...what it is better for us to believe "that is truth." "Truth names whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons." "What works successfully is truth." In fact there seems to be no Truth (with a big T) but temporary...

...in that idea, unless, indeed, belief in it incidentally clashed with other greater vital benefits. 76 ^/ 'What would be better for us to believe'! This sounds very like a definition of truth. It comes very near to saying 'what we ought to believe ' : and in that definition none of you would...

...that idea, unless, indeed, belief in it incidentally clashed with other greater vital benefits. ti 76 * What- would -be better for .us., to believe' ! This sounds very like a definition of truth. It „ -* — j comes very near to saying. 'what we ought to I -jj . -— - — "Y****"1*"" * ""* *...

...in that idea, unless, indeed, belief in it incidentally clashed with other greater vital benefits. 'What would be better for us to believe'! This sounds very like a definition of truth. It comes very near to saying 'what we ought to believe ': and in that definition none of you would...

...what is meant by truth." " The true," he writes, "is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons ' ' (p. 76; italics the author's). We cannot "keep the notion of what is better for us, and what is...

...distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons. Surely you must admit this, that if there were ? no good for life in true ideas, or if the know, *-...

...distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons. Surely you must admit this, that if there were no good for life in true ideas, or if the knowledge...

...espèce de genre bien : « The true, ajoute-t-il, is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons». (Pragmatism p. 76). Et plus loin : « What would be better for us to beliève ? This sounds very like...

...distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons " (p. 75). This first sketch is worked out in the chapter on The Notion of Truth. Here we read : "...

...is divine and precious, and its pursuit a duty, could never have grown up or become a dogma. . . . What would be better for us to believe! This sounds very like a definition of truth. It comes very near to saying ' what we ought to believe ' ; and in that definition none of you would...