« ForrigeFortsett »
the presence of Moore at the Ponderosa Tap on April 27.5 "Sanders' testimony to the effect that it was Moore he spoke with at the Ponderosa Tap in itself is not significantly, if at all, impeached. Indeed, it is buttressed by the testimony of bartender Joyce and operator Fair, both of whom elaborated the incident by their description of the man, and by Moore's request for a ride to Harvey, Illinois, Fair's providing that ride, and Fair's hearing, on that trip, the reference to one of the men as ‘Barbee,' ” and a second reference to trouble with a bartender in Lansing.
The other four of the first five items that Jones told police he could identify "Slick" and subsequently testified that Moore was not "Slick”; that the police had a picture of Watts and assigned the lieutenant, unsuccessfully, to find Watts; that Thompson had been shown a picture of Moore and told the police that Moore was not "Slick”; and that on the day of the trial Sanders remarked that the man he knew as "Slick” looked heavier than Moore—are in exactly the same category. They all relate to "Slick," not Moore, and quite naturally go off on Sanders' initial misidentification of "Slick” with
None of the five items serves to impeach in any way the positive identification by Hill and by Powell of
5 The dissent observes, post, at 804, “When confronted with this fact [Moore's imprisonment at Leavenworth), Sanders indicated that it was impossible that petitioner [Moore] was the man with whom he had spoken in the Ponderosa Tavern.” This is a misreading of Sanders' testimony. The question and Sanders' answer were:
"Q. And did you tell me and also later on, did you tell the policeman from the State's Attorney's Office that if you had known that this fellow, Lyman Moore, was in the Federal Penitentiary until March 4, 1962, you would definitely not have identified him as being Slick that you knew?
“A. If he's in jail, it would have been impossible to be the same man." Abstract of Record 296.
Moore as Zitek's killer, or the testimony of Fair and Joyce that Moore was at the Ponderosa Tap on April 27, or the testimony of Fair that the moustached Barbee was accompanying Moore at that time, and that one of the two men made the additional and undisputed admission on the ride to Harvey. We conclude, in the light of all the evidence, that Sanders' misidentification of Moore as Slick was not material to the issue of guilt.
The remaining claim of suppression relates to the diagram on the back of Mayer's statement to the police. Moore contends that the diagram shows that Powell was seated with his back to the entrance to Zitek's and, thus, necessarily contradicts his testimony that he was looking toward the entrance as he sat at the card table, and that the State knowingly permitted false testimony to remain uncorrected, in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959).
In Napue the principal prosecution witness at Napue's murder trial was an accomplice then serving a sentence for the crime. He testified, in response to an inquiry by the prosecutor, that he had received no promise of consideration in return for his testimony. In fact, the prosecutor had promised him consideration, but he did nothing to correct the witness' false testimony. This Court held that the failure of the prosecutor to correct the testimony, which he knew to be false, denied Napue due process of law, and that this was so even though the false testimony went only to the credibility of the witness. See
6 Contrary to the assertion by the dissent that the Mayer statement, with its accompanying diagram, was never made available to the defense, post, at 803 and 809, the trial transcript indicates that during the cross-examination of Officer Koppitz a request was made by the defense for all written statements taken by the officer from persons in Zitek's restaurant at the time of the shooting. The court granted the request and the record recites that statements of Mayer and others were furnished to defense counsel.
Opinion of the Court
also Miller v. Pate, 386 U. S. 1 (1967), and Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U. S. 28 (1957).
We are not persuaded that the diagram shows that Powell's testimony was false. The officer who drew the diagram testified at the post-conviction hearing that it did not indicate the direction in which Powell was facing or looking at the time of the shooting. Powell testified that his position at the table gave him a view of the bartender; that at the moment he could not bid in the pinochle game and had laid his hand down and was looking toward the door when Moore walked in. There is nothing in the diagram to indicate that Powell was looking in another direction or that it was impossible for him to see the nearby door from his seat at the card table. Furthermore, after the shooting he pursued Moore but stopped when the man warned him that he, too, might be shot.
In summary, the background presence of the elusive "Slick," while somewhat confusing, is at most an insignificant factor. The attempt to identify Moore as "Slick" encountered difficulty, but nothing served to destroy the two-witness identification of Moore as Zitek's assailant, the three-witness identification of Moore as present at the Ponderosa Tap, the two-witness identification of Moore as one of the men who requested and obtained a ride from the Ponderosa in Dolton to Harvey, Illinois, and Fair's testimony as to the admission made on that ride.
We adhere to the principles of Brady and Napue, but hold that the present record embraces no violation of those principles.
IV The 16-gauge shotgun was admitted into evidence at the trial over the objection of the defense that it was not the murder weapon, that it had no connection with the crime charged, and that it was inadmissible under Illinois
law.? During his closing argument to the jury, the prosecuting attorney stated that the 16-gauge shotgun was not used to kill Zitek, but that Moore and his companion, Barbee, were “the kind of people that use shotguns.”
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the shotgun was properly admitted into evidence as a weapon in Moore's possession at the time of his arrest, and was a weapon "suitable for the commission of the crime charged . . . even though there is no showing that it was the actual weapon used.” 42 Ill. 2d, at 78, 246 N. E. 2d, at 303. Moore claims that the gun's introduction denied him due process.
Of course, the issue whether the shotgun was properly admitted into evidence under Illinois law is not subject to review here. The due process claim, however, appears to be raised for the first time before us. There is no claim by Moore, and there is nothing in the record to disclose, that due process was argued in the state courts. We could conclude, therefore, that the issue is not one properly presented for review.
In any event, we are unable to conclude that the shotgun's introduction deprived Moore of the due process of law guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 16-gauge shotgun, found in the car, was in the constructive possession of both Moore and Barbee when they were arrested after the shooting incident on October 31. There is substantial other evidence in the record
7 See n. 2.
8 Curiously, the State argues in this Court that it is possible that the 16-gauge shotgun was the murder weapon. Brief for Respondent 20-21.
9 Later in his closing argument the prosecuting attorney referred to the 16-gauge shotgun and stated again that a 12-gauge shotgun killed Zitek. He argued that a shotgun is not “the most humane type weapon" and that the death penalty is appropriate in a case in which a shotgun is used to murder a person.
Opinion of MARSHALL, J.
that a shotgun was used to kill Zitek, and that he suffered the wounds one would expect from a shotgun fired at close range. The testimony as to the murder itself, with all the details as to the shotgun wounds, is such that we cannot say that the presentation of the shotgun was so irrelevant or so inflammatory that Moore was denied a fair trial. The case is not federally reversible on this ground.
V Inasmuch as the Court today has ruled that the imposition of the death penalty under statutes such as those of Illinois is violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Furman v. Georgia, ante, p. 238, it is unnecessary for us to consider the claim of noncompliance with the Witherspoon standards. In Witherspoon, 391 U. S., at 523 in n. 21, the Court stated specifically “Nor, finally, does today's holding render invalid the conviction, as opposed to the sentence, in this or any other case” (emphasis in original). The sentence of death, however, may not now be imposed.
The judgment, insofar as it imposes the death sentence, is reversed, Furman v. Georgia, supra, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE PowELL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Petitioner was convicted of murder in the Illinois state courts and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction and sentence by a divided court. 42 Ill. 2d 73, 246 N. E. 2d 299 (1969). This Court holds that the imposition of the death sentence violated the principle established today in Furman v. Georgia, ante, p. 238, and that the sentence must be vacated, but the Court upholds the underlying conviction. I agree with the majority that the sentence is invalid and