104 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting in part was, however, orderly or, as one officer testified, "very orderly." There was no violence. And appellant made no noise whatever. What Mr. Justice Roberts said in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516, has never been questioned: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." We held in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 544-545, that a State could not infringe the right of free speech and free assembly by convicting demonstrators under a "disturbing the peace" ordinance where all that the students in that case did was to protest segregation and discrimination against blacks by peaceably assembling and marching to the courthouse where they sang, prayed, and listened to a speech, but where there was no violence, no rioting, no boisterous conduct. The school where the present picketing occurred was the center of a racial conflict. Most of the pickets were indeed students in the school. The dispute doubtless disturbed the school; and the blaring of the loudspeakers of the police was certainly a "noise or diversion" in the DOUGLAS, J., dissenting in part 408 U.S. The municipal ordinance on which this case turns is c. 28, § 19.2 (a) which provides in relevant part: "That no person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof." Appellant was one of 200 people picketing a school and carrying signs promoting a black cause “Black cheerleaders to cheer too," "Black history with black teachers," "We want our rights," and the like. Appellant, however, did not himself carry a picket sign. There was no evidence that he yelled or made any noise whatsoever. Indeed, the evidence reveals that appellant simply marched quietly and on one occasion raised his arm in the "power to the people" salute. The pickets were mostly students; but they included former students, parents of students, and concerned citizens. They had made proposals to the school board on their demands and were turned down. Hence the picketing. The picketing was mostly by black students who were counseled and advised by a faculty member of the school. The school contained 1,800 students. Those counseling the students advised they must be quiet, walk hand in hand, no whispering, no talking. Twenty-five policemen were stationed nearby. There was noise but most of it was produced by the police who used loudspeakers to explain the local ordinance and to announce that arrests might be made. The picketing did not stop, and some 40 demonstrators, including appellant, were arrested. The picketing lasted 20 to 30 minutes and some students went to the windows of the classrooms to observe it. It is not clear how many there were. The picketing 104 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting in part 99 47 picketing “in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any . . . county . . . courthouses." As in those two cases, Rockford's modest restriction on some peaceful picketing represents a considered and specific legislative judgment that some kinds of expressive activity should be restricted at a particular time and place, here in order to protect the schools.48 Such a reasonable regulation is not inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.49 The antinoise ordinance is not invalid on its face.50 The judgment is Affirmed in part and reversed in part. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins in the judgment and in Part I of the opinion of the Court. He concurs in the result as to Part II of the opinion. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting in part. While I join Part I of the Court's opinion, I would also reverse the appellant's conviction under the antinoise ordinance. 47 Quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U. S., at 161, we noted that 'such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to . . . distribute information or opinion.'" 390 U. S., at 617. 48 Cf. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S., at 202-203 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). 49 Cf. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966). In Adderley, the Court held that demonstrators could be barred from jailhouse grounds not ordinarily open to the public, at least where the demonstration obstructed the jail driveway and interfered with the functioning of the jail. In Tinker we noted that "a school is not like a hospital or a jail enclosure." 393 U. S., at 512 n. 6. 50 It is possible, of course, that there will be unconstitutional applications; but that is not a matter which presently concerns us. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S., at 91, and n. 1, supra. ted. And the ordinance gives no license to punish anyone because of what he is saying.** We recognize that the ordinance prohibits some picketing that is neither violent nor physically obstructive. Noisy demonstrations that disrupt or are incompatible with normal school activities are obviously within the ordinance's reach. Such expressive conduct may be constitutionally protected at other places or other times, cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965), but next to a school, while classes are in session, it may be prohibited.45 The antinoise ordinance imposes no such restriction on expressive activity before or after the school session, while the student/faculty "audience" enters and leaves the school. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965), this Court indicated that, because of the special nature of the place,16 persons could be constitutionally prohibited from picketing "in or near" a courthouse "with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice." Likewise, in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611 (1968), we upheld a statute prohibiting 44 Compare Scoville v. Board of Education, 425 F. 2d 10 (CA7), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 826 (1970); Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613 (MD Ala. 1967) (cited in Tinker). 45 Different considerations, of course, apply in different circumstances. For example, restrictions appropriate to a single-building high school during class hours would be inappropriate in many open areas on a college campus, just as an assembly that is permitted outside a dormitory would be inappropriate in the middle of a mathematics class. 46 Noting the need "to assure that the administration of justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence," we emphasized that "[a] State may protect against the possibility of a conclusion by the public... [that a] judge's action was in part a product of intimidation and did not flow only from the fair and orderly working of the judicial process." 379 U. S., at 562, 565. ties, daytime picketing and handbilling on public grounds near a school can effectively publicize those grievances to pedestrians, school visitors, and deliverymen, as well as to teachers, administrators, and students. Some picketing to that end will be quiet and peaceful, and will in no way disturb the normal functioning of the school. For example, it would be highly unusual if the classic expressive gesture of the solitary picket disrupts anything related to the school, at least on a public sidewalk open to pedestrians. On the other hand, schools could hardly tolerate boisterous demonstrators who drown out classroom conversation, make studying impossible, block entrances, or incite children to leave the schoolhouse.42 Rockford's antinoise ordinance goes no further than Tinker says a municipality may go to prevent interference with its schools. It is narrowly tailored to further Rockford's compelling interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students' learning, and does not unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment rights. Far from having an impermissibly broad prophylactic ordinance, Rockford punishes only conduct which disrupts or is about to disrupt normal school activities. That decision is made, as it should be, on an individualized basis, given the particular fact situation. Peaceful picketing which does not interfere with the ordinary functioning of the school is permit 43 expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Schneider v. State, 308 U. S., at 163. 41 Cf. Jones v. Board of Regents, supra. 42 Cf. Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (SD W. Va.), aff'd, 399 F. 2d 638 (CA4 1968), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 905 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). 43 See Jones v. Board of Regents, supra; Hammond v. South Carolina State College, supra. |