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Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965), and Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611 (1971), on which appellant particularly relies, presented completely different situations. In Cox, a general breach of the peace ordinance had been construed by state courts to mean "to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet." The Court correctly concluded that, as construed, the ordinance permitted persons to be punished for merely expressing unpopular views.22 In Coates, the ordinance punished the sidewalk assembly of three or more persons who "conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by . . . ." We held, in part, that the ordinance was impermissibly vague because enforcement depended on the completely subjective standard of "annoyance."

In contrast, Rockford's antinoise ordinance does not permit punishment for the expression of an unpopular point of view, and it contains no broad invitation to subjective or discriminatory enforcement. Rockford does not claim the broad power to punish all "noises" and "diversions." 23 The vagueness of these terms, by themselves, is dispelled by the ordinance's requirements that (1) the "noise or diversion" be actually incompatible with normal school activity; (2) there be a demonstrated causality between the disruption that occurs and the "noise or diversion"; and (3) the acts be

22 Cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 308 (1940). Similarly, in numerous other cases, we have condemned broadly worded licensing ordinances which grant such standardless discretion to public officials that they are free to censor ideas and enforce their own personal preferences. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313 (1958); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163-164 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939). 23 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 546-550 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S., at 234-237.

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or imminent interference with the "peace or good order" of the school.20

Although the prohibited quantum of disturbance is not specified in the ordinance, it is apparent from the statute's announced purpose that the measure is whether normal school activity has been or is about to be disrupted. We do not have here a vague, general “breach of the peace" ordinance, but a statute written specifically for the school context, where the prohibited disturbances are easily measured by their impact on the normal activities of the school. Given this "particular context," the ordinance gives "fair notice to those to whom [it] is directed." 21 Although the Rockford ordinance may not be as precise as the statute we upheld in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611 (1968)—which prohibited picketing "in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from" any courthouse we think that, as in Cameron, the ordinance here clearly "delineates its reach in words of common understanding." Id., at 616.

20 Some intermediate appellate courts in Illinois appear to have interpreted the phrase "tending to" out of the Chicago ordinance entirely, at least in some contexts. Chicago v. Hansen, 337 Ill. App. 663, 86 N. E. 2d 415 (1949); Chicago v. Holmes, 339 Ill. App. 146, 88 N. E. 2d 744 (1949); Chicago v. Nesbitt, 19 Ill. App. 2d 220, 153 N. E. 2d 259 (1958); but cf. Chicago v. Williams, 45 Ill. App. 2d 327, 195 N. E. 2d 425 (1963).

In its brief, the city of Rockford indicates that its sole concern is with actual disruption. "[A] court and jury [are] charged with the duty of determining whether or not . . . a school has been disrupted and that the defendant's conduct, [no matter what it was,] caused or contributed to cause the disruption." Brief for Appellee 16 (emphasis supplied). This was the theory on which the city tried appellant's case to the jury, Report, supra, n. 1, at 12-13, although the jury was instructed in the words of the ordinance. As already noted, supra, n. 1, no challenge is made here to the Rockford ordinance as applied in this case.

21 American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S., at 412.

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noisy or diversionary 16 activity that disrupts or is about to disrupt normal school activities. It forbids this willful activity at fixed times-when school is in session—and at a sufficiently fixed place-"adjacent" to the school. Were we left with just the words of the ordinance, we might be troubled by the imprecision of the phrase “tends to disturb." 18 However, in Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill. 2d 1, 4, 253 N. E. 2d 400, 402 (1969), and Chicago v. Gregory, 39 Ill. 2d 47, 233 N. E. 2d 422 (1968), reversed on other grounds, 394 U. S. 111 (1969), the Supreme Court of Illinois construed a Chicago ordinance prohibiting, inter alia, a "diversion tending to disturb the peace," and held that it permitted conviction only where there was "imminent threat of violence." (Emphasis supplied.) See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 116–117, 121-122 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).19 Since Meyer was specifically cited in the opinion below, and it in turn drew heavily on Gregory, we think it proper to conclude that the Supreme Court of Illinois would interpret the Rockford ordinance to prohibit only actual

16 "Diversion" is defined by Webster's Third New International Dictionary as "the act or an instance of diverting from one course or use to another ... the act or an instance of diverting (as the mind or attention) from some activity or concern . . . : a turning aside . . . : something that turns the mind from serious concerns or ordinary matters and relaxes or amuses."

17 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 568-569 (1965) ("near" the courthouse not impermissibly vague).

18 See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S., at 119-120 (Black, J., concurring); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S., at 525-527; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 372 (1947); cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942) (statute punishing "fighting words," that have a "direct tendency to cause acts of violence," upheld); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969).

19 Cf. Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 Ill. 23, 79 N. E. 2d 39 (1948), reversed on other grounds, 337 U. S. 1, 6 (1949).

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below did not elaborate on the meaning of the antinoise ordinance. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it, we must "extrapolate its allowable meaning." Here, we are "relegated . . . to the words of the ordinance itself," "1 to the interpretations the court below has given to analogous statutes,12 and, perhaps to some degree, to the interpretation of the statute given by those charged with enforcing it.13 "Extrapolation," of course, is a delicate task, for it is not within our power to construe and narrow state laws.14

With that warning, we find no unconstitutional vagueness in the antinoise ordinance. Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.15 The words of the Rockford ordinance are marked by "flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity," Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d 1077, 1088 (CA8 1969) (Blackmun, J.), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965 (1970), but we think it is clear what the ordinance as a whole prohibits. Designed, according to its preamble, "for the protection of Schools," the ordinance forbids deliberately

9 The trial magistrate simply charged the jury in the words of the ordinance. The complaint and verdict form used slightly different language. See n. 24, infra.

10 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S., at 174 (concurring in judgment). 11 Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S., at 614.

12 E. g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972).

13 E. g., Lake Carriers Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498, 506-508 (1972); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U. S. 676 (1972); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U. S. 99, 105, 107 (1971); cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961).

14 United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971).

15 It will always be true that the fertile legal "imagination can conjure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of [disputed] terms will be in nice question." American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 412 (1950).

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Opinion of the Court

basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,” it “operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."

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Although the question is close, we conclude that the antinoise ordinance is not impermissibly vague. The court below rejected appellant's arguments "that proscribed conduct was not sufficiently specified and that police were given too broad a discretion in determining whether conduct was proscribed." 46 Ill. 2d, at 494, 263 N. E. 2d, at 867. Although it referred to other, similar statutes it had recently construed and upheld, the court

York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558, 559560 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 261-264 (1937).

5 Where First Amendment interests are affected, a precise statute "evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct proscribed," Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 236 (1963), assures us that the legislature has focused on the First Amendment interests and determined that other governmental policies compel regulation. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 32; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 200, 202 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).

6 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 372 (1964).

7 Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S., at 287.

8 Baggett v. Bullitt, supra, at 372, quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526 (1958). See Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, supra, at 684; Ashton v. Kentucky, supra, at 195, 200-201; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 486 (1965); Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 150-152 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369 (1931).

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