evolution never assumed to give a scientific account of mental phenomena, but only an historical one, and that any attempt to do more than this "lands us at once in absurdity and contradiction." We may accept the latter conclusion without a murmur; but if Mr. Fiske really means as he says, what is he to do about the claim of evolution to be a philosophy? How can anything less than a scientific explanation of the origin of mind meet the demands of a philosophy which insists upon being called scientific? If, then, the oft repeated statements of Mr. Spencer had not already foreclosed the case against Mr. Fiske, we should be compelled to reject his plea in the very nature of the case itself. The alternative is plain. If we accept evolution at the hands of Mr. Spencer, it falls a victim to the refutation from the correlation of forces, or, if, on the other hand, we accept Mr. Fiske's apology, we at the same time deny the claim of evolution to be a philosophy.

But when Mr. Fiske joins Mr. Spencer in denying to evolution any other foundation than the persistence of force, he commits himself to all of the materialistic implications which Mr. Spencer asserts; and upon no other ground than the truth of these false deductions from correlation can he justify his opposition of evolution to supernaturalism. Any refutation of materialism therefore is a refutation of Mr. Fiske; and we find him rejoicing in the invincible strength of a system, which by his own proclamation he has just now "irretrievably discomfited."

But if we are compelled to dissent in a mild way with some of the by-play of Mr. Fiske's argument, we need not on that account fall out with its really earnest conclusion. The following statement of Mr. Fiske's argument is given for brevity's sake from the "Cosmic Philosophy." It differs in no other respect of importance, from his other expositions of the matter. He says: "Have we made the first step towards the resolution of psychical phenomena into modes of motion? Obviously we have not. The closed circuit of motion, motion, motion, remains just what it was before. No conceivable advance in physical discovery can ever get us out of this closed circuit, and into this circuit psychical phenomena do not enter. Psychical phenomena stand outside this circuit, parallel with that brief segment of it which

However

is made up of molecular motions in nerve tissue. strict the parallelism may be within the limits of our experience, between the phenomena of mind and this segment of the circuit of motions, the task of transcending or abolishing the radical antithesis between the phenomena of mind, and the phenomena of motions of matter, must always remain an impracticable task. For in order to transcend or abolish this radical antithesis, we must be prepared to show how a given quantity of molecular motion in nerve tissue, can become transformed into a definable amount of ideation or feeling. But this, it is quite safe to say, can never be done. Free as we were a moment ago to admit the boundless possibilities of scientific inquiry in one direction, we may here at once mark the bounds beyond which, in another direction, scientific inquiry cannot advance."-"Cosm. Philosophy," vol. 2, pp. 442, 443.

Mr. Fiske here speaks of the phenomena of mind as being restricted to what goes on within the mind itself. He does not therefore give the whole of the argument from correlation, as how could he without exhibiting the mind in its true colors as a cause, and so making havoc of his favorite doctrine of phenomenal cause. The causative acts of mind could scarcely be described in the vocabulary of phenomenal cause as "coexistences and sequences." But he does give us enough of it to show that Mr. Spencer's attempt to deduce the phenomena of mind from the persistence of force is utterly futile, and that any such attempt is in the nature of the case as unscientific as it is irreligious. But if any clear understanding of correlation leads to the rejection of Mr. Spencer's assumptions regarding mental phenomena, by showing those assumptions to be at war with the principles upon which they assume to be founded, what becomes of the attempt to expound the principles of social and moral conduct in the same materialistic way? The works in which the attempt. is made are offered as the ultimate stages of a system of philosophy. Mr. Spencer has told us, however, that nothing can be a part of his philosophy unless it can be deduced from the persistence of force. Ethical and social conduct are manifestations of human intelligence; they are phenomena, that is to say, of mind. But if they cannot possibly be interpreted in terms of matter and

motion, how can they be explained by the persistence of force; or how can they be parts of Mr. Spencer's philosophy? Or, under such circumstances how can there be such a philosophy?

But a system which fails to establish its claim to be a philosophy by explaining mental phenomena, is in still farther trouble by its inability to explain the phenomena of matter. We have been told so often and so long about the encroachments of matter and law upon the realm of spirit and spontaneity, that we sometimes forget ourselves and permit scientists and others to tell us without rebuke, how the discovery of the proper complement of physical causes in any case, demonstrates the absence of spiritual cause; as if we should say, upon finding the engines and the boilers, with the water and steam inside, and the proper quantity of coal on board, that we have a sufficient explanation of the voyage of the steamship, without taking account of the minds of pilot and engineer and captain. But these scientific wise men seem not to remember that the study of these material causes is precisely what demonstrates the necessity of spiritual causes to put them in motion. Engines and boilers are nothing to the purpose unless we have men to use them. They are always telling us that we must reason from the known to the unknown, but when they reason about causes this is precisely what they never do. Let us adhere in good faith to this precept of the scientists, and we shall find that what is true of the steamship and its motions is true of every phenomenon; that either within our knowledge or beyond it, there is room behind, however many material causes, for a spiritual cause as the real author of what they seem to do.

Modern scientific scepticism, so far as it has any meaning, is synonymous with materialism, and if it has any justification it is upon the scientific side. But admitting the truth of the correlation of forces, materialism is impossible except upon such terms as correlation prescribes. What those terms are Mr. Spencer has well explained in his "First Principles;" but not only is materialistic evolution impossible upon Mr. Spencer's terms, it is impossible on account of them; and Mr. Spencer asserts a correlation of all the phenomena of the universe with matter and motion, not only without a particle of evidence to support the asser

tion, but directly in the face of positive evidence to the contrary. We reject Mr. Spencer's system therefore, not because we dislike it, but because there are no facts upon which its claims can be justified. Attempting to explain everything, it fails to give a good explanation of anything. Making an imposing show of dealing with the phenomena of mind, it is unable to explain even those of matter; and it stands condemned not so much upon principles of metaphysics or theology as of physical science, and not merely upon our understanding of those principles, but upon Mr. Spencer's own explanation of them.

And now, if we must join the throng of those who, in compliance with the demands of a something which is usually denominated "modern scientific thinking," are pressing into the ranks of evolution, we do not presume to object; we only pause to enquire, shall we do it upon Mr. Spencer's principles, or upon Mr. Fiske's; on the supposition that psychical phenomena can, or that they cannot, be explained as modes of motion? And if we go with Mr. Spencer, we farther venture to enquire, how can we do it without misunderstanding and doing violence to the doctrine of the correlation of forces; or if, on the other hand, we follow Mr. Fiske, how can we escape, at the same time denying the claim of evolution to be a philosophy? And while we have the subject in hand let us furthermore discover, if we can, in what way and how far the fortunes of Mr. Spencer's attempt to found a scientific philosophy by expounding all the phenomena of the universe "in terms of matter, motion and force" have been advanced by the discovery of his favored disciple Mr. Fiske, that so far as the phenomena of the human mind are concerned no such thing can ever be done? And under such circumstances what shall we conclude regarding the unanimity of scientific belief in evolution?

SPONTANEOUS REGENERATION.

BY THE EDITOR.

THERE is a certain class of so-called scientists whose intense hatred of the supernatural gives them a disposition to believe in spontaneous generation; that is to say, it would gratify them to know that there came living things out of inorganic matter; that somehow that incomprehensible element of life which makes all the difference between an addled egg and a good egg, between an egg that has been cut out of a stone and an egg that has come out of an animal, that that "something" now and then allies itself with inorganic matter without the intervention of a Creator.

The wish is often father to the thought and mother to the statement.

All through many modern scientific books there is the most reckless scattering of statements, as if they were facts, which have absolutely not the slightest shadow of a foundation in anything known to truly scientific men. Apart from all religious prejudices-nay, without any pretensions to religion-there are scientific men who are ready to rebuke these unscientific pretenders to science. For instance, one of the most illustrious scientists now living, it would probably be agreed, is Dr. Virchow. The religionists would call him a thoroughly irreligious man, but he rebukes the tyranny of dogmatism which undertakes to master the whole view of nature by the premature generalizing of theoretical combinations.

The most desirable thing for the materialistic philosophers to be able to prove is spontaneous generation. Experiment after experiment has been tried to show that such a thing really occurs in nature; and once or twice certain experiments were triumphantly paraded as conclusive of the truth of that theory. And it really seemed as if those experiments had been fairly

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