from virtuous states of which we are ourselves, in a certain sense, joint authors,' by the same reasoning vice will be voluntary also, because our ignorance of the true end is owing to our vicious habits.

(ƒ) RECAPITULATION OF THE THEORY OF VIRTUE.

To sum up then our theory of the virtues: it has been shown. that:

1. Virtues are, in their generic character, 'mean-states' (to use a metaphor) and permanent states of mind."

2. They tend to reproduce the actions from which they were themselves formed, such reproduction being spontaneous and essential.

3. They are within our own power, and voluntary.

4. They conform exactly to the standard which Right Reason lays down.

[Here it must be noticed, that 'habits' are not voluntary in the same sense that actions are. We are responsible for our actions from beginning to end, since we know every condition which surrounds them. But we have control only over the beginnings of our habits, the gradual growth of particular

Note the different degrees of freedom in regard to acts and to habits.

tendencies being imperceptible in the moral, as in the physical organism; yet, inasmuch as we had it in our power at the outset to shape the circumstances of our lives according to one use or another, the habits which result from our conduct therein will consequently be voluntary also.]

Let us now take up again the subject of special virtues, and show what their nature is, what their subject-matter, and what the mode of their action. It will incidentally be shown also what is their number and variety.

What, then, is virtue? Generally, and in brief, it has been described, (1) as a ' mean state.' lying midway, that is between two faulty states, and (2) as a formed or permanent attitude of mind. It has been further shown (3) under what influences it is produced, and that, after having acquired a virtue we continue to perform the same acts and to manifest the same activities as those were by which the virtue was first made habitual to us. It has been shown, lastly, that virtue is dependent upon ourselves and voluntary.

[But it must be noticed that the action and the habit are not voluntary in the same sense nor in the same degree, though both are, as has been proved, voluntary. When we perform our actions we know their bearings in every particular, and consequently we have control over them in the purest sense of the term-to do them or not, as we will, from beginning to end. Actions are therefore voluntary in an absolute sense. On the other hand, the habit is not known to the full extent it is known not through itself, but through the

actions by which it is formed. We thoroughly understand the actions by which the habit is formed, but we cease to understand our actions when consolidated into habit. A precisely similar case occurs with physical debilities. Knowing the character of a particular diet, we consciously adopt it; and weak health imperceptibly follows in its train. A habit, therefore, is called voluntary on account of the activities by which it is formed being voluntary-since, that is, it was possible for us not to have caused those activities.]

We must now proceed at once to enumerate our mental states in specific detail, and show the character of each one, with what emotions of the soul it is concerned, and in what way it is formed. It will be further evident in the course of the discussion what is the number and variety of these moral states.

PART II-EXAMINATION OF THE VIRTUES.

A.-COURAGE.

i. The subject-matter of Courage defined.

(a) COURAGE IMPLIES FEAR, AND THINGS FEARFUL ARE SYNONY

Courage is concerned with things fearful which are synonymous with evils.

MOUS WITH EVILS.

Now it has been already explained that Courage' is a mean state in regard to subjects of confidence or fear. What we fear are of course the things which are fearful, and things fearful are, to speak in general terms, evils. Hence philosophers define fear as 'an anticipation of evil.' We fear, in fact, all things that are evils, such as infamy, poverty, disease, loss of friends, and death.

Yet the brave man does not seem to be one who is courageous in face of every object of fear. There are certain evils which a man is positively bound to fear, and where fearfulness is honourable and bravery would be unseemly bravado, as in the case of infamy. The man who fears infamy is a man of honour and of self-respect: the man who does not shrink from infamy is destitute of all sense of shame; though, by a rhetorical figure, the shameless man is regarded by some people as a daring man, from the correspondence there is between them in that the brave man is, like him, in a sense, devoid of fear.

Poverty, on the other hand, is surely not a thing which a man ought to fear; nor yet illness, nor in fact any of those evils which fall upon a man through no fault of his own nor through his own agency. Nevertheless, the man who is fearless of such evils as these, is not on that account brave; and if we so describe him, it is by a rhetorical figure. There are cases where men are cowards in the crisis of battle, though liberal minded in money matters, and of cheerful countenance in view of financial ruin.

Again, if a man is fearful of outrage upon his wife or children, or of the power of envy, or of other sinister influences, he is not assuredly a coward; nor, on the other hand, is he brave, if he is cheerful when on the point of being flogged.

It was made evident in the course of our previous enumeration of the virtues that the subject-matter of Courage is fear and confidence, and that it is a mean state in reference thereto, going beyond timidity and falling short of rashness. We will now show with what states it stands in contrast.

Now fear is spoken of in relation to things which are fearful; and, in a general sense, all things are fearful that are thought to be evils. Hence, in defining fear, men say that it is an expectation of evil.' We fear, in fact, whatever things are evil-disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death.

But courage does not stand in opposition to every object of fear, the brave man not being concerned with every thing that is fearful. The brave man fears only what is it right for him to fear, and it is not right for him to fear all these things, but only some of them. To fear disgrace is honourable, not to fear it disgraceful the one attitude is that of a man of self-respect, the other that of a shameless man. Still, even the shameless man is called brave by a metaphor, in that he has some of the features of a brave man in not fearing everything, the brave man being one who, in a certain sense, is devoid of fear.

Poverty, on the contrary, it is not right to fear, nor in fact any of those evils which do not befall us through our own fault nor through our own agency. But just as the man who does not fear what he ought to fear is not therefore brave (except by a rhetorical figure), so neither is the man who does not fear what he ought not to fear, on that account a brave man, and is only so styled in virtue of a kind of resemblance between the two characters. Many there are who though fearless of such evils as poverty, and of stout hearts in view of the loss of their possessions, are cowards amid the dangers of war.

But just as the man who fears what he ought not to fear is not brave, so neither is the man who does not fear what he ought to fear brave. For instance, the man who does fear outrage upon his wife or children is not a coward, and the man who does not fear such a thing is not brave. Nor again is a man brave if he does not fear but rather is cheerful when upon the point of being flogged. Men are not brave for not fearing what they ought to fear.

(6) DESCRIPTION OF THE EVILS WHICH CONCERN THE BRAVE MAN.

Courage is most perfectly mani. fested in presence

What kinds of evils, then, are they, in which a brave man shows his courage? Are they not the evils that are direst and worst? No one is there so capable of sustaining things which are terrible as is the brave man. But of all things terrible death is the worst it is indeed, the extreme of evils, since to the dead man, as it seems, nothing further can good or evil.

of death when death is glorious.

befall, whether

Yet it is not death in any and every form in face of which the brave man would seem to show his courage; not, for example, in face of death at sea, or in sickness. In what kinds of death, then, will his bravery be shown? Must it not be in such as are most glorious? and the most glorious are those which befall men in war, since war involves the greatest and most glorious hazards.

Corresponding with this idea of perfect bravery are the honours paid to warriors both in free cities and in the Courts of Princes.

A man will be called brave,' therefore, in the true and proper sense of the term, when he is fearless in regard to a noble death, or under instant pressure of evils which have death in their train; and such are emphatically the accidents and terrors of war.

Still, even in a storm at sea or in sickness, the brave man is void of fear; yet his courage in a storm is not like that of sailors. The brave man at such times has despaired of safety and is troubled at such a mode of death. Sailors, on the other hand, are confident from the experience which they have had of previous storms. Moreover, the circumstances in which brave men exhibit their courage, are such as give room for prowess and make it glorious to die; but in such disasters as shipwreck or pestilence neither of these conditions is found.

The brave man, therefore, is one who does not fear the worst of evils: no one has such powers of endurance as he. Yet he is not on every occasion courageous to the same degree. There are certain terrors which make even the brave man quail through the mode in which they are brought upon him.

For instance, death is thought to be the last extremity of evil, because it is an end of life, and it is impossible for anything further to betide a man when he is dead, whether good or evil, and therefore it is thought to be the worst and most terrible evil both to the good and also to the evil. But though the death which ensues from disgraceful causes is a thing which the brave man would fear, on the other hand, the death which is brought on by the highest causes, such as that which befalls a man in war, is no longer terrible, but a thing very greatly to be coveted. The death again, which befalls a man in sickness or at sea will be terrible to the brave man, in so far as it has not come upon him on account of some grand cause, but on no account fearful in the proportion in which it is painful.

A man may be called brave,' therefore, when he is fearless in regard to a noble death, (or at any rate a death that is not ignoble.) and in regard to the terrors which bring death in their train, coming with sudden visitation upon him, such as are the circumstances of war. The man who is resolute under perils which unexpectedly encompass him, affords manifest proof that he has advanced to a point where courage is habitual and natural to him. When a man endures a death that is noblest for man, then he is brave in the fullest sense of the term. This principle applies also to the case of honours. When honours involve nothing sacred nor permanent, as in the case of honours conferred at the Courts of Tyrants, the brave man will despise them; but when honours are constitutional and just, as they are in well-ordered States, the brave man will covet them.

Sailors are also fearless in regard to death, but not in the same manner as the brave are. Brave men seem to be resolute under such circumstances because they have absolutely despaired of safety; whereas sailors are so because they expect, on the ground of past experience, that they will survive the dangers of the sea. In fact, however, it is impossible to show bravery in the perfect sense of the term under such circumstances as a storm at sea. A man shows true bravery where there is need of vigour or of spirit, and where death is grand and ennobling. But in a storm or in a plague such considerations have no place : death is not then the occasion of any advantage to others, nor can we display any spirit or vigour in face of it.

ii. Various manifestations of Courage.

(a) THE TRUE MEAN' OF COURAGE DEFINED.

The standard of what is fearful is not an absolute but a relative one, and is determined by Reason.

But what is fearful is not the same under all circumstances, nor to all persons, though of course there is a form of fear which we speak of as 'past human endurance,' and such as would be terrible to any one who was in his right senses. Still, looking to things which are fearful and yet within the limits of endurance, these differ in magnitude and in their relative degrees of intensity, as also do things which inspire confidence. In face even of these the brave man, though dauntless and undaunted, has still the feelings of a man: he will not be unmoved at the sight of things terrible, though his fear will be tempered by regard for the fitness of things and kept within the limits which Reason will allow, his aim being the attainment of honour as the ideal of virtue.

Causes of moral failure.

Yet it is possible to entertain fears of this kind excessively or insufficiently, and again to regard things which are not fearful as though they were. Of the errors committed in these respects, one form arises from the fear being an unworthy one, another from the fear being immoderate, another from its being inopportune, and so on through manifold conditions. The same principle applies to the circumstances upon which we ground confidence.

The conduct of the brave man is always conformed to the ideal of Reason.

That man therefore is a brave man who endures hardship or yields to fear when it is right to do so, though always with a noble motive and to a proper degree and on fitting occasions. Under opposite conditions again he is equally confident. In a word, the brave man is one whose inward feelings and outward actions are in harmony with a true dignity, and with the standard which Right Reason prescribes.

Now the end of every activity, (in order to be either virtuous or vicious,) must be one which corresponds with the fixed attitude of mind in the agent. To the mind of the brave man the display of his bravery is a source of pride and honour. The end' of his every activity, therefore, is a feeling of honour, since the character of every action is determined by its end.' It follows that the motive for which the brave man incurs perils, and performs the acts of bravery, is a sense of honour or a feeling of noble pride.

The brave man, therefore, does not always hold the same attitude in regard to things which are fearful. Some things are more terrible to some men than to