The affection based on one of these grounds must be further (1) reciprocated, (2) unselfish,

objects, as there is in this case no requital of affection nor wish for the good of such objects: it would be ridiculous for instance to wish all happiness to wine; if we have any wish at all, it is merely a wish that the wine may be kept safe that we may ourselves have the enjoyment of it: but in the case of a friend men say we ought to wish him all happiness for his own sake. Those who wish good in this spirit we call well disposed, where the feeling is not reciprocated by the object of it-where the feeling is reciprocated, the kindly disposition becomes at length friendship. Perhaps we should further add that it must not be unknown to the object of it, for many have a kindly feeling for those whom they have never seen, that is to say if they believe them to be good or serviceable, and this same feeling might be entertained in turn towards them by the objects of it, and thus the two would be kindly disposed to one another. But how could they be called friends if they severally did not know of their feelings towards one another?

(3) not unknown to the object.

For men, then, to be friends it is needful that they entertain kindly feelings to one another, that they wish for Summary. each other's good and be known to do so, and that on one or other of the grounds above enumerated.

There being thus three grounds of liking on account of one or other of which affection is felt, it does not follow in the case of all things that are liked that friendship is felt towards them for we like even inanimate objects on one of these three grounds; but such a feeling does not amount to friendship. Friendship exists when the affection is reciprocated, and a man wishes all happiness to the object of his love, while that object in turn wishes it to him; but he who loves, let us suppose, wine is neither loved in return by the wine, nor wishes all happiness to it, as it would be ridiculous to do so; if he has any wish with respect to it, he wishes it to be kept safe, but that not for the sake of the wine but for his own that he may have the enjoyment of it; to a friend on the other hand we wish all happiness for his sake. Consequently the affection felt for inanimate objects is not friendship.

Again, though a man love another man and wish him good, such a feeling may still not amount to friendship; his love must be returned in an equal degree; if not, he is not a friend, but is spoken of as well disposed to the other.

It may moreover happen that some from a mutual belief in one another's goodness, or serviceableness, or excellence, may even wish all happiness to one another and not know they do so. In this case we should not call them friends in the proper sense, because they don't know that they are loved, nor how they are disposed to one another; we should rather call them well affected to one another. Thus, then, neither is the affection for inanimate objects friendship nor the affection of men for one another, when it lacks any of the above conditions. But friendship does exist when men feel kindly to one another on the score of goodness, pleasure or profit, and wish for each other's good, and each knows of the other's love.

III. THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND THEIR COMPARATIVE VALUE.

i.-Friendships differ in kind according to the grounds of
the Affection.

There
Hence the kinds of

These grounds differ from one another in kind, consequently must the affections to which they give rise, and the friendships as well. friendship are three, equal in number to the objects of affection: for on each ground there may be affection, and a requital of it, not unknown to those concerned.

are three distinct kinds of friendship corresponding to the three grounds of affection.

What then friendship is has been now explained. It is clear also from what we have stated that there are three kinds of friendship. For since there are three grounds on which friendship originates, the pleasant, the good, and the useful, and these differ from one another in kind, the friendships must be equal in number to the objects of affection. For in virtue of each one of these separate grounds a friendship may originate, that is to say, an affection known to the object of it and a requital of that affection. Further also an unselfish wish for each other's good; for in so far as we love anything we wish good to that thing. There are, therefore, three kinds of friendship, corresponding to the good, the pleasant, and the serviceable.

ii.-Imperfection of Friendships of Pleasure and Interest.

for profit and pleasure are (1) selfish, (2) accidental in character, (3) easily broken off.

Those who love one another wish good to one another in the way that corresponds to the character of their affection. Those who love one another on grounds Friendships of profit, do not love one another in and for what they are, but only in so far as each gets some advantage from the other. The same is the case with those who love each other on the ground of pleasure. The witty are loved, not for their intrinsic character, but, because they are pleasant to their audience. So, then, both those who love on grounds of profit, feel affection on grounds of their own selfish good, and those who love on grounds of pleasure, on grounds of their own selfish pleasure, and they value their friend, not for what he is, but for his serviceableness or agreeableness; consequently also these friendships are accidental in character, for the person loved is not loved according to what he is in himself, but according as those who profess to love him get in the one case good from him, in the other pleasure.

Another consequence is that friendships of this sort are easily broken off if the position of the parties alters; for if such friends are no longer pleasant or profitable to their friends, they cease to

care for them. Interest is never permanent, but alters with altering circumstances. When the object, then, of their friendship disappears, the friendship vanishes along with it, such friendship being strictly relative to the object.

We must next enquire into each kind. Those, then, who love one another on grounds of interest, love each other not for what they are in themselves but for the sake of the good or the pleasure which they are the instruments of providing, and they love each other only so long as they severally get some advantage from the other; similarly those who love one another on grounds of pleasure do not love each other for their intrinsic worth. They love one another, not because they are respectively pleasant in the abstract, but because each finds the other pleasant to himself, for it would advance the friendship nothing if it was to others they were pleasant. Consequently both those who love for profit's sake, and those who love for pleasure's sake, feel affection not on account of goodness or pleasure absolutely, nor do they love the object of their friendship, for and in what he is in himself, but only because he is pleasant or profitable to them.

It is clear, therefore, that friendships such as these are accidental in character: the person loved is not loved, because he is what he is, but because he furnishes in the one case profit, in the other entertainment. And such friendships are easily broken off the agreeable, and the profitable, do not continue agreeable and profitable for ever; we take pleasure at one time in one set of persons, at another in another, and our interest varies at varying times.

Since, then, the cause of the friendship is not permanent, the friendship proceeding from it is not permanent either, but is broken off, as being strictly relative to these objects and having them for its ends.

Friendships of interest prevail most among the old and the mercenary.

iii. The sphere of the two inferior forms of Friendship determined. It is amongst the elderly that friendships of interest are observed most frequently to prevail, since the old make not pleasure but profit the object of their pursuit, and among those in the prime of life, and the young who have an eye to the main chance. Men of this stamp do not in all cases even care to live in one another's society. Sometimes they are not agreeable to one another, and, consequently, do not feel the need for this sort of intercourse, unless there is profit to be got out of it: for they are agreeable to one another only just so far as they entertain hopes of gain from the other.

Hereditary friendships are probably to be classed under this

head.

Friendships of plea

sure among the young.

The friendship of the young on the contrary is ordinarily based upon pleasure. The young live under the rule of their passions, and for the most part take for the object of their pursuit what is pleasant to them and is close at hand. But as their But as their age advances. the character of their pleasures alters, so they make friends quickly and quickly cease to be friends: their friendship alters along with

their pleasure, and pleasure of this kind is liable to rapid changes. The young are moreover prone to fall in love, love being largely the result of passion and the desire of pleasure. On this account they speedily make friends and speedily cease to be such, changing often in the course of a single day. But these (unlike the last) do wish to spend their time together and to live in one another's company, the object of their friendship being in this way realised by them.

Friendship of this transient sort is observed to prevail most among elderly men, since men of this stamp do not make pleasure strenuously, or continually, the object of pursuit. Consequently they abandon pleasurable friendship, and, devoting themselves to profit, form their friendships on grounds of self-interest. And not the elderly only, but also those of the young who have an eye to interest more than to pleasure. Men of this stamp do not in all cases pass their lives together, for at times they take no delight in one another. They take delight in one another only so long as they are severally profitable to one another, or furnish hopes of advantage to one another. At other times they no longer find pleasure in one another, and, not finding pleasure, they don't care to live in the same house.

Of this character it is maintained that hereditary friendships also are. These are contracted on grounds of self-interest.

But the friendship of the young is, in the great majority of instances, based upon pleasure. The young spend their lives under the sway of passion, and for the most part make pleasure the object of their pursuit, and present pleasure rather than future advantage. Living as a rule by sense they delight in what is actually present and what tickles the senses. But as their age advances so do their pleasures also change, for which reason they quickly make friends and quickly cease to be friends, for as their pleasure drops through, their friendship drops through along with it. But pleasure of this kind drops through quickly, and so does the friendship which depends upon it.

And the young are also ready to fall in love, as they live by the rule of passion and pleasure, for the sentiment of love is largely made up of passion and pleasure. Consequently they are quick to make friends, quick to cease to be friends, changing often in the course of a single day. Their friendships are formed not at the dictates of reason and judgment but under the influence of passion.

But these do wish to pass their time together and to live in one another's society. This is, indeed, the very source and origin of their friendship, and pleasure requires company for its realization. Such then is the friendship based on enjoyment and on self interest, imperfect and accidental in its character.

iv. Of ideal or perfect Friendship.

The friendship of the good is perfect, for (1) it is unselfish, (2) based upon character,

But the friendship of the good, who are alike in the character of their virtue, is perfect: such in virtue of their goodness agree in wishing each other all good, and their goodness is a goodness of character. But they who in an unselfish spirit wish their friends all good, are friends in the highest sense; for they are friends not on any accidental grounds, but in virtue of their own inherent character, and their friendship continues as long as their goodness lasts, and virtue lasts well. Besides each

(3) lasting,

of them is good absolutely and good too to his friend, for the good are profitable to one another as well as absolutely good, and they are in the same way pleasant also, for the good are pleasant absolutely and pleasant to one another. Every man finds pleasure in his own peculiar acts, and those that resemble them, and the acts of all good men are either identical or at any rate similar in character. Friendship of this kind we consider, with good reason, to be lasting, since it combines in itself all the characteristics which friends should have. Every friendship is based on goodness or on pleasure (goodness and pleasure which are really such, or are viewed as such by the person feeling the friendship) and implies a certain resemblance. Now in this perfect form all these requisites are present, and present too in virtue of the character of those concerned; in it we get resemblance between the friends and the remaining conditions, to wit absolute goodness and absolute pleasantness: these are the highest objects of affection; consequently, where these are, there will be love and friendship in their highest and best forms. But it is likely that such friendships will be rare.

(4) combines in itself all necessary conditions.

Perfect friendships are rare, (1) because good men are scarce,

Men of

the character required are few, and the friendship needs time and intimacy to bring it to perfection; for, as the proverb says, men cannot know one another till they have eaten, as the saying goes, salt together; nor can they even be sure that they are friends till they have had time, each of them, to become manifestly loved by the other and to be trusted by him.

But those who hastily strike up friendships with one another have a wish to be friends but are not such, unless they are loved as well and know themselves to be so: a wish for friendship may arise speedily, but not friendship itself.

(2) because time is required to bring them to perfection.

Summary.

We conclude, then, that friendship of this kind is perfect in respect of time and in all its other particulars, and that in all things each gets from the other an identical, or similar, advantage; and this is the relation which should subsist between friends.

But the friendship of good men, who are alike in virtue, based as it is on goodness, is perfect and intrinsic friendship. For such, because they are good themselves, wish each other the enjoyment of all good, having no ulterior object in view, but quite unselfishly. And those, who wish their friends the enjoyment of all good, on no personal grounds but quite unselfishly, are friends in the highest sense of the term: they love their friends for their own sake and wish them all good with no arrière pensée and on no accidental grounds. Such friendship moreover is both stedfast and lasting. It lasts as long as the friends are good