forces: he complained in bitter and indignant terms, that after hav ing brought his army into a state of comparatively good discipline, after having much increased its numbers, and after having been indefatigable and often successful in his attacks on the enemy, he should now be deprived of his command, and placed under the orders of a foreigner. Of Ballasteros's patriotism there can be no doubt; but, like too many of the Spanish generals and nobles, there was something in his feelings and mind superior to the love of his country: he permitted a mean jealousy to rankle in his bosom: he preferred seeing his country desolated, perhaps subdued by the French, to seeing it liberated, if that liberation were to be effected by a foreign power. The Spaniards either were not able, or knew not how, to effect their own deliverance; for upwards of four years they had been struggling against the French, and would have been repeatedly overwhelmed, had it not been for British co-operation-if co-operation it may be called, where the British did every thing, and the Spaniards, if active, were as frequently active to no purpose, or even to the injury of their cause, as to its benefit. Yet, notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding they witnessed what the Portuguese troops had been made under British officers, they refused to follow their example; and the conduct of Ballasteros, though censured and punished by the government, was applauded by many leading men, and his fate pitied.

Lord Wellington continued to retire before the enemy till he arrived at the place from which he had commenced the campaign at the beginning of the year. In vain did Soult attempt to harass his retreat,

or to compel him to fight under dis advantageous circumstances: the British general discovered that his talents were equal to what necessity now required of him; and though the weather was dreadful, and from this cause it was computed that more suffering was endured by the army than during the retreat of sir John Moore, yet there was no disorder or confusion; nothing was lost, nor could the enemy boast of a single trophy.

At the close of this campaign, which began with such splendour, which held out such flattering ex pectations, and which terminated without any other substantial benefit but the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, it may not be improper to take a view of the forces of the contending parties since their numbers were increased on both sides subsequently to the last estimate which we gave of them, and they were likewise now differently disposed. Exclusively of the armies which were wholly occupied by the desultory warfare of the Spaniards, viz. those of Caffarelli, Decaen, &c. in Biscay, Navarre, Arragon, and Catalonia, the French forces opposed to the English were about 104,000 men; of these 72,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry were under the command of Soult, who directed the armies which were formerly under Joseph Bonaparte and Souham. Suchet, in the south of Spain, still retained with him 18,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry. Opposed to these were, at the utmost, 66,000 British, German, and Portuguese. Lord Wel. lington and general Hill had under them 31,000 British and Germans, viz. 27,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry: besides these, there were with those generals 21,000 Portuguese, making up their army

52,000:

52,000 at the close of the campaign, reinforcements were coming to lord Wellington from Great Britain and Sicily, which would increase his army to nearly 60,000 men. The British army, which had been so long blocked up at Alicant, was placed under the command of general Clinton, and was calculated at about 6000 men. Of the French army, a large proportion were very young, being of the last class of conscripts; among the prisoners taken were boys of sixteen years of age. With respect to the equipment of the opposing armies, the French were much superior in point of artillery. Soult alone had 180 pieces of cannon with him. In point of cavalry, the French were undoubtedly numerically superior to the British; but the British cavalry were as certainly individually superior to the French. So far as regarded the provisions of the armies, it is to be remarked that, though in the country of an ally, the British found much more difficulty in obtaining full and regular supplies than the French did. This arose from two causes: in the first place, the commissariat of the French is on a better footing, there is more plan and arrangement in it, as well as more experience and activity, than in the British, It may be admitted, that by the exertions and suggestions of lord Wellington the British commissariat had been much improved: new regulations of essential necessity and service had been introduced. Indeed, on its old footing, it would have been absolutely impossible that the military operations of the peninsula should have been carried on even on a small scale, and for a short period of time; but then there were some radical faults in the commissariat, which all lord Wellington's

attention could not remove. So necessary is influence considered at the fountain-head of government, that all regard to the public service or benefit is frequently abandoned, for the sake of securing or extending it; and persons were appointed to the commissariat, under the operation of this disgraceful cause, by no means qualified to falfil the duties of their situation, in respect either of talents, experience, or knowledge. In the second place, the English commissariat, were it formed on the most perfect plan, and constantly and completely filled by persons who were both willing and able to carry that plan into regular and full execution, could never be so efficient as a French commissariat: the English have too many scruples about them: they hesitate and doubt, and feel qualms of conscience when they should act; they beg the inhabitants to supply them with provisions, when they should seize them; and thus they are not only imposed upon, but they are unable to procure the necessary supplies in time. While war exists, it ought to be conducted in that manner which will ensure sue. cess; for this is obviously the only method by which it can be terminated, and the blessings of a safe and honourable peace restored: it is therefore a blind and paltry humanity, which would shrink at the commission of some violence, if by that violence much greater cruelty and misery could be avoided or shortened." Let us contrast the conduct of the French and British in the peninsula, with respect to the mode in which they obtained supplies from the country. The French at once, with the utmost promptitude, took what they wanted, and paid for it at their own price: the inhabitants, knowing

this, did not attempt to deny or conceal what they had; they knew it would be of no avail; that, in fact, they would be thus injuring themselves, since they would, in this case, obtain no payment for what was taken from them. The English, fighting in the cause of Spain, naturally believed that the Spaniards would cheerfully contribute to the support of their army; they therefore contented themselves with asking for supplies, and paid liberally for them: but the Spaniards, though very willing that we should fight for them, and very anxious to get rid of the French, were not equally disposed to assist the cause of their own battles, or to contribute to their own deliverance, if sacrifices were required of them. The consequence was, that in every campaign that the British have hitherto fought in the peninsula, the French army has been, on the whole, well supplied, while the British has been generally short of supplies.

But we have been drawn away by this subject from the main purpose of our present sketch, which was to exhibit the comparative force and the situation of the contending armies in the peninsula at the close of the year 1812. We have already noticed the main armies; but there are others to which we nust pay some attention, in order to render our statement

correct.

The army of Gallicia, which, to the number of about 10,000 men, we noticed as having joined lord Wellington, separated from him when active operations ceased, and marched into the province from which it takes its name, where it went into winter-quarters. A Spanish division, under the command of don Carlos d'Espagne, was

placed in Ciudad Rodrigo, and near it. This important fortress was also guarded by Murillo's bri gade, and by a body of cavalry under Penne Villamur. The British ministry, in order to reinforce lord Wellington, had sent out the life guards, a body of men, it would have been supposed, by no means fit for active service, especially in such a country as the peninsula, where great hardships were to be undergone, supported by very spare diet: this remark is at least as applicable to the horses as the men. However, they were sent, either because they were thought fit for the service, or because there were no other forces that could be spared. At the close of the year they had not joined lord Wellington, though they had arrived in Portugal; and having been sent at such an unfavourable season, both men and horses had suffered very much during the voyage.

Such was the relative state of the hostile forces in the peninsula at the close of the year 1812: and from this account it will be perceived that the French had still a very formidable force, and were in fact much superior to the allies: there were other circumstances, too, which either rendered their situation better, or lord Wellington's worse. In the first place, the whole plan of the war seemed to have been changed on the part of the French. In our former volumes, we have frequently remarked on the contrast exhibited by the plan which Bonaparte followed in Spain, and the plan on which he conducted his military operations in other parts of Europe. The distinguishing characteristic in all the military plans where he himself had been engaged in their execution, was simplicity, and the aiming

with all his force at one object; that object, indeed, of the greatest importance, the attainment of which brought with it all other minor objects. But in Spain his forces were divided and scattered: it was abundantly obvious, that till the English were decidedly beaten and driven out of the peninsula, he could not expect to obtain what he desired; and yet, instead of bearing down with all his forces against the British army, he never met them with a much superior force, but directed part of his attention and means against them, and part against the Spaniards, who must have fallen if the British had been subdued. This plan was acted on, till Soult took the command in Spain: he immediately abandoned it, and bore down with all the disposable force against lord Wellington, fortunately without success as to his main object: but the excellence of this new plan was clearly shown, by his being enabled, when acting according to it, to strip lord Wellington of nearly all his conquests, and to compel him to retire to the borders of Portugal. In the second place, lord Wellington was exceedingly perplexed and harassed for want of money: at the close of the campaign, his army was above five months in arrear of pay; and all he could raise in Madrid, even on the condition of repaying it in a month, was 20,000. Money is justly regarded as the sinew of war; and in the peninsula it must be so in an especial manner. The arrear of pay due to the army

was comparatively of little moment; while they were so busily employed marching and fighting, they had not much occasion for money: but for the purchase of provisions, especi ally with an inadequate commissariat, a supply of money is indispensable.

Such was the state of the peninsula at the close of the year; for upwards of four years it had been the scene of warfare, and that warfare did not appear to be approaching to a termination. The Spanish government learnt no wisdom by experience; they displayed no energy in their councils; their time was occupied in frivolous debates, or in drawing up addresses to the people and the army, the sentiments and tone of which formed a striking contrast to their suspicious or lukewarm conduct. The Spanish generals succeeded one an other in the command of the trifling armies which Spain had on foot, without improving the discipline of those armies: in short, no talent arose equal to the situation, or the salvation of the country; nor was any activity displayed, except by the guerillas.

Had it not been for them and the British, the peninsula must long since have fallen under the French yoke. As it is, the revolution there affords the singular but melancholy sight of a nation fighting in defence of their independence, without any of those high qualities of mind or soul which will enable them either to obtain that independence, or fully to value and relish it if it were obtained.

CHAP.