatever he has parted with. Cases allowing this do not involve the consequence that an action might be brought at that time on the contract. § 1317. No inconsistency in allowing full damages before all performance due. Again, it is often thought to allow a plaintiff to sue and recover full damages before the time for the completion of all the defendant's performance is to allow the doctrine of anticipatory breach, yet this is not the case. As soon as a party to a contract breaks any promise he has made, he is liable to an action. In such an action the plaintiff will recover whatever damages the breach has caused. If the breach is a trifling one such damages cannot well be more than the direct injury caused by that trifling breach. But if the breach is serious or is accompanied by repudiation of the whole contract, it may and frequently will involve as a consequence that all the rest of the contract will not be carried out. This may be a necessary consequence of the situation of affairs or it may result simply from the plaintiff's right to decline to let the defendant continue performance, since even if all the remaining performances were properly rendered, the plaintiff would not get substantially what he bargained for. The plaintiff is entitled to damages which will compensate him for all the consequences which naturally follow the breach, and therefore to damages for the loss of the entire contract. This is no different principle from See infra, § 1466. Similarly an employee unable to complete performance of his contract because of illness may recover on a quantum meruit before the day when his compensation was payable under the contract. Ryan v. Dayton, 25 Conn. 188, 65 Am. Dec. 560. The contrary decision of Tebo v. Ballard, 36 Vt. 612, is justly criticised in 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317. 8 Nichols v. Scranton, etc., Co., 137 N. Y. 471, 33 N. E. 561; Union Ins. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 157 N. Y. 633, 52 N. E. 671, 44 L. R. A. 227; Hocking v. Hamilton, 158 Pa. 107, 27 Atl. 836, illustrate this. These cases are unquestionably right. They do not involve the question of anticipatory breach, though in each of them the court seems to have thought so. If allowing a plaintiff in an action of tort for personal injuries to recover the damages he will probably suffer in the future. the cause of action has accrued, the fact that the damages or all of them have not yet been suffered is no bar in any form of action to the recovery of damages estimated on the basis of full compensation. This is law where the doctrine of Hochster v. De la Tour is denied, as well as where it is admitted." Indeed in the action of assumpsit the early law seems always to have allowed full damages as soon as any instalment of performance was due and not performed. 10 In most of the cases cited in support of the doctrine of anticipatory breach there had been in fact an actual breach, and, therefore, no novel principle was needed to sustain recovery.11 Pierce v. Tennessee &c. Co., 173 U. S. 1, 43 L. Ed. 591, 19 Sup. Ct. 335; Re Manhattan Ice Co., 114 Fed. 399; Northrop v. Mercantile Trust Co., 119 Fed.. 969; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. Rep. 8; Howard College v. Turner, 71 Ala. 429; Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Nexsen, 84 Ind. 347, 43 Am. Rep. 91; Goldman v. Goldman, 51 La. Ann. 761, 25 So. 555; Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64; Speirs v. Union Drop-Forge Co., 180 Mass. 87, 61 N. E. 825; St. John v. St. John, 223 Mass. 137, 111 N. E. 719; Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592; Girard v. Taggart, 5 S. & R. 19, 9 Am. Dec. 327; King v. Steiren, 44 Pa. St. 99, 84 Am. Dec. 419; Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. 168; Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582, 76 Am. Dec. 140; Treat v. Hiles, 81 Wis. 280, 50 N. W. 896; Zdan v. Hruden, 22 Manitoba, 387. See also Mayne on Damages (6th ed.), 106 et seq.; Sutherland on Damages, §§ 108, 112, 113. The contrary decisions of Lichenstein v. Brooks, 75 Tex. 196, 198, 12 S. W. 975; Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355 (cf. Treat v. Hiles, 81 Wis. 280, 50 N. W. 896); Walsh v. Myers, 92 Wis. 397, 66 N. W. 250, are not to be supported. See also Salyers v. Smith, 67 Ark. 526, 55 S. W. 936. 10 See supra, § 1290, n. 10. 11 In Bridgeport v. Ætna Indemnity Co., 91 Conn. 197, 99 Atl. 566, 568, the court said: "The breach was one of a dependent covenant going to the whole consideration, and therefore total. Kauffman v. Raeder, 108 Fed. 171, 179, 47 C. C. A. 278, 54 L. R. A. 247; Leopold v. Salkey, 89 Ill. 412, 418, 31 Am. Rep. 93. A cause of action in favor of the city thereupon arose for the recovery of the damages consequent upon such breach. It might have brought suit immediately, or waited such length of time as the statute of limitations permitted, but only one action could be brought, and in that action, whenever brought, full recovery, covering the future as well as the past, could be had. Cohn v. Norton, 57 Conn. 480, 490, 18 Atl. 595, 5 L. R. A. 572; Stanton v. New York, etc., Ry. Co., 59 Conn. 272, 283, 22 Atl. 300, 21 Am. St. Rep. 110; Pierce v. Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 173 U. S. 1, 13, 19 Sup. Ct. 335, 43 L. Ed. 591; Parker v. Russell, 133 Mass. 74, 75; Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592, 597; Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64, 68; Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582, 585, 76 Am. Dec. 140; 1 Sedgwick on Damages, § 90; Sutherland on Damages, § 108. "It makes no difference that the liquidation of damages suffered by the |