there was any jurisdiction to try the prisoner at the Central Criminal Court? It was contended in both cases that there was no jurisdiction to try the prisoner *under sec. 21 of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 91. Lopez was not "found" within [*161 the jurisdiction of the Court at Exeter, but was brought into the jurisdiction in custody and against his will, having been "found" in the ship.(k) This clause was intended to apply to cases where an offender, having escaped, was discovered afterwards within another jurisdiction. In Sattler's case, the original caption at Hamburgh was unlawful, and he was illegally taken on board the steamer. There is no extradition treaty between Hamburgh and this country, and the arrest at Hamburgh was without any warrant or authority; and therefore it cannot be said that he was "found" within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court. Secondly, in neither case had the prisoner committed any offence for which he was amenable to the English law. In none of the statutes, except the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 91, s. 21, are foreigners mentioned, and they are not to be included in them by implication. It must be admitted that Lopez went on board the vessel voluntarily; but Sattler, as a foreigner, owed no allegiance to our laws; and as he did not enter into our jurisdiction voluntarily, no allegiance was created thereby. No allegiance can be created by bringing a foreigner forcibly and illegally from his own land. For the Crown it was contended:-First, that the word "found" meant that a man might be tried at any place where he is at the time of the trial. Secondly, that it is a general principle that a ship, public or private, on the high seas is, for the purpose of jurisdiction over crimes therein committed, a part of the territory of the country to which the ship belongs, and a person coming voluntarily or involuntarily on board an English ship is as much amenable to the criminal law of England as if he came voluntarily or involuntarily into an English county. Lord Campbell, C. J.: "We are all of the opinion that in both these cases the conviction must be sustained. In the case of Lopez, we have no doubt that the offence committed by the prisoner was, under the circumstances, an offence against the laws of England. The prisoner, a foreigner, was in an English ship; he was under the protection of English laws, and he therefore owed obedience to the English laws, and was guilty of an offence against those laws when he maliciously wounded another foreigner, one of the crew of the same ship, on the high seas. is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the authorities cited to prove that proposition-they are quite overwhelming; and I am glad to find that in this respect the law of America and France is the same as our own. Then the only other question is, whether there was jurisdiction under the commission of oyer and terminer to try the prisoner at Exeter for that offence; and upon that point we entertain as little doubt. The Court at Exeter would not have had jurisdiction before the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 91, s, 21; but that statute is quite conclusive on the subject, and seems to have been passed for the purpose of removing any doubt that might arise. It provides that offences committed by foreigners in British vessels on the high seas may be tried by any Court within the jurisdiction of which the offender is found, if the offence is one which would have been cognizable by such Court, supposing it to have been committed *within the limits of its ordinary jurisdiction. Here the offence, if committed within the county of [*162 Devon, would certainly have been triable at Exeter; and as the prisoner was found within that jurisdiction, it is the same as if the offence had been committed within the limits of that jurisdiction, and we therefore think there was clearly jurisdiction in the Court at Exeter to try him there, and that he was legally convicted. With regard to the case of Sattler, we think it equally clear that, although the prisoner was a foreigner, the offence of which he was convicted was an offence against the laws of England. [Lord Campbell here stated the facts.] Then, here a crime is committed by the prisoner on board an English ship on the high seas, which would have been murder if the killing had been by an Englishman in an English county; and we are of opinion that, under these circumstances, whether the capture at Hamburgh and the subsequent detention were lawful or unlawful, the It (k) The case did not state how Lopez came into custody; but this was the assertion in the argument. prisoner was guilty of murder and an offence against the laws of England; for he was in an English ship-part of the territory of England-entitled to the protec tion of the English law, and he owed obedience to that law; and he committed the crime of murder-that is to say, he shot the detective officer, not for the purpose of obtaining his liberation, but for revenge, and of malice prepense. Then comes the question, whether the Central Criminal Court had jurisdiction to try the prisoner for this offence; and it appears to us that the late Act was framed for the purpose of obviating, and does obviate, all doubt upon such a subject. A man is found' wherever he is actually present, and the prisoner was found' within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court, and we are all of opinion that the Court had jurisdiction to try him. It was contended that the prisoner was not found' within the jurisdiction, because he was brought within it against his will; but, upon the construction of the statute, we are all of a different opinion."(7) The prisoner was convicted of manslaughter committed on board the Gustav Adolph on the high seas, at a point about five days' sail from Pernambuco, and about 200 miles from the nearest land; the ship was built at Kiel, in the duchy of Holstein, and sailed thence to Loudon, and thence on the voyage in which the offence was committed. All the officers and crew were foreigners; the prisoner was the second mate, and the deceased the master. The ship was sailing under the English flag when the offence was committed. The crew were told before sailing that Mr. Rehder was sole owner. He was not born an Englishman. A certified copy of the register of the Gustav Adoph under the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104 was put in, and admitted as prima facie evidence that the ship was a British ship. Certain letters were put in, which, it was urged, showed a partnership between Rehder and Ehlers, and it was urged that under the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, ss. 18, 38, and 103, the owner of a beneficial interest in a British ship must be qualified in the same way as the owner of a legal interest; that, even admitting that the registration of the ship in the name of Rehder was prima facie evidence that he was owner, it could be no evidence of Ehler's qualification, and therefore the letters (1) Reg. v. Lopez and Reg. v. Sattler, supra. These cases were argued separately, but only one judgment delivered. All that these cases really decide is that the prisoners were properly tried under the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 91, s. 21, and it was quite unnecessary to decide whether they could have been tried under any other act, and it is to be regretted that Lord Campbell should have said that they could not, as that dictum is clearly erroneous; and as the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 91, and 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, apply only to merchant vessels, it is right to correct that error. In the argument in Reg. v. Lopez, C. J. Cockburn said, "There is a strong opinion that but for the difficulty as to laying the venue, a person committing an offence on the high seas in an English ship would have been amenable to punishment at the common law." And that opinion is clearly right. The distinction is this: wherever a murder or other felony against the law of nature or nations was committed in England or on the narrow seas, it was triable by jury in the Court of King's Bench and courts of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery. But wherever a murder or such other felony was committed on the high seas it could not be tried by a jury (because a jury by the common law could only take cognizance of felonies committed within the local jurisdiction from which they were summoned), but such murders and other felonies were always triable by the court of admiralty, which proceeded according to the course of the civil law. To this proceeding, there was the vital objection that it did not try by a jury, and either the accused must plainly confess his offence, or there must be two witnesses who saw the offence committed; and this led to the passing of the 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, as is plain from the preamble and 3 Inst. 112. Now, that act in terms makes "all treasons, felonies, robberies, murders, and confederacies" committed upon the sea, or in any haven, river, creek or place where the admiral has jurisdiction, triable by commissions issued under that act, and as that act did not create or alter any offence, but left the offences as they were before it passed, Inst. 112, it is clear that all the offences mentioned in it were offences triable by the court of admiralty, and were by that act made triable by a jury under the commissions issued under it. Then the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 2, s. 1, gave courts of oyer or terminer or general gaol delivery all the powers which were given by any act to commissioners in any commission of oyer and terminer for trying offences committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. So that it is clear that the courts of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery have now the same jurisdiction as commissioners under the 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, or as the Court of Admiralty before that act passed. In other words, such murders and other felonies are now triable by the courts of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery. proving Ehler's interest in the ship rebutted the prima facie evidence that she was a British ship. And, on a case reserved, it was held that there was primâ facie evidence that she was a British ship; as there was evidence of a certificate of registry in London, wherein Rehder was described as the owner at that time resident in London, and the ship was sailing under the British flag; but that the prima facie proof was rebutted by the proof that Rehder was alien born; and that there was no presumption that letters of denization or naturalization had been granted to him, by reason that he, being alien born, would have become liable to penalties under the Act for registering the ship as belonging to a British owner.(U) *The prisoner, the master of an English ship, entered into a contract with [*163 the Chilian Government, whereby he agreed to convey to the port of Liverpool five persons who had been ordered by that Government to be transported. These persons were brought by force on board the ship, guarded by soldiers of that State, and conveyed by the prisoner, under the contract, and against their will, to Liverpool. At the time the prisoner received these persons on board, the ship was lying in the territorial waters of Chili. The prisoner having been convicted on these facts upon an indictment for false imprisonment and assault tried at Liverpool, it was held that the conviction could not be sustained for what was done within the Chilian waters. It must be assumed that in Chili the act of the Government towards its subjects was lawful; and, although an English ship, in some respects, carries with her the laws of her country in the territorial waters of a foreign State, yet, in other respects, she is subject to the laws of that State, as to acts done to the subjects thereof. The Government could justify all that it did within its own territory, and it followed that the prisoner could justify all that he did there as agent for the Government, and under its authority.(m) But the conviction was sustained for that which was done out of the Chilian territory. It is clear that an English ship on the high sea, out of any foreign territory, is subject to the laws of England; and persons, whether foreign or English, on board such ship, are as much amenable to English law as they would be on English soil. Such being the law, if the act of the prisoner amounted to false imprisonment he was liable to be convicted. Now, as the contract of the prisoner was to receive the five persons on board the ship and to take them, without their consent, over the sea to England, although he was justified in first receiving them in Chili, yet that justification ceased when he passed the line of Chilian jurisdiction, and after that it was a wrong which was intentionally planned and executed in pursuance of the contract, amounting in law to false imprisonment. It may be that transportation to England is lawful by the law of Chili, and that a Chilian ship might so lawfully transport Chilian subjects; but for an English ship the laws of Chili, out of that State, are powerless, and the lawfulness of the acts must be tried by English law.(n) By the last clause of sec. 1 of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 2, the Court may "order the payment of the costs and expenses of the prosecution of Admiralty offences in the manner prescribed by the 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, in the case of felonies tried in the Court of Admiralty;" and by the last clause in the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 267, the costs of the prosecution of any such offence as is therein mentioned may [*164 *be directed to be paid in the same manner as costs of prosecutions for offences committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England. The 12 and 13 Vict. c. 96, provides that the prosecution and trial in the colonies of any treason, piracy, felony, robbery, murder, conspiracy or other offence of what nature or kind soever, committed upon the sea or in any haven, river, creek or place where the admiral has jurisdiction, shall be in the same manner as if such offence had been committed upon any waters within the limits of such colony;(0) and that the punishment of any such offence shall be the same as if it had been committed in England ;(p) and that in cases of murder and manslaughter, where (U) Reg. v. Bjornsen, 12 Law T. 473; 10 Cox C. C. 74. (0) Sec. 1. (P) Sec. 2. the death is in any colony, and the cause of the death elsewhere, the offence may be dealt with, tried and punished as if it had been wholly committed in that colony; and that where the death is within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, wherever the cause of death may have been, the offence shall be held for the purpose of the Act to have been wholly committed upon the sea. (q) *165] *CHAPTER THE NINTH. OF NEGLECTING QUARANTINE, OF SPREADING CONTAGEOUS DISORDERS, AND OF INJURY TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH. Sec. I.-Of neglecting Quarantine. THE performance of quarantine, or forty days' probation, when ships arrive from countries infected with contagious disorders, having been considered as of the highest importance, with reference to the public health of the nation, has been enforced from time to time by various legislative enactments. These were formerly of considerable severity; but the 6 Geo. 4, c. 78, repeals all former Acts upon this subject, and enforces the performance of quarantine principally by pecuniary penalties. Some offences, however, subject the offender to imprisonment, and some are of the degree of felony. It may be here observed, that in a case which arose upon 26 Geo. 2, c. 6, which enacted, that all persons going on board ships coming from infected places should obey such orders as the King in Council should make, but did not award any particular punishment, nor contain a clause as to the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, it was holden that disobedience of such an order of council was an indictable offence, and punishable as a misdemeanor at common law. (a) By the 6 Geo. 4, c. 78. s 17, "if any commander, master, or other person, having charge of any vessel liable to perform quarantine, and on board of which the plague, or other infectious disease or distemper, shall not then have appeared, shall himself quit, or shall knowingly permit or suffer any seaman or passenger coming in such vessel to quit such vessel, by going on shore, or by going on board any other vessel or boat, before such quarantine shall be fully performed, unless by such license as shall be granted by virtue of any order in council, to be made concerning quarantine as aforesaid, or in case any commander or other person having charge of such vessel shall not, within a convenient time after due notice given for that purpose, cause such vessel, and the lading thereof, to be conveyed into the place and places appointed for such vessel and lading to perform quarantine; then, and in every such case every such commander, master, or other person as aforesaid, for every such offence shall forfeit and pay the sum of four hundred pounds; and if any such person coming in any such vessel liable to quarantine (or any pilot or other person going on board the same, either before or after the arrival of such vessel at any port or place in the United Kingdom, or the islands aforesaid), shall, *166] either before or after such arrival, quit such vessel, unless by such license as aforesaid, by going on shore in any port or place in the United Kingdom, or the islands aforesaid, or by going on board any other vessel or boat, with intent to go on shore as aforesaid, before such vessel so liable to quarantine as aforesaid shall be regularly discharged from the performance thereof, it shall and may be lawful for any person whatsoever, by any kind of necessary force, to compel such pilot or other person so quitting such vessel so liable to quarantine, to return on board the same; and every such pilot or other person so quitting such vessel so liable to quarantine shall for every such offence suffer imprisonment for (9) Sec. 3. Sec. 4 provides that the act shall not affect the jurisdiction of the Courts of New South Wales and Van Diemen's land. The 18 & 19 Vict. c. 91, s. 21, provides that nothing contained in that section shall affect the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 96. (a) Rex v. Harris, 4 T. R. 202, 2 Leach 549. the space of six months, and shall forfeit and pay the sum of three hundred pounds." Sec. 21. "If any officer of his Majesty's customs, or any other officer or person whatsoever, to whom it doth or shall appertain to execute any order or orders made or to be made concerning quarantine, or the prevention of infection, as notified as aforesaid, or to see the same put in execution, shall knowingly and wilfully embezzle any goods or articles performing quarantine, or be guilty of any other breach or neglect of his duty in respect to the vessels, persons, goods, or articles performing quarantine, every such officer or person so offending shall forfeit such office or employment as he may be possessed of, and shall become from thence incapable to hold or enjoy the same, or to take a new grant thereof; and every such officer and person shall forfeit and pay the sum of two hundred pounds; and if any such officer or person shall desert from his duty when employed as aforesaid, or shall knowingly and willingly permit any person, vessel, goods, or merchandize, to depart or to be conveyed out of the said lazaret vessel or other place as aforesaid, unless by permission under an order of his Majesty, by and with the advice of his council, or under an order of two or more of the lords or others of his privy council; or if any person hereby authorized and directed to give a certificate of a vessel having duly performed quarantine or airing, shall knowingly give a false certificate thereof, every such person so offending shall be guilty of felony; (b) and if any such officer or person shall knowingly or wilfully damage any goods performing quarantine under his direction, he shall be liable to pay one hundred pounds damages, and full costs of suit, to the owner of the same." The publication in the London Gazette of any order in council, or of any order by two or more of the lords or others of the privy council, made in pursuance of the Act, or his Majesty's royal proclamation made in pursuance of the same, is to be deemed and taken to be sufficient notice to all persons concerned, of all matters therein respectively contained. [*167 The statute also enacts, that in any prosecution, suit, or other proceedings against any person, for any offence against this Act, or any which may hereafter be passed Concerning quarantine, or for any breach or disobedience of any order made by his Majesty by the advice of his privy council, concerning quarantine, and the preven tion of infection, notified or published as aforesaid, or of any order or orders made by two or more of the privy council, the answers of the commander, master, or other person, having charge of any vessel, to any questions or interrogatories put to him by virtue and in pursuance of the Act, or of any Act which may hereafter be passed concerning quarantine, or of any such order or orders as aforesaid, shall be received as evidence so far as the same relate to the place from which such vessel came, or to the place or places at which she touched in the course of her voyage: and also that where any vessel shall have been directed to perform quarantine by the superintendent of quarantine, or his assistant, or, where there is no superintendent or assistant, by the principal officer of the customs at any port or place, or other officer of the customs authorized to act in that behalf; the having been so directed to perform quarantine shall be given and received as evidence that such vessel was liable to quarantine, unless satisfactory proof be produced by the defendant to show that the vessel did not come from, or touch at, any such place or places as is or are stated in the said answers, or that such vessel, although directed to perform quarantine, was not liable to the performance thereof. And it further enacts, that where any vessel shall in fact have been put under quarantine by the superintendent, &c., and shall actually be performing the same, such vessel shall, in any prosecution, &c., for any offence against this act, or any other act hereafter passed concerning quarantine, or against any orders of council as aforesaid, be deemed liable to quarantine, without proving in what manner or from what circumstances such vessel became liable to the performance thereof. (b) This act specifies no punishment for principals; they are, therefore, punishable under the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, ss. 8, 9; 1 Vict c. 90, s. 5, and 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3, s. 2, ante, pp. 3, 4; and as to accessories, see ante, p. 67, et seq. |