which provides that all the rules and regulations for proceedings in cases where shipowners desire the benefit of the limitation of liability "shall apply to the circuit courts of the United States, where such cases are or shall be pending in said courts upon appeal from the district courts," or otherwise. The proceedings must originate in the district court.-The Mary Lord, 31 Fed. 416.

[b] (U. S. C. C., N. Y., 1887) The circuit courts have no jurisdiction by bill in equity, or otherwise, to enforce proceedings for limiting the liability of shipowners under the provisions of Rev. St. §§ 4282, 4284, 4285. The statute embodied in these sections created a new right, and by implication prescribed that it should be enforced in the district courts, and the remedy is confined to the jurisdiction provided by the statute which gave the right.Elwell v. Geibei, 33 Fed. 71.

19.

Jurisdiction of Courts of Admiralty.

[a] (U. S. Sup., Mass., 1889) The limited liability act being a part of the Maritime Code, it is co-extensive with the territorial operation of the general admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and applies, notwithstanding the facts that the injury sued for happened within the technical limits of a county of a state, and that the liability sought to be enforced arose from a state law. Butler v. Steamship Co., 9 Sup. Ct. 612, 130 U. S. 527, 32 L. Ed. 1017.

[b] (U. S. C. C. A., 1898) Where shipowners have invoked the jurisdiction of a court of admiralty by a petition to limit their liability, under Rev. St. § 4283, 4284, and, having thereby secured the stay of proceedings by libelants, surrender but one of two vessels held by the court to be liable, the court, having full equitable powers to adjust the rights of all parties interested, is not bound to dismiss the proceedings for that reason, but may by its own process, or its own order, seize the other vessel, and make distribution of the entire fund which it was the duty of the petitioners to tender by their petition; and such is the proper, and only equitable, course, where, by reason of the proceedings, suits by libelants have been delayed for a number of years, during which the shipowners have become insolvent.-Navigation Co. v. Balfour, 33 C. C. A. 57, 90 Fed. 295.

1

[e] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1866) Where there are a number of claims against the owners of vessels for injuries, a court of admiralty does not have jurisdiction in a proceeding in rem by one claimant to release the vessel from the liens of all the claims upon a stipulation as to its value.-Place v. City of Norwich, Fed. Cas. No. 11,202 [1 Ben. 89].

[d] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1872) Courts of admiralty have exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings under Act Cong. March 3, 1851, limiting the liability of shipowners for injuries to property, since it is substantially a proceeding in rem against the vessel and its pending freight. In re Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 11,451 [6 Ben. 124].

[e] (U. S. D. C., N. Y,, 1873) Admiralty courts have jurisdiction of proceedings for the limitation of the liability of shipowners under Act Cong. March 3, 1851, though some of the liabilities do not come within admiralty jurisdiction. The Epsilon, Fed. Cas. No. 4,506 [6 Ben. 378].

[f] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1873) Admiralty courts have jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for limitation of the liability of shipowners under Act Cong. March 3, 1851, though it does not appear from the face of the libel that there is any amount of money to be distributed.-The Epsilon, Fed. Cas. No. 4,506 [6 Ben. 378].

20.

Loss of Jurisdiction.

[a] (U. S. Sup., N. Y., 1893) The district court does not lose jurisdiction by allowing the steamship, after giving a stipulation for her value under admiralty rule 54, to go into another district in the ordinary course of her business, since the proceeding to limit liability is an equitable action, and not one against the vessel and her freight.-Morrison v. District Court for Southern District of New York, 13 Sup. Ct. 246, 147 U. S. 14, 37 L. Ed. 60; Same v. District Court for District of Massachusetts, Id.

[b] (U. S. Sup., N. Y., 1893) The filing of the libel and petition by the owner of the steamship, with the offer to give a stipulation, confers jurisdietion on the court, which no subsequent irregularity of procedure can take

away.-Morrison v. District Court for Southern District of New York, 13 Sup. Ct. 246, 147 U. S. 14, 37 L. Ed. 60; Same v. District Court for District of Massachusetts, Id.

[e] (U. S. D. C., Md., 1890) The owners of a steamboat which had been sued in the state courts in actions given by the statute of Maryland for loss of life arising out of a collision in the harbor of Baltimore applied for a limitation of liability. After the steamboat had been appraised, and stipulation given in the district court for the payment into court of the amount of the appraisement when ordered, the amounts sued for in the state courts were reduced so that the aggregate of the amounts claimed in those suits was below the amount of the appraisement and stipulation. Held, that it did not take away the jurisdiction of the district court, even conceding that the claims so reduced were all that the owners of the steamboat could be made liable for.The Tolchester, 42 Fed. 180.

[d] (U. S. D. C., N. Y.. 1884) A court is not ousted of jurisdiction of a proceeding to limit liability by a recovery by a claimant of less than the stipulated value of the vessel, where his original claim was greater than its value. -Briggs v. Day, 21 Fed. 727.

21. Surrender of Vessel or Proceeds.

[a] (U. S. Sup., Conn., 1871) Under Act Cong. March 3, 1851, limiting the liability of owners of vessels for damages, and section 4, providing that the shipowner may be released from liability by an assignment of his interest in the vessel and pending freight to a trustee appointed by the court, such assignment releases the owner, though the vessel was a total loss.-Transportation Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 104, 20 L. Ed. 585.

[b] (U. S. Sup., N. Y., 1893) The giving by the owner of a stipulation for the value of his interest in a vessel and her freight under admiralty rule 54, without a judicial determination of such value after a hearing of the persons interested, equivalent to a "transfer" of his interest in the vessel and her freight to a trustee for the benefit.of claimants, under Rev. St. § 4285.-Morrison v. District Court for Southern District of New York, 13 Sup. Ct. 246, 147 U. S. 14, 37 L. Ed. 60; Same v. District Court for District of Massachusetts, ld.

[C] (U. S. Sup., N. Y., 1897) Damages recovered by the owner for the loss of his vessel by collision stand in the place of the vessel herself, and he is not entitled to the benefit of the statutes for limitation of liability, unless he surrenders the sum recovered for the benefit of the ship's creditors.-O'Brien v. Miller, 18 Sup. Ct. 140, 168 U. S. 287, 42 L. Ed. 469, affirming Miller v. O'Brien (D. C. 1894) 59 Fed. 621; reversing (1895) 14 C. C. A. 566, 67 Fed. 605.

[d] (U. S. C. C. A., 1898) It is not material in limited liability proceedings, where the vessel has been brought into court, and her owner has stipulated to pay her appraised value, whether or not she was brought in by the appropriate process.-Navigation Co. v. Balfour, 33 C. C. A. 57, 90 Fed. 295.

[e] (U. S. D. C., Cal., 1896) It is sufficient to give jurisdiction to the district court, in a proceeding for limitation of liability under Rev. St. §§ 4283 4285, that some of several joint owners of the vessel, whose shares were uninsured and so could not be sold at an underwriter's sale, have transferred their title in what remains of the vessel to the trustee; and, having such jurisdiction, the court has the equitable power to compel the petitioners to bring in the money obtained for the insured interests and that for freight and passenger fares, in order to enable it to carry out the provisions of the statute.—In re Meyer, 74 Fed. 881.

[f] (U. S. D. C., Mass., 1884) Insurance effected by the owners on the vessel and her freight is not an "interest in such vessel and freight" which they are bound to surrender for the benefit of claimants for injuries, within the meaning of Rev. St. § 4285.-The City of Columbus, 22 Fed. 460.

[g] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1882) The trustee of an attached vessel showed that the vessel, if compelled to remain in custody until the termination of the litigation, was likely to be eaten up by custody fees, and her value greatly impaired, if not substantially destroyed, and asked to be allowed to sell the vessel free from any claim of the attaching creditors; the attachment to be transferred to the proceeds of the sale, and to that end that the attaching

45 C.C.A.-26

creditors be directed to co-operate in effecting the sale by surrender of the vessel to him. Held, that the court had the power to direct the sale proposed, since such a sale would work no injury to the rights of defendants, and require no present determination of questions that should be determined at final hearing.-The Mendota, 14 Fed. 358.

[h] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1882) In an action begun in a state court against the owners of a vessel, an attachment against the property of some of them as nonresidents was issued, and their shares in the vessel were attached by the sheriff. The cause was then removed to the United States circuit court. The owners then began proceedings in the United States district court to limit their liability, under Rev. St. §§ 4283-4285, and took the steps required by law to transfer the vessel and freight to a trustee appointed by the district court, and to stay all proceedings and suits against them; but the vessel remained in possession of the sheriff. On a motion by the owners for an order directing defendants in the limited liability proceedings, who were plaintiffs in the state court suit, to order the sheriff to surrender the vessel to the trustee, held, that the possession of the vessel by the marshal or trustee is not necessary for the purpose of limited liability proceedings, where the court has acquired jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for, and that the direction asked for was unnecessary and improper at such a stage of the proceedings. -The Mendota, 14 Fed. 358.

[i] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1884) Libelants agreed to take a cargo of petroleum in low-top 10-gallon cases from Philadelphia to Japan, and the owners superintended the loading and ballasting of the ship, and determined the amount of cargo they would receive. On starting from Philadelphia the ship was found unsteady, and, immediately on getting to sea, showed great crankness, so that, notwithstanding all efforts to diminish it, the ship, on the fourteenth day out, in a storm of no unusual character, was nearly on her beam ends, and it was found necessary to jettison 3,000 of the cases. Held, that Rev. St. § 4283, required the surrender of pending freight, which includes, at least, the freight earned up to the time of the loss; and liberty was given to the libelants to amend their proceedings by paying the amount of such freight into court, or giving a further bond therefor.-Sumner v. Caswell, 20 Fed. 249.

[J] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1891) In order to obtain a limitation of liability with respect to claims arising upon a voyage subsequent to the accruing of previous liens, the shipowner must surrender the vessel, or her proceeds, free from such previous liens.-In re The U. S. Grant, 45 Fed. 642.

[k] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1893) A barge without motive power, which is used for carrying excursion parties about New York harbor and adjacent waters, may be surrendered by her owners, under the limited liability acts of the United States, without the surrender of the tug towing the barge at the time of the loss, though the tug belongs to the same owners.-In re Myers Excursion & Navigation Co., 57 Fed. 240, affirmed The Republic (1894) 9 C. C. A. 386, 61 Fed. 109.

[I](U. S. D. C., Pa., 1893) Owners who surrender a vessel for the purpose of limiting liability cannot be required to add interest on her appraised value from the time the liability was incurred, although they have long delayed the surrender.-The Battler, 58 Fed. 704.

[m] (U. S. D. C., Pa., 1893) Where the owners, instead of turning over the vessel herself, or paying her appraised value into court, elect to give a bond therefor, they may be required to provide for interest until such time as the money is paid.-The Battler, 58 Fed. 704.

Pleading.

22.

[a] (U.S.) Petitioners for limitation of liability are entitled, under admiralty rule 56, to litigate in the same proceeding the question of the existence of any liability.-(Sup.. Mass., 1883) Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 3 Sup. Ct. 379, 617, 109 U. S. 578, 27 L. Ed. 1038; (Sup., N. Y., 1880) The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239, 26 L. Ed. 351; (D. C., Wash., 1895) In re The Annie Faxon, 66 Fed. 575.

[b] (U. S. Sup., Mass., 1889) An allegation that the vessel was, at the time of the accident, in charge of the second mate, who was not a licensed pilot, is not sufficient to show that the loss was occasioned with the fault, privity,

or knowledge of the owners, as by the maritime rules the captain had charge of the vessel, and it was his duty, and not that of the owners, to see that a qualified officer was in charge.-Butler v. Steamship Co., Sup. Ct. 612, 130 U. S. 527, 32 L. Ed. 1017.

[e] (U. S. C. C. A., Wash., 1896) A failure to comply with the steamboat inspection law may be invoked to prove that a shipowner is not entitled to a limitation of liability under Rev. St. § 4283, though it is not set up in the pleadings of the parties to the proceeding for limitation.-The Annie Faxon, 21 C. C. A. 366, 75 Fed. 312; Navigation Co. v. Lawton, Id.

[d] (U. S. C. C., Cal., 1889) Rule 54 of the United States supreme court authorizes a petition or libel in a proceeding, to limit the liability of a shipowner for loss or damage to persons or goods, to be filed after a suit for damages has been commenced. Held, that the petition may be filed before as well as after the commencement of the suit for damages.-Black v. Railroad Co., 39 Fed. 565.

[e] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1886) In proceedings to limit shipowners' liability, under Rev. St. U. S. § 4283, it is not necessary to aver in the petition, or to prove, that the claims against the vessel are in excess of her value, as a condition of the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the proceeding.-The Garden City, 26 Fed. 766.

[f] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1892) A petition in an admiralty court to limit liability and to restrain the prosecution of an action in a state court must show the existence, or probability of existence, of more than one damage claimant, and the need of an apportionment, in order to make such a special proceeding either necessary or appropriate, under Rev. St. §§ 4284, 4285; or else it must show such a special case as does not admit of the full statutory defense in the common-law suit in the state court.-The Rosa, 53 Fed. 132; In re New York Harbor Towboat Co., Id.

23.

Extent of Liability.

[a] (U. S. Sup., N. Y., 1886) Rev. St. U. S. § 4283, provides that "the liability of the owner of any vessel for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction of any property shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act * * done

*

* * *

* without the privity or knowledge of such owner, shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel and her freight then pending." Held, that the point of time for taking the value of the owner's interest in the vessel as the measure of his liability is at the termination of the voyage, whether by the arrival of the ship in port or by her loss at sea.-Place v. Transportation Co., 6 Sup. Ct. 1150, 118 U. S. 468, 30 L. Ed. 134.

[b] . S. Sup., N. Y., 1886) Where a steamer collides with and damages a schooner, and then takes fire and sinks herself, her cargo becoming a total loss, the voyage is terminated by her sinking, and the owner's liability for the damages occasioned by her is measured by her value as she lies on the bottom, and such liability is not affected by the fact that she is afterwards raised and repaired, before the libels against her are filed.-Place v. Transportation Co., 6 Sup. Ct. 1150, 118 U. S. 468, 30 L. Ed. 134.

[e] (U. S. Sup., N. Y., 1886) Where a steamer collides with and injures a bark, but proceeds on her voyage, and is stranded and wrecked by the negligence of her master and crew, but from no cause connected with the collision, the wrecking is the termination of the voyage; and the measure of the owner's liability for the damages to the bark is the value of the wreckage and materials.-Thommessen v. Whitwill, 6 Sup. Ct. 1172, 118 U. S. 520, 30 L. Ed. 156, affirming (C. C. 1882) 12 Fed. 891.

[d] (U. S. Sup., N. Y., 1886) Where a steamer collides with and sinks a ship, and, being badly injured herself, puts back to port, but by reason of her injuries sinks, and becomes a total loss, except that some strippings are saved, her sinking is the termination of the voyage; and the measure of her owner's liability, under such section 4282, is the value of the strippings saved.-Dyer v. Steam-Navigation Co., 6 Sup. Ct. 1174, 118 U. S. 507, 30 L. Ed. 153.

[e] (U. S. C. C. A., Mass., 1896) In cases of limited liability, interest will only be allowed on the appraised value from the date of the decree until pay

ment, and in the event of an appeal by the owners, which is unsuccessful, such interest will be decreed against them, in personam, and not against the stipulators.-The H. F. Dimock, 23 C. C. A. 123, 77 Fed. 226; Steamship Co. v. Vanderbilt, Id.; Vanderbilt v. Steamship Co., Id.

[f] (U. S. D. C., Ill., 1882) Where, in an action for damages arising from a collision, the owners of the colliding steamer applied under the admiralty rules for a limitation of their liability as such owners, and by stipulation with approved sureties agreed to make payment of the assessed value of the steamer, and thereby procured her release from arrest, the owners were liable, in addition to such assessed value of their steamer, for the interest thereon from the date of the stipulation, with costs of the litigation.-The Favorite, 12 Fed. 213.

[g] (U. S. D. C., Me., 1890) The extent of the liability being restricted by the act to the amount of the owner's interest in the vessel and the freight then pending, this amount must be determined by taking the values at the termination of the voyage; and, when a vessel is condemned and sold before reaching her final destination, the extent of such liability is measured by her value at the time of the sale and the freight then due under the terms of the charter. The Giles Loring, 48 Fed. 463; Swanzy v. Webster, Id.; Webster v. Swanzy, Id.

[h] (U. S. D. C., Me., 1890) Act Cong. June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 18 (23 Stat. p. 57), providing that "the individual liability of a shipowner shall be limited to the proportion of any or all debts and liabilities that his individual share of the vessel bears to the whole," applies to the liability of owners under the limited liability act; and to the extent of the fund representing their liability thereunder they are bound, not in solido, but only in proportion to their respective interests in the vessel.-The Giles Loring, 48 Fed. 463; Swanzy v. Webster, Id.; Webster v. Swanzy, Id.

[i] (U. S. D. C., N. J., 1890) Under Act Cong. March 3, 1851, providing that the liability of the owner of a vessel for any damage done by collision without his knowledge shall in no case exceed the value of his interest as owner in such vessel, the interest of the owner is measured by the actual value of the vessel, without any reduction on account of liens for supplies which may have attached prior to the collision for which his interest is sought to be subjected. The Leonard Richards, 41 Fed. 818.

[j] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1878) Where a vessel is sailed for a share in the freight by a master who is not an owner, the liability of the owner for damages caused by collision is limited to the amount of the freight pending, less the master's share, after deducting port charges. In re Wright, Fed. Cas. No. 18,066 [10 Ben. 14].

[k] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1878) The value of a vessel, for the purpose of determining the liability of her owners, under the act limiting the liability of shipowners, in an action against them for damages caused by a collision, is the value of the vessel immediately after the collision and before any repairs are made. In re Wright, Fed. Cas. No. 18,066 [10 Ben. 14].

[1] (U. S. D. C., N. Y., 1890) Where several vessels are all in fault for collision, the damages should be divided between them pro rata, subject to the limitation of liability prescribed by Rev. St. U. S. § 4283. If the amount recoverable from either vessel is less than her share of the loss of the cargo, such amount should be first applied on account of the cargo, and the other vessels or their owners are chargeable pro rata, up to their limit of liability, for the balance of the whole loss of cargo belonging to third persons not in fault, and for their proportion of the loss of any other vessel; but the latter, to make good the loss of cargo, must apply thereto any moneys coming to her for her own loss, so far as necessary to make good her share of the cargo loss. Either vessel thus paying more than her share of the whole loss is entitled to the benefit of the judgment against any other party, up to the limit of his liability, for any excess paid in the first instance on his account.-The Doris Eckhoff, 41 Fed. 156, reversed (1892) 1 C. C. A. 494, 50 Fed. 134.

[m] (U. S. D. C., S. C., 1891) A vessel carrying freight ran on a snag and sank in shallow water, near the landing for which she was destined; but, after part of her cargo had been taken off, she was raised, taken to the landing, and the balance of the cargo delivered. Held that, in ascertaining the