covered with forests to Armenia the Less, and this range forms the boundary between Cappadocia and Armenia. The advantage of the route was that the army could not be unexpectedly attacked by the enemy, and that Cappadocia, which lay below the mountains, would furnish abundant supplies. While Domitius was on his march, the king sent several messengers to him to treat of peace and to carry royal presents. Domitius constantly refused the presents, and told the messengers that he had no other object than to maintain the dignity of the Roman people and to recover the kingdoms of their allies. By long and uninterrupted marches he approached Nicopolis,' a town in the Less Armenia on level ground, but with high mountains on two sides, yet at a considerable distance from the town, and he made his camp about seven miles from Nicopolis. From this camp there was a narrow and difficult defile by which Domitius must pass, and here Pharnaces placed in ambuscade some picked infantry and almost all his cavalry; and he also ordered a great number of cattle to be dispersed through the defile and the country people and townsmen to place themselves in the way of Domitius; with this view, that if Domitius should come as a friend, he might not suspect an ambuscade when he saw both men and cattle in the country as if friends were expected; and, if he was coming as an enemy, that the soldiers when they were dispersed and busy with making booty might be cut to pieces. In the meantime Pharnaces was continually sending commissioners to propose peace, expecting that he could thus more easily deceive Domitius. But on the other hand the hope of peace led Domitius to rest in his camp.

Pharnaces having thus lost the recent opportunity, and being afraid that his design would be discovered, recalled his men. On the next day Domitius approached to Nicopolis and placed his camp near the town. While the Roman army was making their camp, Pharnaces drew up his forces in his own fashion. Domitius completed his camp by placing

1 There are some remarks on the site of Nicopolis in vol. iii. p. 151. I do not know whether any recent writer has cleared up the difficulty about the site. 2 What follows (c. 37) is not clear.

part of his force in front of the rampart to protect the workers.

On the next night Pharnaces intercepted letter-carriers, who were bringing news to Domitius about the state of affairs in Alexandria, and he learned from the letters that Caesar was in great danger and required Domitius to send him relief as soon as possible, and to march through Syria himself to Alexandria. Upon gaining this information Pharnaces considered that it would be equivalent to a victory, if he could protract the war, for he supposed that Domitius must soon retreat to join Caesar. Accordingly he dug two ditches from that part of the town where he saw that the access was easiest to the troops of Domitius and most favourable as fighting ground for them: the ditches were made parallel in a straight line towards the Roman army with no great interval between them, and the ramparts were four feet high. The ditches were only dug so far as he had determined to put forward his troops, and in the space between these ditches he drew up his force from time to time. The purpose of these ditches was to protect the army of Pharnaces, which was between them; and it was intended that the cavalry should prevent the Romans from crossing the ditches and attacking the rear. The cavalry of Pharnaces were accordingly placed on the flanks and outside the ditches, for otherwise they could not be of any use, and in numbers they far surpassed the cavalry of Domitius. The Roman general was more troubled about Caesar's danger than his own, and he did not think that he could retreat in safety, if he should either ask for the terms which he had already rejected, or that he could retreat without some ground or reason. He therefore placed his little army in battle order: he put the thirty-sixth legion on the right wing, the Pontic legion on the left, and the legions of Deiotarus in the centre, but he left only very small intervals between the centre and the wings. The rest of the cohorts were placed as a reserve. The signal for battle was given

3

3 The narrative shows that Domitius received intelligence from Caesar, and yet the "tabellarii" or letter-carriers were intercepted; perhaps some escaped The author has made the story incomplete. The words "sine causa discederet" also make some difficulty, and they may not be genuine.

at the same time on both sides. The thirty-sixth legion attacked the king's cavalry outside of the ditch and with such success that they came close to the walls of the town, crossed the ditch and fell on the rear of the enemy. The Pontic legion, which was on the other wing, gave way and made a movement for the purpose of turning to the ditch which was on their side, and taking the enemy in the rear; but they were overwhelmed with missiles in the attempt to cross the ditch. The legions of Deiotarus hardly stood the shock of the enemy. The king's troops being victorious on their right wing and in the centre turned round to oppose the thirtysixth legion, which resisted bravely, and though surrounded by the large forces of the enemy fought with the greatest courage, and finally by placing themselves in the "orbis" or circular form secured a retreat to the base of the mountains, whither Pharnaces was deterred from following by the roughness of the ground. Almost the whole of the Pontic legion was destroyed, and a great part of the soldiers of Deiotarus. were killed; but the thirty-sixth legion escaped to the higher places with the loss of not more than two hundred and fifty soldiers. Some men of rank, Roman equites, fell in the battle. After this defeat Domitius collected the remains of his scattered army, and by a safe road made his retreat through Cappadocia to the province Asia. Elated by this success and hoping that matters would turn out with Caesar according to his wishes, Pharnaces occupied Pontus with all his forces, and behaved with great cruelty, expecting to enjoy his father's good fortune. He stormed several towns, made booty of the property of Roman citizens and of the people of Pontus, and inflicted on those who were young and handsome tortures worse than death." He was now master of Pontus, and boasted that he had recovered his father's kingdom. The defeat of Domitius took place in B.C. 48, and in the latter

This sentence is probably corrupt.

5 As we learn from a subsequent chapter (c. 70), this ferocious Asiatic cut off the private parts of the males. The women, we assume, were ravished. Appian, B. C. ii. 91, who sometimes reports facts which are in no other extant authority, says that Pharnaces took Amisus (Samsun), a city in Pontus, which was on the Roman side, enslaved the people and castrated all the young males.

part of the year. Pharnaces did not push his conquests further in Asia. Some time in B.C. 48 after the defeat of Domitius or early in B.c. 47, Asander, the brother-in-law of Pharnaces, who had been left as guardian of the kingdom of Bosporus, revolted.

The writer of the Alexandrine War (c. 42) now turns to speak of affairs in Illyricum to the time of the death of Gabinius, which I have already described in a previous chapter (xix.).

Vatinius (Bell. Alex. c. 44), who was at Brundisium when he heard of the events which had taken place in Illyricum, was summoned by frequent letters from Cornificius to come to the relief of the province. He also heard that M. Octavius had made treaties with the barbarians, and in several parts was attacking some of Caesar's posts with his fleet; and in others with the assistance of barbarian troops. Though Vatinius was in a bad state of health, and his strength was not equal to his spirit, yet by his energy he made up for the weakness caused by illness, the difficulties incident to a winter campaign and his hasty preparation. Having only few ships of war in the port he wrote to Q. Calenus, who was in Achaia, to send his fleet. As this help did not come in time for the troops of Cornificius, who could not resist Octavius, Vatinius fitted with beaks the vessels which the Romans named "actuariae," of which he had a great number, though they were not large enough to be used in a sea fight. These were added to the ships of war, and the strength of the fleet was increased by putting on board a great number of veteran soldiers from all the legions, who were left sick at Brundisium when Caesar's troops were carried over to Greece. With these forces he crossed to Illyricum, where he recovered some of the maritime towns which had surrendered to Octavius, sailed past others which still persisted in their revolt, and without delay or attending to anything else he kept to his purpose of reaching Octavius as soon as he could. Octavius was attacking by land and by sea the maritime town of Epidaurus (Ragusa Vecchia) a little south of the island Melita; but Vatinius compelled him to retire and saved the garrison. Octavius having discovered that the fleet of Vatinius consisted

chiefly of small vessels, and being confident in the strength of his own fleet took his station at Tauris, a small island on the Illyrian coast opposite to the mouth of the river Naro (Narona). Vatinius followed in this direction, not knowing that Octavius was at Tauris, but being resolved to pursue him wherever he had gone. When Vatinius was near Tauris, and his ships were scattered, for the weather was bad and he had no suspicion that the enemy were in these parts, all at once he saw a vessel advancing towards him with the yards at midmast and full of fighting men. He immediately ordered the sails to be hauled to, the yards to be lowered, the soldiers to take their arms, and the flag to be raised which was the signal for battle; and he also made a signal to the nearest ships which were following to do the same. The men of Vatinius, who were taken by surprise, made ready, and the men of Octavius came out of port. The order of battle was prepared on both sides the line of Octavius was better arranged, but the men of Vatinius had more resolution. Vatinius, seeing that he was not a match for Octavius either in the size of his vessels or the number, would not entrust the decision to the risk of a fortuitous contest, and accordingly he attacked with his own quinquereme the quadrireme of Octavius, whose rowers drove his ship against that of Vatinius. The ships met with so violent a shock that the beak of Octavius' ship was broken.' The fight now began vigorously between the other ships, most of which crowded to the place where the admirals were engaged, and as the ships on each side came to help the admirals, there was a great fight at close quarters in a narrow space. But the closer the fight became, the greater was the advantage on the side of Vatinius, whose men showed admirable courage in leaping from their own vessels into those of the enemy, and the fight being now on equal terms they gained the victory by their superior courage. The quadrireme of Octavius was sunk, and many vessels were

6

The text is supposed by some critics to be corrupt. The sense, if there is any, seems to be that Vatinius would not trust the issue or the event to such accidental encounters as might happen, but he attacked the admiral's (ipsius Octavii) ship in the expectation that if the attack was successful, it might decide the battle.

7 I am not certain what "ligno contineretur" means.