ii. Is Happiness within our own power; and, if so, what are the means for its attainment ? WITHOUT EXCLUDING OTHER INFLUENCES, MAN IS HIMSELF THE MAIN AND MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF HIS OWN HAPPINESS. This last discussion opens up a further question: By what means is happiness to be achieved? Is it the result of study, or of moral discipline, or of some form of philosophic culture? Or does it rather come to us by way of special Providence, or may it even be owing to chance? But does happiness depend at all upon agencies which man himself can create, or is it dependent upon the Divine Will? Whether it be a gift of God' is a logy at any rate it is divine and blessed.' Now if there be any boon at all accorded by Gods to men, it is reasonable to believe that happiness is such a 'gift of heaven,' more especially as of all human blessings this is the highest and best. But this is a subject which will perhaps be more approquestion for Theo- priately dealt with in another Treatise. Still it is quite evident that even if Happiness be not a gift bestowed on us by Heaven, but be a result attained by means of virtue or through some kind of study and philosophic culture, it is one of those things which are most divine. As the reward of virtue, it is undoubtedly the noblest 'end' of man, and thus a thing divine and blessed. In any event, happiness must be within a wide and comprehensive range: it is a thing capable of being realised by all whose progress in virtue has not been stunted at the outset; the means thereto being a kind of training and discipline. Moreover, if it be better that men should gain happiness by their own efforts rather than through chance, it is reasonable to believe that such is in fact the case; since whatever is in nature is so exquisitely designed that whatever is, is best.' The same law of perfection applies to the creations of art and to all that is owing to a defined cause, especially to that noblest of all causes, virtue. It would surely be discordant to our reason, to attribute to the caprice of chance what is grandest and fairest in life. in dispute is indeed made self-evident by the definition given of happiness, which was described as a conscious exercise of the faculties, of a specific character, in conformity with virtue.' As for other goods' there are some which it is essential for a man to have if he is to be happy, whilst others are in their nature co-operative and helpful in the way of instruments. tial character is a 'virtuous activity' which needs beyond itself only few and simple conditions. The Science of civil life' assumes that happiness can be produced by defined agencies-i.e. virtuous activities; and consistently therewith we count This truth will be in accord with what was premised at starting. We laid down the principle that the 'end' of social science is the noblest of all ends. Now this Science regards it as its supreme concern to give to citizens a definite moral character and to render them disposed to practise noble acts. It is reasonable, therefore, that we should call neither ox nor horse nor any mere animal 'happy,' seeing that not one of them is capable of taking part in any virtuous activity from which happiness could arise. For the same reason neither is a boy happy: owing to his youth he is as yet incapable of such activities as are requisite to acquire happiness. If ever boys are called happy, it is only because they are complimented by reason of the hopes formed of them. no one happy who is not capable of virtue. These virtuous ac tivities must be continued all life through. If the moral freedom be taken away by calamity, virtue and happiness become impossible or dithicult. Happiness in a word requires matured virtue and perfect harmony in its external relations, to last all life. through. Many the reverses and many the changes which take place in the course of a long life. It is possible for a man in the highest prosperity to incur great misfortunes as he nears old age, as terrible as those which the Myth records of Priam in the heroic poems. But if a man has encountered sorrows such as those, and has ended his days in wretchedness, no one counts him a happy man. In view of this difficulty a question arises whether happiness be a result of study or is attained through some process of culture, or through constant habituation to virtuous actions, or through some other form of discipline; or whether, on the contrary, it be a gift bestowed on men by the Gods, or even the effect of some chance. Now if there be any boon at all accorded by God to men, it would seem that happiness is veritably that boon. Far more than all other blessings is happiness a gift from Heaven,' in proportion as of all other human interests this is the greatest. But to argue upon these points belongs to a discussion upon Providence and to a different kind of Treatise. We must pursue our investigations upon grounds suitable to the plan which we have set before us. Still it is quite evident that even if happiness be not a boon of Heaven but be owing to virtue, or to some kind of philosophic culture, it is one of those things which are most divine. The reward of virtue and the end of man (which happiness itself exactly is), is manifestly of highest worth, and a thing divine and blessed. : Wide and comprehensive for all will its range be found to be it is possible for it to be the heritage of all who are not dwarfed in understanding nor incapable of being incited to the pursuit of virtue, the means thereto being a kind of training and study. Indeed, happiness as resulting from exercise and discipline, will, it is reasonable to suppose, be greater and more perfect than anything resulting from chance. This principle is a universal one. Whatever is brought about by a defined cause, whether of art or of nature, is better than anything which is produced by chance ; and more especially is that the case in the creations of that noblest of all causes, virtue. Besides, to entrust to fortune the keeping of the highest and noblest good, happiness, would prove an utter discord in nature. This truth is indeed self-evident from the definition of happiness which was laid down. Happiness was described as an activity of the soul according to virtue in a complete life.' As for other goods, they are partly bodily, resulting from the body itself, and partly incidental to the body; and of these some are necessary with a view to happiness, and others are, as it were, instrumental to it. Necessary goods are bodily health and the sustaining of life, and those things in lack of which it is impossible for happiness to be completely realized. Instrumental goods are such helps as wealth or friends. If, then, this is the definition of happiness, how could it possibly have its source and cause in chance? An activity of the soul cannot result from chance. Hence what was said of the end' of Social Science is consistent with this definition. We said that the end of Social Science was the Chief Good, and therefore happiness (i.e., the realization of the Chief Good) was to be found thereby. It is then with good reason that we assert that neither horse nor ox nor any mere animal is happy, since not one of such creatures is there able to participate in the activities of social life and for this very reason neither is a child happy, since, that is, by reason of his tender age, he is incapable of performing moral or social acts. When children are called happy, it is because they are complimented on account of the hopes formed of them: the essential condi tions of virtue are, as we have shown, virtue and a complete life. . : I say that an harmonious life is essential, because there are many reverses and all kinds of vicissitudes which befall men in the course of their lives. It is quite conceivable for a man who is in the very highest degree of prosperity to encounter storms of adversity as he nears old age, as in the myth which is told of Priam, in the heroic poems; and when a man has met with misfortunes such as these and has died in wretchedness, no one counts him happy. iii.-Is Happiness still possible for a Man, so long as sorrow may overtake him or his friends? (a) SOLON'S VIEW VARIOUSLY STATED AND CRITICISED: THE AMBIGUITIES OF IT. Is there then no man in all the world whom we may count happy, so long as he is yet alive, but rather, as Solon's dictum is, must we wait to see his end? In view of possible calamities, is anyone happy in life, or not until death? Suppose the case to be so:-still, is it true in fact that a man is happy even when he is dead? Is not that an utterly inconsistent view for us to take-that there should be happiness in death, more particularly as we define happiness to be a mode of conscious activity? Yet if happiness be a virtuous activity, and death be annihilation, how can a man be happy in death? Suppose another case, and that we say-not But suppose that that the dead man is happy, and that such is not the idea which Solon intends, but rather that not until his death. can we safely count a man to have been happy, death is not annias being only then out of reach of evil and sorrow; this opens up a new difficulty. It is thought that even to a dead man there is a kind of good and evil: just as good or evil may befall a man in his lifetime without his being conscious of it: for example, honours and disgraces, successes and misfortunes, to his children and generally to his descendants. hilation the consciousness of the departed will be afilicted by the sorrows of their friends on earth. This latter supposition seems monstrous that the be dead should conscious and that happiness This latter view again presents a difficulty. A man who has lived happily until old age, and who has died as he has lived, may still encounter many reverses in his descendants: some of them may be good and find a life in accordance with their deserts, others again may experience the contrary. Clearly, their then, it is quite conceivable for men, in their different degrees of relationship to their ancestors, to stand in all kinds of attitudes to them. that the dead also should be conscious of all these vicissitudes, and change their own lot at every alternation of that of their friends, becoming at one moment happy and at another wretched-that would be a monstrous fate. Yet assuredly it would be none the less monstrous if we took the other alternative-that the fortunes of descendants do not for the very least moment penetrate to ancestors. 6 But should be as fluctuating as that of their descendants on earth. Still, equally monstrous would be the supposition that death is unconsciousness. There is surely no reason why those who are happy should not be called happy. . . at any rate provisionally. But let us revert to the problem as originally stated: the question now raised may perhaps be explained by the light of it. Assuming then that it is necessary to see the end,' and not till then count a man happy (not on the score of his actual happiness, but because he has once been happy), surely it is absurd that while a man is happy, the existence of his happiness should not be credited to him, merely from a dislike to congratulate the living from apprehension of possible reverses, or from having formed a conception that happiness is something abiding and by no means susceptible of change, whereas fortune is constantly alternating and reversing her position even in the lifetime of the same individuals. If we are to follow in the wake of fortune we shall clearly have to call the same person at one time wretched, at another time happy, revealing the happy man to be as changeful E as a chameleon, and one whose condition rests on an insecure foundation. Is it right, then, to call any human being happy whilst he is still alive, or ought we rather to see the end' as Solon warns us. Suppose we assume this principle of Solon: will a man be really happy even when he is dead? Is not such a principle quite absurd, that a man should gain his happiness by dying-especially as happiness was defined to be a mode of activity?' The inference from such a principle would evidently be that happiness consists in absolute inaction! But suppose we state the case thus-that neither we ourselves nor Solon count the dead man happy on account of his having died, but because his life has been a life of blessedness right to the end, and because after a man's death one could safely count him happy, as being henceforth out of the reach of evils and misfortunes. Yet not even does this solution appear satisfactory. There is still a difficulty herein... if we admit that to the dead man as to the living there is any kind of good or evil, and that he is conscious of it. Such an one will experience various phases of joy and sorrow, disgrace and honour. The successes of descendants and children are put down to the account of the dead, to swell their felicity. Consequently the dead are happy and blessed on the score of the happiness of their descendants, and miserable on the score of their misfortunes. This latter view again raises a still further difficulty. A man may have lived his own life happily, and have died a death in harmony with his life; and yet it is possible for many reverses to befall him in regard to his descendants, and for some of them to be good and to enjoy a life suitable to their deserts, and for others to be the reverse. It would however be a monstrous thing if the dead man's lot were to vary with every variation in the fortunes of his descendants, and to become at one moment happy, at another moment miserable. On the other hand it seems an equally irrational view that the living should not impart their fortune to those who are departed and are bound to them by nearness of race. But let us revert to the question as originally raised, and ask whether we ought not to count men happy whilst living, but only after their decease. The question which has since arisen may perhaps be elucidated by means thereof. If, then, it be necessary to see the end' and not till then count a man happy (not as though he were happy through having died, but because he was so formerly), surely it is absurd that whilst he is happy, the quality which actually belongs to him should not be credited to him, but that we should shrink from calling him really happy, from an unwillingness to call the living happy and from having regard to the misfortunes of life, or from having formed a conviction that happiness is something abiding and least of all things subject to change, whereas fortune is the entire opposite. But if we follow in the wake of fortune, we shall have to call the same man, time after time, now happy and now miserable, making the happy man to appear as changeful as the hues of a chameleon, or as one whose happiness rests on a rotten foundation. (b) SOLON'S DICTUM DISPROVED BECAUSE THE MAIN ELEMENT IN HAPPINESS IS A VIRTUOUS ACTIVITY WHICH IS WITHIN A Yet surely it is in no sense a right conclusion to say that our happiness follows the course of fortune's caprice. Not upon fortune does it depend whether we pass Solon's dictum is in fact inconsistent |