the existence of something which had better be kept out of existence? It would indeed be a reproach to the divine character, if God employed his agency in causing, or if he did not use it in preventing, the existence of any thing by which the highest interest of the universe would suffer. But he does not cause nor permit any thing to take place contrary to the general good. And till it can be proved, as it never can, that the great interests of the universe suffer by the sins which take place, there is no force in this objection. But, as it has been proved, in the first of these discourses, that nothing takes place but what is, on the whole, for the best, nothing but what tends in some way to promote the highest happiness of the universe, for God to cause these things is not a matter of reproach, but of praise.

Thus, it appears, that the doctrine supported in these discourses does not make God the actor of sin; it does not make him exercise any agency in producing the sinful actions of men, but what is perfectly proper and suitable for him, as governor of the universe; it does not make it necessary to suppose that there is any sin in him, or any imperfection in his nature; nor does it make him exercise an agency in the production of any events, but such as are, on the whole, wisest and best. And consequently, this doctrine does not make God the author of sin, in any sense which is in the least degree derogatory to the divine

character, or which brings the slightest reproach upon his name.

NOTE.

To remove the difficulty of God's being the cause of sin, it has been said, that sin is a mere want of holiness. And that since it is a mere negative thing, it cannot have any positive cause. And that although God causes our actions, he does not cause the sinfulness of them. But, it is apprehended, that there can be really no foundation for this distinction; and if there were, it is not seen that any advantage is gained by it. How can the action of hating God, be separated from the sin of it, so as to have a separate cause? Can any thing be added to, or taken from hatred of God, so as to render it a holy exercise? Can hatred of God be any thing but sin? And if not, how can it be considered a mere negative thing, a non-entity, a nothing? Is not hatred as really a positive exercise, as love is? How can the action of loving sin be abstracted from its moral qualities, so as to become harmless and innocent? Is not loving sin, in itself a sin? And is it not a positive thing, as really as loving God is a positive thing? How can these actions be produced, without producing sin? But if this distinction were well founded, what advantage would be gained by it? If God causes all our actions, and also causes the goodness of good beings, which is admitted, that being a positive thing, then, when he causes one to act, whom he has not made good, he causes him to act wickedly. And if he, by his agency, causes one to act wickedly, who, without that agency, would not act at all, why is not this liable to all the objections which can be brought against our doctrine, on the supposition that sin is a positive thing, and produced by divine power?

SERMON VI.

EPHESIANS I. 11.

Who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.

WE proceed in the discussion of objections. Objection 7. It is said, that God, in scripture, represents sin as contrary to his will, and forbids it under the penalty of his severest indignation; but this doctrine represents sin as taking place agreeably to his will; and if God represents sin as contrary to his will, and at the same time teaches this doctrine, he contradicts himself. It is said, that God, in scripture, expresses the greatest abhorrence of sin; but that, if he has decreed the existence of sin, and employs his own agency in causing it to take place, then he must be well pleased with sin; and therefore, he expresses an abhorrence which he does not feel, and acts a deceitful part. It is said, that God, in scripture, says, that he wills not the death of the sinner; but that if this doctrine is true, he does will his death. And if he punishes his creatures for doing

what he caused them to do, then he must delight in their misery: which represents God as a most wicked, false, cruel, and unfeeling tyrant.

Answer. Before we proceed directly to the consideration of this objection, let a few things be premised. First, let it be observed, that in order to make out a contradiction in the declarations of any one, we must be certain that the words, which are supposed to contradict each other, are used, in both instances, in the same sense. For example, the scripture says, in one place, “Answer a fool according to his folly," and in another place, "Answer ́not a fool according to his folly." Now, to make out a contradiction here, we must be certain that the words are used in both places in the same sense; for if they are used in different senses, the two passages may be perfectly consistent. Again, let it be observed, that an event may, at one time, be considered by itself alone, and spoken of in that point of view, without taking into consideration any of its connections and consequences; and it may, at another time, be considered, and spoken of, with all its connections, consequences, relations, and dependencies. When spoken of in the former point of view, it is said to be spoken of as it is in itself considered; and when spoken of in the latter point of view, it is said to be spoken of as it is upon the whole, all things considered. Once more, let it be observed, that a thing may sometimes be chosen for its own sake, without any

reference to any other thing; and this is what is called being desirable in itself. As, for example, we choose happiness for its own sake, because it is desirable in itself. And again, a thing which is not desirable in itself, and which never could be chosen for its own sake, may be chosen for the sake of some other thing with which it is connected, and which may thereby be attained; and this is called being desirable on the whole. For instance, we may choose to suffer a small temporary evil, for the sake of some great and lasting good, which may thereby be attained. We may choose to suffer the pain of cutting off one of our limbs, which is very undesirable in itself, for the sake of preserving our whole body from destruction. A wise and good parent may choose to inflict pain upon his undutiful child, not for its own sake, not because he delights in seeing his child suffer, for that is very undesirable in itself, but he chooses it for the sake of the child's good, or for the good of the rest of his family, to deter them from the like disobedience. God chose that his Son should die, not for its own sake, he had no pleasure in the sufferings of his Son, in themselves considered, but he chose it for the sake of the salvation of sinners; he chose it, because, upon the whole, considering the amazing worth of souls, and the great glory that will redound to his name from saving sinners, considering how much his law would be honored, and how clearly