have swiftness or slowness. The revolution of the heavens, for instance, is in itself equable and unchangeable but considered relatively to the motion of the stars it may be called swift. So it is that every motion has its special quality of speed or slowness, whereas Pleasure has no such quality, therefore Pleasure is not a process of motion. And that Pleasure has no such quality is plain from the following considerations. A man is said to be pleased' quickly, just as he may 'be angered' quickly. That is, he may change quickly from the condition of not being pleased to that of being so: but he cannot be said to feel Pleasure itself quickly or slowly; neither relatively to himself, (as the things which move irregularly were said to have speed or slowness relatively to themselves) nor in comparison with anything else (as the things, whose motion was equable, were said to have). Progression, growth, change, and all modes of motion are contemplated in connection with swiftness or slowness; and so may the lapse, or sudden shifting, into the condition of pleasure. But there is no swiftness or slowness in the activity of Pleasure itself. Pleasure is a sort of goal or term of motion; it is a sort of rest, and therefore cannot itself be motion of any kind : and this, as we consider, we have proved. Nor, as we have said, is it a process of development; for, if it were, its opposite, Pain, would be a process of dissolution; and of that, of which Pleasure was the development, Pain would be the dissolution for neither development nor dissolution is casual, nor are they casually connected; but from whatsoever anything is developed, into that, and nothing else, does it naturally dissolve.

Again, if it be true, as is said, that Pain is a depletion of the natural condition, it will follow that Pleasure is a renovation thereof; and this depletion and renovation are clearly bodily processes. And so, if Pleasure is a renovation of some natural condition, that which has the renovation-to wit, the body-will feel, and be the subject of, the pleasure: and pleasure will be corporeal purely. But this is not the fact; all agree that the sense of pleasure appertains to the soul. Therefore Pleasure, we conclude, is not a process of development and renovation; but it is consequent on a renovation, just as Pain is on a depletion, of the natural state we certainly feel pleasure while a renovation is taking place, and pain, e.g., when amputation is being performed.

The view we have been criticising seems to have been derived from a consideration of bodily pleasures and pains, and, especially those of eating and drinking wherein it is certainly true that we first feel and are pained by depletion, and then pleased by renovation. But this does not hold with all pleasures: e.g., with those of mathematical science, and those of mental perception. Certainly the pleasures of hearing, smelling, seeing, take place with no antecedent pain, nor are they in any sense a renovation following on depletion.

:

Hope, again, and remembrance of things good, are among the most pleasurable things but can these pleasures be called a development? and if so, of what? There was in their subjects no previous depletion of which they could be the renovation. All which proves Pleasure not to be a development.

Others again aver that pleasure is not a good, and plead the instances of pleasures which are disreputable. So when we reply that things are not pleasurable because base men think them so; the true canon of pleasure is not 'that which pleases the ill-disposed.' Such pleasures are relative to such men, not real-just as, to sick appetites, things appear wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which are not such in fact, but only relatively to the vitiated taste: or as, to diseased eyes, things appear white which are not actually white. So it is evident, in spite of these theories, that the claim of pleasure to be a good is not disproved. For we allege specially

(i.) That the pleasures of the dissolute are not really pleasures.

(ii.) If we grant they are pleasures, still it does not follow that Pleasure in itself is base for pleasure is not homogeneous, but manifold; that is, some kinds may be base while others are good, and those derived from honourable and laudable objects are of one quality, and those derived from base objects, of another in short, some pleasures are good, and some detestable, in themselves. Take as an analogy the case of wealth or health. There is an honourable wealth,

which a man obtains without wronging any one, and a dishonourable wealth, obtained by treachery to one's country, or by selling children or relations into slavery. There is, again, a proper health, obtained by a natural and human mode of life; and an improper health, obtained by unnatural and discreditable means; and so on, in other matters. Precisely the same is the case of pleasures. They are absolutely distinct in kind; e.g., the musician's pleasure cannot be shared by the unmusical, nor that of the just man by any one who is not just; clearly therefore the musician's pleasure is 'sui generis,' and the just man's also, and so on. Therefore,—even if we grant that the pleasure of base men is a base thing,it does not follow that Pleasure, in itself, is worthy of avoidance.

Others again have argued that Pleasure could not be a good, from consideration of the difference between a flatterer and a friend. The flatterer is censured, because in his intercourse he has only the design of pleasing; while the friend is praised because he aims, not at giving pleasure, but at telling truth, and doing good to his friend. Hence it seems to have been inferred that Pleasure was censurable. But the inference is not good; it would be sounder to conclude that the pleasures differ in kind, and that one is censurable and the other laudable. Everybody knows that a friend is agreeable, and gives pleasure to the object of his attachment; whence it is clear that all intercourse between man and man has a mutual pleasure; but, because friendship is exalted in motive, its pleasure is praised; whereas flattery being unworthy in motive, its pleasure is censured.

Others again have argued that pleasure is censurable, because no man of sound mind would choose to live a life of mere childish pleasures, with the ideas and delights of children, nor make any other mean choice merely for pleasure's sake. But this no way proves Pleasure to be a base thing. A man of sound mind does not avoid the life of mere childishness and petty actions because it is pleasurable, but because, for a man, it is intrinsically base.

Many things, again, which conduce to Pleasure we aim at, not for the pleasure, but for their own desirability. For example, if there were no pleasure in sight, memory, knowledge, virtue, we should still choose them. It makes no difference in principle, even if we admit that each of these has a pleasure inseparable from it: we should desire them for ourselves, even if that were not so.

It is therefore clear,―

(i.) That all pleasure is not choiceworthy nor good.

(ii.) That there are certain pleasures meritorious in themselves and distinct from the base pleasures, both in kind and in origin,

iv.-The true nature of Pleasure explained.

But it will become more evident what the true nature of pleasure is and what are its characteristics, if we take up the subject again from the beginning.

(a) COMPARISON BETWEEN PLEASURE AND SIGHT.

Pleasure is of a nature simple, uncompounded, unique, complete, and perfect in an instant.

Now the sense of sight is thought to be perfect at any moment of its exercise: it needs nothing to happen at a future time in order that its nature may be perfected. This is the kind of phænomenon with which pleasure must be compared pleasure is a thing complete in itself-at no instant could one find a pleasure whose nature would be more fully consummated if its sensation were protracted for a longer time.

We have thus recounted the current sayings about Pleasure and Pain. Now we are concerned to investigate about the former, what it intrinsically or generically is; and this would be most clearly shown by a resumption of an earlier part of the argument, in which we affirmed Pleasure to be perfect in itself-just as, e.g., at any moment of its exercise sight is perfect; and it is impossible to discriminate any part of the time occupied in seeing, during which sight is developed : it is complete during the whole time.

Pleasure being

(b) PLEASURE IMPLIES NEITHER CHANGE NOR BECOMING. Wherefore pleasure is not a process of change or of movement. Every movement takes place in a certain time and has reference to a certain end; e.g. the process of divisible particle of housebuilding is not complete until it has accomplished the design which it had in view. When I say in a certain time' I mean either within a certain period' or 'at a particular moment.'

complete in an in

time cannot be 'a process of movement.'

(c) CHARACTERISTICS OF TEMPORAL MOVEMENT.

Temporal movement, in contrast to pleasure, implies (1) division into parts; (2) a distinct end.'

But in relation to particular sections of time all movements are incomplete. Every point of the movement is distinct in kind from the process as a whole, and every point from every other. The laying of the bricks is distinct from the fluting of the columns, and these again from the structure of the whole temple. The structure of the temple is complete and perfect it lacks nothing in view of the purpose for which it was conceived; whereas the structure of the base and the sculpture of the beams are incomplete, each being the structure only of a part.

All the parts or different elements of movement are distinct from one another and from the whole.

Such processes, therefore, all differ in kind, and it is impossible to find at any exact instant a process of movement that is complete in its idea and aim, or, if conceivably at all, within some period regarded as a whole.

Herein, we may observe, sight differs from motion, which is imperfect, so to speak, in each part, and heterogeneous; the parts differ from the whole motion and from one another: just as do the parts in the process of house-building. Take, for instance, the entire construction of a temple,-the process of combining the stone-work is one thing, and that of moulding the pillars another; and they differ both as compared to one another and to the complete result, which-as being fully worked out in all essential parts-may be called perfect; but the work of the basement and of the triglyph is in itself imperfect, because each is only the construction of a part.

Therefore the parts of motion differ generically; and in no sub-division of time -I mean of course the time occupied in the motion-can you make any subdivision of the motion perfect according to the standard of the completed motion -which is consummated in the full period only.

(d) CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL' MOVEMENT.

Similarly in local motion not only are the various kinds distinct, but those kinds are further subdivided into other varieties equally distinct.

The case applies similarly to walking and to all local movements. If it be the fact that locomotion is a movement from one place to another, here too there will be differences corresponding to the different kinds of locomotion, such as flying, walking, leaping and so on. Nor is it only so; but there are distinctions to be made in actual walking. 'Movement from one place to another' is not the same thing in the stadium as a whole as in particular sections of it, nor are all the sections equal nor is it the same thing to pass this line and that. A man does not merely pass over a line, but that line exists in a particular place, and one line differs from another in position.

[I have argued the question of locomotion in another Treatise with scientific precision. The conclusion seems to be that motion is not a thing complete at any and every moment, but the majority of motions are incomplete, as standing in the relation of coordinate species to a common genus, assuming, that is, that the 'whence' and the 'whither' constitute different species of motion.]

Such also is the case in walking and all other modes of motion. Progression comprises divers kinds of motions, such as leaping, flying, walking; all of which are modes of progression, but specifically distinct from each other. Nay, more, in each of these motions there are specifically distinct kinds of progression. The And as the terms, for instance, the whence' and the whither,' are different. terms differ, the modes of motion specifically differ, as in the race-course any part of the race differs, in point of terms, from the race regarded as a whole; and not only that, but from all the other parts of the race. Suppose the whole race to be from the point A to the point E,

the portion of the race between A and B is different in terms from the whole And as the race, and from the other portions, viz., B to C, C to D, and D to E. terms differ, so are the portions specifically distinct. If each motion traversed one and the same line, it would be otherwise; but, as each line lies in its own place, and the places differ, the motions that traverse each line also differ.

We have elsewhere written our scientific account of motion; here we need only affirm that motion as such is only complete in its whole period, not at any and every point of the time it occupies; the portional motions which, combined, make the whole motion, are in themselves incomplete and diverse from each other, if, as is clear, the terms of motion, the whence' and whither,' constitute specific differences.

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(e) ABSOLUTE COMPLETENESS AND INDEPENDENCE OF PLEASure. In regard to pleasure on the other hand, its nature or logical conception is realized at any given moment whatever. It is clear

therefore that various pleasures will be distinct from one another, and that the sensation of pleasure itself will be one of those things that are wholes' (or unities') and complete in themselves.

Pleasure on the contrary is a thing absolutely unique in each instant.

This view will be also evident from the fact that it is impossible for motion to take place except within a cer-tain time, whereas pleasure can be instantaneous; what is instantaneous, being a whole' or unity' in itself.

Pleasure, therefore, is an indivisible 'whole,' whereas change implies parts.

From these considerations it is clear that writers are in error who describe pleasure as a process of transition or of becoming. Change' or 'becoming' are terms not predicable of all facts, but only of those facts that may be analysed into parts and that are not units' in themselves. There is no 'process of becoming' in the case of sight nor of a point nor of a monad: in not one of these cases is either movement' or 'becoming' possible, nor assuredly in the case of pleasure either, pleasure being an ultimate fact, a unity' or 'whole' in itself.

But with Pleasure the case is different; at any point of time it is specifically complete therein differing from motion; the former being something whole and complete in itself, the latter incomplete in itself and needing a certain duration of time for completion. Complete motion, e.g. is impossible in the momentary, present, and indivisible point of time, while complete and entire pleasure is possible therein.

All which proves that Pleasure is neither a process of motion, nor of development. Development is not of all things, but of parts rather than of wholes; e.g. we do not talk of the development of sight, or of a point, or of the unit. Each of these is a whole and indivisible, and does not develop and come to completion by lapse of time, but is, at any moment, whole and complete in itself. The unit, for instance, and the Point are not perfect in one part and imperfect in another, nor are they brought to development by lapse of time; and Sight is, at each moment of the time we are exercising the faculty, complete in itself; as indeed the activity of every sense, working on its appropriate subject, is perfect at every moment of its exercise.

(f) PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PLEASURE,

Pleasure is the re

sult of

(a) a sense healthily constituted;

If, then, every sense comes into operation when in presence of an object of sense; and if the operation is perfect when the sense itself is in a normal state and is in the presence of the highest object that can come within its range (the perfect operation being thought to be pre-eminently of this description, and the difference being immaterial whether we say that the sense itself operates or the subject in which the sense resides).... in every case, I say, the highest activity is that of a man

(B) an object coming within the sphere of that

sense and adapted

to it.

The highest plea

sure will be that where these two