perseverance of nations or individuals in the principles of sound policy.

But perhaps the truth of these propositions will be more readily admitted than the possibility of drawing from them any practical conclusions. It may be said, and with great truth, that the great impediment to the general reception of principles of public and private conduct founded on pure morality evidently arises from the depraved tastes and habits of men; from some objects of self-indulgence, or some fancied interests, which they consider at once as paramount in their estimation, and incompatible with a strict adherence to pure morality. The objections which I have frequently heard stated to the general introduction of religious and moral customs, and to the abandonment of habits and pursuits incompatible with them, when the duty is pressed home, are-that it may be all very true, but that, if reduced to practice, the result would in the first place impede the operations of society, or, if it failed of that effect, that society would scarcely be worth enjoying upon the

terms.

Now this sort of feeling can only arise from grievous faults of education, whereby pernicious habits, pursuits, and amusements, have been intimately associated with, or at least too little dissociated from, the ideas of individual enjoyment and of political expediency. But surely this is no proof that the combination may not, by due precaution, be prevented? Once enlist these very feelings, tastes, and habits on the side of pure morals and religion, by impressing upon the mind of youth their close connexion with political expediency, public prosperity,

and the highest individual enjoyment, and the association is directly reversed. I do not mean to assert that the effects would also be fully reversed; for the new tendencies of the conduct will now be opposed by the natural dispositions of the heart, instead of running parallel with them as in the former case. But it is impossible not to suppose that very considerable effects would be produced both upon individuals and society. One of the best of our old writers observes that "the predominance of custom is every where visible, insomuch that a man would wonder to hear men profess, protest, engage, give great words, and then do just as they have done before; as if they were dead images and engines, moved only by the wheels of custom. Therefore, since custom is the principal magistrate of man's life, let men by all means endeavour to obtain good customs! Certainly custom is most perfect when it beginneth in young years: this we call education, which is in effect but an early custom. But if the force of custom simple and separate" (that is, operating individually,) “be great, the force of custom copulate, conjoined, and collegiate" (that is, operating upon society)" is far greater; for there example teacheth, company comforteth, emulation quickeneth, glory raiseth; so as in such places the force of custom is in its exaltation. Certainly the great multiplication of virtues upon human nature resteth upon societies well ordained and disciplined;" (that is, pure churches, well regulated universities, &c. ;) "for commonwealths and good governments do nourish virtue grown, but do not much mend the seeds. But the misery is, that the most effectual means are now applied to the

ends least to be desired." Custom and Education.)

(Bacon's Essay on

But it is time to bring this chapter to a close, lest, under colour of a treatise on the elements of political

Mr.

economy, I be accused of coming down upon my readers with a general treatise of ethics. If the preceding observations apply to politics in general, they are especially true of political economy-the most important, because the fundamental, branch of all politics. The writers on this science, particularly of that part of it specifically treated in this work, have eminently discussed the objects of their attention as if they were distinct from moral considerations. Malthus, indeed, forms an honourable exception to this observation, by his care in tracing all his political conclusions on to their moral consequences, and has thereby submitted to his readers' consideration the whole question as to the expediency of adopting or rejecting his hypothesis. But by far the greater number of economists seem to have supposed that a bare proof of the general political expediency of their conclusions would lead to their universal admission and successful operation-a supposition contrary to the experience of all ages and nations, when applied to any thing so variable and uncertain as the judgment of men upon the application or effects of the best reasoned principles of political economy. The books, therefore, though by no means useless for the practical purposes for which they were intended, have had this mischievous tendency-that, being elementary parts of the education of youth of the higher orders, the fountains of political knowledge and legislative practice have been poisoned at their source;

and the great and leading principles, which should regulate both have been overlooked. Philosophers and legislators are brought up to consider the bare, and at the best uncertain, principles of political economy as sufficient to guide their conduct in promoting the welfare of mankind. The subject in this contracted and insulated view being in itself abstruse, and not capable of reference to any fixed or undeniable principles, is peculiarly the department of controversy. The science is divided, if we may thus express it, into so many different schools, each dogmatically adhering to opposite opinions, all equally convinced of the justness of their own conclusions, but no one in any great degree successful in improving the condition of society. The practical statesman having observed successive trials of each system, and finding none capable of attaining its professed object, becomes gradually indifferent to all, and disposed merely to have recourse to temporary expedients as difficulties arise, instead of anticipating them by a comprehensive view of remote causes and their consequences.

It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the debilitating effects of such a system of government on the commonwealth of a country, or upon its degrading effects on the habits and dispositions of the people. It is sure to engender general discontent, a dissatisfaction with the laws and the government, and a dereliction of all manly and self-denying principles. Surely then if we consider how perfectly innocent and safe is all reform that proceeds only upon the system of strengthening the spirit of the laws, by adapting them to a sound system of morals, it may be worth while to see what can be done for society upon that principle. Seeing

that the effects of disjoining morals from politics have hitherto been very unpropitious, let us at length begin to try the effect of their combined force.

For this purpose I submit it again, with great humility, to the consideration of those whom it may concern, whether an improvement in the system of education may not be here suggested. If a scheme of political economy were taught, in which the principles of the science should never be contemplated as distinct from sound morals and religion, which constitute the real criterion of their truth and practical utility, a new set of views and sentiments would in time become habitual, and new elements of vigour would be diffused throughout the decaying fabric of society. That they would amount to a beneficial improvement in the condition of mankind will perhaps be the less disputed, if we consider that the result promises to be rather the attainment of that which all good men and enlightened statesmen have in vain endeavoured to accomplish, than the introduction of any unknown or doubtful ingredient into the political system. And the attempt may with more readiness be made, because, supposing it to fail of its whole object, it can only, as far as it does succeed, lead to a practical enlargement of public happiness, and of the moral and political force of the people which makes the experiment.

If such a school were established, I would write over the professor's chair-" Goodness, of all virtues and dignities of the mind, is the greatest, being the character of the Deity; without it man is a busy, mischievous, wretched thing, no better than a kind of vermin. Goodness answers to the theological virtue charity, and admits of no excess but