The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United StatesM. Walter Dunne, 1901 - 427 sider |
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The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United ..., Volum 1 Uten tilgangsbegrensning - 1901 |
The Federalist: A Commentary On the Constitution of the United States, Being ... James Madison,John Jay,Alexander Hamilton Ingen forhåndsvisning tilgjengelig - 2022 |
The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Being ... James Madison,John Jay,Alexander Hamilton Ingen forhåndsvisning tilgjengelig - 2016 |
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Populære avsnitt
Side 327 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.
Side 61 - The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the Government.
Side 59 - By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
Side 304 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Side 329 - In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them : the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Side 168 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Side 65 - Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will* have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens...
Side 325 - No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded; The accumulation of all powers Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or manj% and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
Side 261 - And whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present confederation, as a means to remedy which, several of the States, and particularly the State of New York, by express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a Convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such Convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States, a firm national government.
Side 56 - Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound.