decision violated the petitioners' First Amendment rights. Healy v.
James, p. 169.

3. Freedom of associationCivil disorders-Army's compilation
of data on civilian political activities.—Civilians' claim that their
First Amendment rights are chilled, due to the mere existence of the
data-gathering system, does not constitute a justiciable controversy
on the basis of the record in this case, disclosing as it does no show-
ing of objective harm or threat of specific future harm. Laird v.
Tatum, p. 1.

4. Freedom of associationLeftist students organizing as Students
for a Democratic SocietyDenial of recognition as campus organiza-
tion.—Lower courts erred in (1) discounting the cognizable First
Amendment associational interest that petitioners had in furthering
their personal beliefs, and (2) assuming that the burden was on
petitioners to show entitlement to recognition by the college rather
than on the college to justify its nonrecognition of the group, once
petitioners had made application conformably to college requirements.
Healy v. James, p. 169.

5. Freedom of expressionPeaceful picketing near school in
violation of city ordinance.—City ordinance prohibiting all picketing
within 150 feet of a school, except peaceful picketing of any school
involved in a labor dispute, is violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it makes an impermis-
sible distinction between peaceful labor picketing and other peaceful
picketing. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, p. 92; Grayned
v. City of Rockford, p. 104.

6. Freedom of speechAntinoise ordinanceMass demonstration
while school is in session.—Antinoise ordinance prohibiting a person
while on grounds adjacent to a building in which a school is in
session from willfully making a noise or diversion that disturbs or
tends to disturb the peace or good order of the school session is not
unconstitutionally vague since, with fair warning, it prohibits only
actual or imminent, and willful, interference with normal school
activity, and is not a broad invitation to discriminatory enforcement;
nor is the ordinance overbroad as unduly interfering with First
Amendment rights since expressive activity is prohibited only if it
“materially disrupts classwork.” Grayned v. City of Rockford,

p. 104.

7. Freedom of the press-Obscenity statuteUnderground news-
paper's publication of pictures of nudes and a sex poem. In the
context in which they appeared, the photographs were rationally re-

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lated to a news article, in conjunction with which they appeared,
and were entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection.
In view of the poem's content and placement with other poems
inside the newspaper, its dominant theme cannot be said to appeal
to prurient interest. Kois v. Wisconsin, p. 229.

8. Newspaper reportersGrand jury subpoenasProtection of
confidential sources.—The First Amendment does not relieve a news-
paper reporter of the obligation that all citizens have to respond
to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a crim-
inal investigation, and therefore the Amendment does not afford
him a constitutional testimonial privilege for an agreement he makes
to conceal facts relevant to a grand jury's investigation of a crime
or to conceal the criminal conduct of his source or evidence thereof.
Branzburg v. Hayes, p. 665.

9. Professor's public statements critical of administration-One-
year employment contract not renewed.-Lack of a contractual or
tenure right to re-employment, taken alone, did not defeat respond-
ent's claim that the nonrenewal of his contract violated his free
speech right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
District Court erred in foreclosing determination of the contested
issue whether the decision not to renew was based on respondent's
exercise of his right of free speech. Perry v. Sindermann, p. 593.
IV. Fourteenth Amendment.

1. Due processWounded prisoner in extreme pain, under the
influence of morphine-Oral confession to hospital doctor.—Peti-
tioner's oral confession was invalid, having been the product of
gross coercion and part of the same "stream of events” that neces-
sitated invalidation of the written confessions. Beecher v. Alabama,

p. 234.

2. Procedural due processProper basis for nonrecognition.-
Proper basis for nonrecognition of local chapter of SDS might
have been afforded by a showing that the petitioners' group refused
to comply with a rule requiring them to abide by reasonable campus
regulations. Since the record is not clear whether the college has
such a rule and, if so, whether petitioners intend to observe it, these
issues remain to be resolved. Healy v. James, p. 169.
V. Fourth Amendment.

Warrant authorizing search for, and seizure of, stolen whiskey
Searched premises owned by petitioner's father-Petitioner not

Since the Government now suggests that the warrant was
invalid, and since the record is inadequate for a determination of

whether petitioner had an interest in the searched premises that would
afford him standing under Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364, to
challenge the legality of the search, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Combs v. United States, p. 224.
VI. Sixth Amendment.

State's witness moved permanently to foreign country.Where
a State's witness is bona fide unavailable, the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause are met when prior-recorded testimony of
the witness is admitted in second trial if that prior testimony bears
“indicia of reliability” that would afford "the trier of fact a satis-
factory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.'
Mancusi v. Stubbs, p. 204.
VII. Speech or Debate Clause.

1. Former United States Senator charged with solicitation and
acceptance of bribes-Vote on pending legislation. Although the
Speech or Debate Clause protects Members of Congress from
inquiry into legislative acts or the motivation for performance of
such acts, it does not protect all conduct relating to the legislative
process. Since in this case prosecution of the bribery charges does
not necessitate inquiry into legislative acts or motivation, the
District Court erred in holding that the Speech or Debate Clause
required dismissal of the indictment. United States v. Brewster,

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p. 501.

2. Interrogation of Senator's aide-Scope of questioning.--Aide
may be questioned by the grand jury about the source of classified
documents in the Senator's possession, as long as the questioning
implicates no legislative act. The Court of Appeals' protective
order in other respects would suffice if it forbade questioning the
aide or others about the conduct or motives of the Senator or his
aides at the subcommittee meeting; communications between the
Senator and his aides relating to that meeting or any legislative
act of the Senator; or steps of the Senator or his aides preparatory
for the meeting, if not relevant to third-party crimes. Gravel v.
United States, p. 606.

3. Questioning Senator's aide-Protective order.—The Court of
Appeals' protective order was overly broad in enjoining interroga-
tion of the aide with respect to any act, "in the broadest sense,”
that he performed within the scope of his employment, since the
aide's immunity extended only to legislative acts as to which the
Senator would be immune. Gravel v. United States, p. 606.

4. Senate subcommittee meetingChairman's aide's preparations

for meeting.—The Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a
Member of Congress but also to his aide, insofar as the aide's con-
duct would be a protected legislative act if performed by the
Member himself. Gravel v. United States, p. 606.

5. Senate subcommittee meetingClassified documents in public
recordGrand jury investigating private republication.—The Speech
or Debate Clause does not extend immunity to the Senator's aide
from testifying before the grand jury about the alleged arrange-
ment for private publication of the Pentagon Papers, as such pub-
lication had no connection with the legislative process. Gravel v.
United States, p. 606.

6. Testimonial privilege.-Senator's aide had no nonconstitutional
testimonial privilege from being questioned by the grand jury in
connection with its inquiry into whether private publication of the
Pentagon Papers violated federal law. Gravel v. United States,

p. 606.

CONTEMPT. See Constitutional Law, III, 8; Grand Juries, 1, 4.
CONTINGENCY PLANS. See Constitutional Law, III, 3;

CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT. See Constitutional Law, I,

5; III, 9; Procedure, 2-3.
CONVICTIONS. See Constitutional Law, VI; Mootness;


, .

CORPORATIONS. See Taxes, 1-3.

COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law, VI; Mootness; Witnesses.
COURT ORDERS. See Constitutional Law, III, 8; Grand

Juries, 4.
CRIMINAL LAW. See also Appeals, 1-3; Confessions; Con-

stitutional Law, I, 1-4; II, 1-2; III, 6–8; IV, 1; V; VI;
VII, 1-6; Evidence, 1-3; Grand Juries, 1-5; Mootness; Pa-

roles, 1-3; Procedure, 1; Witnesses.
1. Death sentences imposed for rapes and murder.—The imposi-
tion and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is there-
fore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence

imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings.
Furman v. Georgia, p. 238.

2. Eighth AmendmentConviction for murderDeath penalty
imposed by jury.—The sentence of death may not be imposed on
petitioner. Moore v. Illinois, p. 786.

3. Pretrial motion for disclosure-Criminal trialItems of evi-
dence helpful to the defense.—The evidentiary items (other than
a diagra on which petitioner bases his suppression claim relate
to a witness' misidentification of petitioner as "Slick” and not to
the identification, by that witness and others, of petitioner as the
person who made the incriminating statements. These evidentiary
items are not material under the standard of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U. S. 830. Moore v. Illinois, p. 786.

4. Pretrial motion for disclosure-Murder trialItem of evidence
helpful to the defense.-A diagram showing the positions of cus-
tomers at a bar where a shotgun slaying occurred does not support
petitioner's contention that the State knowingly permitted false
testimony to remain uncorrected, in violation of Napu2 v. Illinois,
360 U. S. 264, since the diagram does not show that it was impos-
sible for a prosecution witness to see the shooting. Moore v. Illinois,

p. 786.


tional Law, I, 5; III, 9; Procedure, 2–3.
CROSS-EXAMINATIONS. See Constitutional Law, I, 1-2, 4;

VI; Mootness; Paroles, 1-3; Witnesses.

PUNISHMENT. See Constitutional
Law, II, 1–2; Criminal Law, 1.
CUSTODY. See Constitutional Law, I, 1-2, 4; Paroles, 1-3.
DATA-GATHERING SYSTEMS. See Constitutional Law, III,

3; Justiciability.
DEATH PENALTY. See Constitutional Law, II, 2; Criminal

Law, 1.
DEATH SENTENCES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2; Criminal

Law, 1.
DE FACTO TENURE PROGRAMS. See Constitutional Law,

III, 9; Procedure, 2.
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT. See Appeals, 2–3; Constitutional

Law, III, 3; VII, 2–6; Grand Juries, 2–3, 5; Justiciability,

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