The Moral Philosophy of Aristotle: Consisting of a Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, and of the Paraphrase Attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes, with an Introductory Analysis of Each BookMurray, 1879 - 589 sider |
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Side xix
... Anger . • ii . - Contrast between Weakness , Dissoluteness , Savagery , and Effeminacy ( a ) Dissoluteness worse than savagery ( b ) Variations of character produced by pleasure . ( c ) The dissolute contrasted with the weak ( d ) ...
... Anger . • ii . - Contrast between Weakness , Dissoluteness , Savagery , and Effeminacy ( a ) Dissoluteness worse than savagery ( b ) Variations of character produced by pleasure . ( c ) The dissolute contrasted with the weak ( d ) ...
Side 87
... anger , fear , confidence , envy , joy , affection , hatred , longing , emulation , pity , -in fact , all those states of consciousness which are attended by pleasure and pain . 6 2. I mean by capacities ' those dispositions or ...
... anger , fear , confidence , envy , joy , affection , hatred , longing , emulation , pity , -in fact , all those states of consciousness which are attended by pleasure and pain . 6 2. I mean by capacities ' those dispositions or ...
Side 88
... anger , if the attitude of our minds be towards either violence or apathy , then our habit ' is an improper one , whereas , if our attitude be one of due moderation , then our ' habit ' is a virtuous habit . The case is analogous with ...
... anger , if the attitude of our minds be towards either violence or apathy , then our habit ' is an improper one , whereas , if our attitude be one of due moderation , then our ' habit ' is a virtuous habit . The case is analogous with ...
Side 89
... anger . Neither virtue nor vice , therefore , will be an emotion . ( 2. ) In respect of our emotions we are neither praised nor blamed as we are in respect of our virtues or vices . ( 3. ) We feel anger or fear without any distinct ...
... anger . Neither virtue nor vice , therefore , will be an emotion . ( 2. ) In respect of our emotions we are neither praised nor blamed as we are in respect of our virtues or vices . ( 3. ) We feel anger or fear without any distinct ...
Side 92
... anger or to be moved to pity , and generally , to feel plea- sure and pain , in excess and defect , and in either event wrongly . In such cases what constitutes the moral mean and the true ideal of action , is the observance of the due ...
... anger or to be moved to pity , and generally , to feel plea- sure and pain , in excess and defect , and in either event wrongly . In such cases what constitutes the moral mean and the true ideal of action , is the observance of the due ...
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The Moral Philosophy of Aristotle: Consisting of a Translation of the ... Aristotle,Walter Mooney Hatch Uten tilgangsbegrensning - 1879 |
The Moral Philosophy of Aristotle: Consisting of a Translation of the ... Aristotle,Walter Mooney Hatch Uten tilgangsbegrensning - 1879 |
The Moral Philosophy of Aristotle: Consisting of a Translation of the ... Aristotle Ingen forhåndsvisning tilgjengelig - 2013 |
Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
absolute according activity adultery anger asceticism attain brave called casuistry cause cerned character charitable circumstances concerned Consequently Corrective Justice courage course cowardice defect definition deliberation delight desire dissolute distinct Distributive Justice effeminacy emotions equal Eudoxus evil excellence excess exercise extremes fact faculty Fcap fear feeling friends friendship gain give habit hand happiness Hence Heraclitus honour human ideal ignorance inasmuch injured Injustice instance intellectual virtues intemperate involuntary Justice kind knowledge mean mind moral elevation moral virtue motive munificent nature noble objects opinion overmastered particular passion perfect persons Philosophy pleasant pleasure and pain possible Post 8vo Practical Wisdom praise principle prodigality proper proportion receive regard relation Right Reason sake Science simply soul sphere Summum Bonum syllogism temperate term things tical timocracy tion true truth unjust vice vicious virtuous Volition voluntary weak whereas wish Woodcuts wrong
Populære avsnitt
Side 39 - Again, the mathematical postulate that things which are equal to the same are equal to one another, is similar to the form of the syllogism in logic, which unites things agreeing in the middle term.
Side 329 - Thus, for" example, he to whom the geometrical proposition, that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles...
Side 553 - But whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life is a question we may dismiss for the present. For they seem to be bound up together and not to admit of separation, since without activity pleasure does not arise, and every activity is completed by the attendant pleasure.
Side 169 - ... people, when they are hungry, delighting in the smell of food; but to delight in this kind of thing is the mark of the self-indulgent man; for these are objects of appetite to him. "Nor is there in animals other than man any pleasure connected with these senses, except incidentally. For dogs do not delight in the scent of hares, but in the eating of them, but the scent told them the hares were there: nor does the lion delight in the lowing of the ox, but in eating it...
Side 264 - ... fair or equal in some sort, and that which is unjust is unfair or unequal ; but the proportion to be observed here is not a geometrical proportion as above, but an arithmetical one. For it makes no difference whether a good man defrauds a bad one, or a bad man a good one, nor whether a man who commits an adultery be a good or a bad man; the law looks only to the difference created by the injury, treating the parties themselves as equal, and only asking whether the one has done, and the other...