and on May 19 he arrived from Newmarket just in time for the division which finally extinguished it. Notwithstanding this independence, there was, however, no actual breach between Fox and the Government, and Lord North was too sensible of his value as a debater not to wish to retain him as an ally. On the 21st of the following December, a new writ was issued for Midhurst, Fox having been appointed a Junior Lord of the Treasury, in which capacity he acted during the whole of the year 1773. But this year in Parliament was a quiet one, for the King and the Government had, for the time being, crushed the life out of the Opposition; no opportunity offered for goading it to new struggles; and the trial of Clive, which was the parliamentary event of the year, and one of great national importance, was fortunately not made a party question, but was decided on its merits in a manner at once just and honourable.

But quiet as the year was in Parliament, to the private life of Charles Fox it was one of very serious business. The reckless dicing in which, or in horse-racing and drinking, most of his time was passed, had swallowed up the wealth which Lord Holland freely bestowed upon him, and as much more as he could raise from the Jews. These had been to him no difficult creditors: his acquaintances pretended to believe them victims to his powers of persuasion; they were rather trusting to Lord Holland's riches, to which Charles Fox was the probable heir. But his debts accumulated, his creditors were uneasy, and the birth of a son to his elder brother, Stephen, brought matters to a crisis. Stephen's delicate constitution had given little prospect of his living to inherit the title, but this new life totally altered the conditions. The creditors, -tradesmen, Jews, usurers, on the one hand; friends who had guaranteed the debts, on the other-were obliged to bring the state of Charles's affairs to the knowledge of Lord Holland. The old man faced the difficulty honourably and courageously. High or low, exacting or considerate, grasping Jew or good Samaritan, no one was a penny the worse for having helped ' and trusted his favourite boy;' but by the time that all was clear, the Fox property was less by 140,0007., as the consequence of three years of childish giddiness and mis

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'behaviour.'

The following spring was destined to see no less marked a change in the political life of Charles Fox. He thought fit to force Lord North, very unwillingly, into a line of action against their old enemies the printers; whether he was instigated by some grudge against Woodfall, which is not likely; or by

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some pique against Lord North, which is more probable; or whether, as the Irishman of fiction, he was spoiling for a 'beating,' is uncertain; but the course which he took was so offensive to Lord North that he acquiesced in the dislike which the King had entertained towards the young Lord of the Treasury ever since the debate on the Marriage Bill. That young man,' wrote his Majesty, has so thoroughly cast off every principle of common honour and honesty that ' he must become as contemptible as he is odious.' And within a few days Lord North, in a curt note, conveyed to the 'young man' the King's will that he should no longer hold office. The dismissal happened fortunately for Fox's fair fame. If,' says Mr. Trevelyan, in a remarkable sentence, ' at an age when his character was still malleable, his premature ' ambition had been tempted by the offer of the highest place ' in the State, he might have gone down to the execration of posterity as the Wentworth of the eighteenth century.' Had he continued longer a member of the Government, he would probably have been led on to support the King's measures, which were fast driving the colonies into revolt, and which did, in little more than two years, compel them to proclaim their independence. From implication in these Fox was saved. The temporary feeling which had led him, in the first instance, to oppose Lord North, gave way to happier and firmer principles, teaching him to wage war no longer for the mere love of the strife, but for devotion to the cause of freedom, for hatred to the very name of oppression. It was thus that he dissolved his partnership with Sandwich and Wedderburn, and united himself to Burke and Chatham and Savile, in their crusade against the tyranny which was trampling out the English liberty in the colonies, and the 'corruption which was undermining it at home.' These are Mr. Trevelyan's closing words. To tell how ably, and, against great odds, how manfully, that crusade was fought out, would lead us far beyond the early history of Charles James Fox.

ART. IX.-Papers relating to the Advance of Ayoob Khan on Candahar. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty: 1880.

IT

In

T is not unusual that we should begin a campaign badly and finish it brilliantly. This has been the case with the series of operations in the neighbourhood of Candahar. The explanation of failure at first is to be found in our overweening confidence and want of foresight; the cause of subsequent success lies in the national character, which is braced by misfortunes that would demoralise other races. Relying upon our vast resources, we are apt to defer making them available for military purposes till the last moment. Hence we maintain armies which, from want of stores and transport, are incapable of moving in any large numbers a mile from the railway terminus or place of disembarkation on the sea coast. fact we have in India no army properly so called, but only an aggregate of battalions, batteries, and squadrons distributed among various peace stations according either to purely political or rather police considerations, or to military reasons valid many years ago, but no longer applicable. Our confidence is at once a source of strength and weakness. It is the fond but erroneous belief of the large majority of our countrymen that a British army has never been beaten. With regard to Orientals, this notion of our superiority to them as warriors was to a great extent justified by the extraordinary feats of our troops during the Indian Mutiny, and, recalling these facts and inflated by conceit in our discipline and weapons, we have included the Afghans among the Eastern foes whom it is for an English force mere child's play to beat. At the same time it must be admitted that with soldiers a fancied often gives a real superiority. An army which deems itself invincible generally is so; and the proverbial ignorance of the British soldier as to when he is-or rather, according to the rules of the bloody game of war, ought to be-beaten, has stood us in good stead on many a hardly contested field. This military conceit is not to be discouraged as long as it is confined to the men and regimental officers; but when it extends to generals it becomes dangerous, and has proved the cause of many disasters. The preceding observations serve to throw some light on the recent events near Candahar. Our information concerning them is in certain details incomplete, but with the main facts we are already sufficiently acquainted to justify both a narrative and a criticism.

As soon as it became known that the Indian Government had resolved not to replace Yakoob Khan on the musnud of Cabul, Ayoob Khan, his brother and Governor of Herat, began making preparations to assert by force of arms his own claim to the Amirship. During several months he occupied himself in making arrangements for an advance on Candahar, and on June 9 he formed his camp outside the walls of Herat preparatory to an advance. It is believed, however, that he did not commence his march till several days later, viz. about June 18. His army consisted, at starting, of 2,500 cavalry, of whom only 900 were regulars, the remainder being Khazadars or mounted militia, 10 regiments of infantry varying in strength from 350 to 500 men, and five batteries -including one mule battery-with 30 guns. Altogether he had between 7,000 and 8,000 men. Some of the infantry regiments were composed of Cabulis, between whom and the Heratis there was no very cordial feeling. Indeed, during the preparations for the march there had been a sharp fight between the two portions of the army. It would seem as if the Heratis were not very eager for the expedition, while the Cabulis were induced to undertake it in the belief, encouraged by Ayoob Khan, that they would eventually proceed to their native district. This surmise receives some colour from the fact that the Cabuli regiments were accompanied by their families. We are, however, disposed to think that originally Ayoob Khan had no intention of risking a battle with the British, or even with their nominee the Wali of Candahar, as long as the former remained in Candahar. His plan was probably to gather revenue from the northern districts of the Candahar province, and to hang about the Helmund fomenting intrigues till the departure of the British, which he had reason to expect would shortly take place, should afford him an opening for more vigorous action. Possibly, indeed, he entertained a hope that when he had shown the weakness of the Wali we might not be indisposed to negotiate with him as we had negotiated with Abdurrahman Khan, and that he might eventually thus obtain peaceful possession of Candahar. Let us now pass from political speculations to military facts.

The Indian Government was at first somewhat sceptical as to Ayoob's success in marching an army over the difficult 367 miles of country intervening between Herat and Candahar, believing that if he did appear on the Helmund he would be easily disposed of by the Wali alone. At length, however, the Viceroy and his advisers began to awake to a feeling that there was real danger in the air. On June 27, i.e. nine days

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after Ayoob's departure from Herat, the Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary for India that a telegram from our Minister at Teheran stated that Ayoob was marching against Candahar with a large force. Lord Ripon expressed an opinion that Shere Ali (the Wali) should be left to defend himself beyond the Helmund, but that, after consultation with Sir Donald Stewart, he had arrived at the conviction that a British force should be employed to defend the passage of that river. This was an error of judgment, for the appearance of a brigade of cavalry with a troop of horse artillery even one march beyond the Helmund would have caused Ayoob to hesitate, and have checked the disaffected tribesmen. A force so mobile would not have been compromised by the possible disaffection of the Wali's troops, and the moral effect of its advance would have been great. It is evident, however, that the Indian Government did not appreciate the position, for Lord Ripon in the telegram above quoted goes on to say: I propose, therefore, to instruct Primrose, if Ayoob reaches Furrah, to advance towards Girishk with sufficient force to prevent passage of Helmund. This would necessitate moving up reinforcement from Phayre's reserve. No troops would be moved until necessity actually arose.' Thus it will be seen that General Primrose was not to advance till he heard that Ayoob Khan had actually reached Furrah, which is 160 miles from Girishk and 235 miles from Candahar. Now, by the time that the intelligence of Ayoob's arrival at Furrah had been brought to Candahar, the Herat army would have had time to get as far as a point 60 miles from the Helmund, which river is at Girishk, 75 miles from Candahar. Quetta is from the latter city 148 miles; consequently, even if everything in the shape of transport, &c., were ready, no considerable portion of General Phayre's reserve could have joined General Primrose under fifteen days. As we shall see presently, General Phayre's division was not in such a condition that it could advance without long preparation. In fact it was not a mobile force at all.

On June 30 the Viceroy received information that Ayoob's advanced guard of 800 horsemen had arrived at Furrah, and at once ordered General Primrose to send a force to the Helmund, and General Phayre to push on reinforcements to Candahar. On July 1 the Resident at Candahar telegraphs to Simla that the Wali, 1,500 of whose cavalry are at Washir, 66 miles in advance of Girishk, is beginning to be uneasy, and that it is calculated that Ayoob with the main body of his army had arrived at Furrah about June 26, i.e. five days