only to provide by a contract, even though made subsequently to that on which the claim is made, that the award of arbitrators on a certain question involved therein shall be a condition precedent to any cause of action, 52 but also, at any time, though a cause of action has arisen, to substitute for that and take in full satisfaction of it, an executory agreement to pay whatever arbitrators should award. This seems a necessary consequence of the modern recognition of the possibility of an executory promise being taken, if so intended, as final accord and satisfaction;52 but it has certainly not hitherto been the ordinary construction put on agreements to arbitrate; and undoubtedly cases are rare where it could be found as a fact that the parties intended, to substitute the mere agreement to arbitrate for the original cause of action. It follows from the revocability of a submission that a revocation by either party to the arbitration of the authority given by him to the arbitrators will invalidate any award made thereafter. 53 The only redress for breach of an agreement to refer is an action for damages, 54 and in such an action if arbitration has not been begun and no expenses incurred, only nominal damages can be recov52 Jones v. Enorree Power Co., 92 S. Car. 263, 75 S. E. 452, Ann. Cas. 1914 B. 293.

524 See supra, § 1846.

53 Vynior's Case, 8 Coke 80a; Re Rouse and Meier, L. R. 6 C. P. 212; Fraser v. Ehrensperger, 12 Q. B. D. 310; Fooks v. Lawson, 40 Atl. Rep. 661, 1 Marvel (Del.), 115; Gregory v. Pike, 94 Me. 27, 46 Atl. 793; Boston &c. R. Corp. v. Nashua, &c. R. Corp., 139 Mass. 463, 31 N. E. 751; Jones v. Harris, 59 Miss. 214; Butler v. Greene, 49 Neb. 280, 68 N. W. 496; Allen v. Watson, 16 Johns. 205; Sartwell v. Sowles, 72 Vt. 270, 48 Atl. 11, 82 Am. St. Rep. 943; Martin v. Vansant, 99 Wash. 106, 168 Pac. 990. But see contra, McGeehen v. Duffield, 5 Pa. 497; McCune v. Lytle, 197 Pa. 404, 47 Atl. 190; and cf. Toledo Steamship Co. v. Zenith Transportation Co., 184 Fed. 391, 106 C. C. A. 501; Ivins v. Ivins, 77 N. J. L. 368,

72 Atl. 94. Death of one of the parties effects a revocation of the arbitrators' authority. Cooper v. Johnson, 2 B. & Ald. 394; Gregory v. Boston Safe Deposit Co., 36 Fed. 408; Gregory v. Pike, 94 Me. 27, 46 Atl. 793; Marseilles v. Kenton, 17 Pa. 238; Sutton v. Tyrrell, 10 Vt. 91.

54 Noble v. Harris, 3 Keb. 745; Warburton v. Storr, 4 B. & C. 103; Aktieselskabet &c. Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, 250 Fed. 935, 163 C. C. A. 185 (cert. granted 248 U. S. 553, 39 S. Ct. 8); Reg. v. Hardey, 14 Q. B. 529; Brown v. Leavitt, 26 Me. 251; Call v. Hagar, 69 Me. 521; Quimby v. Melvin, 28 N. H. 250; Dexter v. Young, 40 N. H. 130; Miller v. Junction Canal Co., 53 Barb. 590, 41 N. Y. 98; Craftsbury v. Hill, 28 Vt. 763; Mead v. Ewen, 83 Vt. 132, 74 Atl. 1058; Rison v. Moon, 91 Va. 384, 22 S. E. 165. See also Ferguson v. Rogers, 129 Ark. 197, 195 S. W. 22.

ered. 54a A court of law will not enforce the stipulation by disregarding any attempted revocation, nor will a court of equity enforce specifically the agreement.55 Institution of suit on the original claim is by implication a revocation of an agreement to arbitrate, 55

§ 1928. When writing necessary.

"A submission to arbitration may be either oral, in writing or under seal, depending on the subject-matter of the arbitration. If a writing is necessary to pass title to the thing in controversy, an award, disposing of such title, to be valid must be in writing."'56

§ 1929. Arbitrators must follow authority.

In order that an award shall be binding, the arbitrators must follow exactly the authority given them by the agreement of the parties." Therefore, though the submission authorizes a

majority of the arbitrators to make an award, the award is void if all of the arbitrators did not participate in the consideration of the case. 58

An award when once made exhausts the authority of arbitrators, and unless there is what amounts to a new submission, they cannot make a substituted or supplementary award. 59 If arbitrators exceed their authority the award is void to that extent, and if the part which is void cannot be separated from the rest without injustice, the whole award is void.60

"Unless an arbitrator renders his award on all matters within the submission, and of which he had notice, the award is wholly void," and it is essential to the validity of an award that it be final, that is, a termination of the question under

Conn. 480; Fountain v. Harrington, 3 Har. (Del.) 22; Denman v. Bayless, 22 Ill. 300; Buntain v. Curtis, 27 Ill. 374; Sthreshly v. Broadwell, 1 J. J. Marsh. 340; Boynton v. Frye, 33 Me. 216; Sawtells v. Howard, 104 Mich. 54, 62 N. W. 156; Gibson v. Powell, 13 Miss. 712; Adams v. Adams, 8 N. H. 82; Hiscock v. Harris, 74 N. Y. 108; McCracken v. Clarke, 31 Pa. 498; Toomey v. Nichols, 6 Heisk. 159; Bailey v. Triplett (W. Va.), 98 S. E. 166. Cf. O'Neill v. Clark, 57 Neb. 760, 78 N. W. 256.

58 Fraley v. Nickels, 121 Va. 377, 93 S. E. 636. Unless the submission expressly or impliedly authorizes a majority to make an award, all must concur therein. Tennessee Lumber Mfg. Co. v. Clark Bros. Co., 182 Fed. 618, 105 C. C. A. 156; Whitman v. Bartlett, 156 Ala. 546, 46 So. 972; Washburn v. White, 197 Mass. 540, 84 N. E. 106.

59 St. Charles v. Stookey, 154 Fed. 772, 85 C. C. A. 494, cert. denied 208 U. S. 617, 28 S. Ct. 569, 52 L. Ed. 647; Black v. Woodruff, 193 Ala. 327, 69 So. 97; Hightower v. Georgia Fertilizer & Oil Co., 145 Ga. 780, 89 S. E. 827; Hackney v. Adam, 20 N. Dak. 130,

127 N. W. 519. Cf. Frederick v. Margwarth, 221 Pa. 418, 70 Atl. 797, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1246.

60 Falkingham v. Victorian Ry. Commissioners, [1900] A. C. 452; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 15 Ala. 398; Brown v. Mize, 119 Ala. 10, 24 So. 453; Boynton v. Frye, 33 Me. 216; Orcutt v. Butler, 42 Me. 83; Skillings v. Coolidge, 14 Mass. 43; Gibson v. Powell, 13 Miss. 712; Yeaton v. Brown, 52 N. H. 14; Cox v. Jagger, 2 Cow. 638, 14 Am. Dec. 522; Clark Millinery Co. v. National Union F. Ins. Co., 160 N. C. 130, 75 S. E. 940, Ann. Cas. 1914 C. 367; Scott v. Barnes, 7 Pa. 134.

61 Carnochan v. Christie, 11 Wheat. 446, 6 L. Ed. 516; Porter v. Scott, 7 Cal. 312; Buntain v. Curtis, 27 Ill. 374, 379; Stearns v. Cope, 109 III. 340; Steere v. Brownell, 113 Ill. 415; McGregor &c. R. Co. v. Sioux City &c. R. Co., 49 Ia. 604; McNear v. Bailey, 18 Me. 251; Rollins v. Townsend, 118 Mass. 224; Kabatchnick v. Hoffman, 226 Mass. 221, 115 N. E. 309; Harker v. Hough, 2 Halst. 428; Jones v. Welwood, 71 N. Y. 208; Young v. Kinney, 48 Vt. 22; Bean v. Bean, 25 W. Va. 604; Blakeston v. Wilson, 14 Manitoba, 271.

arbitration.62 Further, the award must be certain, so that no reasonable question can be made as to its meaning.63

§ 1929a. Circumstances invalidating arbitration; waiver.

An award may be invalidated not only by fraud, interest or misconduct of an arbitrator, in failing to give a fair hearing,64 but also where it is founded on such a basic mistake as to make it clearly fail to express the judgment of the arbitrators on the actual facts.65

Partiality, interest, or relationship to the adverse party is not an adequate reason for attacking an award when the facts were known prior to the arbitration; 66 and generally it may be said

that defects in the conduct of an arbitration may be waived by continuing to take part in the proceedings after acquiring knowledge of the defects.67

§ 1930. Statutory arbitration.

In England and in most of the United States a form of arbitration under direction of the courts is provided for by statute. The reference is made by order of court and the award is returned into court and becomes the basis of a judgment. Such statutes generally do not supersede arbitration at common law, but give an alternative and sometimes more desirable mode of precedure.68

ner, 155 Fed. 910; Central Union Stockyards Co. v. Uvalde Asphalt Pav. Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 246, 87 Atl. 235.

67 Chicago, Rock Island &c. Ry. v. Union Pac. R., 254 Fed. 235, 165 C. C. A. 523; Dore v. Southern Pac. Co., 163 Cal. 182, 124 Pac. 817; Ramish v. Marsh, 178 Cal. 217, 172 Pac. 1100; Williams v. Henkle, 201 Ill. App. 362; Hackney v. Adam, 20 N. Dak. 130, 127 N. W. 519; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Pierce Engine Co., 141 Wis. 103. There is no power to waive express statutory requirements. Con

way v. Roth, 179 N. Y. App. D. 108, 166 N. Y. S. 182.

68 Utah Construction Co. v. Western Pac. Ry., 174 Cal. 156, 162 Pac. 631; Evans v. Stinson, 21 Ga. App. 612, 94 S. E. 826; Thatcher Implement &c. Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627, 187 S. W. 117; Johnsen v. Wineman, 34 N. Dak. 116, 157 N. W. 679; Hill v. Walker (Tex. Civ. App.), 140 S. W. 1159. Cf. Conway v. Roth, 170 N. Y. S. 176; Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Constr. &c. Co., 92 Wash. 316, 159 Pac. 129; Suksdorf v. Suksdorf, 93 Wash. 667, 161 Pac. 465.