appropriations and be available for similar purposes until June 30, 1922, and of said amounts, not to exceed $250,000 shall also be available for such personal services as in the discretion of the Secretary of War are necessary to properly protect the interests of the United States in making such settlements and adjustments: Provided, That no part of said amounts shall be used to pay any claims arising out of any contract or other obligation unless such contract or obligation was entered into subsequently to April 6, 1917, and prior to November 12, 1918.

The act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat., 1026, specifically makes certain balances of 1918 appropriations available to June 30, 1921, in connection with settlements under authority of the act of March 2, 1919, 40 Stat., 1272, and there is no question that the act of June 16, 1921, extends the availability of the proper balances to June 30, 1922. But the act of March 3, 1919, 40 Stat., 1309, directs:

That appropriations for fortifications and other works of defense, for the armament thereof, and for the procurement of heavy ordnance for trial and service, heretofore made in fortifications or sundry civil appropriation acts, shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1920, and all unexpended balances of such appropriations which remain upon the books of the Treasury Department on June 30, 1921, shall be covered into the Treasury and carried to the surplus fund.

The appropriations coming under this act of March 3, 1919, have also been required in connection with settlements under the act of March 2, 1919, and the question which thus arises is whether the authority in the act of June 16, 1921, is sufficient to extend these appropriations beyond the limit fixed by the act of March 3, 1919, for going to the surplus fund. The act of June 16, 1921, does not name any particular appropriations, and I am constrained to answer in the affirmative as to the armament, etc., appropriations to the extent that balances are available for the purposes indicated in the act of June 16, 1921.

Further question arises as to the proper procedure in connection with the act of June 16, 1921, so as to give effect to the purposes to which the unexpended balances are authorized to be applied. If all balances of appropriations involved are carried to the surplus fund, it would require the administrative office to transmit its settlements to the General Accounting Office for settlement and certification and then in each case the necessary amount be raised upon the books of the Treasury Department to make the payment. I understand the past procedure has been to have the proper balances of the appropriations appear upon the books of the Treasury Department and have the payments made by disbursing officers, and accordingly that procedure may continue to be followed.

The further question is also presented whether the authority to use $250,000 for personal services would authorize making available some one of the appropriations involved and specifically designate it to distinguish it from other funds upon the books of the Treasury Department. This I answer in the affirmative as the practicable method, the title of the funds thus made available to be designated by the Treasury Department.

INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION-FEDERAL AID TO STATES.

Federal aid to a State for industrial rehabilitation to the extent of an amount equal to that expended by the State for the same purpose, as authorized by the act of June 2, 1920, 41 Stat., 735, is conditioned upon the State's acceptance of the terms of the act in the manner and within the time prescribed, and the provision in the act fixing a time limit for acceptance "until the legislature of such State meets in due course and has been in session 60 days," must be construed as setting a limitation of 60 days after it first convenes, whether or not it remains in session 60 days, within which the legislature must accept and comply with the terms of the act if it is to participate in the benefits of the act.

Comptroller General McCarl to the Chairman, Federal Board for Vocational Education, July 8, 1921:

I have your letter of June 22, 1921, addressed to the Comptroller of the Treasury, as follows:

The provisions of the Industrial Rehabilitation Act, approved June 2, 1920, 41 Stat., 735, were accepted for the State of South Carolina by the Governor on September 30, 1920, in accordance with the following provision contained in Section 3 of the Act.

"In any State the legislature of which does not meet in regular session between the date of the passage of this act and December 30, 1920, if the governor of that state shall accept the provisions of this act, such state shall be entitled to the benefits of this act until the legislature of such state meets in due course and has been in session sixty days."

The legislature of the State convened on January 11, 1920, and subsequently, on March 5th, adjourned without accepting the provisions of the Industrial Rehabilitation Act, having been in session less than sixty days.

In view of the foregoing your decision is respectfully requested as to whether or not the Federal Board for Vocational Education may recognize the State of South Carolina as still entitled to the benefits of the appropriation provided by said act.

Section 1 of the act from which you quote makes annual appropriation for the use of the several States in cooperative vocational rehabilitation work, the several appropriations to be allotted to the States upon the basis of their several populations. These appropriations are made upon certain conditions imposed upon the States by the act, among which is the condition that for each dollar of Federal money expended there shall be expended by the State at least an equal amount for the same purpose.

Section 3 of the act also provides that in order to secure the benefit of these appropriations the State shall, through its legislative authority, accept the provisions of the act and comply with certain other requirements set forth in that section. That portion of the section which you quote makes temporary provision for participation by States in the benefits of the act until their legislatures shall have had an opportunity to accept the provisions of the act and comply with its requirements. It contemplates that a State shall have not exceed ing 60 days after its legislature meets in which to accept the provisions of the act. It does not contemplate that a State may continue to enjoy indefinitely the benefits of the statute without accepting its

provisions and making the contribution which it requires merely be cause its legislature sits less than 60 days after it meets.

Taking the statute as a whole the provision that a State shall be entitled to the benefits of the act "until the legislature of such State meets in due course and has been in session sixty days" must be construed as setting a limitation of sixty days after it first convenes within which the legislature must accept and comply with the provisions of the act if it is to participate in its benefits.

Having succeeded to the powers and duties of the Comptroller of the Treasury I decide that under the facts stated in your submission the State of South Carolina is not now entitled to the benefits of this act.

PROMOTIONS OF POSTAL EMPLOYEES.

Under the provisions of the act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat., 1051-2, dividing postoffice inspectors and clerks at division headquarters into various grades with fixed salaries for each grade, and authorizing promotions at the beginning of the quarter following a year's satisfactory service in the next lower grade, promotions may be made at the beginning of the quarter following one year's service since the employee's last promotion, whether that promotion was before, on, or after July 1, 1920.

Comptroller General McCarl to the Postmaster General, July 8, 1921:

I have your letter of June 27, 1921, requesting decision of a question presented as follows:

An act approved June 5, 1920, to reclassify postmasters and employees of the postal service and readjust their salaries and compensation on an equitable basis provides as follows with respect to the salaries of clerks-incharge at division headquarters and of post office inspectors:

"That clerks at division headquarters of postoffice inspectors shall be divided into six grades, as follows: Grade one-salary, $1,600; grade two-salary, $1,700; grade three-salary, $1,850; grade four-salary, $2,000; grade fivesalary, $2,150; grade six-salary, $2,300; and there shall be one chief clerk at each division headquarters at a salary of $2,600. That clerks at division headquarters shall be promoted successively to grade five at the beginning of the quarter following a year's satisfactory service in the next lower grade, and one clerk at each division headquarters may be promoted to grade six after one year's satisfactory service in grade five."

The same act makes the following provision respecting the salaries of post office inspectors:

"That post office inspectors shall be divided into seven grades, as follows: Grade one-salary, $2,300; grade two-salary, $2,500; grade three-salary, $2,700; grade four-salary, $2,900; grade five salary, $3,200; grade sixsalary, $3,500; grade seven-salary, $3,700; and there shall be fifteen inspectors in charge at $4,200. Inspectors shall be promoted successively to grade five at the beginning of the quarter following a year's satisfactory and efficient service in the next lower grade, and to grade six at the beginning of the quarter following the expiration of one year's meritorious service in grade five, and not to exceed 20 per centum of the force to grade seven for specially meritorious service after not less than one year's service in grade six. The three grades of inspectors without per diem allowance and the three senior grades of field inspectors shall be considered on a parity in readjusting the inspectors to the grades provided."

Your decision is requested as to whether a clerk at division headquarters or an inspector who has not been promoted after a year's service in any of the grades enumerated may be promoted at the beginning of the next succeeding quarter, or whether it is necessary before considering him for advancement to await the elapse of another full year.

The question as stated in the last paragraph of your letter is not entirely clear, but I assume that you have reference to employees who prior to July 1, 1920, had been serving in the grades to which they were assigned on July 1, 1920, under the provisions of the act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat., 1045, and that your doubt in the matter is as to whether the year's service necessary to entitle them to advance automatically to the next higher grade should begin to run from July 1, 1920, or from the date of their promotion to the grade in which they were serving on July 1, 1920.

The act in question contains a provision, page 1053, as follows:

All employees herein provided for in automatic grades, who have not reached the maximum grades to which they are entitled to progress automatically, shall be promoted at the beginning of the quarter following the completion of one year's sat.sfactory service since their last promotion, regardless of any increases in salaries granted them by the provisions of this act.

This provision would seem to answer your question by indicating that it is the intent and purpose of the law that automatic promotions be made at the beginning of the quarter following one year's service since the employee's last promotion, whether that promotion was before, on, or after July 1, 1920, and I have to advise that you are authorized to make promotions accordingly.

CLERKS, UNITED STATES COURTS-HOLDING OTHER POSITIONS. A person holding both the offices of justice of the peace and United States commissioner should act in his capacity as United States commissioner in committing offenders against Federal laws, or, if he acts as justice of the peace, should be placed in the same position as regards payment of his fees that he would have occupied had he acted as commissioner; hence a clerk of United States court also holding offices of United States commissioner and justice of the peace is prohibited by provisions of the act of March 4, 1921, 41 Stat., 1413, from receiving any compensation for services in either capacity of United States commissioner or justice of the peace in Federal cases other than his regular salary as clerk of the court.

Decision by Comptroller General McCarl, July 9, 1921.

The Auditor for the State and Other Departments submitted to the Comptroller of the Treasury for approval, disapproval, or modification his decision of June 8, 1921, as follows:

The following decision is submitted for approval, disapproval or modification under the Act of July 31, 1894, 28 Stat., 208:

This office has before it for settlement an account submitted by Burns P. Hodgman, as Justice of the Peace, covering the period from March 25 to March 31, 1921, in which he claims fees for services performed during said period in accordance with U. S. Commissioner's fee bill.

Mr. Hodgman is Clerk of the U. S. District Court for the district of New Hampshire and the records of this office show that he also holds the office of U. S. Commissioner for the district of New Hampshire.

The Sundry Civil Appropriation Act approved March 4, 1921, 41 Stat., 1413, contains the following provision:

"That no clerk or deputy clerk or assistant in the office of the clerk of a United States district court shall receive any compensation or emoluments through any office or position to which he may be appointed by the court, other

than that received as such clerk, deputy clerk, or assistant, whether from the United States or from private litigants."

In Vol. 27 Comp. Dec., page 821, in construing this provision you stated: "Clerks of courts and their deputies and assistants by recent legislation have been put upon salaries payable by the Government, so that the Government pays for their time and services. The evident purpose of this legislation is to prohibit receipt by them of any compensation from any source other than these salaries,"

In Vol. 20 Comp. Dec., page 692, you stated as follows: "Section 1014, Revised Statutes, confers upon justices of the peace authority and power to act as committing officers in Federal cases, in the same manner and to the same extent that like authority and power is thereby conferred on United States Commissioners. When acting under the section justices of the peace are by virtue of the statute Federal officers engaged in administering Federal laws." In view of the above it is the opinion of this office and it so decides: 1st that Mr. Hodgman should have performed the services for which fees are claimed in his official capacity as United States Commissioner; 2d that inasmuch as he performed them as justice of the peace he was by virtue of the statute, as quoted above, a Federal official, and is by the provision of the act of March 4, 1921, quoted above, prohibited from receiving any compensation for these services other than his regular salary as clerk of the court.

While section 1014, Revised Statutes, authorizes justices of the peace to act as Federal committing officers, the duty of committing offenders against Federal laws rests primarily upon United States commissioners. It is only in case no commissioner is available that practice has sanctioned the service of justices of the peace in that capacity. One holding both offices should act in the capacity of commissioner, and if he acts in the other capacity should be placed in the same position as regards payment of his fees that he would have occupied if he had acted as commissioner. The auditor's decision is approved.

LEASES TERMINATION AT END OF FISCAL YEAR.

As officers of the Government are prohibited by section 3679, Revised Statutes, as amended, limiting expenditures of the Government departments to the appropriations for the fiscal year, from executing a lease to run beyond the end of one fiscal year, except when specifically authorized by law, the legal effect of a lease for five years and four months was to bind the United States only to the end of the first fiscal year, with an option from year to year until the end of the term, and the termination of the lease at the close of the first fiscal year did not constitute a breach of contract on the part of the United States which could be made the basis of a claim for damages.

Decision by Comptroller General McCarl, July 12, 1921:

Benjamin Stern, Louis Stern, and Arthur II. Hahlo, executors of the estate of Isaac Stern, applied July 1, 1921, for a revision of the action of the Auditor for the Treasury Department in disallowing by settlement No. 187976, dated June 13, 1921, their claim for $43,288.33 as damages on account of the alleged breach of a lease agreement made and entered into between them and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on September 12, 1919.