the facts of the case are to be disclosed before the Commission. We do not mean, of course, that either party, in a trial in the court, is to be restricted to the evidence that was before the Commission, but that the purposes of the Act call for a full inquiry by the Commission into all the circumstances and conditions pertinent to the questions involved." 99 But it is competent for the legislature to provide that if the party affected had a right to introduce all material evidence at the hearing before the Commission no new evidence shall be introduced on review in the courts. In such case the Commission acts like a master in chancery. It takes testimony and makes findings, and the court tests their correctness by reviewing the evidence upon which they were based.1 Even without such legislation the court in a recent case held that if the carrier wished to introduce additional evidence as to whether a rate was confiscatory it should apply to the Commission for a rehearing, and unless it appeared that the Commission had excluded evidence that was material, the court would review the order only on the testimony that was before the Commission.2 Topic D. Enforcement Proceedings in the Courts § 1156. Functions of the Commission in the enforcement of the Act. The Act imposes upon the Commission many duties and authorizes it to exercise many powers without however providing the Commission itself with the necessary machinery. In such cases the Act provides that the Commission may resort to the courts for assistance. The Act expressly states, "The Commission is hereby authorized and required to execute and enforce the provisions of this 99 Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 196, 40 L. ed. 935, 27 Sup. Ct. 948. 1 Oregon R. R. & N. Co. v. Fair child, 224 U. S. 510, 56 L. ed. 863, 32 Sup. Ct. 535. 2 Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. United States, 218 Fed. 89. ***** ***ed to ong benet by the Elme fe. A 193. Bende ne sme moer the InesuTE Gran bet the ComSL & MATHI V korvment of the malery Appians are of apri la b Mo the La-Pun An đó May 30, 198 and be that Dry & ctories to wet de poves vi vis A a veteri under any enartment of Congas Is LS: 1 kop with the proper distance T tornaven wien i maj wyle && Dupins of the Hound Beria ka di Mama £. 197, and is aubari wwlore any onen wiki may make i mosequebre of the pomere vested in it by the Government-aided Rurol and Telegraph. At of August 7. 1888. The Commiss sion is also charged with the enforcement of the Clayton Anti-triet Act of October 15, 1914, in so far as that An relate to carriers. For the purpose of siting it in the accomplishment of the objects for which it was established. the Commission may require carriers subject to the Act to file annual reports of their operations, and monthly reports of their earnings and expenses, together with such special reports as may be desired on specific matters as to which the Commission is required to keep itself informed. The Commission may also prescribe a uniform system of accounts for all carriers, and shall have access at all times to all accounts, records, and memoranda kept by carriers subject to the Act. And no other accounts, records, or memoranda than those prescribed or approved by the Commission may be kept by any such carrier. § 1157. Judicial process in aid of proceedings before the Commission. Section 12 of the Act provides that the Commission shall have authority to inquire into the management of the business of all common carriers subject to the provisions of the Act, and shall keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the same is conducted. For this purpose it is empowered to obtain from the carriers whatever information may be necessary to enable it to carry out the objects for which it was created. To this end it is provided that "for the purposes of this Act the Commission may require, by subpoena, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any matter under investigation." In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued by the Commission, a district court of the United States may issue an order requiring such common carrier or other person to appear before the Commission and produce books and papers if so ordered and give evidence touching the matter in question. Any failure to obey such order may be punished by the court as contempt thereof. No witness may be excused from testifying on the ground that his evidence might tend to incriminate him, but such evidence may not be used against him on the trial of any criminal proceeding except for perjury committed while so testifying. Soon after these provisions authorizing the Commission to resort to the courts for assistance in obtaining testimony were enacted, the contention was set up that such a proceeding before the courts was not a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution and was not a judicial function and hence could not be required of the courts. But the court held that the functions entrusted to the Commission were within the power of Congress to regulate commerce and that they could not be discharged without the taking of testimony. The Commission, however, not being a judicial body, could not compel testimony and it must therefore receive the assistance of the courts. An application to the courts for an order compelling a witness to appear and testify presents all the elements of a judicial controversy, for in determining whether or not the order should issue the court is obliged to determine whether the Commission is entitled to the evidence which it seeks and whether the refusal of the witness to testify or to produce papers is in derogation of the rights of the United States. These questions were presented in a case in which the Commission, in the course of an investigation initiated on its own motion, sought an order compelling testimony from a witness who refused to testify on the ground that the questions did not relate to any affirmative provision of the Act which it was the duty of the Commission to enforce, and another witness who refused to answer on the ground that the questions related to the business of a private banking house and not to that of a carrier. The Commission contended that it was authorized to make investigations not only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Act had been violated but also as a basis for recommending additional legislation to Congress, and that its power to compel testimony was the same in the two cases. But the court held that no such general inquisitorial power had been vested in the Commission, and that its power to compel testimony was confined to the investigation of specific breaches of existing law.4 The power of the Commission has been further 3 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 38 L. ed. 104, 14 Sup. Ct. 1125; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 48 L. ed. 860, 24 4 Harriman V. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, 53 L. ed. 253, 29 Sup. Ct. 115. limited by the decision of the Supreme Court on February 23, 1915, to the effect that the correspondence of a carrier is not included among those papers which a witness may be required to produce." § 1158. Judicial action necessary to the enforcement of orders. No order of the Commission is self-executing. Should the carrier against whom it is directed not choose to obey it, it can be enforced only through judicial proceedings as provided for in section 16 of the Act. This section clearly distinguishes suits to enforce administrative orders of the Commission, which are in equity, where the only issue is as to the legality of the order, and an action to recover reparation awarded. The latter is not a suit to enforce the order, but an action at law triable by jury and the proceedings are as in other civil actions, save that the findings and order of the Commission are received as prima facie evidence of the facts stated." Section 16 provides that if a carrier does not comply with an order for the payment of money within the time limit set in the order, the complainant or any person for whose benefit the order was made may file in the district court of the United States a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims damages and the order of the Commission. Such suit shall then proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the Commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and except that the petitioner shall not be liable for costs in the district court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless they accrue upon his appeal. If the petitioner shall finally prevail, he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of his 5 Louisville & Nashville Ry. case, decision announced Feb. 23, 1915. 6 Western N. Y. & P. Ry. v. Penn Refining Co., 137 Fed. 343. 7 Lehigh Valley Ry. v. Meeker, 211 Fed. 785. |