their hearts, and cause them to comply. It is he that takes away the stony heart, and gives a new heart; and he is able to do it in every instance, if he chooses. If he does not do it, then, in any instance, it is because he does not, on the whole, choose to do it, in that instance; that is, he does not, on the whole, choose that that sinner should be saved. But, should any say that God cannot change the sinner's heart, and make him "willing in the day of his power," and "cause him to walk in his statutes," though he does, on the whole, desire to do it; we may ask them, if God does, on the whole, desire the salvation of every sinner, why does he not do all that he can, to save them? If he cannot give them a new heart, and make them willing to comply with the terms of the gospel, why does he not use with them all the means that he can? He could raise up more

preachers, he could pour out his spirit, he could awaken the careless and secure, he could place before every sinner a lively view of the glories of heaven and the torments of the damned, he could send his gospel to all nations, he could furnish his preachers with all those miraculous gifts, which were so instrumental of spreading the gospel at first, he could do a thousand things, which he does not do, to promote the salvation of all men. It is evident, then, that he does not, on the whole, desire the salvation of all men; but chooses, for some wise reasons, that a part should

perish; and, according to his own word, "sends them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they might be damned." Since, there

ly feels.

fore, God does not, on the whole, desire the salvation of all men, the offers of life, which are made to all, do not express a desire, on the whole, for the salvation of all. But God does desire the salvation of all men, in itself considered. He views it, as in itself, exceedingly desirable. And the offers of life, the invitations, warnings, threatenings, expostulations, and commands, express this desire. And they express what God sincereBut they do not express any other desire, and God does not feel any other desire for the salvation of those he does not save. The salvation of a particular sinner may be exceedingly desirable in itself, while, on the whole, for some wise reason, it may be best he should not be saved. God, therefore, may, without any inconsistency, sincerely desire his salvation, in itself considered, while, on the whole, all things considered, he desires his destruction. He may, therefore, express his desire for his salvation, in itself considered, by offering him life, and exhorting him to choose it, and be very sincere in it; while, at the same time, since his damnation is best on the whole, he may decree his damnation, and harden his heart, and "send him strong delusion, that he might be damned."

SERMON VII.

EPHESIANS I. 11.

Who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.

WE proceed in the discussion of objections. Objection 10. It is said, that if this doctrine is true, and all the sin that takes place is for the best, then sin is a good thing, and the more we have of it the better. And therefore, that the language of this doctrine is, "let us do evil that good may come;" for if we believe this doctrine we should not endeavor to prevent sin, but rather encourage it by all the means in our power.

Answer. The same objection was made against this doctrine, in the days of the apostle. When he taught, Rom. 3. 7. that "the truth of God hath more abounded, through our lie, unto his glory;" that is, that our wickedness has been the occasion of manifesting the divine perfections, in a more glorious manner than they could otherwise have been manifested; he was "slanderously reported" and affirmed to say, "let us do evil, that good

may come." But those who drew this conclusion from the doctrine, so evidently and so wickedly perverted it, that he says, their "damnation is just." It does not follow, because the sin which does take place, is, on the whole, for the best, all things being considered, that therefore, it is good in its own nature. It is best, on the whole, that

the people of God should suffer many trials in this life, from pain, sickness, and death, as it will prepare them for a higher degree of holiness and happiness in heaven; but it does not follow, that pain, sickness, and death are good things in their own nature, or desirable for their own sake. Neither does it follow, because all the sin which does take place is for the best, that the more there is of it the better. It does not follow, because it is best to have some pain, sickness, and death, that the more we have of them the better. It is best, in the whole compass of the year, to have some bitter cold weather; but it does not follow, that the more there is of it the better. The doctrine of these discourses is, that whatever takes place is for the best; that the present system, just as it is, is the best possible system. But to say, that because the sin which does take place is for the best, it would be better to have more, is the same as to say, that because the present system is the best, a different system would be better, which is absurd. And to say, that if this doctrine is true, we should encourage sin, instead of opposing it,

is not a correct conclusion, for several reasons. In the first place, if we did not oppose it as much as we do, there would be more of it than there is now; and agreeably to our doctrine, any change, either way, would make the system worse. We must oppose it, therefore, just as much as we do, in order that there may not be too much. In the second place, we cannot know before hand, what particular sins will be for the best, because we cannot, as God does, take a view of the whole ground, and see things in all their connections. and consequences; and consequently, we could not know what sins to oppose, and what to encourage, if it could be right for us to encourage any. In the third place, it is the peculiar prerogative of God to make what is best on the whole his rule of conduct, and we have no right to attempt to make it ours. If we could know before hand, that a particular sin would be for the best, as we cannot, unless God informs us, still, God has given us no right to commit it ourselves, or to use our influence to have others commit it. It was known before hand that Judas should betray Christ, for our Lord had given the information. But this did not give Judas a right to betray him; nor did it give the other disciples a right to encourage him in doing so. It was known before hand that Peter should deny his

master, for our Lord had told him. not give him a right to do so.

But this did

It was known