1806. Practice. Mortgage. COLBY versus GIBSON. COLBY against GIBSON.-18th June. A mortgagee, having filed a bill of foreclosure and having proceeded to execution, in ejectment and being in possession of the rents and profits of 2001. a year, under an ejectment, and having brought covenant for the mortgage money and obtained execution; the court refused to discharge the defendant out of cxecution: for the plaintiff has a right to his remedy on all his securities. MOTION for a rule to shew cause, why the defen dant should not be discharged out of execution, in an action by a mortgagee on a covenant for payment of the mortgage money. There were three remedies taken; first a bill of foreclosure; secondly, an ejectment; and thirdly, an action for the mortgage money. The plaintiff had obtained a writ of possession, and was in the receipt of the rents and profits of 2001. a year, at the time of making the motion, and there was a ca, sa. in execution, for the whole of the mortgage money, at the same time. LAWES, for the defendant contended, that the judg ment in one action was a satisfaction of the whole; and that, after the elegit issued, as that was a continuing judgment and satisfaction,there could be nothing taken further. He said the plaintiff had got the whole estate under the ejectment. GROSE, J." I remember this very case, a mortgagee took a bond and a covenant, brought an ejectment, put the bond and covenant in suit, and proceeded to execution in all. I moved to have the man discharged as to some, after so many securities taken; but it was held, that the party had a right to all. The ca. sa. is only a satisfaction where the judgment is the same." Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. "The elegit being a continuing satisfaction is only to be urged where the judgment is the same. Here the securities are different." 1806. COLBY versus GIBSON RULE NISI REFUSED. DOE on the demise of Lord BRADFORD against WAT- Where a tenant entered on meadow land at December, on pas- Ejectment. Noture at March, and the houses, consisting of mills, and other tice to quit. buildings for a manufactory, at the 1st of May, and was to pay rent at Pentecost; held that the day of entering on the manufactory, which was the principal day of entry, and not the rent day. IN ejectment the defendants, in September, 1801, by virtue of a contract between them and one John Glover, entered into possession of the premises, and afterwards purchased the whole term and interest therein, from the assignees and mortgagees of Glover who became bankrupt in 1803. Glover himself derived his title under an agreement for a lease indented and sealed, bearing date the 1st day of January, 1791, and made between William Hobson the agent to, and on the behalf of Sir Henry Bridgman, bart. since deceased (the father of the lessor of the plaintiff Lord Bradford,) of the one part, and the said Glover of the other part; whereby it was for the considerations therein-mentioned, agreed, that the said Sir Henry his heirs or assigns should, on or before the 1st day of January, 1792, upon the condition therein-mentioned, make and execute unto the said Glover his executors and administrators a lease of the messuages, tenements, lands, mills, waters, watercourses, and premises therein described (being the premises in question ;) which lease was to be for the term of 35 years, to commence as to the meadow ground, from the 25th day Doe Dem. versus WATKINS, 1806. versus of December then last, and as to the pasture ground Doe dem. (except the fields therein excepted) from the 25th BRADFORD day of March then next; and as to the said fields, WATKINS. (before excepted,) and the housing, mills, outhousing, and other buildings, and all the residue of the said premises, from the 1st day of May, then next; at and under the yearly rent of 2501. without any deduction; and to be paid and payable to the said Sir Henry Bridgman his heirs and assessors on the day of Pentecost, and the feast of St. Martin the bishop, in winter, yearly during the said term; and the first payment thereof to begin, and be made on the feast day of Pentecost then next. The premises were taken and fitted by Glover for the trades and businesses of bleaching and printing, and manufacturing oil of vitriol, in which businesses they had been used by him and the defendants, and for no other purpose. The day of the demise in the declarations was the 11th day of June, 1805, to hold from the 10th day of June. then last past, and the time of the ouster was on the 12th day of June, 1805. The causes came on to be tried at the last Lent assizes for the county of Lancas ter before Chambre, J. The plaintiff proved service of the notice to quit only on the defendant Walkins, the notice was dated on the 18th of September, 1804, but was not as it was proved, served until the 28th of that month. The plaintiff also proved payment of rent by the defendants. An objection was taken at the trial and was afterwards mentioned on the motion for the rule nisi that the service on the defendant Watkins only, was insufficient. He lived on the premises; the defendant Hadkinson lived at Liverpool: but the objection was overruled at the trial. The notice to quit was as follows: Lake, notice that you must quit and deliver to me or my order peaccable and quiet possession of the messuage, cottage, or dwelling house, hereditaments and premises, which you 1806. Doe dem. versus now hold under Orlando, Lord Bradford, of Great Lever in the county of Lancaster, at the expiration of the current year, for which you hold the said premi- BRADFORD ses, at which time your term and interest of and in the said premises will expire. Dated this 18th day of September, in the year of our lord 1804." At the trial the learned judge thought the holding was at the last of the three periods mentioned, namely the 1st of May; and said that it was very common to make the whole rent payable before the year expires. He alluded to a variety of usages in different countries, and seemed to consider it the same as a letting of an agricultural farm. He thought, however, that the previous entries could not be considered as mere privileges; because they were more than compensated for by the first half year's rent which was paid at Pentecost, that is, for a holding short of half a year. And according to his direction there was a verdict for the plaintiff. PARK obtained a rule to shew cause why the verdict should not be set aside, and a new trial had, which was now argued, and the whole question was as to the validity of the notice to quit, and consequently as to the commencement of the term. Doe d. Spencer v. Strickland,* was cited and it was contended that the notice to quit should be to quit as the tenant entered on each of the portions of the demised premises; or previous to the entry on the meadow land which was used chiefly for the purpose of bleaching. That there should be six months notice previous to all the days of entry, and that for want of it the notice was bad. Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. "In Doe d. Spencer · v. Strickland, and the other cases it is laid down, that six months notice to quit previous to the substantial *East. 2 Smith's Rep. WATKINS. 1806. Doe dem* versus time of entry is sufficient to determine a lease from year to year. What then is the substantial time of entry? BRADFORD This demise is for the purpose of carrying on a maWATKING Dufactory of whitstering printing, bleaching, and making oil of vitriol. The houses for the bleaching, then are the principal; and the entry to them is the 1st of May. That is the substantial part of the demise; almost every thing is ancillary to it. There is a liberty of entry or commencement as to the meadow ground upon the 25th of December a bye-gone day; a liberty of entering for the purpose of preparing it for the purposes of bleaching. If it is not an absolute entering from that day, all the rest of the days are without the six months, and it appears that all these are in the nature of liberties, to enter antecedent to the time of the substantial enjoyment. It is convenient, that there should be one,period at which a notice to quit is to determine the whole, and there is nothing here to confine the notice to a succession of times of entering. There is nothing to induce us to say, that the notice should be half a year previous to all the times mentioned, or that it should extend to the whole year. That rule would only operate to produce the inconvenience of giving a notice at different times, and would be as if there were a different occupation of each under different demises. The rule laid down in Doe d, Spencer v. Strickland, that the day of payment of rent is the principal time of entry, is a good rule ; ` but it is not interfered with in this case; for the substantial entry here is the 1st of May. GROSE, J. "It is laid down in Doe d. Spencer v. Strickland,that the time for which notice is to be given is the substantial time of entry. What that is must depend upon what the premises are, and the particular nature of the demise. This is a demise of pasture, meadow, outhouses, and buildings; but the place |