1805. ANDERSON, ther versus the ROYAL Assurance Company. EXCHANGE ture subsisting, it could only be considered a total loss after the abandonment, and that must be made in a reasonable time. I thought at first that, as there was Bart. and Anoa total submersion of the goods under water, it was a total loss, but as they were fished up and kiln-dried, there must be an abandonment. It is but three days post from Liverpool to Waterford. There were, therefore nearly three weeks or at least eighteen days, during which the plaintiff neglected to make the abandonment, and treated the goods as his own, and there is a salvage of 951. 3s. 4d. received. The plaintiff could not go for a stranding, because part of the goods were sent forward, and if he had notice of it on the 31st of January which he might have had, he was out of time to abandon on the 18th of February." JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT. But it being said that the abandonment was in fact within a reasonable time, it was afterwards directed that there should be a new trial to ascertain that fact. PARISH against WOLSTONECRAFT-16th November. An agreement by a debtor with his creditor not to be entitled to take the benefit of the Lords' act will not be supported by a court of law. JESSOP moved for the defendant, who was a prisoner in the county gaol of Lancaster, to be brought up to take the benefit of the Lords' act. MANLEY shewed cause, and stated that the defendant, at the commencement of the present action, executed a cognovit for the debt, being 1501. when the plaintiff agreed to take 1301. at four months after the date; and in consideration thereof the defendant agreed to pay the money, and not to bring a writ of error nor be entitled to take the benefit of the Lords' act. The H 2 Lord's Act. Prisoner. Liberty. Agreement. Practice. PARISH versus WOLSTONE CRAFT. 1805. PARISH versus WOLSTONE CRAFT. defendant not paying the money, he was taken in execution last summer. THE COURT held that the defendant could not so bargain with the plaintiff, to exclude himself from the benefit of this act, and thus sell his personal liberty. RULE ABSOLUTE. LONDON COURT of REQUESTS PLAINTIFF'S Costs. Practiee. Statute 39, and 40 Geo. III. c. 104. Pub. loc. BROAD versus PARKER BROAD against PARKER.-November 20th. An attorney, plaintiff, suing for his costs, held, not within the jurisdiction of the London Court of Requests, 39 and 40 Geo. III. c. 104. He therefore may sue in B. R. for a sum less than 51. for costs. THIS was an action brought by the plaintiff, who is an attorney living at Bath, for the amount of a bill of costs, for business done for the defendant, who resided in Fetter lane, London, and which was tried at the last assizes at Bridgewater, when the plaintiff obtained a verdict for the sum of 41. 8s. 6d. PELL, for the defendant, obtained a rule to shew cause why the defendant should not be at liberty to enter a suggestion upon the roll, that the defendant resided within the city of London, and was subject to and within the jurisdiction of the court of Requests, for the same city, under the stat. 39 and 40 Geo. III. c. 104, public local acts, which enacts that that no privilege shall be allowed to exempt any person from the jurisdiction of the said court of requests, on account of his being an attorney or solicitor, or any other officer of any of the courts of law or equity at Westminster, or of any other court whatsoever; but that all attornies, solicitors, and officers shall be subject to the several processes, orders, judgments, and executions of the said court of Requests, in the same manner as any other persons are subject to the same by the said recited acts and this act, or any of them.' LENS, Serjeant, and BURROW, now shewed cause, and contended, that as before the stat. 39 and 40 Geo. III. c. 104, attornies were not at all liable to the jurisdiction of the court of Requests in London, they could not be so now; except under the express provisions of that statute, and that by the clause which subjects them to its jurisdiction, they are only made so in cases in which they are defendants; for they are in terms rendered subject to the process, order, judgment, and execution of the court of Requests. They cited also 2 Wilson, 42; and Hussey v. Jordan,† which was a case arising upon the 23 Geo.II. c. 33, a statute which contained terms equally general with the present; and AsнURST, J. said that it could never be in the contemplation of the legislature to subject attornies, when suing for their bills to the court of Conscience for Westminster, because it has no process to compel the taxing of costs; and attornies are also bound to deliver their bills a month previous to commencing a suit, in order to have them taxed, which they would in that case not be bound to do, or would in fact evade the effect of it. * Lord ELLEN BOROUGH, C. J. inquired if the word judgment would not apply to a judgment of nonsuit, and so meet the case of a plaintiff. + Dougl. 38, in notis. Edit. ult. Q. Would not the statutes 3 Jac. 1. and 2 Geo. II. c. 23, s. 23,which require attornies to deliver their bills a month before bringing an action, apply to a suit or process in the court of Conscience?" After the attorney has furnished his bill, and the client does not refer it to a master, to have it taxed, but he drives the attorney to an action, the defendant shall not be admitted before a jury to question the reasona bleness of the items. 1 Esp. N. P. cites Williams v. Frith, 1805. BROAD versus PARKER. 1805. BROAD versus PARKER. They added, that the late case of Sandly v. Miller,* did not point at this distinction. PELL, contrà, relied upon the general words of the statute, which made attornies liable to the court of Requests, and also on the words of the 10th section, referred to by Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J.t Lord ELLEN BOROUGH, C. J "Upon referring to the words of the statute 28 Geo. II. c. 33, they are equally general, that any person who can recover a debt in the court of Conscience must sue there. The same reason which governed in that case must prevail in this. We cannot make a different rule. There is an express provision in the present act to render attornies, defendants, liable to the inferior court, but the clause omits to mention the case of plaintiffs, and expressio unius est omissio alterius. The words are, no privilege shall exempt them from the judgment, order, or process of the said court; but they would have been different if it was intended to apply to them in both that Dougl. 188. Then is not a court of Conscience put in place of a jury, and at liberty to admit or refuse the evidence of attornies, as to the reasonableness of the items? E contrà, Q. would not the court of K. B. in term, upon action brought, order proceedings to be stayed upon payment of costs, i. e. the debt, to be taxed; or refer the costs, being part of the debt, to the master; and could the same advantage be obtained by motion, upon a suit pending in the inferior court? Semble, that it could not, unless the inferior court staid their proceedings in the mean time; and therefore the reason of the judgment is good. 5 East's Rep. 194. 1 Smith's Rep. 396. + Vide supra, in notis. characters. This is not an act which requires any ex tension." GROSE, J. If we were to compel attornies to sue in the court of Requests, there is no proper officer in the court there to tax the bill; therefore, it would be very inconvenient to the public at large to construe this act of parliament in favour of the defendant; and my Lord's observation is very strong, that the words making the attorney liable to the jurisdiction of the inferior court apply mainly to cases of attornies, defendants." LAWRENCE, J. "The words of the stat. 25 Geo. II. c. 33, are as strong as these. If that statute was properly construed, we ought to construe this similarly. [ wish to decide on that ground, rather than on any other; because there should be an uniformity in the decisions of the court upon similar statutes made in pari materia. The inconvenience, on the other hand, would be very great, if, because a client removes into the city of London, the attorney is obliged to follow him there. If indeed the words of the act would have borne no other construction, we must have given them that effect." LE BLANC, J. of the same opinion; for though, previous to suing, the plaintiff might apply to have the bill taxed, yet the superior courts might order it to be taxed at any time. RULE DISCHARGED. Q. If a bill of costs has been taxed before action brought, will that differ the case? Semble. The ground of the deci sion stated in Dougl. 381, fails; but the other grounds of inconvenience which were relied on by Lord ELLEN BOROUGH, C. J. and mentioned by LAWRENCE, J. both upon the first motion and upon shewing cause, still remain. So also does the argument from the words of the 39 and 40 Geo. III. c. 104, s. 10. I did not understand that the costs here were taxed.] 1805. BOARD versus PARKER |