interest or for pleasure, will give such an amount and will receive such a return, as may seem fair to both of them. In this way it will be brought about that their intercourse shall be free from all reproaches. But if this cannot be effected and they cannot both agree on the proper return to be made, but one or other or both of them object, the returns must necessarily be regulated in accordance with the decision of him who receives the benefits. For, if the one says that he is willing to give so much for such and such a service, and the other renders that service on these terms, the one will give what he agreed that he would give, and will repay the service by giving pleasure or some other advantage, while the other is precluded from grumbling since he has got what he judged it fair that he should get. This is not only necessary and relieves the transaction from all trouble, it is also fair as well. For if a man gets what he wishes, no injustice is done him; and this seems to be the way in which matters are regulated in buying and selling; the purchaser fixes the price and measures it by the profit, or the pleasure the article will bring to him, and says the thing he wishes to buy is worth so much to him. In some countries moreover there is a law, that no suits shall lie for the enforcement of voluntary contracts, and that the parties shall not have recourse to any other judge in such covenants, or any other law, than the terms of the contract; but as a man has trusted his neighbour and has given him his goods on trust, he must finish the、 transaction on the terms of his original agreement. Such nations consider it more just that he who has been trusted in the first instance should settle the amount of the return than the man who has trusted him. Otherwise, he who trusted his companion, will decide for the receiver, but no one is a trustworthy judge in his own cause. For as a general rule, each thinks that what is his own, and what he has to give, is worth a great deal. But he who in the first instance was trusted to settle the return for the benefits he received, even though subsequently the man who parted with his goods to him, give him trouble on the ground of being inadequately recompensed, can still judge aright if he carry out the original conditions which the other assented to and he agreed upon for he will not do what he now thinks right after having received the service, but what he valued it at when he had not yet got it.

v.-Questions of casuistry stated and solved.

(a) QUESTIONS STATED.

There are a number of cases in which it is doubtful who has the prior claim upon

The following kind of questions are also attended with difficulty. Ought a man to give up all to his father and obey him in all things, or, when he is sick, obey his doctor, and when voting for one to serve the office of general, vote for the man most skilled in war? Similarly, should a man do a service to a friend in preference to a good man, and repay his benefactor a kindness in preference to giving money to a comrade, if it be impossible to do both?

us.

Thus much on these points. But we must look also into the following questions. Must we give all things and obey in all things our most honoured and our dearest ones, or are there some things which we shall give to those less honoured and less loved in preference to those who are more honoured and more loved? For instance, shall we obey our father in all things, whatsoever and whenever he command us, or not always? but, when we are sick, obey our physician, when we are at war, obey one fitted to command? And ought we to vote for as general not our friend nor our father, but one who is skilled in war?

In the same way to which of the two ought we to do a service, our friend or a good man? And should we do a favour to our comrade or repay our benefactor and one to whom we may owe a debt if it is not possible to do them both a good turn?

(b) EXACT ANSWERS ARE IMPOSsible.

Is it not the case that to determine this class of cases exactly is by no means easy! They are subject to all kinds and varieties of difference in magnitude and pettiness, in point of honourableness and imperativeness.

Such cases of casuistry are too numerous and intricate to be exactly solved.

Now to settle all such cases individually and exactly is not easy. They are subject to all kinds and varieties of difference and they differ from one another variously in magnitude and insignificance, in honourableness and necessity. They are not all of them equally small or great, honourable, or necessary. Sometimes to tend a friend seems more imperative than to tend a good man, sometimes it is more honourable to do a service to a benefactor than a friend, sometimes the reverse; hence it is not possible to lay down an exact rule on each one of these points.

(c) TWO GENERAL RULES STATED.

But that we ought not to heap all things on the same individual is clear enough. Also we should as a rule repay benefits rather than confer favours on our comrades. For instance we should repay a debt to the man to whom it is due rather than make a present to a comrade.

1. Don't give everything to the same individual. 2. Repay your debts before you give away.

This is plain at any rate, that we should not give all things to the same individual, but as a rule it is more just to repay our benefactors the benefits they have conferred upon us than to gratify our comrade, for instance we should repay a debt to one who has lent us money, rather than make a present to a comrade.

(d) EXCEPTIONS STATED AND CONSIDERED.

1. A father may have superior claims even to a debtor.

But, perhaps, not even this always, for instance if a man has been ransomed from robbers should he ransom his ransomer, whoever he may be, or should he repay him, if he has not indeed been captured but asks for repayment, or should he not ransom his father in preference? (Surely this latter) for it would seem as if one should ransom one's father even before oneself. As has been already said, then, though generally speaking we should repay a debt rather than bestow a favour, yet if the gift surpass the repayment of the debt in honourableness or obligatoriness, we must incline rather to it: for sometimes it is not even fair to requite a favour, as in the instance where one man does a

2. Cases in which the repayment of favours is not obligatory.

favour to another knowing him to be good, while he to whom the return is to be made is, as he believes, a bad man. Sometimes we are not even bound to repay a loan by another loan. A bad man knows very well that if he has lent his money to a good man he will get it back again, but the other has no expectation of getting his back from a bad man (and is not, therefore, bound to lend it). If this is in truth the case, the claim is no longer an equal one; if it is not the case, but the one holds it to be the case, still we shall not consider his conduct strange.

But I say as a general rule, because it may happen that the opposite course of conduct is the more just. For instance, supposing a man to have been ransomed from robbers, is he bound to ransom his ransomer whoever he may be, in return, or to repay him, if he has not been captured but asks for the money back again, or to ransom his father? Surely the latter, as it would seem that he should ransom his father even before himself. Therefore it is that we said that as a general principle and as a rule we should pay a debt rather than gratify one whom we love. But if the gratifying our friends is so necessary or so honourable as to outweigh justice to our benefactors, we must incline rather to that side, since it is not always just even to recompense our benefactor if that benefactor be a bad man for instance if a bad man has lent money to a good man, the good man will not be bound to lend money to the bad, for the one lent his money with the full knowledge that he would get it repaid, but the good man having no expectation of getting it back again does not act unjustly in not lending it. Whether then the good man is right in thinking about the bad man that he will be evil also in this, and so refuses to return his favour, he acts reasonably in refusing to advance the loan; or if this is not the case, but he still thinks that it is, and consequently does not requite him by an equal service, in this case also he does not miss justice by much. For it is not fair that whatever a bad man gives a good, this he should also get from him. The gift of the bad man is not equal to that of the good, even though each does the same service to the other. The good man's gift becomes the greater by the reputation of the giver. Therefore it is that we have said, we must not always repay our benefactor in preference to conferring favours on our friends.

Rules on this, as on all other moral

laid down with precise accuracy.

(e) THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE IS RENDER TO ALL THEIR DUE.' As we have often already said, discussions about feeling and actions admit of precise definition only to the degree to which the subject matter of which they treat, admits it. That, then, we must not give subjects, cannot be the same service to all alike, and that we must not give everything to a father, any more than we must sacrifice everything to Zeus, is obvious enough. But since parents and mothers, comrades and benefactors have different claims upon us, we must render to each their due. And this is what men To marriage feasts they seem actually to do. invite their relations; since they are bound by the tie of a common race they naturally take

ing,

Generally speak. different classes have different claims upon us. Relatives are called

in on occasions of family interest.

Parents are entitled to support and to honour;

Elders to respect;

their part in all acts connected with it; for the same reason men hold that relatives above others should attend funerals. Parents would seem, thus, to have a special claim upon us for maintenance since we owe to them our own; and those who are the authors of our being it is more honourable to provide for in this way even than to provide for ourselves. And honour too should be paid to parents as to the Gods, only not all honour. Father and mother for instance have not a right to the same honour, nor to that which we pay a philosopher or our general, but to that which befits a father and to that similarly which befits a mother. To every elder we should pay the respect to which their age entitles them, by rising up in their presence, making way for them at table and in other similar matters. Comrades on the other hand and brothers have a right to plainness of speech and to share our goods with us. To relations, to fellow-tribesmen, to fellow-citizens, to all others we must ever try to give their due, and seek to determine what properly belongs to each in respect of relationship, virtue or usefulness. When the claims are of the same sort, the decision is comparatively easy, where they are different in kind, it becomes more difficult, still we must not on this ground shrink from making it, but decide to the best of our powers.

Comrades to frankness and openhandedness. Every class has its own special claims,

and these are sometimes found to conflict.

As we have often remarked in our previous discussions, statements about feelings and actions must correspond to the feelings and actions, varying from time to time as they do. And it is not possible to give a precise and exact answer on every point.

That we must not give the same things to all, nor everything to a father, as we must not sacrifice everything even to Zeus, is obvious. But since we owe one kind of duties to parents, a different kind to brothers, and a different set to benefactors and to comrades, we must render to each their due and what properly belongs to them. And this is what almost all men seem actually to do: to weddings they invite not their benefactors nor their intimates but their relations; for, as their race is what they share with them, they call on them to participate in acts which have reference to it; and they consider that relatives are especially bound to attend the funerals of relations for the same reason.

It would further seem that we are bound to provide support for our parents, for them even before ourselves. Children are bound to maintain their parents in existence, as they themselves derive their own existence from them. And we ought also to pay them honour as we do to the Gods-yet not all honour nor honour of every kind. Father and mother are not entitled to the same honour, and to neither of them should we pay the honour due to the philosopher or the general-that I mean which we naturally pay to these two; but to a father we should pay the honour due to a father, and to a mother the honour due to a mother. And we should further render to every elderly person the respect due to their age; a young man for instance should show his respect for an old one by rising up in his presence, making way for him, and in many such

ways. To comrades and brothers we should manifest frankness and readiness to impart, and so to relations, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-citizens, and all the rest. And we must try to give to each his due, taking into account the relationship in which each stands to oneself, or his usefulness, or his virtue, and measuring by these the honours and the intimacy to which we should severally admit them.

Where the claims are the same in kind the decision is comparatively easy. What we ought to give to different relatives, or fellow-tribesmen, or fellowcitizens, or any others who are similarly related to us, we shall easily discover. But when the claims are various and diverse, to settle what we should render to each is a task of more difficulty. Still we are not entitled for all that to abandon the claims of equity, but we must decide in each case as best we can, and in respect of all we must observe the conduct which propriety dictates.

vi.-Questions relating to the dissolution of Friendships.

1. In friendships of pleasure or interest the friendship comes naturally to an end, when pleasure or interest is no longer promoted by them.

(a) CASES WHICH JUSTIFY A DISSOLUTION OF FRIENDSHIPS. Difficulties too surround the question whether we should or should not break off our friendship with those who no longer continue to be what they were. Where men are friends on grounds of interest or of pleasure, it seems perfectly natural that they should part company when these motives no longer exist. It was by their interests or their pleasure that they were bound, and where these fail, it is natural that their affection should come to an end. But a man would have a right to find fault if a friend while really loving him for profit or for pleasure through where a should profess that he loved him on the score of character. For as we said at the commencement

2. Friendships fall

man has been deceived as to the motive which

prompted the friendship.

When, then,

of the discussion, the most fruitful source of dissension is when men imagine they are friends on different grounds from what they really are. a man has deceived himself and considers that he is loved on the score of his character, while his friend did nothing of the kind, he has himself to blame for it; but when he is led astray by his friend's profession he has a right to find fault with him who has deceived him, even more than with the issuers of counterfeit coin, inasmuch as the ill deed touches a point of more vital interest.

We have still the following point to investigate-should we or should we not break off friendships? For it is matter of discussion whether in certain cases, where our friend still continues to feel affection for us and to love us, we should by our own act bring the friendship to an end.

Now our sentence is that when men are friends on grounds of interest or pleasure, it is not unreasonable for them to separate, when they no longer afford each other the one or the other: if the pleasure or the profit come to an end, which was what they really cared for, it is quite natural that they should no longer feel affection,