BOOK VII.-PART I. CONCERNING STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF CHARACTER. PART II. CONCERNING PLEASURE. INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS. Part I.-Concerning Strength or Weakness of Character. HITHERTO We have been mainly occupied with ideals of character which are seldom realized. But in dealing with men as they actually are we find not only that the ideals both of excellence and of defect are seldom realized, but also that the deviations from the type assume various forms. We must, therefore, assuming all that has been already said, make a new beginning, and treat of men's characters as being not only ideally good or bad, but as being also actually strong or weak, and as exhibiting different forms both of strength and weakness. The defective types of character which exist may be classified as wickedness, weakness or self-indulgence, and savagery; and corresponding to them are three forms of moral excellence, goodness, manliness, and that heroic temperament which is sometimes called divine. It is with the second of each of these types that we shall be specially concerned. Our method will be, as in previous books, to take the facts as they appear, and to examine the difficulties which have arisen respecting the interpretation of them. The prevalent opinions respecting moral weakness and its opposite may be stated as seven in number: (1.) It is thought that moral weakness is to be ranked among things which are to be blamed, and moral strength among things which are praiseworthy. (2.) It is thought that moral weakness consists in a want of power to adhere to conviction, and that strength of character is identical with tenacity of purpose. (3.) It is thought that moral weakness consists in the want of power to resist passion, and that strength of character is the reverse. (4.) It is thought by some that strength of character is identical with Temperance: by others this is denied. (5.) It is thought by some that moral weakness is identical with dissoluteness: others regard it as distinct. (6.) It is thought by some that moral weakness is incompatible with A,$73 Practical Wisdom: others think that a man may be intellectually strong (7.) It is questioned whether moral weakness is an absolute charac- These various opinions present several difficulties, with which we must briefly deal before proceeding to a more philosophical analysis of the subject. (a.) What is the true relation between moral weakness and mental conviction? In what sense can a man know what is right and do what is wrong? Socrates answered this question in the negative: but his view fails adequately to explain the psychological phenomena involved in the fact that men do actually commit under the influence of passion acts which when out of the range of that influence they know to be wrong. Others have answered the question by making a distinction between 'knowledge' and opinion.' But if a man were not sure of his moral ideas, if, that is to say, he could not oppose to the influence of passion the firm front of firm convictions, he would be pardoned for yielding to that influence but as a fact of experience he is not pardoned, consequently this solution is at issue with experience. Others have thought that the form of knowledge which struggles against passion is Conscience or Practical Wisdom: but if a man have Practical Wisdom in the sense in which we have described it in the previous book, he cannot have a weak will. (b.) What is the relation between Moral Strength and Temperance? They are not identical, as is sometimes supposed: for the man who is ideally temperate has already banished from his soul the strong and evil passions which the strong-minded man possesses and controls. (c) What is the relation between Moral Strength and tenacity of resolution? These, again, cannot be identical for some resolutions and opinions are bad: others are the result of a more or less conscious sophistry: in either case it is not weakness but strength which is shown in departing from them. Moreover, a wrong action which is the result of fixed, though mistaken, conviction, seems to be better than one which is the result of mere weak yielding to impulse. Some of the questions which these difficulties raise cannot now be discussed to the more precise solution of others we must now address ourselves. We propose (1) to determine the sense in which knowledge is compatible with moral evil, (2) to consider the special conditions which test strength or weakness of character. (1.) The distinction which is drawn between 'knowledge' and 'opinion”, will not hold in reference to the attitude of mind in which men stand to moral truths. Even if the distinction be metaphysically tenable, it will not account for the facts, inasmuch as what is called knowledge' and what is called opinion' do not differ in the action which they respectively exert upon the will. We shall assume that what a weak-minded man resists is knowledge:' but, assuming this, several distinctions may be drawn : (a.) A man may have knowledge and not use it in committing a : wrong action a man may for the moment forget, though he really knows, how wrong it is. (b.) There are two premisses in a moral syllogism: if a man does not see both at once, he will not act upon both, .e. he will not act according to his full knowledge. He may say to himself 'This is a king' without realizing to himself at the moment the other premiss Kings are to be reverenced:' or he may be fully alive to the premiss Kings are to be reverenced,' but may not know that 'This is a king.' In either case his knowledge will not avail him. : (c.) A man may possess knowledge in another sense. He may be asleep or mad. For example, dreams are in a sense the result of knowledge but a man has no control over that knowledge: what he knows is seen in a false light and with a distorted meaning. His state of mind under the influence of passion may be similar to this. The fact that he talks intelligently is no proof to the contrary. He may be talking only as children repeat words which they do not understand, or as actors upon the stage may go through their parts without realizing the poet's meaning. (d.) The relative force of the influences of knowledge and passion or desire vary widely under different circumstances. A man who has dined may see food which is the property of his neighbour, and feel no desire to touch it. But the same man seeing food which is the property of his neighbour, and knowing it to be the property of his neighbour, when in a state of ravenous hunger, is constrained to take it. On the one hand is the syllogism My neighbour's property is not to be touched, and this is my neighbour's property:' on the other hand is the syllogism Food satisfies hunger, and this is food.' In such a case the weak-minded man, in yielding to temptation, yields in a sense to reason: albeit that his reason acts wrongly, desire having suggested the major premiss Food satisfies hunger,' instead of that which should have been the major premiss My neighbour's property is not to be touched.' The general conclusion to be drawn is that although knowledge is compatible with a weak will, the form of knowledge which is so compatible is not intellectual but sensuous or emotional. It is the knowledge of particulars, i.e. of minor premisses, to which desire suggests wrong major premisses: it is not the knowledge of universals, i.e. of the true major premisses and principles of action. (2.) Moral weakness is a generic term which includes several species. Its sphere is identical with that of pleasure, and its forms are not less numerous than the forms of pleasure. (a.) Some forms of pleasure are produced by objects which are in themselves as innocent as they are desirable, such as victory, honour, and wealth. When a man pursues any one of these objects in excess, we do not call him weak-minded in an unqualified sense, but add a limiting description, for example, we speak of a man as being weak-minded in regard to military fame.' This description does not connote, as the unqualified epithet weak-minded' does, the idea of depravity. (b.) Other forms of pleasure are produced by causes which, though natural and inevitable, admit of excess. Of this kind are the pleasures of the body, and it is in regard to these that a man is called, in an unqualified sense, strong or weak, when he pursues them in excess contrary to the dictates of conscience and sound judgment, (c.) A third class of objects are pleasurable only as the consequence of physical defects or evil habits. The pleasures to which they give rise are neither innocent nor natural: they are censurable not in their excess, but in any form of their indulgence. They are savage and bestial. The term 'weak-minded' does not properly apply to those who give way to them though at the same time it may be applied metaphorically and with the addition of the epithets 'bestial' or 'morbid,' according as the cause of the indulgence in them is nature or disease. It will appear from this analysis that the sphere within which moral weakness is possible in the proper and unqualified sense of the term, is identical with the sphere of viciousness; it is exercised in relation to natural and inevitable desires: and the use of the term in relation to other desires is metaphorical and not absolute. Having thus determined the several spheres within which the defective types of moral character are, properly speaking, displayed, we proceed to compare the various types with one another and to estimate their various degrees of blameworthiness. (1.) In the first place, the moral weakness which yields to lust is more reprehensible than that which yields to anger: this is the case for several reasons: (a.) Anger is more rational than lust. The man who yields to the one listens in a sense to reason, though he may listen to it amiss: the other ¦ sets reason wholly aside. (b.) Anger is a more purely natural impulse than lust. It is more deeply implanted in our constitution, not indeed than the desires from which lust springs, but than the excess of the indulgence of those desires, which constitute lust. (c.) Anger is more impulsive than lust. It is less the result of deliberate intention. (d.) Anger is sometimes painful to the man who indulges it: lust is always pleasurable. (2.) Secondly, dissoluteness is worse than savagery, on the principle 'corruptio optimi pessima.' It is the wreck of higher faculties and a nobler nature. (3.) Thirdly, of the three varieties of character which are the special results of yielding to pleasure, the dissolute man is worse than the weakminded man because he is farther from the chance of reformation, and the effeminate man is also worse than the weak-minded man because he yields to temptation with less struggle. On the other hand (4.) Fourthly, moral weakness, in the strict sense of the term which has been described above, has itself two varieties. Some men yield through sudden impulse, others through feebleness of will: the former are impetuous, the latter nerveless. Between moral weakness and dissoluteness there are several points of comparison. (a.) The dissolute man acts from fixed, though depraved, purpose: the weak-minded man yields in opposition to his better judgment: the former is incurable, the latter may be influenced for good and admits of repentance. In (b.) The dissolute man has wrong principles or axioms of conduct: the weak-minded man right principles, upon which through the influence of passion and the want of strength of purpose, he fails to act. The former is utterly vicious, the latter is a mixture of good and evil. In a similar way Strength of Character is predicated in two senses. the strict sense of the term it is used only of a man who adheres to a right judgment: but accidentally it is used of a man who is firm to any kind of purpose. In the latter case it degenerates into obstinacy and self-will: and tends to become weakness rather than strength of character. For the case of Neoptolemus shows that men who depart from their resolution are not in every instance weak-minded: they may present the inconsistency of swerving from their purpose and yet achieving thereby a noble end. In the strict sense of the term Strength of Character forms a mean between Asceticism and Moral Weakness: but since the former type of character is rare, it has popularly been considered to be opposed only to Moral Weakness. It is not identical with Temperance, except that the temperate man may be called strong-minded by analogy: but there is in reality this important difference between them that the strong-minded man has bad desires whereas the temperate man has not-having so perfected his moral nature as to be incapable of acting contrary to reason, Part II.-Concerning Pleasure. The question of pleasure is one which the political philosopher must necessarily take into consideration. For pleasure is conceivably the end, and certainly the sphere, of moral activity: if it be the end, then by reference to it, actions must be judged: if it be no more than the sphere, still activity cannot be dissociated from it in either case the consideration of it is of essential importance to a student of human life. What then, is pleasure, and what is its relation to human life! We must answer this question, as we have answered other questions, by considering in the first place, the opinions which are current in reference to it. These opinions are mainly three, (1) that no pleasure is a good, (2) that some pleasures are good and the majority bad, (3) that pleasure is a good, but not the Chief Good. I. The first of these opinions is held and advocated on several grounds (1.) It is alleged that 'pleasure is a process of becoming, and therefore cannot be a good, which is not a process but an end.' We may urge in reference to this argument, (a.) that 'goods' are of two kinds, absolute and relative: there will be a corresponding distinction in moral states: some will be good or bad absolutely, some relatively to a particular individual, or to particular circumstances; and if this be the case with moral states, it will be the case also with the processes which produce those states: they cannot be all absolutely bad: some will be relatively good hence even assuming that pleasure is a process, it may |