excess and defect, are evils. What that 'middle state' is, has been describedthe curbing of anger except where it may be shown against persons who deserve it, and then shown only in a proper manner and on proper occasions. But what the proper point is at which to curb our anger; what the occasions are when we shall be only doing what is right to be angry; what is the fitting time of anger, what the place, who the fitting person to show it- these and such like points it is impossible to define exactly. Considerations of special application and particular circumstances are indefinite and indefinable, as was shown at the outset of this Treatise. What is fitting at one time, is not what is fitting at another : the conditions of special circumstances never remain fixed at one and the same point. The general principle is all that we can lay down, that, in regard to every emotion, the attitude of virtuous moderation is praiseworthy, while states of excess and of defect are blameworthy; and those states of mind which deviate only slightly from the mean, not growing to be very conspicuous, are therefore not very much blamed, whereas those states which are very much removed from the virtuous ideal, are very much noticed and strongly censured. Hence it is plain that the attitude of mind which we ought to hold, is the attitude of a virtuous moderation.

This must satisfy as a description of the moral states concerned with the temper.

H.-COURTESY.

(a) COURTESY THE IDEAL OF SOCIAL INTERCOURSE.

Courtesy the mean state between servility and offensiveness.

Now in the intercourse of society-in the common life we have to live, in the mutual offices of word and deed which we have to render, there are some men who appear obsequious in their courtesies, praising everything where praise may conduce to pleasure, and placing themselves in antagonism to nothing, but fancying it their duty to avoid all possible offence to those whom they meet. Others, again, from a standpoint the very opposite of this, are in constant antagonism to everything, and reck not one whit that they are causing pain;-and who are properly called 'crossgrained' and 'quarrelsome.'

There can be no question but that both the habits of mind

Courtesy is a kind of friendliness, but is devoid of all emotion; and is strictly defined by the law of honour.'

above described are reprehensible, and that the only attitude which is laudable is one which steers a mid course between these extremes-an attitude which will lead a man to approve only of what is morally right, and to show his approval in a proper way, or, if it be necessary, to show his annoyance in the same spirit. No distinctive name has been assigned in Greek to this mean state,' but it has a very close resemblance to friendliness: the man who keeps the mid course of virtue herein has precisely that type of character which we mean to describe as the considerate friend' (though the friend combines also an element of affection). There is this

difference, then, between courtesy and friendliness: courtesy is devoid of an emotional element and of the feeling of affection towards those in whose society it is displayed. It is not owing to any affection or aversion that a man has, that he regards the conduct of others in a proper light, but simply because he has a certain moral nature. He will take the same line of conduct in dealing with those who are unknown as with those who are known, with those who are familiar as with those who are strangers to him-only in every relation he will act in a manner that harmonizes with the circumstances: it is not fitting that he should interest himself to the same extent in regard to his own relations as in regard to foreigners; nor, again, has he the same right to cause them pain.

But there are other states of mind manifested in the associations which men form one with another, and which depend upon what they say and do therein. In regard, then, to these associations a man may be praised or blamed, as he comports himself therein.

The mean state is, of course, commendable, and states of excess or defect reprehensible; and so, in the associations referred to, there is evidently a state of excess and of defect, and a mean.' (1) Some men desire never, under any condition, to give pain to those whom they meet, and so have a word of praise for everything, and are anxious to seem to give pleasure to everyone, and never to be in opposition to anyone upon any point. (2) Others are diametrically opposed to these and are offensive to everyone and find fault with everything, and nothing that is ever done is satisfactory to them, and they are in antagonism to everyone upon every point.

Both these extremes are blamed. The man who is praised is one whose demeanour therein is consistent with right-who blames what he ought to blame, praises what he ought to praise, and finds satisfaction where it is right for him to be pleased.

Now the man who showers his praise upon everything is called an obsequious person or a flatterer; and the man who finds fault with everything, 'cross-grained.' The man who, on the contrary, keeps inviolate the truth of fact in dealing out praise or blame, may be called a candid friend: so far as depends upon himself, his attitude resembles that of friendship. There is, however, no special name for the ideal state in social intercourse: a term must be borrowed from analogous associations. The virtuous attitude towards society would be friendship, if it included the idea of affection: it differs from friendship in that it is found apart from personal affection-i.e., it is not owing to the affection or to the hatred which he has that such a man approves or blames what is said or done, but simply from the motive of realizing his ideal, and because he has acquired a state of mind to love that ideal. In virtue of this moral state of his he holds an attitude of equal impartiality to those who are known, as to those who are unknown to him, towards those who are familiar, as to those who are not. The objects which he praises or which he blames, are invariably what such as he ought to praise or blame; and his feeling thereto is never greater or less than is right-except that his impartiality is not quite absolute: i... where it is his duty to cause pain, he will not be so free in his strictures towards those whom he does not know as towards those whom he does, nor towards those who are strange to him as to those with whom he is familiar; and similarly in regard to the pleasure he causes. The same freedom is not fitting toward strangers as towards friends.

(6) CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF COURTESY.

The courteous man will promote the

whom he associ

ates, so far as he consistently

can

with his allegiance to the higher laws of truth, and justice, and honour.

The general principle may therefore be assumed that in all his intercourse the courteous man will show a becoming attitude towards all those with whom he pleasure of all with mingles. Having the noble' and 'the expedient' before him as his standard of reference, he will make it his aim to avoid offence, or to contribute to pleasure, as may best accord therewith. The sphere with which he seems to be concerned being that of pleasure and pain attendant on social intercourse, wherever it is ignoble or injurious to join in such pleasures, he will show his disapprobation thereof and deliberately prefer to cause pain. Again, if any matter entail disgrace or shame, and that in no slight degree, or even injury upon the author of it, whereas opposition on his part to such a course will cause only trifling pain, he will not acquiesce in its adoption, but will show his disapproval of it. Again, he will make his intercourse with men of high position vary from that with ordinary men; he will mingle on very different terms with men who are known and with those who are unknown, and so on through all the shades of social gradation, he will pay to each what is due to his rank. Though preferring as a matter of principle to contribute to the pleasure of others, and scrupulously careful not to cause them pain, yet he will guide his conduct by the consequences which are involved therein (I mean by considerations of what is noble and expedient), if those consequences in the future outweigh the pleasure or pain of the present. In view of a grand pleasure in the future, he will inflict a slight pain in the present as the price of it.

Hence it is that, with his eye fixed always upon what is noble or what is expedient, the good man will cause either pleasure or pain to those with whom he comes into contact, as may accord with his own ideal.

Now the habit of courtesy is manifested in regard to the pleasures and pains which are found in social intercourse; and wherever pleasures have no reference to what is morally good, he will not share them with those whom he meets, but will rather show his disgust when he finds others taking delight therein. With this moral ideal before him, he will prefer to have the appearance, to such people, of being disagreeable rather than pleasant especially if such a pleasure entail serious disgrace or harm upon the man who indulges in it. He will, under those circumstances, prefer to give pain and cause some slight disgrace, and to relieve a man of a greater pain and of a more serious disgrace, rather than to give him a slight solace by sharing with him his present joy, and afterwards to involve him in overwhelming grief.

Again, he will not mingle on the same footing with ordinary men as with those in high position, but will show to everyone the deference that befits his rank, and throughout the various shades of rank among those whom he meets,

he will, for his own part, adapt the method and amount of his intercourse thereto: he will bestow praise upon everything according as may be right, and censure everything upon grounds that may be right, and on occasions that may be right. He will seek above all things to contribute to the joy of others, and will prefer that for its own sake as a matter of principle, and to cause the very least possible pain, or only moderate pain, and that not for its own sake, but in view of the benefits to be derived therefrom. When, for instance, he causes pain in view of a great pleasure to follow, he does but pain gently, taking scrupulous care always to avoid vulgar irritation.

(c) CONTRAST BETWEEN COURTESY AND ITS EXTREMES.

Such are the main features in the life of the courteous man, though in Greek there is no one term in which they are all summed up.

into

Excess of courtesy degenerates servility and flattery.

But in regard to the case of a man who contributes to pleasure, there are two other phases. If a man make it his aim to be agreeable and has no consideration for aught else, he is obsequious; but if his courtesy is shown in the hope that some advantage may accrue to himself thereby, in the shape of money or of such things as money will buy, then he is a flatterer.

On the other hand, the man who is disagreeable to all men is, as has been shown, 'cross-grained' and quarrelsome.

These extremes appear to be opposed one to the other (rather than to the mean), inasmuch as the ideal has no distinctive name of its own.

Defect of courtesy is peevishness and irritability.

Such then is the character of the man who holds a mid-course of a virtuous moderation in regard to the pleasures and pains which attend social intercourse. But he has not been characterised by any special name of his own, though he might be called, in one sense, a friend, on account of the similarity of his attitude to friendship, as has been explained.

Looking to the states on either side of this mean,' the man who goes into excess of courtesy-if he praises everything and expresses satisfaction at everything, without an ulterior motive, seeking simply to be agreeable, he is called obsequious; but if his courtesy is shown in the hope of some advantage accruing to him in the shape of money or of what money can buy, he is a flatterer.

On the other hand, the man who falls short of courtesy, is called 'cross-grained' and quarrelsome '—a man, that is, who is disagreeable to everyone and finds fault with everything.

But inasmuch as in the case of courtesy as elsewhere, the ideal state has no distinctive name, the extremes do not seem to be opposed to any kind of mean,' but simply to one another.

I. SINCERITY.

(a) SUBJECT-MATTER OF SINCERITY AND OF ITS EXTREMES Defined.

There is a mean state in regard to exaggeration which has almost the same sphere of action as courtesy; and, like courtesy,

Sincerity the virtue of human converse.

it has in Greek no distinctive name. But it is not on that account less important to describe the virtues of this class by detailing the conditions which attach to each phase of character we shall the better understand the nature of morality, and be the more convinced that the virtues are mean states' by seeing how, under all connections, the law of the mean' applies to all the virtues alike.

6

Now, in dealing with the life which men pass in common, the description which has been already given of courtesy, describes social intercourse as it tends to pleasure or pain: we have now to treat of the sincerity or insincerity, the straightforwardness or the want of it, which men show in the words they use, the demeanour they adopt, the professions they make one towards another. It is thought, then, that the boastful man' is one who lays claim to distinctions which do not belong to him, or one who claims distinctions in excess of what belongs to him. On the other hand,' the diffident man seems to repudiate the good qualities he really has, or to depreciate them. Midway between these two extremes is the ideal character-that of the man who is straightforward and sincere, honest in life and truthful of speech, one who simply acknowledges the facts as they are about himself without either exaggerating or underrating them.

Sincerity the mean between boastfulness and diffidence.

But it is possible to act in each of these several ways either with an ulterior motive or not. Unless there be some special motive to influence a man's conduct on a particular occasion, the words he uses, the things he does, and the way of life he adopts will follow the general bent of his character. Viewed in itself, and apart from such a special motive, falsehood is evil and reprehensible, truth noble and commendable; and so the man whose character it is to speak the truth (avoiding unswervingly all extremes) is worthy of esteem; while those who deviate from truth in either direction, and particularly those who are boastful and exaggerate, are deserving of censure.

In the sphere of those associations which men form, and the intercourse they have one with another, there are still other habits of mind displayed. The social relations into which men are thrown with one another are twofold: such relations arise either in reference to the words and actions of those whom they meet, or in reference to their own individual dealings with others. In regard to the first of these relations the moral dispositions which arise have been already detailed in regard to the latter class of relations there are other dispositions which we will now discuss.

Now when a man speaks of himself and of his own actions, he states what is either true or untrue. If he says what is untrue, he either says what is in excess of the truth, or what is below the truth. If, however, he speaks truly, and says