Yet he is none the less a brave man for this inward pang; nay, he is even more so, since he voluntarily chooses the glory that is purchased in war in preference to all other advantages. Courage, therefore, is one of those virtues which it is not possible to practise with a sense of pleasure except in so far as the brave man realizes his end,' and finds his satisfaction therein. 6 [But as for mere fighting, there is no reason why the best soldiers should not be men who are not brave with this ideal bravery, but are less nobly brave in heart and have besides no good things to lose; common soldiers being willing to barter away their lives for very scant rewards.] Here we must end our examination of Courage. After the explanations above given it will not be difficult to comprehend, at least in outline, what its real nature is. Now although the brave man has a kind of pleasure in his bravery in consequence of the end' which he attains thereby being a pleasant end; yet still it so happens that this pleasure is overclouded and obscured by the painful accessories by which it is environed. A similar case is found in gymnastic conflicts. The 'end' which is set before the wrestlers-the crown and the honours, is a pleasant one; but as wrestlers are only flesh and blood, it is painful for them to be buffeted: indeed to men of that class the whole struggle is a painful one. Since then the incidents of pain are grievous, and the element of pleasure only slight, they seem to have nothing that is pleasurable from the contest. Precisely the same is the fate which befalls brave men. Death and wounds are painful to them, and consequently also in despite of their own wills; still they submit to their fate because endurance is glorious, and a shrinking from hardship ignoble. Even more grievous do such things appear in proportion as those who incur them are good and brave and happy and have pursued every form of virtue. To men of that stamp death is peculiarly painful because life is to them of an exceeding worth, from the fact of their own life being most excellent and attaining to the true fitness of their manhood, and because these are manifold blessings of which death will deprive them. In consequence, therefore, of the vastness of these painful surroundings, it seems as though the brave man had no kind of pleasure; and though a man grieve and be distressed at these circumstances, there is nothing in that incon. sistent with his being still a brave man. To be overpowered by such influences and to yield to the pressure of pain-that is conduct of which the brave man is incapable; whereas to be grieved and feel inward pain, that is but natural for him. The more grief he feels while still steadfastly, for all his grief, bearing up his courage for the sake of a noble end, the more perfectly is he a man brave in the true sense of the term, In fact, in all the other virtues, there is no single form in which they can be exercised that is pleasurable in its own right: it only seems to be pleasurable to the imagination of the man who is actuated by such a motive because it tends to an end which is a noble one. But as for simple fighting, there is surely no extreme necessity why we should seek for an exact definition of courage to be realized in common soldiers. More serviceable than the genuinely brave, for purposes of war, are men who do not possess any strong element of courage, and who are entirely destitute of worldly advantages: such men are more ready to face dangers, and freely sacrifice their lives in return for trifling gains. Men on the other hand who are brave in the perfect sense of the term, being as they must be, of sound sense and of a general excellence and worth, take delight in their own existence as being a noble one, and are extremely reluctant to cast it away. Here we may conclude our examination of Courage. From the description which we have given it will be easy to construct a formal definition of it, at any rate in outline. B.-TEMPERANCE. i. The subject-matter of Temperance defined. (a) THE SPHERE OF TEMPERANCE THAT OF PLEASURE OF BODY. The subject of which we must treat next to Courage is Temperance, these two being, as it would seem, the virtues of those parts of our nature which are devoid of Reason. Temperance, like Courage, is a control of the feelings, but is more concerned with pleasures than with pains, As has been already shown, Temperance is a middle state of mind in regard to pleasures, though to a less degree and in a different sense it is also concerned with pains. Obviously also, its opposite, intemperance, is displayed in the same sphere. But what precisely those pleasures are with which Temperance is concerned, we have now to discriminate. and with pleasures of the body rather than with pleasures of the mind. A distinction must be at once drawn between pleasures of the body and pleasures of the mind. Among pleasures of the mind there are, for example, love of honour and love of knowledge, whose votaries delight in the pursuits of which they are enamoured, but their delight is not at all a bodily sensation, but on the contrary a purely mental one. Now those who are devoted to purely rational pleasures of this kind are not called either temperate' or 'intemperate;' nor, for similar reasons, are they who follow other pleasures which are not sensual. When, for example, men are fond of romances or of history, or spend their time upon the passing incidents of the hour, we call them triflers and idlers, but not intemperate; nor, again, do we call men intemperate when they are whelmed in grief for the loss of money or of friends. The subject of which we must now treat is that of Temperance. In a kind of way this is coordinate with that of Courage, inasmuch as they are both concerned with the irrational part of our nature. As has been already shown, Temperance is a virtuous attitude of mind in regard to pleasures. (I say in regard to pleasures' because, though it is also concerned with pains, yet it is so to a less extent and not in the same sense as it is with pleasures.) Obviously intemperance is also manifested in the same sphere. It may then be assumed that the province in which Temperance is displayed is that of the pleasures. We must now determine what precisely those pleasures are, some pleasures being bodily, others spiritual. Spiritual pleasures are found in love of honour or love of knowledge: the ambitious man and the student both feel pleasure in the objects which they love, though the body does not experience any sensation therein, but simply the mind. Men who find pleasure in such pursuits are not called either temperate or dissolute; and for similar reasons neither are those who find their pleasure in other interests which are not sensual. We call those who are fond of romance and of stories, and who spend their days upon the topics of the hour, loiterers and idlers, but by no means dissolute; nor again, do we call men dissolute when whelmed in grief for the loss of their property or of their friends when they are deprived of the one, or bereaved of the other. (b) BUT THERE ARE CERTAIN BODILY PLEASURES EXCLUDED FROM THE SPHERE OF TEMPERANCE. It is then the pleasures of the body which form the sphere within which Temperance is displayed; but this province must be further narrowed by the exclusion of certain bodily sensations. Yet even bodily 1. When men feel pleasure in the impressions which come through the sight, beautiful colours and forms and paintings, they are not called either temperate or intemperate for so doing; although it would seem possible even in these pleasures to maintain a proper moderation, or to give them an insufficient or else an undue prominence. 2. The pleasures of sound. 3. The pleasures of 2. Again, in pleasures which come through hearing the same truth holds good. We do not call men intemperate' who take extravagant delight in music or in acting, nor yet 'temperate' though their pleasure therein be moderate and right. 3. Nor, again, do we call those who take pleasure in indulging the sense of smell, either temperate or intemperate-except through its accidental associations; for example, we do not call men intemperate for delighting in the sweet fragrance of fruit or of roses or of incense, but rather those whose delight is in unguents and condiments, these latter being the things in which intemperate men delight, since by such means a recollection is aroused within them of the things for which their passions crave. scent (except where associated with other pleasures which need trol). con In support of this view of smelling, one may see men of different temperaments all delighting in the odour of food when they are hungry; yet to delight in such odours is, pro tanto, a sign of a sensuous nature, savoury smells being desired by the sensual man for their own sake. But among animals generally there is no pleasure arising from these sensations, except through accidental associations. Dogs do not delight in the scent of hares but in the eating of them, though the scent has created an appetite. Nor does the lion rejoice at the lowing of the ox, but at the banquet of his flesh: by its lowing he has become aware that the ox is near, and hence seems to rejoice at the mere sound. Similarly the lion does not rejoice at having seen or found stag or wild goat, except in the belief that he will gain a feast thereby. Temperance, therefore, is not concerned with pleasures of the mind, but with the pleasures of the body. But even certain bodily pleasures are excluded from its range. Those, for instance, who delight in things which are pleasant to behold, beautiful colours or drawings or paintings, are not called either temperate or intemperate; nor are they who are enamoured of certain sounds or musical airs, nor are they who love sweet smells. Yet in regard to all these matters there are states of mind which are ideally best and fitting, and there are states which go beyond or fall short of a perfect standard; but, notwithstanding, we do not call those who preserve the ideal mean temperate,' nor those who violate that mean intemperate.' In regard, however, to the pleasures connected with smelling, if we delight in the fragrance of apples or of roses or of incense, we are not called intemperate. If on the other hand we delight in the odours of ointments and condiments, we are called intemperate; but even then only from accidental associationssince, that is, these are things in which intemperate men delight because, by means thereof, a recollection is aroused within them of things for which their passions crave. One may see, indeed, that all men, not only the intemperate, delight in the smell of food when they are hungry. Hence it is clear that those who take pleasure in smells of that kind, only find their pleasure therein from accidental associations-because, that is, a recollection is awakened within them of the food and trifles generally in which sensual men delight. Neither in man, therefore, nor in any living creature is there any pleasure consequent upon the exercise of the senses enumerated above, except from casual associations. (I am now referring to pleasures in which the temperate and the dissolute man display themselves.) Dogs, for example, though they delight in the smell of hares, yet that is not for the sake of the scent simply, but in view of food foreseen: they pursue because they have gained from the scent an instinct of preying. Similarly the lion does not delight in the scent or the lowing of the ox, but in the eating of his flesh only he perceives from the lowing, that his prey is near. He does not delight simply that he has seen or found a stag or wild goat, but because he will gain food thereby. (c) TEMPERANCE IS SPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH THE PLEASURES OF TOUCH AND TASTE. The conclusion is that the pleasures with which temperance and intemperance are specially concerned, are those bodily pleasures which all living creatures share with men, and which are consequently admitted to be slavish and bestial-the pleasures, that is, of touch and of taste. Practically, however, men are found to indulge The sensations in regard to which temperance is specially necessary, are those of touch and taste; though taste is far less the occasion of temptation than touch. the sense of taste only to a slight extent or not at all. Taste is the determination of questions of flavour, and is used chiefly by those who have to taste wines or season dishes. But men do not generally take delight in mere tasting, certainly not those who are sensual, but rather in that full enjoyment which comes entirely through touch, and is experienced in eating and drinking, and in the so-called 'pleasures of love.' Hence the wish which the noted epicure Philoxenus the son of Eryxis uttered, that 'his throat might become longer than that of a crane '-such was the delight he took in the pleasures of touch. Touch is the most widely diffused of all the senses; but the pleasure it gives is of all pleasures least worthy of Now this sense of touch, from the indulgence of which intemperance arises, is the most widely diffused of all the senses; and rightly does it seem to be stigmatised, because it does not belong to us so far as we are men, but so far as we are animals. To take delight in pleasures of this kind and to cherish them exceedingly, is simply the sign of a brutal nature. [But of course such of the pleasures of touch as are really liberal, are exempted from this condemnation; as, for instance, the pleasure felt in the gymnasia from rubbing and heating. The touch from which the intemperate man derives pleasure does not extend to the whole body, but only to certain parts of it.] man. The pleasures, therefore, with which temperance and intemperance are concerned are the pleasures which we share with all living creatures-the pleasures, that is, of touch and taste. Intemperate men are, therefore, seen to be of a bestial and slavish nature-in that they weakly yield to allurements in which wild beasts find their pleasure. Generally, however, they find their pleasure in touch rather than in taste: perhaps, indeed, it were more correct to say that they do not delight in taste at all, but simply in touch. Men are not intemperate simply for taking delight in pleasures generally, but for their delight in eating and drinking. They do not delight in such things as things to be tasted (the proper business of tasting being to discriminate flavours, a thing chiefly done by those who test the quality of wines and prepare seasoned dishes), but rather as things to be touched. Hence, the wish which that noted epicure Philoxenus, the son of Eryxis, uttered, that his throat might become longer than a crane's,'-such was the pleasure he experienced in the touch of his favourite relishes. Among all the senses, that of touch is the one most widely diffused: it is, in fact, by a kind of touch that all the senses arouse our consciousness. It is therefore this sense of touch that forms the special province wherein sensuality is displayed and rightly does it seem to be stigmatised because it belongs to us, not in so far as we are men, but in so far as we are brutes. To delight in pleasures of such a type, and to covet them above all things, is the sign of a bestial nature. [Still, there are certain liberal pleasures, even in respect of touch, of which the sensual man deprives himself: such are the pleasures which are experienced in the gymnasia through rubbing and heating. The pleasure of the dissolute man is not diffused throughout his body, but is confined to certain parts.] |