APPEAL TO PRURIENT INTEREST. See Constitutional Law, III, 7.
ARBITRARY PENALTIES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2; Crim- inal Law, 1.
ARMY INTELLIGENCE. See Constitutional Law, III, 3;
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law, VI; Mootness; Witnesses.
ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1-2,
4; IV, 2; Immigration and Nationality Act; Judicial Review, 1. ATTORNEY GENERAL. See Constitutional Law, III, 1; Immi- gration and Nationality Act; Judicial Review, 1.
AVAILABILITY OF WITNESSES. See Constitutional Law, VI; Mootness; Witnesses.
BARTENDERS. See Constitutional Law, I, 3; II, 1; Criminal Law, 2-4; Evidence, 1-2; Procedure, 1.
BEACON PRESS. See Appeals, 2-3; Constitutional Law, VII, 2-6; Grand Juries, 2-3, 5.
BELGIAN JOURNALISTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1; Immigration and Nationality Act; Judicial Review, 1. BENEFICIARIES. See Taxes, 1-3.
BENEFITS. See Constitutional Law, III, 9; Procedure, 2.
BLACK PANTHER PARTY. See Constitutional Law, III, 8;
BOARD OF DIRECTORS. See Taxes, 1-3.
BOARD OF REGENTS. See Constitutional Law, I, 5; III, 9; Procedure, 2-3.
BRIBERY. See Appeals, 1; Constitutional Law, VII, 1;
BUGGING ACTIVITIES. See Grand Juries, 1.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See Constitutional Law, III, 2, 4; IV, 2. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD. See Administrative Procedure, 1-5; Interstate Commerce Commission, 1-5; Judi- cial Review, 2-6.
BUSINESS CONSTRAINTS. See Taxes, 1-3.
CALIFORNIA. See Constitutional Law, III, 8; Grand Juries, 4. CAMPUS ORGANIZATIONS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2, 4; IV, 2.
CAPITAL CASES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2; Criminal Law, 1.
CASE AND CONTROVERSY. See Constitutional Law, III, 3; Justiciability.
CENSORSHIP. See Constitutional Law, III, 8; Grand Juries, 4. CENTRAL CONNECTICUT STATE COLLEGE. See Constitu- tional Law, III, 2, 4; IV, 2.
CHALLENGES. See Constitutional Law, V; Evidence, 3. CHAPTERS OF SDS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2, 4; IV, 2. CHICAGO. See Constitutional Law, III, 5.
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAILROAD. See Administrative Procedure, 1-5; Interstate Commerce Com- mission, 1-5; Judicial Review, 2-6.
CHILLING EFFECT. See Constitutional Law, III, 3;
CITIZENS' DUTY TO TESTIFY. See Constitutional Law, III, 8; Grand Juries, 4.
CIVIL CONTEMPT. See Grand Juries, 1.
See Constitutional Law, III, 3;
CIVILIAN ACTIVITY. See Constitutional Law, III, 3;
CIVIL RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 5-6.
CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS. See Appeals, 2-3; Constitutional Law; VII, 2-6; Grand Juries, 2-3, 5.
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS. See Taxes, 1-3.
COERCION. See Confessions; Constitutional Law, IV, 1.
COLLEGE PROFESSORS. See Constitutional Law, III, 9; Pro- cedure, 2.
COLLEGES. See Constitutional Law, III, 2, 4; IV, 2.
COMMITTEE MEETINGS. See Appeals, 2-3; Constitutional Law, VII, 2-6; Grand Juries, 2-3, 5.
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SENATOR AND AIDES. See Appeals, 2-3; Constitutional Law, VII, 2-6; Grand Juries, 2-3, 5.
COMMUNISM. See Constitutional Law, III, 1; Immigration and Nationality Act; Judicial Review, 1.
COMPELLED TESTIMONY. See Appeals, 2-3; Constitutional Law, III, 8; VII, 2-6; Grand Juries, 1–5.
COMPETITIVE EFFECTS. See Administrative Procedure, 1-5; Interstate Commerce Commission, 1-5; Judicial Review, 2-6. COMPULSORY PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, VI; Moot- ness; Witnesses.
COMPUTER DATA. See Constitutional Law, III, 3; Justiciability.
CONDITIONAL LIBERTY. See Constitutional Law, I, 1-2, 4; Paroles, 1-3.
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE. See Constitutional Law, I, 1-2, 4; Paroles, 1-3.
CONDUCT OF SENATORS. See Appeals, 2-3; Constitutional Law, VII, 2-6; Grand Juries, 2-3, 5.
CONFERENCES. See Constitutional Law, III, 1; Immigration and Nationality Act; Judicial Review, 1.
CONFESSIONS. See also Constitutional Law, IV, 1.
Wounded prisoner in extreme pain, under the influence of mor- phine-Oral confession to hospital doctor.-Petitioner's oral con- fession was invalid, having been the product of gross coercion and part of the same "stream of events" that necessitated invalidation of the written confessions. Beecher v. Alabama, p. 234.
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 8; Grand Juries, 4.
See Constitutional Law, I, 1-2, 4; Paroles,
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, VI; Mootness; Witnesses.
CONGRESSIONAL AIDES. See Appeals, 2-3; Constitutional Law, VII, 2-6; Grand Juries, 2-3, 5.
CONGRESSMEN. See Appeals, 1; Constitutional Law, VII, 1; Jurisdiction.
CONNECTICUT. See Constitutional Law, III, 2, 4; IV, 2.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See also Appeals, 1-3; Confessions; Criminal Law, 1-4; Evidence, 1-3; Grand Juries, 1-5; Immi- gration and Nationality Act; Judicial Review, 1; Jurisdic- tion; Justiciability; Mootness; Paroles, 1-3; Procedure, 1-3; Witnesses.
1. Arrest for parole violation-Revocation of parole.-Though parole revocation does not call for the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding, a parolee's liberty involves significant values within the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and termination of that liberty requires an informal hearing to give assurance that the finding of a parole violation is based on verified facts to support the revocation. Mor- rissey v. Brewer, p. 471.
2. Determination whether parole condition was violated.-Due process requires a reasonably prompt informal inquiry conducted by an impartial hearing officer near the place of the alleged parole vio- lation to determine if there is reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has violated a parole condition. The parolee should receive prior notice of the inquiry, its purpose, and the alleged viola- tions. The parolee may present relevant information and (absent security considerations) question adverse informants. The hearing officer shall digest the evidence on probable cause and state the reasons for holding the parolee for the parole board's decision. Morrissey v. Brewer, p. 471.
3. Other shotgun improperly admitted into evidence-Claim not raised below.-Petitioner's due process claim as to the shotgun was not previously raised and therefore is not properly before this Court, and in any event the introduction of the shotgun does not constitute federally reversible error. Moore v. Illinois, p. 786.
4. Parolee arrested for parole violation-Hearing on proposed revo- cation of parole.-At the revocation hearing, which must be con- ducted reasonably soon after the parolee's arrest, minimum due process requirements are: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revok- ing parole. Morrissey v. Brewer, p. 471.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
5. Teacher hired for one academic year-Not rehired for ensuing year-No prior hearing.-The Fourteenth Amendment does not re- quire opportunity for a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of a non- tenured state teacher's contract, unless he can show that the non- renewal deprived him of an interest in "liberty" or that he had a "property" interest in continued employment, despite the lack of tenure or a formal contract. Here the nonretention of respondent, absent any charges against him or stigma or disability foreclosing other employment, is not tantamount to a deprivation of "liberty," and the terms of his employment accorded him no "property" interest protected by procedural due process. Board of Regents v. Roth, p. 564.
1. Conviction for murder-Death penalty imposed by jury.-The sentence of death may not be imposed on petitioner. Moore v. Illinois, p. 786.
2. Fourteenth Amendment-Death sentences imposed for rapes and murder. The imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceed- ings. Furman v. Georgia, p. 238; Stewart v. Massachusetts, p. 845. III. First Amendment.
1. Alien journalist-Marxist scholar invited to participate in aca- demic conferences-Attorney General refused waiver of ineligibility.— In the exercise of Congress' plenary power to exclude aliens or pre- scribe the conditions for their entry into this country, Congress in § 212 (a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 has delegated conditional exercise of this power to the Executive Branch. When, as in this case, the Attorney General decides for a legitimate and bona fide reason not to waive the statutory exclusion of an alien, courts will not look behind his decision or weigh it against the First Amendment interests of those who would personally com- municate with the alien. Kleindienst v. Mandel, p. 753.
2. Freedom of association-Assumed relationship with the National Students for a Democratic Society.-Insofar as the college's denial of recognition to petitioners' group was based on an assumed relation- ship with the National SDS, or was a result of disagreement with the group's philosophy, or was a consequence of a fear of disrup- tion, for which there was no support in the record, the college's
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