that his most glorious victories would be followed by the necessity of retreat, how were the ministers in England to be able to foresee, much less to prevent, such necessity? -This writer, who, a few weeks ago, ascribed to Lord Wellington exclusively the merit of having nearly annihílated the French army, has now the cool impudence to tell his readers that the British army is, in numerical strength, not much more than a third part of that of the French army; and that, if the latter should bear down upon him, he must be compelled to retire into Portugal. Well, and what of that? Could the ministers in England prevent the French army from being so strong, or did they give imperative orders for undertaking those marches, those battles, and those sieges, by which the English army must have been so materially reduced? Let any candid man put this question to himself, and I am persuaded the answer will be the contrary of that which is suggested by this writer.-We are here told, that our sick and wounded being removed from Madrid to Salamanca gave our friends at the former place much concern; that it was indicative of a change about to over-cloud all their bright prospects. There is no question of the truth of this; but, how could this

"Wellington, to frustrate all the skill of "all the French Commanders united; but "we cannot help reflecting, that our be"loved Hero is mortal; a chance shot,"a fever, might blast all our hopes; and "the prospect of dragging on the war in "Spain, like a Walcheren expedition, "would be enough to reduce the most zea"lous friend of his country to despair." -This paragraph sets out with a position, from which, though laid down in so dogmatical a manner, I must beg leave explicitly to dissent. In one way, indeed, it is the business of a minister to turn victory to account. It is his business, and I said at the time, that it was the business of our minister, to turn the victory of Salamanca to account, by offering Napoleon, who was alleged to be the defeated party, terms of peace; but, in a military point of view, it is not only the business of a general, and especially of a commander in chief, to turn his own victories to account; but, it is his business to avoid fighting, and, of course, to avoid gaining victories, unless he be convinced that he can turn them to account; for, unless victory be attended with beneficial results, every life lost in the acquiring of it is a life thrown away. Strictly speaking, it is not a victory, with which word we always associate the idea of ad-chauge be ascribed to the deficiencies of our vantage as to the main object contended for. If, for example, a commander be successful, as MELAS was at the battle of Marengo, in the former part of the day, and if he be defeated in the latter part of the day, no man thinks of saying that he has gained a victory. And, if he be successful in his attempt at advancing to-day, and be compelled to abandon his ground tomorrow, can he with reason be said to have been victorious? It is in the results of battles that we are to look for the proof of victory; and, if it belong to ministers to be the cause of the results, the merit of all victories must remain with them.

cabinet, who were not upon the spot, who could know very little of what was going on, who had exercised no control over the movements of our commander, and in whose power it was not to prevent any of the causes which compelled him to retreat? If our army be, as this writer asserts it is, reduced by sickness and service, to whom is the cause of that effect to be ascribed? If it be critically situated, that situation may have been caused by the zeal, by the bravery, by any other estimable quality in the commander; but, surely, common sense, as well as common justice, forbid us to ascribe it to the ministers in England, who This writer says, that it must be grating have had no more to do in all probability, to Lord Wellington to find his most glo- in causing those movements which have rious victories followed by the necessity of placed the army in such a critical situation, retreat. Doubtless, it may have been than they had in gaining the victory of Sagrating to him; but then, who has he to lamanca.-It may suit the hireling who blame for it? The Spaniards, perhaps; writes in the Times newspaper, and it may those who ought, or whom he expected to suit the proprietor of the Morning Chronisecond his efforts; but, certainly, not cle, who condescends to make his columns those by whom those efforts were not com- subservient to the purposes of an insolent manded to be made. He was commander- and greedy faction of oligarchs; these, it in-chief; he was upon the spot; he, if may suit to give to Lord Wellington all the any one could, must have known the ex-merit of every advantage that he obtains tent of his own means and of those of the enemy; and if he was unable to perceive

over the enemy with the immense means placed in his hands; and to give to the

ministers all the demerit of every reverse | military point of view; for of that any one
in my situation can be but a poor judge;
but, I should, in case of final failure, blame
him, who must have such excellent means
of obtaining information, for not discover-
ing in time, that the cause was a cause not
to be maintained. I do not pretend to the
gift of prophecy; and I do not know how
the contest may end; but, if we should be
finally compelled to yield up the Peninsula
to the French, I am not one of those who
shall be disposed to lay all the blame upon
the ministers, who cannot be so well in-
formed as to many important points as those
who have been upon the spot, and who
have had such ample means of observation
as well as of information. Of this way of
thinking, however, is not our good hire-
ling of the Times newspaper. He, on the
contrary, would lay the sins even of the Spa-
nish government, as it is called, upon our
ministers, that is to say, upon the present
set, without Lord Wellesley amongst them,
whom he denominates the "first Slates-
man in Europe." He says, the "Govern-
66 ment of Spain is new. It needs the gui-
"dance of experience. It requires to be
"protected and to be directed. Protection
"has been afforded to it by the blood and
"treasure of the British nation; to give
"it direction and advice is the proper task
of the British Ministry. Three years
ago
it was stated, that there was no ab-
"solute want of resources in the country,
no inherent or incorrigible defects in the
"materials of which the body of the Army

that he sustains. But, men in general do
not, and will not, decide in this way.
They will say, that, if to him belongs ex-
clusively the glory of victory, to him also
belongs exclusively, whatever attribute at-
taches to retreat; and I am sure, that, if
the whole nation were put to the vote upon
the subject, nine hundred and ninety-nine
out of every thousand would say with me,
that this writer, in supposing it possible,
that Lord Wellington, now that he sees his
army critically situated, should resign in
disgust, and leave it to find its way back to
Portugal as it could, has imputed to him
the possible possession of a mind, the seat
of baseness itself. What! A commander
in chief, who has advanced into a country
of his own accord; who has been absolute
master of his operations; who has had as-
cribed to him exclusively all the advantages
he has gained; who has been covered with
honours and rewards, in which even his
posterity is to partake; shall such a man,
when, before the close of the campaign, he
finds himself beset with difficulties, resign.
in disgust! Shall he abandon his post,
and, with it that army by the valour of
whom he has gained a profusion of titles
and of pecuniary compensation! The very
idea must fill every man of honour, every
man who has the ordinary sentiments of"
morality, with indignation and abhorrence.
If ever there was a commander who had no
reason to complain of being thwarted in his
plans and operations, Lord Wellington ap-
pears to me to be in that state. He has
had, and has, every thing within his reach,
under his absolute control. He is com-
mander in chief of the English forces; he
has long been generalissimo of the Portu-
guese army, and he is now generalissimo
of the Spanish army. His brother is our
ambassador to the Spanish government;
the political parties at home have vied with
each other in their praises of him and his
deeds. No fault has ever been found of any
thing that he has done: advancing or re-
treating behind his lines and in the open
field, capturing fortresses or raising sieges;"
still has he been praised; with him the
tide of titles and rewards has never ceased
to flow. It is, therefore, most abomina-
bly unjust towards the government to pre-
tend, that they are answerable for every"
reverse that may happen to him. I, for
my part, should rather be inclined to say,
that if the war should finally prove disas-
trous, the fault was his, or at least, as
much his as theirs. I do not mean in a

66

was composed, and no perverse or un⚫ tractable disposition in the mass of the "people of Spain, yet at that time no " system had been established by which "the deficiencies of one district could be

supplied from the abundance of another, or by which the resources of any one "province could be made properly avail"able for its own or the general defence; "there were corruption and treachery

66

among many of the Civil Authorities,"the numbers, composition, and discipline "of the army were defective, and many of its chief officers were notoriously in"capable, or disaffected. If these defects

66

were now wholly removed, it is utterly "incredible, that Spain should not have "shaken off her invaders "like dew-drops

from the lion's mane;" but if the defects "exist, we say they argue not merely an "imbecility in Spain, but here in England, "-here, at the head-quarters of the cause. "Our Ministers are to blame, if they do "not exercise the weight they possess in

army likewise assembled in the neighbour-
hood of Monasterio. They moved forward
on the evening of the 20th with about ten
thousand men to drive in our outpost at
Quintana Palla, and Olmos. The former
withdrew by order, but the latter was
maintained with great spirit by the Chas-
seurs Britanniques. Seeing a fair oppor-
tunity of striking a blow upon the enemy,
I requested Lieutenant General Sir Edward
Paget to move with the 1st and 5th divi-
sions upon the enemy's right flank, which
movement having been well executed,
drove them back upon Monasterio, and our
posts were replaced in Quintana Palla.-
On the morning of the 21st, I received a
letter from Sir Rowland Hill, of the 17th,
in which he acquainted me of the enemy's
intention to move towards the Tagus,
which was already fordable by individuals
in many places, and was likely to become
so by an army.The Castle of Chin-
chilla had surrendered on the 9th instant.

tacked by numbers so superior, before they could receive the support, allotted to them, that they were obliged to retire, suffering considerable loss. Major Wurmb was unfortunately killed.- -It is impossible to represent in adequate terms my sense of the conduct of the Guards and German Legion upon this occasion; and I am quite satisfied, that if it had been possible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, these troops would have maintained them. Some of the men stormed even the third line, and one was killed in one of the embrasures of that line; and I had the satisfaction of seeing that if I could breach the wall of the Castle we should carry the place.Another mine was commenced under the second line from the church of St. Roman, of which we remained in possession.- -The enemy had on the 13th moved forward a considerable body of infantry, and six squadrons of cavalry from Briviesca to reconnoitre our out-posts at Monasterio. They-The enemy's force in Valencia was attacked the picquet at the bridge in front supposed to amount to not less than seventy of that town, but were repulsed by the thousand men, a very large proportion of fire of a detachment of the Infantry of the which, it was expected, would be disBrunswick Legion. In this affair, Lieu- posable for service out of that kingdom. tenant Colonel the Honourable Frederick I had desired Lieutenant General Sir Ponsonby, who commanded at Monasterio, was wounded, but not severely, and I hope I shall soon again have the benefit of his assistance. — I had long had reports of the enemy's intention to advance for the relief of the Castle of Burgos with the army of Portugal, reinforced by troops recently arrived from France, and with that part of the army of the North which was disposable; and they did advance in considerable force against the post at Monasterio on the evening of the 18th. The subal- -I felt severely the sacrifice I was theretern of the Brunswick Legion, who com- by obliged to make. Your Lordship is manded a picquet in St. Olalla, disobeyed aware that I was never very sanguine in his orders in remaining in that village upon my expectations of success in the siege of the approach of the enemy, and he was Burgos, notwithstanding that I considered taken with his picquet. The enemy con- success was attainable, even with the sequently obtained possession of the heights means in my power, within a reasonably which commanded the town of Monasterio, limited period. If the attack made on the and our outpost was obliged to retire on first line on the 22d or the 29th had sucthe morning of the 19th to the Burgos side ceeded, I believe we should have taken the of the town.- -I assembled the troops, place, notwithstanding the ability with excepting those necessary for carrying on which the Governor conducted the defence, the operations of the siege, as soon as it and the gallantry with which it was exappeared by the enemy's movement of the ecuted by the garrison. Our means were 18th, that they entertained serious inten- limited; but it appeared to me, that if we tions of endeavouring to raise it, and placed should succeed, the advantage to the cause the allied army on the heights, having would be great, and the final success of their right at Ibeas, on the Arlanzon, the the campaign would have been certain. centre at Rio Vena and Magaradas, and I had every reason to be satisfied with the left at Soto Pallacio. The enemy's the conduct of the officers and troops dur

Rowland Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that he could not maintain himself in it with advantage; and it was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the corps under my command might not be insulated, in consequence of the movements which he should find himself under the necessity of making; I therefore raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 20th, and moved the whole army back towards the Douro.

ing the siege of Burgos, particularly with of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse the brigade of Guards. During the lat-shot, was taken prisoner.The delay ter part of the siege the weather was very occasioned by this misfortune enabled the unfavourable, and the troops suffered much enemy to bring up a very superior body of from the rain. The officers at the head of cavalry, which was charged by Major the artillery and engineer departments- General Bock's and Major General Anson's Lieutenant Colonel Robe, and Lieutenant brigades, near the Venta del Pozo, but Colonel Burgoyne, and Lieutenant Colonel unsuccessfully, and our rear-guard was Dickson, who commands the reserve ar- hardly pressed. The enemy made their tillery, rendered me every assistance; and charges on the two light battalions of the the failure of success is not to be attributed King's German Legion, formed in squares, to them. By their activity we carried off but were always repulsed with considerevery thing in the course of one night, ex- able loss by the steadiness of these two cepting three eighteen pounders destroyed battalions. They suffered no loss, and I by the enemy's fire, and the eight pieces cannot sufficiently applaud their conduct of cannon which we had taken from the and that of Colonel Halkett who commandenemy on the night of the 19th ultimo in ed them.--The exertions and conduct of the storm of the hornwork. Having sent Lieutenant General Sir S. Cotton, and of our cattle to meet the equipment expected the officers and staff attached to him from Santander, we had not the means of throughout this day, were highly meritomoving the latter.The enemy was not rious, and although the charge made by aware of our movement, and did not fol- the cavalry was not successful, I had the low us till late on the 22d, when ten thou- satisfaction of observing great steadiness in sand men encamped on this side of Burgos. their movements. Major Bull's troop of -The British army encamped at Celada horse artillery, under Major Downman and del Camino and Hornillos, with the light | Captain Ramsay, distinguished themselves. cavalry at Estepan and Baniel. We con-The army continued its march on the tinued our march on the following day, the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carright of the army to Torquemada, the left rion, with its right at Duenas, and its left of Cordevilla, at which places we crossed at Villa Muriel, and the 1st battalion 1st the Pisuerga.The enemy followed our Guards joined us from Corunna.- -I movement with their whole army. Our halted here on the 25th, and the enemy rear-guard consisted of two light battalions attacked our left at Villa Muriel. They of the King's German Legion, under Co- were repulsed, however, by the 5th dilonel Halkett, and of Major General An- vision of infantry, under the command of son's brigade of cavalry and Major Ge- Major General Oswald, in the absence of neral Bock's brigade was halted at the Lieutenant Leith on account of indisposiVenta del Pozo to give them support. The tion.I had directed the third battalion whole under the command of Lieutenant of the Royals to march to Palencia, to proGeneral Sir Stapleton Cotton. Don Julian tect the destruction of the bridges over the Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlan- Carrion at that place, but it appears that zon; and the party of Guerillas, hereto- the enemy assembled in such force at that fore commanded by the late Martinez, on point, that Lieutenant Colonel Campbell the hills on the left of our rear-guard.- thought it necessary to retire upon Villa Major General Anson's brigade charged Muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion twice with great success, in front of Celada at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to del Camino, and the enemy was detained change our front, and I directed Major above three hours by the troops under General Oswald to throw back our left, Lieutenant General Sir S. Cotton, in the and the Spanish troops upon the heights, passage of the Hormaza, in front of that and to maintain the Carrion with the right village.The rear-guard continued to of the fifth division. The bridge of Villa fall back in the best order, till the Gue- Muriel was destroyed; but the enemy disrillas on the left having been driven in, covered a ford, and passed over a consithey rode towards the flank of the rear- derable body of infantry and cavalry. I guard of Major General Anson's brigade, made Major General Pringle and Major and four or five squadrons of the enemy General Barnes attack these troops under mixed with them. These were mistaken the orders of Major General Oswald; in for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank which attack the Spanish troops co-opeand rear of our troops. We sustained rated, and they were driven across the some loss, and Lieutenant Colonel Pelly, river with considerable loss. The fire