mass of men are naturally predisposed to yield to pleasure and to become slaves of their appetites. They argue, in consequence, that it is right to draw them to a contrary direction, in the hope that they may, through these counteracting influences, attain to a proper moderation. Those who decry pleasure do so often from prudential considerations, and in order to counteract the undue pursuit of it. politic. Theories But such a policy defeats its Own ends. I doubt whether such a theory is prudent or that bear on human emotions and practical conduct are less credited than observed facts. When therefore, theories are at variance with the facts that come under personal observation they are derided and bring the truth itself into an equal discredit. For example, if the philosopher who censures pleasure is himself observed at any time to be eager for some pleasure of his own, he is which manifestly thought to have such a leaning for it, as though it were altogether and entirely a thing to covet. In such cases it is not characteristic of the world generally to make fine distinctions. In practical matters men always bring theories to the test of their own experience and the observations of life. A theory contradicts experience (however pious the intention) brings discre dit on the author. verified, are of Theories, however, that are based on fact, are accepted by the reason and made a rule of life. Theories, however, that are true and can be extreme utility, not merely with a view to knowing our duty, but also in their bearing on practical life. Being consistent with the facts of experience they are accredited, and consequently stimulate those who understand their importance, to live in accordance with their standard. But enough of general remarks. Let us proceed to the discussion of the theories that have been maintained on this subject of pleasure. In what follows, we must, according to the scheme of our argument, discuss more fully the nature of Pleasure: for Pleasure is in a sense congenital, and an essential element in our nature. This is the reason why, as teachers of the young, we guide them by Pleasure and Pain; leading them, by infliction of the latter, away from what is base, and by means of the former inciting them to what is noble. Which process clearly proves that by nature we shrink from pain and pursue after pleasure. Therefore, since our Treatise concerns the emotions of mankind and their actions as well, it is but reasonable and consistent with our scheme, that we should accurately discriminate in the matter of Pleasure, affecting as it does both emotions and actions. Further, it appears to contribute in no small degree to the acquisition of Moral Virtue, that we should feel delight and dislike just when such feelings are appropriate. For these feelings are coextensive with human life; joy and sorrow, in their respective objects, are always with us: and, if felt duly and fittingly, both in kind and amount, and consistently with Right Reason, they contribute largely to the formation of the virtuous character, and to the life of true happiness. Nor would it be at all reasonable to omit such a subject as Pleasure: for, in its consideration, there is nothing so simple or obvious as not to require copious and weighty discussion. On the contrary, so great, somehow, is the divergence of opinion about Pleasure, that some affirm it to be the very Chief Good, while others affirm that it is not a 'good' at all, but exactly the opposite-an intrinsically base thing. Of those who maintain the latter view, some do actually themselves believe it, having been convinced that pleasure is a base thing; while others, believing, themselves, that this or that pleasure may be good, yet wish to persuade their neighbours that all pleasure is bad, thinking that this is a safer canon for the conduct of life, and that men in general would be advantaged by a conviction that Pleasure is a base thing. This they support by pleading the natural propensity of all men to pleasure, and consequently, how essential it is to give them a strong wrench in the opposite direction, by drawing them, once for all, by all available means, away from pleasures, and enabling them thereby to reach the condition which we called the mean state,' and so to adopt eventually the right attitude towards Pleasure in the abstract. This plea is fallacious. Such a process will never wean the majority of mankind from base pleasures. Human emotions and actions carry more conviction to those who behold them, than do arguments about them. Whenever therefore such teachers are found to condemn Pleasure by their words, but to approve it by their practice and by their feelings towards it, they contradict themselves, and become a laughing-stock to those who hear their words, and see their conduct; and such teachers progress not one step towards aiding mankind, for all their words, the insincerity of which is proved by their actions. He who condemns Pleasure, if at any time he is detected in its pursuit, is concluded to have deserted to its side, and to be approving it as a good : nay, more, he causes those, who observe his defection, to imagine, not merely that some pleasure may be a good, but that all Pleasure may be approved as such. For distinction and discrimination-as, that one class of pleasure may be good, while another pleasure may possibly be base-are too subtle for the multitude: which no sooner sees a man of mind delighting in some pleasure, than it leaps to the conclusion that all pleasure is a thing good in itself and choice-worthy. Whereby such teachers as we have described not only fail to establish their own views, but bring the truth to naught, into the bargain. Thus it is clear that true moral theories, and such only, can have real usefulness to the mind, in purging it of all error, and can also have a profitable influence on the conduct of life. Such theories win acceptance by being seen to coincide with the best actions of those who hold them. : Enough however about erroneous views let us return to the discussion of Pleasure itself; and, first, we will set forth the opinions of the ancients about it. ii.-Examination of the theory of Eudoxus that Pleasure is the Summum Bonum. (a) STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF EUDoxus. Now Eudoxus regarded pleasure as the summum bonum, and used the following arguments : 1. He saw all creatures, as well rational as irrational, eagerly striving to attain it. In all cases that which is desired is a thing good and right, and that which is desired in the highest degree is by the same reasoning the highest good. Consequently, the fact that all creatures alike are impelled to the pursuit of pleasure, proves that for all alike 1. That which is desired is a good. That which is desired in the highest degree is the summum bonum. But pleasure is desired in the by all. Therefore pleasure is the Summum Bonum.' highest degree and pleasure is the greatest good. Everything, so he argued, finds out what is good for its own self, just as it finds out its proper food; hence, a thing which is good for all beings, a thing (His arguments for which they all strive, that is the chiefest good. [These arguments of Eudoxus gained credit on account of the excellence of his personal character, rather than had great weight through their own cogency. through their own cogency. He was known to be a pre-eminently temperate man; consequently he was thought to hold these opinions not as the votary of pleasure, but from real conviction of their truth.] from the pure and temperate character he bore.) 2. He maintained, too, that the correctness of his view was equally plain from a consideration of pain, which is the opposite of pleasure. Pain, he said, was a thing shunned by all creatures as an evil in itself; and by parity of reasoning its opposite, pleasure, was a good to be coveted. 2. The same truth is seen conversely. 'Pain is shunned as universally as pleasure is Coveted.' 3. Pleasure is a good in its own 3. Now an object is, in the highest degree, an object of choice when we desire it not on account of something else nor with any ulterior aim; and, confessedly, right and satisfies pleasure is an object of this kind: if a man feels pleasure, no one asks him further what his motive is for having that feeling, pleasure being a feeling desirable in its own right. per se. Therefore it is the summum bonum. 4. Added to 4. Whatever makes other good more desirable is the summum bonum: pleasure does so: therefore pleasure is the summum bonum. any other good, he argued, pleasure makes that good more desirable still; e.g., added to the performance of justice or the practice of self-restraint, pleasure makes such acts more desirable: and that which increases good must, he thought, itself be good. Eudoxus, for his part, held that Pleasure was the absolute ultimate good; and he held so because he saw all things, rational and irrational, eager in its pursuit; and that which all things specially pursue, must be-he thought-the crowning good, and superior to all others. For his definition of the good was 'to each man, that, at which he specially aims.' Just as, in the case of food, each animal seeks after that which is good and serviceable to itself, while that food, if such there be, which all alike desire and would procure for themselves, is 'good' in the universal sense-so, (he held) that which all things alike deem absolutely good, and desire accordingly, must be the ultimate good. Such were the declarations of Eudoxus about Pleasure; and his arguments obtained credence rather through the moral excellence of their author than by their own merit. For he was the most temperate of men, and seemed therefore to argue thus, not as a partisan of pleasure, but as an ardent votary of truth. Further, he thought that his theory was clearly proved by the opposition between Pleasure and Pain: inasmuch as all things avoided Pain, they must pari passu' pursue Pleasure: and what all things pursue, must be the good. And, again, he tried to fortify his view by this argument. Of all things choiceworthy, that is most so which is choiceworthy for its own sake, and is not selected on any other account nor with a view to any further result. And such a good-he argued-Pleasure undoubtedly is. No one, indeed, asks why we wish for Pleasure, as might be asked about other objects-such as, for example, money or honour, with what aim we desire them. Pleasure admits no such queries: no one can allege any ulterior result of pleasure which prompts him to its acquisition; but everyone chooses it for its own nature, as its own standard, measure, and perfection. And since that which is absolutely and in itself choiceworthy is thereby the end, and ultimate object, and the actual good, therefore (he inferred) Pleasure is the ultimate good. Furthermore, he thought another reason proved his view on the subject. Pleasure, superadded to any good, makes it more choiceworthy and desirable: e.g. Temperance, or Justice, certainly become sweeter and more choiceworthy when combined with Pleasure. But that which has power to make any good better, when added to it, that, he held, must be the ultimate good. at most that (b) CRITICISM UPON THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS. Surely such an argument would seem to prove pleasure is among things that are good, though not more so than any other good, every good being more desirable when joined to another good, than when isolated. argument of Eu(1) The fourth doxus is not conclusive: (a) Assuming it to be true, the inference is that pleasure is a good, not the good. (b) Plato, in fact, used this identical argument to prove that pleasure is not the summum bonum. In fact it was by a precisely similar argument that Plato positively disproves the theory that pleasure is the summum bonum. He showed that a life of pleasure is even more desirable when combined with wisdom, than when it is per se and apart from wisdom; and he drew the conclusion that, if the combination be better, then pleasure is not per se the summum bonum. The absolute summum bonum cannot be made more desirable whatever may be added to it. But [Plato proves too much :] it is evident that according to this argument neither pleasure nor anything else can be the summum bonum: for there is nothing in the world that does not become more desirable by association with some absolute other thing good in itself. What, then, is there that satisfies Plato's requirements, and is yet a good in which we mortals have a share? [None] and yet this is a necessary attribute of the is the object of our search. [The summum bonum of Plato, however, was something transcendental, and his argument has no real validity. The good of which we are talking is of course τὸ ἀνθρωπινὸν ἀγαθόν.] Those, again, who take exception to the theory that good which OS (2) The first argu at which all things aim is a good,' and maintain the contrary, are surely mistaken in their view. When an opinion is held by all men, I maintain that it is true. The theorist who destroys this universal ground of confidence will have no greater assurance of certainty for what he may himself adduce. If it were only irrational beings who yearned for pleasures, there would have been some reason in the objection, but since even rational creatures have the same impulses, on what grounds can their objection possibly rest? It is probable that even in depraved natures there is an instinctive good, higher than the level of themselves, which aims at an end' congenial to itself. The appeal to universal experience is a valid and proper one. The pursuit of pleasure by all living things proves it to be A good (though not the summum bonum). (3) The second argument of Eudoxus is challenged by Speusippus, but upon insufficient grounds. Eudoxus was right in assuming an opposi 2. Nor, again, do the criticisms of the opponents of Eudoxus on his argument from pain as the contrary of pleasure seem to be soundly based. They deny that it follows that if pain is an evil, pleasure is therefore a good. They maintain that evil may be opposed to evil, and both extremes to a state of indifference or impassivity; and so far their tion between plea- reasoning is not amiss, though they are not right in their inferences in regard to the question now before us. If pleasure and pain were both evils, then both of them ought to have been equally avoided; if neither were evils, then neither ought to have been avoided, or both alike in exact proportion. But, as a matter of fact, men are seen to shun pain as an evil and to desire pleasure as a good. Consequently pleasure and pain are, in reality, opposed the one to the other. sure and pain, as one is EUкov and the other is not. But this is not the case. That which, added to a good, makes it better, must itself be a good but it need not be the ultimate Good, nor indeed better than any other good. Every 'good' added to another of course enhances it quâ 'good; ' the whole must invariably be greater than the part. Such, at any rate, were the views of Eudoxus about Pleasure. Plato, on the other hand, used to maintain that Pleasure could not be the ultimate Good; for which position he employed the very arguments by which Eudoxus attempted to prove that it was. For since he says-that 'good,' a greater good than which can be found, cannot be the ultimate Good-(for the ultimate Good must be the greatest of all)-it follows that any good which, by the addition of another, becomes greater and more choiceworthy, cannot itself be the ultimate Good; for it is not the greatest good, but admits of a superior. Such a good,' Pleasure is the life of pleasure becomes more pleasurable and choiceworthy by the addition of Wisdom, or of Temperance: which proves that there is something better than Pleasure. Pleasure, therefore, according to Plato, is not the ultimate Good; it is a good, but in the same sense as are the virtues, the sciences, and the other endowments of our nature. Now this is the very |