MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE. BOOK I.-THEORY OF HAPPINESS. INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS. 1. IS THERE A PERFECTION OF MAN? HOW CAN IT BE ATTAINED? THE subject of the Treatise is an inquiry into the nature of the Sintim Boutim. What constitutes the perfection of man? What is that ideal towards the attainment of which all the powers and tendencies of our nature are directed? What is the perfect life? Before entering upon the main subject, there is a prior question which we must answer: Is there such a perfection? Is the fulness of satisfaction, the perfection of all human aims and efforts, ever completely realized or capable of being realized? The analogy of nature forces us to conclude that there is such an ideal and that it may be and ought to be attained. In outward Nature, science discovers to us coordination and arrangement in all things: law and order, the adaptation of means to ends, prevail throughout the world. In the nature of man, again, there are aims which, consciously or unconsciously, influence every movement of the mind, every activity of the body. There is design in all things-a 'good' or purpose which Nature is incessantly striving to attain. Nor is this true only of isolated forms of activity. There is design equally in the larger groups of existences formed by the simpler modes of good. There is a gradation of goods,' lower goods being subordinated to higher ones. The higher we ascend in the scale of being, the grander the design which we see manifested. But in the purposes of man there is a point where the subordination ceases and where the mind attains complete and absolute satisfaction. However noble its range there is a point where human conception can ascend no higher. There is a 'final good,' a supreme purpose satisfying all aspiration, comprehending in its completeness all lower forms of good. The result at which the strivings of our nature aim is no vague, unattainable 'infinite,' but a human good-a good which man can B attain by his own effort and in his own life. In one word, there is a perfection of human nature and we can attain to it. The same conclusion may be expressed more simply thus: When an action has attained its proper 'end' and fulfilled its proper design, that action is a perfect action. When therefore all actions have attained .their proper end' and fulfilled their proper design, life itself—as the sum of all human activities, will be perfect, and man will have attained his proper perfection, his Summum Bonum, and, with it, all that is possible of blessedness and felicity. But how can this perfection be attained?-By a life in community, under the guidance of the State. There is no sphere in which a man's activities can be exercised or his virtues practised, save in the community of his fellows. There is no security for his freedom, save under the protection of the State. Nature herself teaches us so much: the very constitution of man marks him out as a social being.' 6 The study of life will therefore be a study of civil life; and the study of man will be the study also of social organizations and of the influences which they exert upon him. Since human perfection can only be attained, as we have seen, in the State, the science of human perfection will be a form of the Science of Statesmanship. Statesmanship itself will be the supreme Science, sovereign of all other Sciences, the unique dispenser of human well-being, regulating the steps by which the soul must mount up to its perfection, giving to each man his proper sphere, determining the Sciences which each must pursue, opening to all the practical means by which their proper genius can be most amply satisfied and perfected. The inquiry into 'human perfection' merges itself, therefore, into a 'study of man as a member of an organized community;' and that is a wide and complicated subject. The interests of society are so varied and its issues are so involved, that we must be well-content if we can delineate the main principles which should govern life and characterise its broader features. Looking at the difficulties and complexities of the subject, the student, if he be an educated man, will be sympathetic and appreciative. He will not insist upon a rigid, unelastic method, but will be satisfied if the conclusions drawn are as exact as the premisses will warrant. In fine, the Method of Ethics will be Inductive, and its inductions will be general conclusions into which the element of probability will largely enter. Where the contingencies are so great as to baffle all minute calculations-which is the case in reference to the facts upon which Ethics are based-' probability must be the guide of life.' There is one other caution which must be borne in mind. The facts of life are unlike other facts in this respect: they are 'complex wholes.' The fact and the meaning of the fact are inseparably bound up, one with another. We see only so much of the facts of the moral life as our eyes have been trained to see. Experience is thus essential for one who would read aright the facts of the moral order. Hence, of course, it is impossible for the young to study morals with any profit to themselves. They have no experience to guide them to a sound judgment; and what they see they cannot understand, whilst the clouds of their own passions darken their conscience. II. REVIEW OF CURRENT OPINIONS UPON HUMAN PERFECTION. Assuming, then, that there is such a thing as human perfection, and that it is attainable, let us examine more precisely what it is. What are the characteristics of that conception which denotes the satisfaction and fulfilment of the varied efforts and aims of human nature? What is that 'end' which civil communities were formed to realize in their members, and with which the Science of Statesmanship deals? As far as words go, there is an universal agreement: all men identify perfection with happiness, and understand by happiness a good life and a prosperous career.' But that is only a verbal agreement. The ideas which men practically associate with happiness are various and conflicting, answering to the needs and wants of their own lives. Some give their preference to pleasure, others to honour, others to wealth, others to philosophy. There are others again who regard the Chief Good as something transcendental. We need not pass all possible conceptions under review. Sufficient for us to examine those views which are most generally entertained, or which admit of more intelligent criticism. [Here again a caution is necessary in reference to the spirit in which we ought to approach discussions of moral questions. There are two points which cannot be too often insisted upon : 1. That we must take our start from the facts of real experience, as exemplified in actual life (and not from à priori truths); 2. That in order to understand these facts, we need a specially trained intelligence, or an educated conscience. Early education and the discipline of sound habits must have fostered within us those moral dispositions that make it easy for us to recognize moral truth. Observation of moral facts becomes thus (in one who has been rightly educated) an intuition of a moral law. To detect right and wrong (which are the facts of morals) amid the entanglements of circumstance, is to detect a moral law. A conscience which has been so educated as to read aright the moral fact, has, whether latently or consciously, recognized the moral principle or 'law.'] Let us now proceed to criticise in detail the popular theories, though they are but the reflection of men's own lives, and the ideals which they picture take their form and colour from the surroundings in which men live. They may be characterized as follows: 6 1. There is the theory of animalism, which makes pleasure' the goal of life. But this surely is a slavish type of life, unworthy of the true freeman, however much it may be countenanced by men in high station. 2. There is the theory of men of action, who see in honour' or 'dignity' the culmination of their hopes. But this, again, is open to many objections: (a) it can be easily wrested from us; (3) it depends upon others rather than upon ourselves; (7) it is not pursued for its own sake, but only as the sign and seal of virtuc. [Indeed, on this hypothesis, it would appear rather that virtue had the stronger claim to the chief place. Yet neither is virtue adequate to meet the requirements of happiness; for these reasons. (1) It may exist in complete inaction; (2) it depends upon external conditions which are likely enough to entail utter disaster and misery.] 3. There is, again, the theory of the mystic, which regards Meditation as the end of man. (The discussion of this theory will best be reserved for the end of the Treatise.) 4. Lastly, there is the theory of the money-maker; but that is below notice. The life of commerce is obviously an unnatural existence for man. Moreover, money is not an end in itself; its value depending solely upon its uses. There is one other theory of great importance-the transcendental theory of the Platonists, which seems to represent all things which are 'good' as falling under a common idéa. It is a matter of diffidence to criticise the system of one whose memory is so revered as that of Plato; but reverence for truth is more sacred than affection for a friend. I. First of all let us assume that Plato's 'theory of ideas' may be stated in some such way as this: whatever things are good may be grouped under one common notion, or law of the good, idéa roû ȧyaðoû.' The following arguments are advanced in disproof of this position :1. Things which admit of priority and posteriority cannot have a common idéa: The various forms of good' admit of priority and posteriority: Therefore, the various forms of 'good 'cannot have a common idéa. The major in this Syllogism is admitted by the Platonists. The minor may be proved as follows: Substance is a good, Quality is a good, Relation is a good: But substance is prior to Quality, and Quality is prior to Relation: 2. Things which are predicated in several categories cannot be a single Universal: 6 But the good' is predicated in several categories : Therefore, the good' cannot be a singie Universal. 3. If 'goods' fell under a single idea, they would be treated by a single Science : But they are not treated by a single Science: Therefore, they do not fall under a common idéa. 4. Moreover, the idea is unnecessary and superfluous, at any rate as an abstraction subsisting independently of phenomena. The definition of a thing in itself' is identical with that of the actual, existing thing. The definition of good in itself' will therefore differ in no way from the definition of 'good' in its actual manifestation. 5. Nor, again, is it to the point to say that the idea is eternal and indestructible. It makes no difference in respect of the existence of a thing whether it be long or short-lived. (There is more plausibility in the view of the Pythagorcans. Unlike the Platonists, who regarded the unity of the good to be its essence and cause, the Pythagoreans, and with them apparently Speusippus, regarded 'unity' as only a mark or characteristic of good, ranging unity as one of a number (or roll') of things perfect; according to which view 'unity' is immanent in things and not (like the Platonic idéa) separable from things and independent of them). II. Perhaps, however, the theory of the Platonists may be stated differently. It is possible that the theory does not mean that every aspect or form of good may be brought under a single idéa, but rather that only absolute goods' can be reduced to a single notion as coming under a single law,' and as having the unity of a single idéa. Let us then put out of the consideration such 'goods' as are merely relative or instrumental, and consider the case of absolute goods.' Now if there be any absolute goods,' they will be pre-eminently such things as sight and thought; and we may regard them under two alternatives: (a.) If thought and sight are not absolute goods,' there will be no members to form the class which the idéa roù ayaboù assumes; whereas if they are absolute goods' there can be nothing more absolute;' and, therefore, the idéa (as implying nothing beyond the members which come under it) will be superfluous. (8.) If thought and sight are absolute goods' and come under a common idea, the definition of each would be identical. But their definitions are quite distinct. Therefore absolute goods do not form a common ιδέα. III. Some possible solutions may be attempted of the problem which underlies the Platonic theory. There are three ways in which 'good things' may come to have a common name :— (1.) As depending upon a single cause. (3.) As having an analogy to one another. May not the latter be the true explanation? IV. But a thorough discussion of these subjects belongs rather to a Treatise of Metaphysics. Our present concern is with the practical side of Ethics. That perfection which we are discussing in the present Book, is a human perfection, one which can be realized in life and carried out in action. The transcendental character of Plato's conception of the good removes it from the sphere of practical Ethics. It may however be retorted that though itself unattainable, the 'Law of the Perfect' gives us an ideal which may ennoble our work and help us to realize what can be realizable in actual life. But this is not, in fact, the case. The various professions utterly ignore it; nor truly is it easy to see how a man could be a better artist or a better surgeon by having contemplated the Absolute.' In art, and in the business of life, the important point is the specific detail, in which special knowledge rather than transcendental conceptions, is of real avail, |