what is neither an exaggeration nor an understatement of the facts, the habit of mind corresponding thereto is called truthfulness, and the man who possesses it is called truthful.

Understatement and exaggeration are practised, like all other habits of the same type, in certain cases for a special purpose, e.g. to gain glory or wealth, or some other advantage. They are also found in other cases where no such motive exists. Some men say of themselves less than their merits entitle them to say, and others again say more, not because they are wishful to have a certain reputation, but because they are ignorant of their own selves; this, however, is a phase of character which very seldom occurs. For the most part, where a man has no special motive for doing or saying what he does, then it is the general bent of his character which determines the colour of his words and actions, and indeed of the whole direction of his life. Since then falsehood is in itself reprehensible, while truth is commendable, the state of mind which keeps inviolate the ideal in this case also, is that which is worthy of esteem, and that is truthfulness, while the states of mind which exaggerate or fall short of that ideal are reprehensible, and they are forms of falsehood; exaggeration being in excess of the truth, 'reserve' being an understatement or defect of the truth.

(b) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SINCERE MAN.

We will now proceed to speak of each of these characters. separately; and first, of the sincere or truthful

man.

Sincerity the expression in life of an upright and truthful character.

Now in speaking of the sincere man' I am not referring to one who speaks truthfully in regard to matters of compact, nor in regard to matters which fall within the sphere of Injustice or Justice (such questions belonging to a different form of moral excellence), but rather of the man who is truthful both in word and deed where no material interest is involved, and is truthful simply from having a moral nature which impels him to the true; and such an one would seem to be an honest man. One who loves the truth, and speaks the truth even on points of immaterial importance, will even more surely speak the truth in questions which are material; since he has grown to have a horror of falsehood per se, he will have the same horror of it as a thing practically disgraceful. Such a character is worthy of all esteem.

In relation to the extremes, the sincere man inclines rather to say what is below than what is beyond the truth, because such a reticence is more in harmony with his character, as is obvious, exaggerations being specially repulsive to him.

We will now treat of each of these characters separately, and first of the ideal or standard by which the extremes must be regarded :-i.e. of the sincere man. Now the sincere man is not identical with the man who speaks the truth in matters relating to agreements and similar questions which come under the sphere of Justice or of Injustice (such points forming the province of another and separate virtue), but he is a man who, apart from any sanction of law or of justice, and apart from any urgency of social good, is truthful of speech and consistent in life, simply because he has a moral nature disposing him to

man.

sincerity, and is actuated by the very noblest of motives. He is a man who in all that he says about himself wishes to appear in the eyes of others precisely in the character that in reality he bears. Such an one will of course be an honest When men are truthful even in matters where there is no compulsion to be so, much more will they be true where they are bound to speak the truth in view of the good of society. If a man has a religious horror of falsehood per se, because it is an evil, surely he will avoid it by all means in his power when it entails positive disgrace-when, that is, it is not only an evil per se, but is recognised as such by the world at large. Such, then, is the character of the truthful man, and he is worthy of all esteem for guarding himself as he does from what is evil and disgraceful.

In relation to the extremes, if it be necessary for him to deviate at all from the strict line of absolute truth, he will incline to the defect, not the excess: an understatement seems to be more in harmony with his character, exaggerations being always offensive to him.

has com

Boastfulness
a different
plexion according
as it has a special
motive, or is the

(c) CHARACTERISTICS OF BOASTFULNESS.

The man who lays claim to qualities superior to what he really possesses, without any particular object to serve, has a resemblance to the vicious man-otherwise he would have had no pleasure in falsehood; but obviously he is rather empty-headed than wicked. If on the other hand he has a purpose to serve, and that purpose be glory or honour, he is not so very blameable (considering that it is his disposition to boast); yet if that purpose be gain or what is instrumental to gain, his conduct is much more unseemly.

natural outcome of the character.

The boastful man, however, is what he is, not from having a latent power of boasting, but in virtue of the disposition of his own will-i.e., he is boastful in virtue of a certain bent of his own nature, and in consequence of having formed a certain character; precisely in the same way as the liar is, properly speaking, one who takes pleasure in sheer falsehood, though there are also those who lie from the eagerness with which they strive after honour or gain. So, when men boast themselves from a motive of ostentation, they lay claim to qualities for which they may be praised or congratulated; but when their aim is gain, they lay claim to qualities from which advantage might be reaped by their neighbours; they claim, for instance, to be clever soothsayers or doctors, and their pretensions, when unfounded, are yet of a nature to escape detection. These useful qualities are, therefore, those to which boastful men generally lay claim and upon which they found exaggerated pretensions, since all the advantages which I have named are found therein.

The boastful man is one who lays claim to higher qualities than he possesses, and supports his pretensions by word and deed. Now if he has no motive to serve in making these pretensions, he seems to be a feeble fellow-otherwise Ke

6

would have no pleasure in falsehood, though obviously he is rather empty-headed' than vicious. But if he has an end to gain by his pretensions, and if that end be glory or honour, the braggart is not so very reprehensible; if, however, the end he has in view be money, or what amounts to the same thing as money, his conduct is much more unseemly.

Now boastfulness does not consist in the latent power which the boastful man has otherwise, if that had been the case, boastfulness would not have been reprehensible-i.e. it would not have belonged to the category of things voluntary and within our own power. Boastfulness depends upon a disposition of the Will, and consequently it is shameful as well as reprehensible :-i.e. it is a certain state of the moral nature. It is thus in virtue of a certain attitude of mind that the boastful man comes to be what he is; precisely in the same way as the liar who makes the pretences he does, not for the sake of glory or of money, but from sheer love of falsehood in itself.

Those, however, who boast themselves with a view to glory lay claim to the possession of qualities whence praise accrues or the congratulations of others. Those again who boast themselves with a view to profit lay claim to the possession of qualities which are serviceable to their neighbours-knowledge, for instance, of medicine, or of soothsaying. There are men who pretend to be skilful doctors or soothsayers in order that, by being thought serviceable to those who resort to them, they may make a profit of their dupes.

Such, then, is the character of the boastful man.

(d) CHARACTERISTICS OF SELF-DISPARAGEMENT.

Self

depreciation may be either a delicate and praiseworthy reticence,

or a vulgar affectation.

On the other hand, those who disparage themselves by understating what they mean, appear to be more winsome and seemly in their moral nature. The motive which they seem to have in speaking thus is not a sordid one, but only the avoidance of what is pompous or self-conceited. What such men are mostly found to deny is their own meritorious deeds, as Socrates used to do. As for those who make an ostentatious claim to merely trifling merits which are seen by all, they only show the affectation of snobs, and are deservedly despised. At times the boastful arrogance of such men peers out as the pride which apes humility' or the scant raiment of the Spartans. Extreme self-abasement is as much the cloak of vanity as is extreme boastfulness. However, those who show the diffidence of reserve only to a moderate extent, and depreciate themselves only in regard to things which are not very conspicuous nor plain, are thought to be men of good taste, and to show a graceful refinement.

But obviously it is the boastful man who is the opposite of the truthful man, since he is more mischievous than the diffident man.

On the other hand, the diffident' or 'reserved' man is one who lays claim to less merit than he might. Such a man is of course more delicately-minded than the boastful man. The motive for which he disparages himself is not a sordid one, but because he shrinks from ostentation or pomp and the assumption of grandeur. So then, the man who in self-depreciation repudiates the honourable

qualities which belong to him, as Socrates, for instance, used to do, seems to be a man of fine and delicate feeling. If, however, he repudiates not only great and distinguished qualities but also trifling merits, and pretends not to be able to perform things which it is palpable that he can achieve,-such a man is called an affected snob,' and is deserving of contempt. For similar reasons such a man is sometimes called vain-glorious, acting in the spirit which the Spartans showed in the matter of their dress. Self-abasement is as much a sign of vanity as is self-exaltation. When, however, men use this reserve of speech in moderation, they appear only to show good taste-when, that is, they do not show their diffidence in matters that are trifling and cheap and perfectly obvious.

So then the diffident man and the boastful man are both in opposition to the truthful man, but the boastful man is the more widely opposed of the two. Boasting is a more mischievous evil than diffidence, as is obvious from the reasons given above.

J.-HUMOUR.

(a) SUBJECT-MATTER OF HUMOUR AND OF ITS OPPOSITES DEFINED. But there is an element of rest in the conduct of life, and during

Times of relaxation have their own

exigencies, and admit of the display

of a special virtue.

rest there are pastimes for men which are attended by amusement; and here, too, as in more serious pursuits, intercourse may take a graceful shape, and a man may say the very things which he ought to say in the most perfect manner, or listen to the words of others in the same spirit: (though there will be a difference whether the man is a speaker or listener, and between the character of the audience, whatever it be in either case).

It is evident that here, too, is a sphere of circumstance in which the ideal of perfect propriety may be violated either by excess or defect.

Now those who are extravagant in their indulgence of humour are thought frivolous and vulgar people, being as they are eager for frivolity, in season and out of season, and more intent upon exciting laughter than on speaking what is becoming, or avoiding pain to the object of their ridicule.

There are others again who could never of themselves have uttered a joke, and who show irritation against those who do; and they are regarded as morose and soured.

But since there are times of relaxation and rest in human life, and in such times of relaxation there is a kind of pastime which goes hand in hand with diversion, there seems to be, here as elsewhere, a mode of intercourse which is at once graceful and virtuous, and it is possible for a man who requires such relaxation to say just the things which ought to be said and to say them in the most graceful manner, and in the same spirit to be a listener only when the subject is decorous and the manner in which it is said and the occasion of saying it are equally appropriate (though there is a difference between listening to things and saying them, whatever the character of the things said be in either case).

It is evident, therefore, that in this kind of intercourse (as in that which is

more serious,) there is one state of mind which is an extravagance, another which is a deficiency, and, between the two, the perfect mean of virtue.

Now the extravagance of humour is called buffoonery, and those who show it, buffoons and vulgar people: such are they who indulge in excess of merriment, and are more anxious to excite laughter than they are to say what is becoming or to avoid paining the object of their ridicule.

The defect of humour is moroseness and sourness, and those who show it are morose and sour: such men never utter a joke of their own, and are annoyed at and detest those who do.

(b) CHARACTERISTICS OF REAL AND PERFECT HUMOUR.

Humour is a graceful adaptation of wit to the phases and circumstances of character.

Those who exhibit playfulness in good taste are called 'quickwitted,' being as it were lively and versatile. The playful movements of their wit seem to be movements of the character; and just as the nature of bodies is indicated by their movements, so is it with the character. As, however, the sphere of merriment covers the very surface of society, and the mass of men delight in playfulness and the making of jests to an extent beyond what is right, frivolous people are also styled 'quickwitted' as being amusing and pleasant to their companions; though from what has been already said, it is clear that there is a difference, and that no slight difference, between the two.

Tact and cleverness, combined with gentlemanly instincts, essential

to perfect humour.

A further trait, characteristic of perfect humour, is that of tact or cleverness; and the man of tact and cleverness is known by his making only such remarks himself, or listening to them in others, as befits the character of a considerate and right-minded gentleman. There are, of course, certain things which it is consistent for a gentleman to say himself, or to listen to in others, in the way of fun, and the fun of a gentleman is a very different thing from that of a clown, as, again, the fun of an educated man is from that of an illiterate boor. This is a truth which we may see illustrated in the comedies of the Old School as contrasted with those of the New. In the Old Comedy wit meant scurrility and obscenity: in the New Comedy it means innuendo. These points make no slight difference in view of what - is decorous.

May we, then, define the man who makes a display of perfect humour by such limitations as that of his saying only what becomes a gentleman?' or by the condition of his avoiding giving pain to his hearers?' [or by the terms of his giving them. pleasure?'-Is not such a limitation too vague, seeing that the idea of what is hateful or agreeable differs with different temperaments?]