(c) COMPARISON BETWEEN DELIBERATION AND CHOICE.

Rational volition, therefore, or the exercise of a rational choice, is identical in range with Deliberation.

its

The province within which Deliberation is exercised is thus identical with that of Choice-except that a matter which has been adopted by the Choice is one which is ipso facto defined and settled. A matter which has been selected in preference to anything else, after deliberation, is a matter which is purposed,' or rationally adopted by an act of the Will. Everyone ceases to inquire how he shall act, when he has brought the final decision to himself, that is, to the sovereign power within him, which is the power of willing or purposing.

Picture of the war - councils Homer:

in

An illustration of this power of Will may be drawn from the old polities or constitutions which Homer has described. There we see the Princes in consultation; and after they have formed their purpose, they announce their Will to the crowd. Just so the Reason deliberates and announces its purpose to the crowd of passions, for them to carry out.

6

(1.) Princes deliberating

what measures to take. (2.) Choice of measures and proclamation to the crowd to carry them out.

Since then a thing which has been purposed is a thing which has been deliberated upon, and which is consciously striven after, and a thing which is within our own power, purpose itself will be a striving after things within our own power, which have been deliberately determined upon.' After having deliberated we decide, and then strive after our object in accordance with our choice. Let this, then, suffice for an outlined definition of Choice, and for an account of its objects, and of its special concern with means.

Such then is the province of Deliberation; and a matter of Choice is such part of the province of Deliberation as has been determined upon. A matter is said to be purposed' or 'chosen,' when it has been selected in preference to something else after deliberation. After having decided what we ought to do, we no longer deliberate upon the matter, but know definitely how we ought to act: we bring down the power of originating (apxý) the desired object to our own wish, and we bring down our own decision and wish to our own Will, which is, ipso facto, the spring or cause' of the action.

This view of the Will may be illustrated from the old constitutions which Homer has described in his Ballads. He there introduces the Princes after a Council announcing the course which they have determined upon, to the Demus, just as the Reason or Prerogative Power within us announces its decision to the Will, so that it may be carried into effect.

Since then that which is purposed' is what has been deliberated upon, aiming at objects dependent upon ourselves-a thing in fact for which we strive after deliberating thereon and which we are ourselves able to effect, it is evident that

the Will may be defined as a 'deliberate striving after objects which are within our own power.' After having deliberated, we decide, and then strive after the object chosen in accordance with our wish.

Such is our definition of Will, or Rational Choice,' as far as is possible in a general outline; and in this definition is implied the scope of the Will, which is not the end,' but the means which conduce to the end.

iii. The Will implies a 'Wish for the good.'

It has been

(a) IS THE OBJECT OF WISH THE REAL OR THE APPARENT GOOD? already shown that Wish' has relation to the 'end' of action; but there is a difference of opinion whether this 'end' is identical with the real good, or whether it is identical only with the apparent good.

How far is a man responsible for his moral impressions?

1. If every man had a φαντασία οι the real good, no one would make an evil choice.

1. Now there is this difficulty facing those who say that it is the real good which is the object of wish-when a man adopts a particular course in error, that for which he is wishing is not the true object of his wish. Otherwise, had their theory been true, and that for which a man wished were really desirable, it would be a good; but in the case that I am supposing, it might be actually an evil. 2. On the other hand, those who maintain that it is the apparent good which is the object of wish, are met with this difficulty-that, according to their theory, there would be nothing good per se and in the nature of things, but whatever each man thought to be good, to him that thing would be good. But there are different things thought good by different individuals, and perchance, in possible cases, things which are antagonistic.

2. If our φαντασία be only of the apparent good, there is an end of moral distinctions.

We must now proceed to treat of the subject of Wish.

It was shown in the previous discussion that Wish is concerned with 'the end' of action, but, a controversy has been raised whether the end' which the Wish has before it may be of any nature whatever, anything in fact which a man might desire to gain, or whether it must be the real good only. In fact some thinkers maintain that Wish is concerned simply with the true 'good,' others that it is concerned with what seems to be the good, whether it be so in reality or no.

1. Now there is this difficulty facing those who say that it is the real good alone which is the object of Wish :-they imply that evil is not an object of Wish to the vicious man, though in fact it most assuredly is.

2. On the other hand, those who maintain that it is the apparent good which is the object of Wish, not by reason of any intrinsic quality, but just as each man temporarily thinks it good, are confronted by this difficulty: inasmuch as different things appear good to different individuals, what one man thinks good, appearing evil to another, and the same person ofttimes regarding things antagonistic to each other to be good-according to this view, nothing can be an object of wish in its own nature and for its own sake.

(b) RECONCILEMENT OF THESE TWO THEORIES.

The wish for the real good is universal, but the im

If, therefore, neither of these theories be satisfactory, may we not say that absolutely, and in strict truth, the object of Wish is that which is really good, though relatively to the individual it is the apparent good?' To the good man, the object of pressions wish is that which is conformable to absolute truth; on the other hand, to the bad man the object of wish is anything that may chance.

which men form of it vary with the variations of their own moral temperament.

It is precisely the same in the case of physical tasks: when men are in a healthy state of body, things are wholesome that are really so, whereas if men are themselves diseased, things abnormal are wholesome in their eyes. In such cases, also, the sensations of bitter and sweet, hot and heavy, and so on, are similarly reversed.

It is only in the good man that the

accord with the reality. The moral sense of men generally is dimmed by pleasure that of the good man alone is pure and incorruptible.

The fact is that it is only the good man who judges aright of moral differences; on none but on him are the impressions made in every particular true and just. Corresponding to the varying conditions of impressions of good temperament, there are special impressions of what is noble and of what is agreeable; and herein is the good man pre-eminent above others, that he sees the truth in every instance; being, as it were, himself the standard and measure of truth in all its forms. On the other hand, in the minds of men generally, error seems to grow up naturally, under the influence of pleasure. Though pleasure is not itself a good, it has the appearance of being so in the eyes of the world: hence they make their choice of the pleasurable as of a good, and shun pain as an evil.

But if neither of these views seems probable, we may state a solution of our own-that it is the good which is the object of wish by nature, and in real truth, and in its own right, but that under certain aspects, and according to the standard of particular individuals, it is what seems to be the good that is the object of wish. Though a thing be not a good in real truth, yet in reference to given circumstances it may be good; for instance, to steal clothes is by nature an evil thing, yet from the point of view of the footpad, under certain circumstances it may be a good, and in so far as a thing is a good it is an object of wish. It consequently happens that what seems to be good, is under a particular aspect an object of wish. To the good man, therefore, that which is veritably good is the object of wish, and to the bad man the object of wish is anything that may chance.

Precisely similar is the case of our physical conditions. To those who are in sound health and in a good state of body, things appear to be healthy that are so in truth, but to those who are diseased, the contrary. Similarly in the case of things bitter or sweet: to those who are in sound health, things that are in their

own nature bitter or sweet, appear to be what they are. Such men judge rightly that such and such things are hot, or heavy, and so forth: on the other hand, those who are diseased in their senses, judge that things quite different from these are hot, or heavy, and so forth. The analogy applies exactly to things that are morally good or pleasant or evil. The good man thinks things good when they are so in reality: the bad man often thinks quite the reverse. Corresponding to the various temperaments of men's souls, there are things which are specially good and pleasurable; and herein the good man differs from the bad, in that he discriminates the good from the pleasant, and sees what is really true in every situation, having, as he has, become the standard and measure of truth, But the evil, from being unable to recognize the truth, are led astray by pleasure, fancying that things pleasant are good, though they are not so by nature; and similarly they shrink from things that are painful, though they are not in their own nature either evil or undesirable.

iv.-The Will implies Moral Freedom.

(a) BOTH VIRTUE AND VICE ARE WITHIN OUR OWN POWER. Since, then, the end of action is the object of wish, and the means of realizing the end are matters of deliberation and choice, the actions consequent thereon will be in accordance with our own Will, and voluntary.

The efficient causes of Virtue and Vice being within our own power, Virtue and Vice will both be voluntary.

In this sphere also the various forms of moral excellence will be exhibited. Consequently moral excellence is a state within our own power, as also, for similar reasons, is moral corruption. Where the power of action depends upon our own selves, in such cases there is also the power of forbearing; and where there is a power of forbearing, there is also a power of acting.

Hence, if action, when honourable, is within our power, the refraining from action when such refraining is disgraceful, will also be within our power; and if the power of not acting when such non-action is honourable depend upon ourselves, the power of acting when action is disgraceful will also depend upon ourselves. But if it be within our power to perform actions honourable and dishonourable, and similarly to abstain therefrom (and that is equivalent to being good or bad), it will consequently rest with ourselves whether we be virtuous or vicious.

Since then the ends of action are the objects of wish, and the means which conduce to those ends, objects of deliberation and rational choice, it is evident that the actions which result from these processes of deliberation and of choice will themselves be in accordance with our own Will, and voluntary.

Of such a character are the actions which are conformable to virtue, since they are manifested in the same sphere as deliberation and choice. Virtue and vice are therefore dependent upon ourselves, since the actions by means of which we habituate ourselves to virtue are deliberately adopted or willed,' and are dependent upon ourselves. But if the doing of good be within our own power, the refraining from good will be within our own power, since where there is 'nay' there is also 'yea.'

Hence if action, when honourable, be within our own power, the refraining

from action, where such refraining is disgraceful, will also be within our own power. If, that is, the refraining from evil. when such refraining is right, be within our own power, the performing of evil, when such performance is evil, is also within our own power. But our line of conduct in such circumstances makes us good or evil; and consequently it is within our own power to be virtuous or vicious.

(b) REFUTATION OF THE THEORY THAT VICE IS INVOLUNTARY.

But as for saying that

"None are wicked of their free will, nor 'gainst their will are they happy,"

such a theory is partly true and partly untrue. is happy against his own inclination, wickedness is still a voluntary state to the wicked man.

Though no one

Disproof of the theory of Epicharmus that Vice is involuntary' :

Otherwise we must raise, in opposition to the theory of voluntariness advanced above, a new issue, and argue that man is not the 'primal cause' and father of his own acts, as he is the father of his children.

(1.) By the fact

that the first causes of vice are within our own power.

(2.) By the consideration that all legislation assumes human freedom.

But if our own theory be, as it manifestly is, the true one, and we are not able to refer our actions to any causes beyond those which are within our own power, then, where the causes of actions depend upon ourselves, the effects will likewise depend upon ourselves, and our actions will be voluntary. Evidence of this moral freedom seems to be given not only by the individual consciousness of each, but also by the example of legislators, whose codes inflict punishment and penalty upon evil-doers (except where men act under constraint, and owing to ignorance for which they are not themselves to blame) and, on the other hand, confer honours upon such as perform noble exploits, the design and intention being to encourage the one in their heroism, and to deter the others from their wickedness. Yet of course, no lawgiver would urge men to perform actions which were neither within their own control nor voluntary, knowing that it would be as futile as for a man to have been persuaded not to feel heat or pain or hunger or other similar sensations: none the less for all the persuasion we shall continue liable to feel them.

Furthermore, when a man seems to be himself responsible for his own ignorance, the laws punish him on the simple ground of his being ignorant; for instance, penalties are doubled in the case of drunkards. In such cases, the first step depends

(3.) By the fact that ignorance is sometimes punished doubly as an aggra

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