« ForrigeFortsett »
that certiorari should be granted. Reported below: 435 F. 2d 859.
No. 70–354. FOODEN ET AL. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OF ILLINOIS. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Reported below: 48 Ill. 2d 580, 272 N. E. 2d 497.
No. 71–430. CRABTREE V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, WELLSTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.
No. 71–6259. McENTEGGART v. CATALDO ET AL. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Reported below: 451 F. 2d 1109.
No. 71–249. ORR V. TRINTER ET AL. C. A. 6th Cir. Motions of National Education Assn. and Board of Education of the City of Washington C. H., Ohio, for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Reported below: 444 F. 2d 128. Rehearing Granted. (See No. 204, October Term, 1970,
STATEMENT SHOWING THE NUMBER OF CASES FILED, DISPOSED OF, AND REMAINING ON DOCKETS AT CONCLUSION OF OCTOBER TERMS—1969, 1970, AND 1971
Number of cases on dockets.-
Number disposed of during terms.
18 1,758 1,903 2,070 2,429 2,289 2,445 4,202 4,212
8 1,433 1,541 1,628 1,971 1,774 2,009 3,409 3,322
Cases argued during term
Number disposed of by full opinions
Number disposed of by per curiam opinions
Number set for reargument the following term
Cases granted review this term
Cases reviewed and decided without oral argument
Total cases to be available for argument at outset of following term
3 Includes A-483 and No. 9 Orig.
1 Includes No. 9 Orig. (pending) 2 Includes A-483 and No. 50 Orig.
JULY 11, 1972
ACADEMIC CONFERENCES. See Constitutional Law, III, 1;
Immigration and Nationality Act; Judicial Review, 1.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM. See Constitutional Law, I, 5; III, 9;
ACCEPTANCE OF BRIBES. See Appeals, 1; Constitutional
Law, VII, 1; Jurisdiction.
ACCESS ROUTES. See Administrative Procedure, 1-5; Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 1-5; Judicial Review, 2–6.
ACCUMULATION OF INCOME. See Taxes, 1-3.
ACQUISITIONS. See Administrative Procedure, 1–5; Interstate
Commerce Commission, 1-5; Judicial Review, 2–6.
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS. See Constitutional Law, I, 5;
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE. See also Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 1-5; Judicial Review, 2–6.
1. Line-haul carriers jointly acquiring control of switching rail-
road—Related application for trackage rights by one petitioner for
inclusion.—The denial of trackage rights to Southern Pacific (on the
ground that SP was “not entitled to serve Peninsula or Rivergate”)
should be reconsidered by the Interstate Commerce Commission in
conjunction with the reappraisal of the issues arising under $ 5 (2)
of the Interstate Commerce Act. Port of Portland v. United States,
2. Line-haul carriers petitioning for inclusion in control of switch-
ing railroad—ICC decision--Applicable legal principles.-In view
of uncertainties about the northern access to Portland's Rivergate
industrial complex-given the physical limitations of the present
facilities of Peninsula Terminal Co.—and the apparent fact that
physical operation over Peninsula into Rivergate was not at issue
here, approval of the ICC order, with its protective conditions, may
still be in the public interest, but the announced grounds for the
ICC decision do not comport with the applicable legal principles.
Port of Portland v. United States, p. 811.
3. Line-haul carriers petitioning for inclusion in joint purchase of
switching railroad—Market shares and existing traffic.—In stressing
the small share in Peninsula Terminal Co.'s traffic that Milwaukee
Railroad had before the Northern Lines Merger, the ICC ignored
any possible increase in that share after Condition 24 (a) of that
merger took effect. In announcing a principle of preserving the
market shares of the two railroads currently connecting with Penin-
sula, the ICC failed to explain why it was not taking into account
the potentially enormous traffic over Peninsula, should Peninsula
become the northern route into Portland's Rivergate industrial com-
plex. Port of Portland v. United States, p. 811.
4. Line-haul carriers seeking joint acquisition of switching rail-
road—Petitions for inclusion denied by ICC.—On the record in
this case (which is ambiguous with regard to many factual and
procedural issues) it has not been shown that the ICC's order
authorizing Union Pacific and Burlington Northern alone to acquire
control of the Peninsula Terminal Co. met the “public interest”
standard of $ 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Port of Port-
land v. United States, p. 811.
5. Petitions for inclusion-Shifting market shares-Anticompetitive
effects.—The ICC's denial of inclusion of the Southern Pacific Trans-
portation Co. and the Milwaukee Railroad because their gain would
work a corresponding loss to Burlington Northern and Union Pacific
is not a proper approach under $5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce
Act, given the principle that the anticompetitive effects of any
§ 5 (2) transaction must be explicitly considered. Port of Portland
v. United States, p. 811.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law, V;
ADMISSION OF ALIENS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1;
Immigration and Nationality Act; Judicial Review,
ADVERSARY HEARINGS. See Constitutional Law, I, 1-2, 4;
ADVISORY OPINIONS. See Constitutional Law,
Law, III, 3;
AGREEMENTS TO CONCEAL FACTS. See Constitutional Law,
III, 8; Grand Juries, 4.
AIDE TO SENATOR. See Appeals, 2–3; Constitutional Law,
VII, 2–6; Grand Juries, 2-3, 5.
ALABAMA. See Confessions; Constitutional Law, IV, 1.
ALIBI DEFENSES. See Constitutional Law, I, 3; II, 1; Crim-
inal Law, 2-4; Evidence, 1-2; Procedure, 1.
ALIENS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1; Immigration and Na-
tionality Act; Judicial Review, 1.
ANONYMITY OF SOURCES. See Constitutional Law, III, 8;
Grand Juries, 4.
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS. See Administrative Procedure,
1-5; Interstate Commerce Commission, 1–5; Judicial Review,
ANTINOISE ORDINANCES. See Constitutional Law, III, 6.
ANTIPICKETING ORDINANCES. See Constitutional Law, III,
APPEALS. See also Constitutional Law, V; VII, 1–6; Evidence,
3; Grand Juries, 2–3, 5; Jurisdiction.
1. District Court "decision or judgment setting aside, or dismiss-
ing” the indictment—Direct appeal.—This Court has jurisdiction
under 18 U. S. C. $ 3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V) to hear the appeal, since
the District Court's order was based upon its determination of the
constitutional invalidity of 18 U. S. C. $8 201 (c)(1) and 201 (g)
on the facts as alleged in the indictment, United States v. Brewster,
2. Interrogation of Senator's aide-Scope of questioning.-Aide
may be questioned by the grand jury about the source of classified
documents in the Senator's possession, as long as the questioning
implicates no legislative act. The Court of Appeals' protective order
in other respects would suffice if it forbade questioning the aide or
others about the conduct or motives of the Senator or his aides at
the subcommittee meeting; communications between the Senator and
his aides relating to that meeting or any legislative act of
the Senator; or steps of the Senator or his aides preparatory for
the meeting, if not relevant to third-party crimes. Gravel v. United
States, p. 606.
3. Questioning Senator's aide—Protective order.—The Court of
Appeals' protective order was overly broad in enjoining interrogation
of the aide with respect to any act, "in the broadest sense,” that he
performed within the scope of his employment, since the aide's im-
munity extended only to legislative acts as to which the Senator would
be immune. Gravel v. United States, p. 606.