recently ruled by the Commission that a bridge company with its viaduct approaches, was not a common carrier subject to the Act.97 But where a bridge company takes the position of an intervening carrier, it will, if it participates in interstate traffic, be held subject in its rates to the jurisdiction of the Commission.98 The reservation of Congress of the right to fix charges over bridges is exercised by a delegation of authority to the Commission.99 Unless the circumstances are dissimilar a carrier may not arbitrarily absorb a bridge charge at one river crossing and refuse to do so at another.1 It has, however, recently been pointed out that mere ferriage across a stream separating two states was not a matter which Congress had as yet undertaken to regulate. As in the case of railway bridges, so in the case of car ferries, if the charge therefor is involved in the through service the Commission has jurisdiction, otherwise not.3 § 175. Wharfage. 2 A railroad which terminates on navigable water in arranging to handle through traffic ought to provide proper facilities therefor. As the Commission said in a recent case, it is the duty of defendant carriers to provide facilities for receiving flour reaching Buffalo via steamship; and if their facilities are inadequate, facilities must be provided elsewhere, and at a charge no greater than would apply via their own docks. And consequently, a wharf used by another as Shagway was held to be an instrumentality of interstate commerce, in respect to the use of Kansas City v. K. C. V. & T. Ry. Co., 24 I. C. C. 22. 98 Railroad Commission of Ind. v. K. & I. B. & R. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 563. " West End Improvement Club v. O. & C. B. R. & B. Co., 17 I. C. C. 239. 1 Mfrs. & Merchants' Assoc. v. A. & A. R. R. Co., 24 I. C. C. 331. 2 Port Richmond & H. Ferry Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 234 U. S. 317, 34 Sup. Ct. 152. 3 The cost of such car ferriage was considered in Rates on Coal to Milwaukee, 28 I. C. C. 527. Flour City S. S. Co. v. L. V. R. R. Co., 24 I. C. C. 179. 5 which discrimination would be forbidden. It all depends, with the courts, upon the situation which they find to have been established. A railroad may however, have a special wharf, especially for a particular line connecting with it; and it has been held that from such a wharf it may exclude other lines desirous of using it where, as in that case, sufficient facilities were apparently to be obtained at other wharves. But in the case of the Southern Pacific Terminal Company created by an act of the legislature for the purpose of furnishing terminal facilities at the port of Galveston for use in connection with the Southern Pacific Railroad and Steamship systems and controlled by it through stock ownership, the Supreme Court held that the Commission has jurisdiction to regulate the charges on traffic handled in connection with these carriers, since the terminal was a part of the system and was not a distinct wharfage company. Following the lines of these decisions, the Commission has recently investigated wharves maintained by carriers at Fort Myers for use of business from certain boat lines on the Caloosahatchee River.8 At Pensacola, also, preferences discovered in berthing vessels in connection with railroad owned wharves were held unlawful.9 § 176. Terminals. In the matter of terminals a distinction seems to be made in the law between the terminals which are part of the system of the railroad itself, and terminals which are maintained for the use of railroads entering the city. 10 5 Humboldt S. S. Co. v. W. P. & Y. R., 25 I. C. C. 136. • Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. West Coast N. S. Co., 198 U. S. 483, 49 L. ed. 1135, 25 Sup. Ct. 745. 7 Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. I. C. C., 219 U. S. 498, 55 L. ed. 310, 31 Sup. Ct. 278. 8 R. R. Com'rs of Fla. v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 28 I. C. C. 356. "In re Wharfage Facilities at Pensacola, 27 I. C. C. 252. 10 Concerning the obligations of public terminals, see State v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 41 Fla. 363, 27 So. 221 (Union station); and Union Ry. of Balt. v. Canton R. R., 105 Md. 12, 65 Atl. 409 (belt line). Generally speaking, while a railroad company may refuse the use of its terminals to other railroads, a terminal company must permit all railroads to use its facilities upon equal terms.11 Although the terminals of a railroad are subject to the supervision of the Commission as part of the facilities furnished for the public desiring the transportation which the carrier is furnishing, there is an explicit proviso in the Act to the effect that a railroad need not give the use of its terminals to its rivals. Thus a freight depot owned and maintained by a carrier is a terminal facility for use in handling business from its own line, and cannot under section 3 be used for handling business from other lines without its consent.12 On the other hand, railroads may voluntarily open their terminals to other carriers, as apparently all railroads at Detroit voluntarily open their trackage to other railroads entering that city.13 Very often, as at St. Louis, the so-called terminal is in reality a connecting carrier; and the law governing such terminal lines is that imposing the obligation of interchange of traffic, rather than the utilization of facilities.14 A company which offers a terminal service as such to all comers would seem to be in a position where it could be compelled to treat all with equality; and in this view of the matter it all depends upon the basis upon which the terminal is constituted. The Peoria case, recently decided, contains the most important rulings of the Commission on these problems. The Commission in effect found that the defendant was a terminal company constructed for the purpose of giving main-line roads access to various industries in and about Peoria, and virtually organized to furnish terminal facilities for car 11 Unless a terminal is operated upon a public basis its owners cannot be compelled to admit other railroads; see Terre Haute & I. R. R. v. Peoria & P. V. Ry. Co., 167 Ill. 296, 47 N. E. 513; and Com. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 103 Va. 291, 68 S. E. 351. 12 R. R. Com. of Arkansas v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 24 I. C. C. 292. 13 Detroit Switching Charges, 28 I. C. C. 494. 14 Mfgrs. Ry. Co. v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 28 I. C. C. 93. 5 which discrimination would be forbidden. It all depends, with the courts, upon the situation which they find to have been established. A railroad may however, have a special wharf, especially for a particular line connecting with it; and it has been held that from such a wharf it may exclude other lines desirous of using it where, as in that case, sufficient facilities were apparently to be obtained at other wharves. But in the case of the Southern Pacific Terminal Company created by an act of the legislature for the purpose of furnishing terminal facilities at the port of Galveston for use in connection with the Southern Pacific Railroad and Steamship systems and controlled by it through stock ownership, the Supreme Court held that the Commission has jurisdiction to regulate the charges on traffic handled in connection with these carriers, since the terminal was a part of the system and was not a distinct wharfage company. Following the lines of these decisions, the Commission has recently investigated wharves maintained by carriers at Fort Myers for use of business from certain boat lines on the Caloosahatchee River. At Pensacola, also, preferences discovered in berthing vessels in connection with railroad owned wharves were held unlawful.9 § 176. Terminals. In the matter of terminals a distinction seems to be made in the law between the terminals which are part of the system of the railroad itself, and terminals which are maintained for the use of railroads entering the city.10 5 Humboldt S. S. Co. v. W. P. & Y. R., 25 I. C. C. 136. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. West Coast N. S. Co., 198 U. S. 483, 49 L. ed. 1135, 25 Sup. Ct. 745. 7 Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. I. C. C., 219 U. S. 498, 55 L. ed. 310, 31 Sup. Ct. 278. 8 R. R. Com'rs of Fla. v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 28 I. C. C. 356. In re Wharfage Facilities at Pensacola, 27 I. C. C. 252. 10 Concerning the obligations of public terminals, see State v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 41 Fla. 363, 27 So. 221 (Union station); and Union Ry. of Balt. v. Canton R. R., 105 Md. 12, 65 Atl. 409 (belt line). Generally speaking, while a railroad company may refuse the use of its terminals to other railroads, a terminal company must permit all railroads to use its facilities upon equal terms.11 Although the terminals of a railroad are subject to the supervision of the Commission as part of the facilities furnished for the public desiring the transportation which the carrier is furnishing, there is an explicit proviso in the Act to the effect that a railroad need not give the use of its terminals to its rivals. Thus a freight depot owned and maintained by a carrier is a terminal facility for use in handling business from its own line, and cannot under section 3 be used for handling business from other lines without its consent.12 On the other hand, railroads may voluntarily open their terminals to other carriers, as apparently all railroads at Detroit voluntarily open their trackage to other railroads entering that city.13 Very often, as at St. Louis, the so-called terminal is in reality a connecting carrier; and the law governing such terminal lines is that imposing the obligation of interchange of traffic, rather than the utilization of facilities.14 A company which offers a terminal service as such to all comers would seem to be in a position where it could be compelled to treat all with equality; and in this view of the matter it all depends upon the basis upon which the terminal is constituted. The Peoria case, recently decided, contains the most important rulings of the Commission on these problems. The Commission in effect found that the defendant was a terminal company constructed for the purpose of giving main-line roads access to various industries in and about Peoria, and virtually organized to furnish terminal facilities for car 11 Unless a terminal is operated upon a public basis its owners cannot be compelled to admit other railroads; see Terre Haute & I. R. R. v. Peoria & P. V. Ry. Co., 167 Ill. 296, 47 N. E. 513; and Com. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 103 Va. 291, 68 S. E. 351. 12 R. R. Com. of Arkansas v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 24 I. C. C. 292. 13 Detroit Switching Charges, 28 I. C. C. 494. 14 Mfgrs. Ry. Co. v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 28 I. C. C. 93. |