The striving of all
creatures
pleasure

after shows

But since there is no one state of nature which either is or is recognised to be the best for all, so neither do men all pursue the same pleasure, though pleasure they all pursue. Nay, perhaps unconsciously they are not pursuing the pleasure they think they are and say they are, but, in reality, all alike the same. There is a kind of instinct which all creatures alike possess by right of nature-a divine instinct (which justifies an appeal to universal nature).

that some form of it is the ultimate object of striving, viz., the chief good.

Yet inasmuch as bodily pleasures are those to which men most frequently resort and in which all men share, they have usurped full possession of the name of pleasure: because they are the only pleasures men know of, they think that they are the only pleasures which exist.

In conclusion, it is evident that, if pleasure and the play of the faculties be not a good, it will be impossible that the happy man should live a pleasurable existence. With what object would a happy man need pleasure, if pleasure be not a good and if it be possible to live happily in the midst of pain? In fact, if pleasure be neither a good nor an evil, neither will pain be good nor evil: why, then, should a man shrink from pain? Moreover, if the activities of the good man are not more pleasurable than that of the bad, neither will the life of the good man be more pleasurable than that of the bad.

Further, the fact that animals and men and all beings possessed of sensation pursue pleasure makes it clear that pleasure is the Chief Good. For all agree in shouting out that pleasure is a good and the highest good, and all press on in the pursuit of it. And

"Mankind's universal voice falleth not wholly vain."

It is true that they do not all pursue the highest form of pleasure; for, in the same way, they do not all have the same mental state or the same nature: but pleasure they do all pursue, though the form of it be only in some cases good, and in others bad. Nay perhaps none of them even pursue or seck for a bad form of pleasure or aim at anything that is bad: the actual object of their pursuit and seeking is not that which they intend to seek, or would admit that they pursue what all of them really pursue is the highest form of pleasure, for all things naturally aim at what is really good, since in all things there is a divine element, and the impulse of all things is towards a form of pleasure which is good, and which is pleasurable in the proper sense of the term: though it may be admitted that the bodily pleasures seem to men to be pleasures in the proper sense of the term, on account of their constant exposure to them and also on account of all men participating in them. They are, in fact, not cognizant of any others, and consequently think these to be the only forms of pleasure which exist. And since these forms of pleasure are not good nor are pleasures in the proper sense of the term, men (knowing no others) have denied that any form of pleasure is a 'good.' But it is incontrovertible that (some form of) pleasure is a good.

For if pleasure, and the play of the faculties which is in harmony with pleasure, be not a good, it is not possible for the happy man to live pleasurably. But

surely there is no doubt that a happy man's life must be accompanied with pleasure. Consequently it is impossible that pleasure should not be a good. A further argument to prove the same point from the same premisses is that nothing which is evil, or in fact which is not in the proper sense good, can be an element in happiness. Why, then, if pleasure be not a good, does the happy man pursue it? And again, if pleasure be not either a good or an evil, pain will not be either a good or an evil: consequently it will not be a thing to be avoided. Why then does the happy man avoid it? He would not avoid it unless it were an evil: but as a matter of fact he cannot help avoiding it. It is necessary, in short, that the happy life should be the pleasantest life but this is impossible unless the modes in which the activities of the happy man manifest themselves are pleasant for if otherwise how will the pleasantness of his life be realized?

If, then, pleasure be not either positively evil or negatively not good, it follows that it is good.

v.-Refutation of the argument from bodily pleasures.

(1.) BODILY PLEASURES ARE, IN CERTAIN CONNECTIONS, GOOD. Now the subject of bodily pleasures is one especially incumbent on those thinkers to examine who maintain that though certain pleasures, i.e. noble pleasures, are emphatically desirable in a high degree, yet bodily pleasures and such as those in which the dissolute man indulges, are evil.

Bodily pleasures are only evil in their abuse and

excess.

If this view of theirs be true, why are the pains which are the opposite of pleasures grievous and evil? Good and evil are, of course, opposites.

May the solution be this: are not necessary pleasures good in the sense that whatever is not an evil is a good? or, are these bodily pleasures good up to a certain point? In the case of mental habits and processes where there is no excess possible as they increase from more to more, there is no excess possible either, in the pleasure resulting therefrom. On the contrary, where excess is possible from the increase and enhancement of those processes, there also there is excess possible in the pleasure which ensues. Consequently excess is possible in the pleasures of the body; and the bad man is bad in that he seeks that excess ustead of seeking such pleasures as are necessary. All men find pleasure of a certain kind in dainties and wines and love; though not all observe the proper standard therein. The converse is true in the case of pain. Men shrink not merely from the excess of pain but from pain in general: pain is not opposed to the mere excess of pleasure-except in the case of the [very sensitive and self-indulgent] man who pursues the excess [and makes every defection from his own extravagant standard a pain].

It is possible for anyone to raise the question why it is that if some pleasures are good and choiceworthy, and some on the other hand evil-as for example the

E E

bodily pleasures with which the dissolute man is concerned-every form of pain is vicious and to be avoided. For it would be reasonable to suppose that although the pain which is opposed to good pleasures is evil, the pain which is opposed to evil pleasures should be good-evil and good being in the relation of opposites. If on the contrary this form of pain is evil, it would seem as though the bodily pleasures were good. Our answer to this question is as follows: Bodily pleasures are good in the sense of not being bad for whatever is not bad is good. This is true up to a certain point. For if they do not exceed a certain limit they are in this sense good: consequently the pains that are opposed to them are not good. For, since some states of mind and body exceed the due limit and what is best, whereas other states of mind and body do not so exceed, the necessary states of body, such as the state of requiring nourishment, are capable of excess, since they can be exercised to a greater extent than they should properly be exercised: on the other hand those which when subjected to tension do not go beyond the due limit are not capable of excess, but are always good, as for example the states of mind which are engaged in philosophical investigation. But since pleasures follow upon states of mind, it necessarily follows that some pleasures exceed the due limit, and some do not. All those which exceed the limit are bad, and it is with them that the dissolute and the weak-minded man are concerned. In the case of pains which are opposed to pleasures, it is not with excessive pains that the dissolute man concerns himself he pursues no doubt excessive pleasures but avoids even small pains. From this it is manifest that the pains which in the case of the dissolute man are opposed to his excessive pleasures are not excessive but moderate pains-such as no good man would avoid, because they do not in fact deserve the name of pains.

This is the solution of the question which was raised: the pains which are opposed to moderate pleasures are not good for moderate bodily pleasures are good, inasmuch as they are not evil the pains which are opposed to excessive pleasures are moderate pains, in fact not pains at all, and consequently not to be avoided. Every form of good is contrary to that which is to be avoided and bad pleasures are opposed to good pains, just as good pleasures are to pains which should be avoided.

(2.) CAUSES OF THE UNIVERSAL PURSUIT OF PLEASURE.

Why do bodily pleasures seem to most men to be especially desirable.

However, we must not only give a true account: we must also explain the cause of the error; a thorough exposition being highly conducive to winning conviction. When a probable reason has been shown why a theory has an appearance of truth without being true, such an explanation makes us have a greater confidence in the truth itself.

Hence we must explain why it is that bodily pleasures have the appearance of being more choiceworthy than others.

(1.) Because they act as the remedies of pain.

(1.) In the first place, of course, bodily pleasure drives out pain. In face of excessive pain, as though it were a remedy for it, men strive after a pleasure correspondingly excessive-in fact, after bodily pleasure. Now these remedies are found to be powerful, and hence they are adopted because they are regarded in contrast to their opposites.

[It is on account of these two causes that pleasure is thought not to be a good: (a) i.e. some pleasures, as we have explained, are the actions of a depraved nature, whether congenital as in the case of beasts, or the result of habit as in the case of vicious characters; (B) other pleasures, again, are remedies, because they are the actions of an imperfect nature. But, as for remedial pleasures, it is better to have a normal condition than to be arriving at one: yet these remedial pleasures only take place whilst we are arriving at a state of completeness: hence they are only 'pleasures' in an indirect and secondary sense.]

on account of

(2.) Because of the want of capacity in most men for mental pleasures.

(2.) Again, these bodily pleasures are sought their powerful effect only by those who have lost the capacity for taking pleasure in simpler and purer tastes. At any rate men have to create artificial excitements so as to satisfy their abnormal tastes. Of course, if these indulgences do not hurt their health their conduct is not censurable; but if they are injurious, then their conduct is morally evil. Men only indulge them in fact because they have nothing else in which they can take pleasure, and a state of impassivity' is to many men painful by the constitution of their nature. The whole creation struggleth even until now,' as the writings of natural philosophers tell adding in fact that even the act of seeing or of hearing is painful; only in time we become habituated to the pain, which is second nature to us (so they say).

us

The same truth is conspicuous in time of youth: owing to the processes of growth, boys are in a physical state resembling that of the intoxicated, and boyhood is sweet and pleasant.

Again, people of a nervous temperament are ever in need of an anodyne: their bodies are in a state of constant irritation, owing to their temperament, and they are incessantly in a state of vehement desire. Now pleasure, be it the opposite of a given pain, or be it what it may, provided it be strong enough, drives away the irritation; and hence it is that nervous people become dissolute and depraved.

However, we must not only give a true account: we must also explain the cause of the error; a thorough exposition being highly conducive to winning conviction of the truth. For when the reason has been shown why it is that what is in reality false has an appearance of truth, and the cause of the error has been exposed, the explanation makes us have a greater confidence in the truth itself. Hence we must explain why it is that bodily pleasures have the appearance of being more choiceworthy than those which are really good.

(1.) In the first place bodily pleasures are of the nature of remedies for bodily pains. The pains may be great, but the strength of the pleasures exceeds the strength of the pain, and drives it out. Consequently, at the time when bodily

pain presses upon a man, pleasures are sought after, because they seem to be strong and powerful remedies, and easily rid a man of the pain which comes from defect of pleasure. The second reason is that bodily pleasures are sought after by those who are incapable of taking delight in other forms of pleasure. And these persons form a numerous class and consequently that which they seek after is thought to be good and choiceworthy. They are not content with the satisfaction of natural desires, but they go on to devise artificial excitements, creating for themselves, for example an artificial thirst, in order that they may be always capable of delighting themselves with drink. No doubt if this practice does not go beyond the limits of reason and moderation, it is not injurious, for bodily pleasures in moderation do not injure the body, and to that extent the practice of which I have spoken is not to be censured. But if the pleasures which are to be pursued do go beyond the limit, and the pursuit of them injures the body, the pursuit of them is morally evil. I assert that the use of bodily pleasures in moderation is not to be censured, because it is absolutely necessary for a man to find some things pleasant in life, because his nature is in process of struggle, and requires some kind of pleasure which will serve, so to speak, as a repose. For the whole creation is always in process of struggle, as in fact natural philosophers tell us for they say that even the act of seeing or of hearing is in reality painful, though through habituation it does not seem so. Men, therefore, need some kind of pleasure, and if a man is insensible to intellectual pleasures, he is compelled to enjoy himself with the pleasures of the body. It follows, that those who use them in moderation, and in such a way as not to injure their body are not morally censured.

The same truth is conspicuous in time of youth: the pleasures which accompany the nutritive part of our nature, just as they are by the dissolute man, under an impulse of nature struggling after growth. Youths are, in fact, in an analogous position to men who are under the influence of wine; for eating, drinking, and sleeping continually, as they do, they have the desire which is stimulated by these operations in a constant state of extreme vigour, just as those with whom I have compared them are under the constant influence of thirst. It is for this reason that the period of youth is pleasant because its realization of the necessary conditions of existence is always accompanied with desire.

In just the same way persons of a nervous temperament are always in a state of vehement desire, and are always in need of an anodyne: for their bodies are always in a state of irritation on account of their temperament.

These, therefore, are persons who seek after bodily pleasures, and these are the reasons why they seek them. Speaking generally, every bodily pleasure is sought for in order that it may expel a bodily pain: for pleasure drives out pain, nor is it necessary that the particular form of pleasure should be the exact opposite of the particular form of pain; for example, a pain which arises in the nutritive part of us, is driven out not only by a pleasure which has its seat in the nutritive part of us, but by any other form of pleasure as well, if only it be strong enough. It is for this reason that bodily pleasures are pursued, and it is hence that men become dissolute or bad.

(3.) THE PLEASURES OF THE MIND, HOWEVER, ARE PREFERABLE TO

Mental pleasures

THOSE OF THE BODY.

On the other hand, pleasures unaccompanied by pain do not admit of excess they are the satisfaction and realization of things which are pleasurable in their own nature and not through adventitious circumstances. By 'pleasures of association' I mean such things as are of the nature of a remedy. Since it

do not admit of

excess.