and excellent, and take pleasure in what is good, and virtue is lasting. And each of the two is both absolutely good in himself and good also to his friend. For the good are both good in themselves and good to one another. In a similar way they are pleasant and profitable as well; since those who are good in themselves, and absolutely, are also pleasant to one another. Each takes delight in his own peculiar acts and is also delighted with those of the rest of the world, when they are like to, or the same as, his own acts. But the acts of all good and excellent men are either the same or at any rate alike and so it is plain that the good are pleasant both to themselves and to one another. Consequently such friendship as this is lasting. For those characteristics which the other two forms of friendship exhibit specially, and which are needful in friends, all these this friendship, and this friendship alone, comprises in itself. It contains at once goodness, and pleasantness, and profitableness; pleasantness and profitableness resulting from goodness; and goodness of this sort is not merely good in itself but is also good to him who feels the affection. Moreover their very likeness to one another is productive of pleasure to friends of this kind. So this friendship has both pleasantness and profitableness in the highest degree. And in virtue of their likeness to this the two other kinds of friendship get their names. This is the best form of friendship; and the causes which produce it are most properly and in the highest sense, objects of affection.

It is likely enough that such friendships should be rare. Those who are good, the sense we have described, are few and far between. And friendship of this kind requires not only virtue and good dispositions but time and intimacy as well to mature it. As the proverb says, you cannot know one another, till you have consumed together the proverbial salt. Nor is it possible heartily to receive and to love one another, till each has had time to become clearly loved by the other, and to be believed to love that other. Those, who strike up friendly relations with one another in a hurry have a wish to be friends, but are not really such, unless they grow into each other's affections by length of time and intimacy and come to believe themselves to be loved. Consequently a wish for friendship may originate quickly, but not friendship itself. As a result of this the friendship of the good is complete in point of time as well as in all those other particulars which have been enumerated, and rests on all the different grounds of affection.

Once more, each of the two friends gets from the other to an equal extent all those good offices, which should subsist between friends: both of these are alike in being good, alike in being pleasant to the other, and alike in being loved by that other.

.-Ideal Friendship compared with the two inferior kinds.

(a) THEIR INFERIORITY FURTHER DEMONSTRATED.

1. Friendships, where the objects sought by the two parties are identical, are more real and more lasting than where they are different.

Still friendship, which has pleasure for its object, has a certain likeness to true friendship, since the good are agreeable to one another as well as to the rest of the world; so too has friendship for profit's sake, since the good are also profitable to one another. In these two cases, friendships are more likely to be permanent where each of the two friends derives a similar kind of gratification from the other, pleasure say, and not only so but where this pleasure is drawn in both cases from the same source. This is so with the witty, but not so with the lover and his darling. These latter both

indeed feel pleasure, but not pleasure in the same objects. What the lover delights in is the sight of his darling, what the latter delights in is being courted by his lover. So when the bloom passes off, the friendship often drops; the lover is no longer charmed by the sight of his darling, and so the latter no longer receives the same attentions as of old. Still in many cases such friendships are lasting, if the two from similarity of disposition come to love each other's characters.

Those who, in their love affairs, interchange, not pleasure but profit, are not such real or such lasting friends. 2. Friendships of pleasure more last- Those whom profit makes friends break off their ing than those of friendships as soon as the profit vanishes. It is profit, not one another they are friends of, but their

own selfish interests.

3. but fall short of true friendship (1) in unselfishness,

Now on grounds of pleasure or of profit the bad may be friends with one another, and the good with the bad, and those who are neither one nor the other with any of the three; but to be friends for their friend's own sake is clearly restricted to the good alone, since the bad have no pleasure in one another,

(2) in superiority to slander.

unless some advantage is to be gained.

Furthermore, it is the friendship of the good that is alone unruffled by slander; it is not easy to believe anyone's stories about a friend who has been proved over a long period of time. Between such friends perfect trust prevails and an assurance that their friend never could have injured them, and those other requisites which we look for in real friendship. But in the two other kinds there is nothing to prevent slander having its way.

But the friendship which is based on pleasure and that which is based on profit has a certain likeness to this kind. Goodness is that which is strictly pleasant and profitable, and the good are in the highest sense pleasant and profitable to one another. And in the case of these friends by analogy,' as they may be called, their friendships are lasting when they give one another the same sort of gratification, for instance when each is pleasant to the other or profitable; they are not lasting where the one is pleasant the other profitable. But not only should they afford the same kind of gratification to one another, but also one derived from the same source, that is to say if they are to keep up their friendship permanently: for instance if they are to give each other pleasure, they must give it by the same kind of dispositions, the witty, for example, gratifying one another by their wit and not being like the lover and the object of his affection. In this case both give one another pleasure, yet not after the same manner. The lover delights in the sight of his darling, the latter in the attentions he receives from his lover. As the bloom dies off, the friendship often fades away, since the pleasure which gave rise to the friendship ceases; neither is the lover pleased any longer by the sight of his darling, nor does the latter get his attentions. Still many under these circumstances do form lasting friendships, that is to say if being of similar dispositions, they come as a result of their intimacy to love each other's characters,

But those who give one another not the same kind of gratification do not form lasting friendships and, when they are friends, love each other less. As a general rule, those who are friends for profit's sake, when the profit ceases, cease to be friends and separate; it was not one another that they cared for but their own interests. Such friendships, then, as these which rest on pleasure or profit, the bad even may experience; and the bad man may be a friend in this sense as well as the good on such grounds as these the bad man may love a bad man and may also love a good man, and a good man a bad, and an indifferent man either of them, for a good man may often have occasion to use a bad one. A man may well be an excellent admiral, or a first-rate general, without being very excellent morally; and there is nothing to prevent a good man requiring the services of such.

Moreover it is not impossible for the good to be pleased by the bad. Some there are who, though of a wholly alien character, by their skill in discussion and philosophy, and in hitting on truth and the good, make themselves agreeable to the good; those, then, who are loved in this way are loved not on their own account but for their pleasantness or profitableness.

But it is the good alone who are loved by the good for their own sakes; and such friendship is indissoluble because it is tested and tried by length of time and perfect intimacy. About those who have been so tested it is not possible for one who has tested them to believe anything to their disadvantage. In such friendship there prevails perfect trust in one another and confidence on the allimportant points, assurance that they never could do one another wrong and all those other things which we look for in those who desire to be friends in truth. But in all besides there is nothing to prevent the friends from being slandered to one another and injuring one another, by not maintaining equality, and from suffering other things as well.

(b) TRUE FRIENDSHIP BELONGS TO THE GOOD alone.

Though general usage dignifies such connexions by the name of friendships,

Since, however, men give the name of friends to those who love one another on grounds of interest, which is the case with states (for the alliance which states form are held to be formed for the sake of mutual advantage), and again to those who love one another on the score of pleasure, which is the case with children--perhaps we too ought to call such friends, and to admit more kinds of friendship than one-the friendship of the good qud good, being friendship in the primary and strict sense of the term, the others friendships only by analogy. So far as there is some good in these latter or likeness to the good, so far are they friends, since the pleasant is good to those who are fond of pleasure. Such friendships do not often coalesce, nor is it the same men that become friends on grounds of pleasure that become friends on the score of interest, such accidental qualifications being not often coupled together.

yet they are friendships only by analogy, and in virtue of their likeness to true friendship.

But since friendship may be divided into these different species, the bad will be friends either for pleasure or for profit, when they happen to agree in affording one another pleasure or profit. But the good are friends for one another's own sakes: and friends because they are

This is confined to the good.

good. Such, then, are friends in an absolute sense, the others only accidentally, and in virtue of the resemblance they bear to them.

For which reason men of this stamp are not friends at all in the proper sense of the term. But since men are wont to name those friends, who are held together by mutual need-as states for instance call their allies friends-or those who are held together by pleasure-as children who are intimate call one another friends accordingly we too must name them friends, only not friends in the same way as the good; we do not regard them as of the same species, but call them friends by analogy.' For this same reason we speak also of several kinds of friendship. The friendship of the good, in virtue of their goodness, is friendship in the primary and proper sense of the term: the other two are friendships only by analogy; for the pleasant also, in so far as it is a kind of good, by its pleasantness holds men together the pleasant is a sort of good to the lovers of pleasure, and it is like good just because it seems good to them; the profitable also seems good to him who is in the enjoyment of it. Hence it comes to pass that friendships which are prompted by these motives get called friendships from their likeness to true friendship.

:

But a friendship which grows out of a mixture of pleasure and profit, in such a way that on the one side the affection arises from pleasure on the other from profit, is of rare occurrence; that which binds friends together is only accidentally present in this case, for that which binds friends together is the delighting in the same things, the loving the same things. Socrates' love for Plato, for instance, is based on their common love to (the elder) Socrates and their common delight in his prosperity or, it may be, on their both loving pleasure, or both profit. But in the case of this compound friendship they don't both take delight in the same thing, but one delights in the pleasant, the other in the profitable: it is only a matter of accident that they love the same thing, so far as each rejoices in the other's good and prays for his prosperity: still they don't do this for their friend's own sake, but because of pleasure or profit.

For this reason, then, friendship of this kind does not often occur, because it is a pure accident that what is common to the two is united in one thing. But what is a single thing only by accident will not often hold men together.

If, then, friendship be divided into these three species, the bad will be friends to get pleasure or profit, this being the point of resemblance between them, while the good alone will be friends unselfishly. Because they are both good, therefore do they love each other. Such men then are friends absolutely properly and essentially, the others only accidentally, having the name of friendship applied to them from their resemblance to the good.

IV. THE CONDITIONS FAVOURABLE TO FRIENDSHIP. i.-Constant intercourse is necessary to give reality to Friendship. Now, just as in respect of the virtues, some men are called good for their dispositions others for their acts, so too is it in respect of friendship-that is, some are called friends for their friendly dispositions, others for their friendly acts. Those who live course is required together delight in one another and supply one another with blessings, while those who are asleep or separated by distance do not live in the performance of acts of actual friendship, though they may be dis

Friendship, like virtue, may exist as a potential disposition, or as an actual fact. Inter

to make friendships actual.

posed to do so distance destroys, not friendship in itself but, the actual exhibition of it; and if the absence be protracted, even the friendship itself gets forgotten, a fact which has given rise to the sentiment,

"Many are the friendships dissolved for want of intercourse."

And, as in respect of the virtues, some men are called good for their disposition, others for their actual conduct-some, for instance, have a disposition of justice, but do not put it in practice, as they are prevented by external circumstances, while others do put their justice in practice, acting in accordance with that disposition of justice which they have received-so too is it with friendship. Some there are, who live together, delight in one another's prosperity, and furnish each to the other all the good in their power, while others sleep, are separated by distance, and do not practise acts of friendship to one another, and yet are so disposed as to do so-since distance does not put an end to friendship in itself, only to the active exercise of it.

But if the absence be long continued, then even the friendship itself grows forgotten, which has caused it to be said,

"Many are the friendships dissolved for want of intercourse."

ii.—A certain pliability and easiness of temper required. But the elderly and the austere don't appear to be good subjects for friendship; there is little that is pleasing in them, and no one can pass his days with what gives him pain or even with what gives him no pleasure, since nature seems to shun beyond all else what is painful and to yearn for what is pleasant.

The elderly and austere do not often make friends since

they have no pleasure in one another's company,

yet don't live

though mutual es

teem may render them well disposed.

Those who entertain esteem for one another but together should be regarded rather as well disposed than as friends proper, there being nothing so distinctive of friends as their living together; since the needy require assistance, the fortunate company, they least of all can afford to be solitary. But men cannot pass their time with one another if they are not agreeable to one another and don't take pleasure in the same pursuits, these conditions being the bases on which companionship rests.

The elderly and the austere do not furnish promising material for friendship, as there is so little that is pleasant in them. But where there is no pleasure felt, men do not care to live together or pass their time in company, since no one would choose to pass his days with what is painful or even with what fails to please him. A man we cannot live with cannot become our friend, for it is intercourse and companionship that make friends.

Those who esteem one another without living together are to be accounted well-disposed rather than friends.

There is nothing so distinctive of friends as living together. Not even those whom interest makes friends can do without living together; if they are in want, they require each other's services, and these they cannot have without living