The act of February 4, 1919, 40 Stat., 1056, provided as follows: That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to present, in the name of Congress, a medal of honor to any person who, while in the naval service of the United States, shall, in action involving actual conflict with the enemy, distinguish himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty and without detriment to the mission of his command or the command to which attached.

Sec. 2. That the President be, and he hereby is, further authorized to present, but not in the name of Congress, a distinguished-service medal of appropriate design and a ribbon, together with a rosette or other device to be worn in lieu thereof, to any person who, while in the naval service of the United States, since the sixth day of April, nineteen hundred and seventeen, has distinguished, or who hereafter shall distinguish, himself by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility.

Sec. 3. That the President be, and he hereby is, further authorized to present, but not in the name of Congress, a Navy cross of appropriate design and a ribbon, together with a rosette or other device to be worn in lieu thereof, to any person who, while in the naval service of the United States, since the sixth day of April, nineteen hundred and seventeen, has distinguished, or who shall hereafter distinguish, himself by extraordinary heroism or distinguished service in the line of his profession, such heroism or service not being sufficient to justify the award of a medal of honor or a distinguished-service medal.

Sec. 4. That each enlisted or enrolled person of the naval service to whom is awarded a medal of honor, distinguished-service medal, or a Navy cross shall, for each such award, be entitled to additional pay at the rate of $2 per month from the date of the distinguished act or service on which the award is based, and each bar or other suitable emblem or insignia, in lieu of a medal of honor, distinguished-service medal, or Navy cross, as hereinafter provided for, shall entitle him to further additional pay at the rate of $2 per month from the date of the distinguished act of service for which the bar is awarded, and such additional pay shall continue throughout his active service, whether such service shall or shall not be continuous.

The Comptroller of the Treasury in decision dated December 8, 1919, 26 Comp. Dec., 464, relative to these acts held that the act of February 4, 1919, was a substitute for, and repealed, all prior acts. affecting the conferring of medals of honor and gratuities for distinguished naval service, and that subsequent to the date of the act an enlisted man's right to additional pay or gratuities for such medals was to be determined thereby.

The case before the Comptroller in that decision involved the award of a medal of honor "for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity" in actual conflict with the enemy. In the present case it is pointed out that since section 1407, Revised Statutes, specified that medals of honor may be awarded to men for "distinguishing themselves in battle" and for "extraordinary heroism in line of their profession "-two distinct acts-and the case before the Comptroller involved only distinction in battle, the question now presented was not considered in that decision.

It appears that the medal in question was awarded in accordance with an opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy Department, to the effect that since the prior statutes authorized the awarding of a medal of honor for extraordinary heroism in line of their profession as well as for distinguished service in battle, while the

act of February 4, 1919, only authorized such medal for distinguished service in actual conflict with the enemy, and contained no provision relative to the repeal of prior laws, the provision in the prior laws for awarding a medal for extraordinary heroism in the line of their profession not being substituted or modified in the act of February 4, 1919, was therefore still in force.

While the act of February 4, 1919, provided a medal of honor only for distinguished service "in action involving actual conflict with the enemy" which corresponds to distinguished service in battle as provided in section 1407, Revised Statutes, it does, however, provide a medal (a Navy cross) to any person who shall distinguish "himself by extraordinary heroism or distinguished service in the line of his profession." Though such recognition of heroism is not denominated a medal of honor, in its effect it fulfills the same purpose and is given for the identical service-"extraordinary heroism in line of their profession"—and, therefore, in that sense the act of February 4, 1919, does provide a medal for all the acts for which a medal of honor was provided in section 1407,, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of March 3, 1901.

The reason stated in 26 Comp. Dec., 464, for holding that the act of February 4, 1919, repealed the earlier acts providing a medal of honor and gratuities for heroism in the naval service was that the scope of that act shows clearly that it dealt with the entire subject matter involved in the earlier acts and constituted a complete substitute therefor. That such was the legislative intent is borne out by the facts shown herein relative to the purpose of the Navy cross, also by the following proviso in section 8 of the act:

That in cases of persons now in the naval service for whom the award of the medal of honor has been recommended in full compliance with then existing regulations, but on account of services which, though insufficient fully to justify the award of the medal of honor, appears to have been such as to justify the award of the distinguished service medal or Navy cross hereinbefore provided for, such cases may be considered and acted upon under the provisions of this Act authorizing the award of the distinguished service medal and Navy cross notwithstanding that said service may have been rendered more than five years before said cases shall have been considered as authorized by this proviso, but all consideration or any action upon any of said cases shall be based exclusively upon official records now on file in the Navy Department.

That proviso in the act waived certain requirements in order to adapt the provisions of the act to cases coming under prior law and not finally determined. It was a recognition that prior laws authorized the awarding of a medal of honor for acts for which the law of February 4, 1919, did not award such medal, and prescribed that in such cases the distinguished service medal or Navy cross may be awarded. It would seem, therefore, that the act of February 4, 1919, makes due provision for the specific case in question, and is,

as held in 26 Comp. Dec., 464, a complete substitute for all prior laws on the subject matter in question relating to the naval service.

Accordingly, you are advised that an enlisted man of the Navy or Marine Corps awarded a medal of honor on or after February 4, 1919, is not entitled to a gratuity of $100 as provided by section 1407, Revised Statutes.

LAND-GRANT DEDUCTIONS-STRAGGLERS.

Land-grant deductions are not applicable to transportation furnished "stragglers." 27 Comp. Dec., 1072, overruled.

Decision by Comptroller General McCarl, October 26, 1921.

The Chief, Navy Department Division, submitted October 1, 1921, for approval, disapproval, or modification, memorandum decision in connection with supplemental bill of the Alabama and Vicksburg Railway Company as follows:

The question arising in this account is as to the deductibility of land grant in connection with travel of sailors, absent without leave returning to station, where cost is to be charged to sailors. Carrier claimed full commercial fare and disbursing officer paid the balance after taking out land grant and the usual 5%. Claim is now presented for the difference. ** It is not spe

cifically included in the six classes enumerated in U. S. v. Union Pacific R. R., 249 U. S., 354. It is known as that of "stragglers," a "straggler " being one who is absent without leave for a period of not to exceed ten days. In the Navy it is the practice to enter a charge against the man's pay for the full commercial fare, and in the Marine Corps for the net military fare paid to carrier. There is a certain analogy between transportation for a "straggler and for a soldier returning from furlough (as described in class #6, 249 U. S., 354). The difference is that one is absent without leave and not necessarily traveling exclusively "for his own purposes," and the other travels with leave "for his own purposes." Both are without means and are therefore advanced the cost of transportation. In advance decision 5863 of the Assistant Comptroller of the Treasury dated June 22, 1921, 27 Comp. Dec. 1072, a distinction was made between "stragglers" and furloughed soldiers as to land-grant deductibility. If the decision of the court hinges upon the point that the furloughed soldier traveling to his station is doing it "for his own purposes," then the application of the rule is one of fact as to the purpose of the "straggler," in returning to his station. It is the opinion of this division, subject to your approval, disapproval, or modification, that a straggler" returning to his station is presumed to do so "for his own purposes" and that therefore land grant is not deductible.

The decision as submitted is approved.

CLERKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, HOLDING OTHER

POSITIONS.

Acceptance of compensation as special master from private litigants by a clerk of a United States district court on and after March 4, 1921, automatically terminates his appointment as clerk, under acts of that date, 41 Stat., 1413, and June 16, 1921, 42 Stat., 41, precluding him from receiving salary of the clerkship from and after such acceptance, irrespective of whether appointment as master was before or after March 4, 1921.

Comptroller General McCarl to the Attorney General, October 27, 1921.

I have your letter of August 24, 1921, resubmitting for decision a question decided by this office August 20, 1921, as to whether acceptance by a clerk of a United States district court from a private litigant of compensation for his services as special master rendered under an appointment made prior to March 4, 1921, will automatically terminate his appointment as clerk so as to bar him from the salary of the clerkship from and after such acceptance.

The former decision held that the effect of acceptance of compensation from private litigant upon the tenure of the clerkship is matter for determination of the court in passinig upon the account for such compensation, and not for determination of the General Accounting Office.

The Comptroller of the Treasury was authorized to decide what payments may lawfully be made by the United States, and in the exercise of that function he decided that payment by the United States after March 4, 1921, to one who holds the office of clerk of court of compensation as special master, examiner, etc., for any services rendered after that date is unauthorized by law, whether under an appointment made before or after that date.

The matter of payment by private litigants of compensation to a special master is one entirely within the jurisdiction of the court in which the case is pending to determine. The Comptroller General has no authority or control over such payments. If the court shall find that compensation as special master in any case is lawfully due and may lawfully be paid to one who holds the office of clerk of a United States district court, and shall order such payment, the General Accounting Office will not undertake to review that finding.

The Comptroller General, however, must decide whether the salary of a clerkship may lawfully be paid to one asserting claim to such salary, and in doing so must necessarily determine the official status of the claimant. The act of March 4, 1921, prohibits the clerk from receiving compensation or emoluments of any office or position to which appointed by the court, whether from the United States or from private litigants; and the act of June 16, 1921, specifically directs that the appointment as clerk shall be deemed vacated by the acceptance of payment for personal services from private litigants. If the court allow compensation as special master to one who is also clerk of a United States district court, and the clerk accept the compensation, it is for the Comptroller General to decide whether under the provision of the acts cited the clerkship is so vacant that the salary thereof may not thereafter lawfully be paid to the person accepting the inhibited compensation. In other

words, when a claim for salary as clerk is made, the Comptroller General must determine whether the clerk holds the place, particularly where the facts are shown of having accepted compensation from private litigants.

In reply to your specific question I have to say that payment of salary as clerk would not be authorized where it appears that the compensation as special master was earned and paid after the passage of the acts in question, irrespective of whether the appointment as master was before or after the passage of said acts.

LEAVES OF ABSENCE-SICK-POSTAL EMPLOYEES.

Under the act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat., 1052, authorizing sick leave for postal employees at the rate of 10 days a year, cumulative through three consecutive fiscal years, the unused portion of the 10 days' leave for any one year may accumulate for the two years thereafter, but if not taken within that time is forfeited.

Comptroller General McCarl to the Postmaster General, November 1, 1921. I have your letter, dated October 11, received in this office October 21, requesting decision of a question presented as follows:

The act to reclassify postmasters and employees of the Postal Service and readjust their salaries and compensation on an equitable basis, approved June 5, 1920, provides:

"Employees in the Postal Service shall be granted fifteen days' leave of absence with pay, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, each fiscal year, and sick leave with pay at the rate of ten days a year, to be cumulative, for a period of three years, but no sick leave with pay in excess of thirty days shall be granted during any three consecutive years. Sick leave shall be granted only upon satisfactory evidence of illness and if for more than two days the application therefor shall be accompanied by a physician's certificate." 41 Stat., 1052.

Your decision is requested as to whether under this law a rural carrier who has during the first three years of the operation of the law or if appointed subsequent to July 1, 1920, during the first three years of his service, taken not more than ten of the thirty days' sick leave to which he was entitled during that time, will be allowed to take during the succeeding fiscal year the remaining twenty days in addition to the ten days' leave for the current year; or will the carrier at the beginning of the fourth fiscal year be regarded as commencing a new three-year period? For example: If a carrier were appointed August 1, 1920, and took but ten days' sick leave with pay prior to June 30, 1923, would he, during the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1923, be entitled to thirty days' sick leave with pay or to only ten days, it being considered that July 1, 1923, was the beginning of a new three-year period?

With reference to sick leave the law authorizes the granting thereof at the rate of 10 days a year, to be cumulative for a period of three years, with a proviso that no sick leave with pay in excess of 30 days shall be granted during any three consecutive years.

Under this law the unused portion of the authorized sick leave for any year may accumulate for two years thereafter. A new leave period does not necessarily begin after each three years of service or after each three years from the time the provision became operative, but the accumulated leave is lost if not taken within two years after the year in which it accrued.