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correctness in reference to what is expedient in view of some end of which practical wisdom is a true apprehension.' I say in reference to what is expedient,' because of the deliberation which, though directed to a virtuous end, is by no means carried out through fitting processes, by fitting actions, at a fitting time, and in a fitting manner. I say in view of some end of which Practical Wisdom is a true apprehension,' on account of vicious deliberation which seeks, indeed, what is fitting and consistent with its end, but is impelled to an end that is vicious; of which practical wisdom is not a true apprehension. So much for Good Counsel.

ii.—Analysis of Moral Discrimination.

(a) MORAL DISCRIMINATION IS NEITHER SCIENCE NOR OPINION. Moral Discrimination (and its opposite, dulness of the Moral Sense), in virtue of which we call men discriminating (or the reverse), are states of mind. which are not generically the same as Science or Opinion:-otherwise, as all men form opinions, that of Practical all men would have been men of discrimination.

The sphere of Moral Discrimination is the same as

Wisdom.

Nor, again, is Moral Discrimination one of the partial or particular sciences like Medicine, which is concerned with the conditions of health, or like Geometry, which is concerned with dimension.

For neither is it concerned with matters that are eternal and unalterable, nor with any of those phenomena which come into being.

Its province is that class of matters about which a man might feel a difficulty and take counsel.

We must now speak of Moral Discrimination. Moral Discrimination. and its opposite, dulness of the Moral Sense, are states of mind in virtue whereof we speak of men as discriminating or the reverse.

Moral Discrimination is not the same thing either as Science or as Opinion, or as Moral Sense or Practical Wisdom.

It is neither Science nor Opinion-otherwise all men of science, and all men who form opinions, would have been men of discrimination; but of course they are not.

Nor is it one of the special sciences, such as are Geometry and Medicine: otherwise it would have been concerned with the conditions of health or the laws of matter.

Nor is it concerned with matters which have a necessary existence, and which ever keep in the same state.

Nor is it specially concerned with any one of those particular things which admit of being altered.

But, in a general sense, it is concerned with matters about which one might raise a doubt and deliberate, matters which admit of investigation and deliberation and inquiry.

() MORAL DISCRIMINATION COMPARED WITH PRACTICAL WISDOM. Consequently Moral Discrimination is concerned with the same class of questions as Practical Wisdom, though these virtues are in themselves distinct.

But Moral Discrimination and Practical Wisdom differ from one another,

in the mode of their operation.

1. Practical Wisdom is imperative in its utterances its scope and end' is to determine what it is a man's duty to do or not to do. Moral Discrimination is simply judicial or critical, the term 'discrimination' being identical with sound discrimination,' and men who discriminate' being identical with those who discriminate soundly.

2. Moral Discrimination is not the possessing nor the acquiring of Practical Wisdom. But just as learning is called understanding when the student makes use of his knowledge, so also moral understanding consists in the use of opinion to determine questions that fall within the scope of the Moral Sense, and to determine them rightly, when stated by another. Well' and 'rightly' are in this sense synonymous: hence has come the term 'discrimination,' in virtue of which men are called men of right judgment. from the discrimination which they show in comprehending moral facts. We often say in this sense that 'to learn' is 'to understand.'

Consequently, Moral Discrimination has the same sphere as Practical Wisdom, being concerned with 'contingent matter'-things which we have it within our own power to do or not to do.

Yet it is not the same thing in every respect as Practical Wisdom. Practical Wisdom is simply imperative, and prescribes the kind of end towards which we ought to tend and the measures which we ought to take so as to attain to that end-and this is its function, to prescribe what men ought to do. On the other hand, to estimate the commands laid upon men by Practical Wisdom, and to know that they are fitting and right, and that we ought to act accordinglythat is Moral Discrimination. [It is immaterial to say a man of discrimination' or a man of sound discrimination: the term man of discrimination involves this very thing-comprehending rightly and well, and judging accordingly of the commands laid down by the Moral Sense. So the virtue of discrimination is the same as that of sound discrimination.]

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Moral Discrimination, however, is not Practical Wisdom, nor is it the possession of Practical Wisdom, nor is it the receiving nor the gaining of Practical Wisdom: to gain Practical Wisdom is to learn those things which the man of Practical Wisdom knows, whereas Moral Discrimination is to judge of them. Moral Discrimination is, therefore, not the same thing as gaining Practical Wisdom or possessing it. But just as a man who hears a scientific truth from some one else, and estimates it rightly, is said to comprehend, so also the man who understands the commands issued by Practical Wisdom and estimates them rightly is said to comprehend them, and is called a man of discrimination, or of sound discrimination, on account of his comprehending them rightly (well' and rightly' being the same thing). From this the name has been derived, because for a man to understand rightly on hearing what another says to him, is said to be learning' or comprehending.'

Charitableness

is

iii.-Analysis of Charitableness and Consideration. 'Charitableness,' as it is called (in respect of which we say of men that they are kindly disposed and show consideration), is the right judgment of the fair-minded man.' As a proof of this we say that the fair-minded man is above all others charitable, and ready to make allowances, and that equity consists in showing forbearance and consideration under special circumstances.

the Right Reason of the equitable man.

is

'Consideration,' again, is an appreciative charitableness which marks the standard of fairness truly, and which is just, as being the appreciation of a man true and honest.

Consideration
the critical judg-
ment of the equit
able man.

We must now treat of Charitableness, the province of which is matters within our own power, as is that of Practical Wisdom, Good Counsel, and Moral Discrimination.

Charitableness, then (in respect of which we speak of men as being kindly disposed and showing consideration) is 'the right judgment of the fair-minded man' (what this fair-mindedness is, and what is the character of the man who shows it, has been explained in a previous Book). That Charitableness is of this kind, is evident. We say that the fair-minded man is above all others charitable and ready to make allowances, and that fairness consists in making allowances in certain contingencies.

Consideration, again, is a rightful charity, that is critically appreciative of what is equitable: it is, in fact, a right judgment upon moral questions, and a reasonable charity.' By 'right judgment' is meant the judgment of one whose mind is true and honest. If, then, consideration is a judgment of the fairminded man and a proper and correct charitableness, and men are called kindly disposed' in respect of their right-minded charitableness, Charitableness, therefore, in virtue whereof men are called kindly disposed,' is the judgment of the fairminded man.'

iv.-Review of Practical Wisdom under all its aspects.

Now all these mental states tend, as we might expect, to the same result. We use the terms Charitableness,' 'Discrimination,' Practical Wisdom,' and Moral Sense,' in reference to the same persons, implying that all such possess charitableness, and of course a moral sense, whether as men of practical wisdom or of moral discernment.

The attitude of the wise man only varies with the variation of the phenomena with which it has to deal.

The sphere, indeed, of all these faculties alike is that of ultimate facts and of particular details. In showing discernment upon questions with which the man of practical wisdom is concerned, a man is called discriminating' or 'kindly-natured' or 'considerate,' since considerations of equity have weight with all good

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It is the right
estimate of moral
truths,

men in their relations with their fellows. The whole world of action is, in truth, a world of particular details and of ultimate facts,' and assuredly the man of practical wisdom must know these facts; and moral intelligence and charitableness are also entirely concerned with specific actions, which are ultimate facts.'

But these

whether those
truths be universal
axioms or particu-
lar facts.

ultimate facts' come within the cognizance of the Moral Sense in a double aspect-in their widest comprehension and in their narrowest extension : the Moral Sense is not a process of formal reasoning, but an intuitive perception as well of the primary axioms as of the simplest details. In one aspect, therefore, the Moral Sense is an immediate consciousness of eternal and immutable first truths, such as are applicable to demonstrations of Geometry. In the other aspect, it is the intuition of the meaning of the particular fact, and of what is within the power of man to compass, and of the minor premisses in the moral syllogism. These particular facts are indeed the starting points from which we mount up to the Final Cause, or Summum Bonum.' It is necessary, then, that we should have an immediate consciousness of these particular truths, and this immediate consciousness is the Moral Sense' or 'Intuition of | Morality.'

How far is this
attitude dependent
upon age and ex-
perience?

Hence it is that the moral instincts are thought to be inherent or innate, the gifts of Nature'; and though no one is a metaphysician by Nature, yet it is thought to be in right of Nature that men possess charitableness and discrimination and a Moral Sense. In proof of this view is the fact that we consider the Moral Sense to be developed with the development of age and character, and that there is a particular time of life which evinces a Moral Sense and a spirit of Charity, as though Nature were the cause which produced them.

Wherefore the Moral Sense is the starting point of Moral Science, and also the ultimate principle in which all its truths end. The demonstrations of Moral Science all start from the truths apprehended by the Moral Sense, and are all concerned therewith. Consequently we ought to pay regard to the opinions and sayings, authoritative though undemonstrated, of men who have experience and age and practical wisdom, quite as much as -to positive demonstrations: inasmuch as they gain from experience a moral insight, they detect the true principles and laws of life under the complexities of circumstance.

Now all these mental states which attain to truth, tend to the same result, and have the same objects for the subject-matter with which they are found to be concerned. Practical Wisdom, Moral Sense, Good Counsel, Moral Discrimination, and Charitableness are concerned with special facts and particular circumstances

in which alone moral action can be displayed [I here refer to the Moral Sense as synonymous with the Practical Reason, which has for its principles particular facts which come under the cognisance of the moral instinct]. The same man who is practically wise' when he performs what tends to the true end of virtue, is a wise counsellor' when he deliberates in a befitting manner upon the bearing of circumstances; and when again, he knows and judges that the measures which he has adopted and carried out for the attainment of the end of virtue have been rightly and befittingly carried out and adopted, then he is a man of moral discrimination; and, lastly, when, in judging aright of the actions performed by others, he thinks at times that those actions are deserving of commiseration, when they are really so, then he is a man of kindly nature and considerateness.

Now the subjects with which every judgment of the equitable man is concerned are the whole of the actions of virtue that are commonly performed by others. Equity, as it is called, or the moral corrective of strict legal justice (the nature of which was discussed in a previous Book), criticises the laws laid down by others; and Considerateness and Charity judge rightly concerning actions performed by others. All these form the province of the fair-minded man; and it follows that the actions which the fair-minded man criticises and judges cover the whole sphere of human activity, equity being concerned with the same sphere as positive law. Considerateness is concerned with actions only when they are performed by others.

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The same subjects form the sphere also of the Moral Sense or Practical Reason.' Since the Moral Sense is a knowledge of fundamental truths, and these fundamental truths are in the case of actions particular facts, and in the case of abstract speculation and inquiries, where the end is truth per se, the definitions and immediate propositions and general conceptions, the Moral Sense will have X two varieties:-as theoretical' or 'speculative' it is a knowledge of definitions and of primary and unalterable propositions; and as 'practical' it is a knowledge of ultimate facts and of contingent truths, i.e., of specific and particular actions. Hence under its double aspect the Moral Sense, as 'practical' and 'speculative' Reason, is concerned with ultimate facts and with primary principles. Immediate propositions and definitions and particular circumstances are both primary principles and ultimate facts. Immediate propositions are 'primary' in respect of nature, and ultimate in respect of human knowledge. Particular circum-ar stances are 'primary' in respect of ourselves, and ultimate' as the last product of Nature. Those truths which are ultimate' in respect of nature are primary principles and causes of the end to be attained by human action. Being instructed by particular facts, which fall under the observation of the senses, how to do what is expedient for ourselves and for others, and by what means we may attain to the desired end; inferring in turn from these particular experiences certain universal and general truths, we thus grow to be practically wise' in regard to the course we should pursue in life. Wherefore the statesman ought to have a knowledge of particular facts; and when such a knowledge is gained without the help of a middle term (ie., when it is immediate), it is an intuition of the Moral Sense-the Moral Sense being a knowledge of immediate truths and of first principles.

Hence it is that knowledge of this kind is thought to be a product of Nature; since it is not derived from any methods of instruction, nor from definite teaching, but grows with a man's growth. Nor is it the Moral Sense alone, but Practical Wisdom and Moral Discrimination and Charitableness are also thought to be gifts of Nature. It is from the innate knowledge derived from the Moral Sense that all these moral qualities are derived, and the sphere in which such knowledge is exercised is identical with that of the Moral Sense--i.c., particular circumstances. Metaphysics on the contrary is not the product of Nature. No one is a philoso

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