Bk. VII. 15.]

happens that we are relieved, owing to some operation of that part in us which continues sound, the object [which causes this result] seems to us to be itself pleasant. On the contrary things are naturally pleasant when they produce the activity of a nature corresponding to their own.

But the same object is never continuously pleasant to us, because our nature is not simple, but there are in it other and diverse elements (in virtue of our corruptible nature). Hence when one element is in action, it thwarts the tendency of the second element; and when the two elements are balanced, the result of their action appears to be either painful nor pleasant. However, if there be any being whose nature is uncompounded, the same mode of action will be continuously and in the highest degree pleasurable to him.

Hence it is, through the simplicity of His essence, God enjoys everlastingly one pure pleasure. There is an activity assuredly not only in change but in changelessness; and pleasure is keener in a state of calm than in a state of motion. It is only, as the poet says, 'through the frailty of our mortal nature that change is the sweetest of all things.' It is the frail and faulty character which is fond of change; and the nature which needs change bears the same stamp of imperfection, being neither sincere nor true.

We must here conclude our account of moral strength and weakness, and of pleasure and pain, having defined the nature of each respectively and the sense in which they are right or wrong, good or evil. It now remains for us to proceed with our examination of Friendship.

On the other hand, intellectual pleasures are not preceded by pain (for it is not necessary for us, as in the case of bodily pleasures, to feel pain before feeling the delight which they bring), and do not admit of excess. It is not possible for us to give play to the intellect beyond what is fitting: the pleasures which flow from the play of the intellect are always praiseworthy, for the objects which cause those pleasures are pleasant not accidentally, but always and absolutely. By things which are accidentally pleasurable I mean those which satisfy and heal bodily wants and pains; for example, articles of food. For food is, as it were, a remedy to the nature of a hungry man, which is, so to speak, in an abnormal and morbid state, and it supplies what is lacking: when, that is to say, the man's nature is not defective or morbid in respect of its capacity of receiving nutriment, but possesses that capacity, and is sound in respect of it, and gives it play, that is to say, feels a desire for food. Things of this kind are pleasurable, not in themselves, but through adventitious circumstances, that is, because they happen to serve as remedies. On the other hand, things are naturally pleasurable which instead of filling up a deficiency in a man's nature, stimulate that nature into activity. Of this kind are the objects upon which the intellect employs itself, for they allow a perfect play to the activity of the mind.

But since our nature is not simple but complex, and since we do not live with

our minds only apart from our bodies, the same objects are not always pleasurable to us; since even in the case of those things which are accidentally pleasurable, the same things are not always objects of pursuit, but we seek at one time one class of objects, at another time another. For when our bent is in the direction of our body, we feel pleasure in those things which are connected with our body, but when, on the other hand, we look beyond our body, we seek things which are not accidentally, but naturally pleasurable, for there is a conflict between the pleasures of the mind and the pleasures of the body and the objects in which the mind feels delight seem to the body to be contrary to nature. At the same time, when the exercise of virtue has brought the mind and body into unison, then, although it is still true that the body does not feel delight in the objects round which the mind delights to play-for they are not objects of sense, still, it is not objects of pain,

:

Hence it is that to those beings whose nature is absolutely simple, the same course of action is always absolutely pleasant. For God enjoys everlastingly one pure pleasure. It is true that he is changeless, and that he has been thought on this account to be incapable of pleasure, for pleasure is a mode of activity, and activity is thought to be only a mode of change. But it is not so there is an activity not only in change, but in changelessness, and pleasure is keener in a state of calm than in a state of changeful motion. Change is the sweetest of all things, as the poet says, not to an absolutely good and perfect nature, but to a composite nature, owing to its frailty and its wickedness: for just as a wicked man is constantly changing, so also a wicked nature is in constant need of change, it is neither simple nor sincere.

We must here conclude our account of moral strength and weakness, and of pleasure and pain, having defined the nature of each respectively, and the sense in which they are right or wrong, good or evil. It remains for us to speak of friendship.

BOOK VIII.-CONCERNING FRIENDSHIP.

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

I.-GENERAL CONCEPTION OF FRIENDSHIP.

THE general subject of these two books (VIII. and IX.) is Friendship. The subject has many claims on the moralist for his attention. It deserves consideration (1) on account of its intimate connection with virtue. Friendship in all its higher forms is impossible without virtue, and is in its turn of the greatest assistance towards leading a virtuous and so a happy life.

(2.) It befits every condition and every age of life. young and middle-aged are all on different grounds ship.

Rich and poor, old indebted to friend

(3.) Friendship is a principle deeply rooted in human nature; not to speak of the natural affection subsisting between parent and child and even among animals towards those of their own kind, man has a natural attraction to man as man. We may see this in the way in which men casually thrown together make friends with one another, and even strangers are made welcome.

(4.) Associal philosophers' we are especially bound to consider it; it is the chief tie that binds civil society together and is even more absolutely indispensable to its well-being than justice is, while

(5.) The possession of friends is a crown of glory' to a man, a distinctive addition to virtue itself.

Yet as to the nature and origin of the sentiment there are a variety of differing, and even diametrically opposed, opinions.

1. Some Philosophers take the view that 'like is attracted by like.' 2. Others maintain that it is dissimilar natures that have affinities. Both alike trace the prevalence of one or other of these principles through the whole of nature.

3. Into these wider questions it is beyond our present purpose to enter. As moralists, we approach the question only from the moral side, and would confine our attention to such questions as these. What is the relation of friendship to virtue and to happiness? Are there different kinds of friendship, friendships which the vicious man may share as well as the virtuous, or is friendship the privilege of the virtuous alone?

II. ARE THERE DIFFERENT KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP?

Let us attempt to answer this last question first and consider

'Are there different kinds of friendship, and if so how many they are.' In order to answer it, it will be necessary to analyse the grounds on which affection, and with it friendship, may rest. What are the objects of affection? Now that which excites affection is always either the good, or the agreeable or the useful. We love persons, or things, because they are good, or pleasant or useful to us. But the useful, if we consider what it really means, is that which conduces to our good, or conduces to our pleasure. Consequently goodness and pleasantness are the only ultimate grounds of affection, and, therefore, of friendship. (We may notice further that, though ideally it may be the truly good and the really pleasant which excite and command our affection, yet practically the feeling will be evoked in each individual by that which impresses him as good or as pleasant.)

Yet mere affection for a person or an object, prompted by one or other of these motives does not, taken by itself alone, constitute friendship. If it did, we might be said to be friends with our wine, or with any other inanimate object which gives us gratification or amusement. Three other conditions have to be complied with before the idea of friendship can be regarded as complete.

1. The affection felt must be unselfish; it must be a genuine wish for the good of the person, or the object, loved.

2. The feeling must be reciprocated by the object towards which it is felt, and

3. Their mutual affection must not be unknown to the two parties concerned.

We are now in a position to answer the question with which we started, whether there are different kinds of friendship, and to answer it in the affirmative. Since the three objects of affection above enumerated are distinct in kind, and since an unselfish feeling of affection, reciprocated by, and not unknown to, the object of it, may arise on any one of these grounds, it follows that there are three distinct kinds of friendship, corresponding to these three different objects of affection; friendships, that is, based upon goodness, friendships based upon pleasure, and friendships based upon interest.

III. THE THREE KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP CONTRASTED
AND COMPARED.

Of these three forms of friendship, the two which originate severally in interest and in pleasure, depend not so much on the intrinsic character of the contracting parties as upon circumstances which are more or less accidental, and consequently the friendships have themselves something of an accidental character.

This same fact renders them also liable to speedy dissolution, as interest and pleasure quickly change.

These different kinds of friendship do not prevail equally among all classes. The old and the more mercenary of the young and the middleaged form friendships of interest, while the young form friendships

chiefly from delight in one another's society; but the changeableness of youth, and the uncertainty of pleasure, make such friendships often only of short duration.

The only perfect form of friendship is the friendship of the good, and it can alone be regarded as true and real friendship. (1) It is unselfish, and this gives it a true element of friendliness in which the other forms are wanting. (2) Being based on a mutual respect between the friends for each other's character, it is not affected by any external or accidental considerations. (3) It contains in itself the advantages of both the other kinds, as the good are both pleasant and profitable to one another. (4) It is lasting, for it has its roots in virtue and virtue wears well; while (5) we have here that similarity of disposition which is essential to friendship.

Of course such friendships are rare. Perfectly good men are scarce, and time and intimacy are requisite to bring friendship, in this its highest and completest form, to perfection.

The two other forms are enduring, and approach the ideal form in` varying degrees.

1. Of the imperfect forms that is most lasting, in which each of the friends is agreeable to the other and on the same grounds. Two wits, for instance, may often strike up a lasting friendship. But

2. Where, as in the case of lovers, the advantage sought is not of the same kind, but one seeks gratification, the other profit, the connexion is apt to be transitory, ceasing as the bloom of youth dies away and attentions cease to be paid as of old; though of course cases occur in which love ripens into lasting friendship, if the lovers come mutually to esteem each other's characters.

3. Those friendships are least real, and least lasting, which are dictated by merely mercenary motives.

4. One other point in which all such friendships fall short of the ideal of true friendship is their liability to be destroyed by the breath of slander; true friends, who have really proved one another, are superior to all its assaults.

In all these respects, then, does true friendship transcend these its imperfect copies; yet since popular usage extends the name of friendship also to them, we will follow it in this particular and speak of three kinds of friendship, one that true and ideal friendship which is confined to the good, the other two kinds shared by bad and good alike, being called friendships at all only by a kind of analogy or metaphor.

If we turn next to consider the conditions which give vitality or reality to friendship, they seem to be summed up in these three.

(1.) Constant intercourse and delight on the part of the friends in one another's society.

(2.) A certain pleasantness and pliability of temper which makes such constant intercourse possible and delightful.

(3.) A certain fixity of character and determination to do good to one's friend, which distinguishes true friendship from any passing affection.

Lastly, if we ask