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as a matter of public policy; except in so far as these figures related to the power of the Commission over rates, it had no power otherwise over financial operations good or bad, or over profit or loss.

§ 1004. Extent of its supervision.

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In view of these rulings it is obvious that the Commission will not go out of its way to assert jurisdiction over matters clearly not confided to it. Thus in Sprigg v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, it was said that the Commission will not attempt to administer generally all Federal statutes to the conduct of railroads, such as, for instance, the anti-trust law. In Consolidation Fuel Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, it was pointed out that the Commission has not been charged with the enforcement of the commodities clause in section 1 of the Act itself, beyond the general duty of calling attention to any infraction of the provisions of the Act. In Railroad Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 10 it was held that the Commission could not without usurpation of authority enforce State laws or the provisions of State constitutions. And in Southwestern Produce Distributers v. Railroad,11 it was added that the Commission's jurisdiction, in a general sense, extends only to relations between the carriers and passenger and carrier and shipper.

§ 1005. Visitorial powers in general.

There have been important cases of late years in the courts relating to the principles under discussion. It has, of course, long been well established that the State may supervise railroads, and regulate their affairs through a Commission. 12 Such a Commission in its general supervisory powers may require reports of the whole businesses of the carrier so far as the information desired has a bear

88 I. C. C. 443.

927 I. C. C. 554.

10 10 I. C. C. 173.

11 20 I. C. C. 458.

12 Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. 344.

ing upon matters put within its jurisdiction. 13 It has been pointed out, however, by the Supreme Court in speaking of the federal Commission that railroads are the private property of their owners; and while from the public character of the work in which they are engaged the public has the power to prescribe rules for securing faithful and efficient service and equality between shippers and communities, yet in no sense proper is the public a general manager.1 Thus it would seem to be fundamental, as a State court has recently said in refusing to permit its own commission to go too far into detail in its orders, that, while a commission has power to require every railroad company to discharge all its public duties, whether imposed by charter, general law, or the nature of its business, its powers are only those of supervision and regulation-not of management and control.15 By observing this distinction a commission would not go so far as to take away from the owners the operation of their properties.

§ 1006. What supervision implies.

The Commission has at times taken the point of view that its powers are inherently limited to those of supervision. The Act leaves carriers free to initiate their own policies and regulations; the jurisdiction of the Commission is to revise what the carriers are doing. 16 Thus the Commission cannot place limitations on railroad expenditures, nor direct improvements, nor enforce economies, no matter what revenue may be received. 17 The Commission does not sit as a supreme traffic manager for the railroads of the country; power to direct the policy which they may pursue is not a matter delegated to it, so long as such policy does not infringe upon the prohibitions of

13 People v. Chicago I. & L. Ry., 223 Ill. 581, 79 N. E. 144.

14 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago Gt. W. Ry., 209 U.S. 108, 28 Sup. Ct. 493.

15 Bacon v. Boston & M. R. R., 83 Vt. 421, 76 Atl. 128.

16 Traer v. C., B. & Q. R. R., 14 I. C. C. 165.

17 In re Advances in Rates, Western Case, 20 I. C. C. 307.

the law. 18 Nor has the Commission power to say what shall be done, as a matter of public policy, except in so far as the public will must always be considered in exercising its authority under the Act. Its duty with respect to rates is, therefore, simply to inquire whether they are in accordance with the requirements of the Act. 19

§ 1007. Status of the Commission.

To invest an administrative body like this Commission with unrestricted and unguided authority would be to give it legislative power, which cannot be done under our federal Constitution. Congress, instead of making rates itself, laid down certain rules which its administrative representatives must follow; and the Commission may take into consideration those various circumstances which properly would have acted upon the mind of the legislature in determining upon proper rates.20 It is one thing to authorize such a body to administer the law in accordance with certain rules and standards prescribed by the legislature, and an entirely different thing to turn over to it the exercise of the legislative discretion itself." Since the Commission is an administrative body, it may not by interpretation annul an act of Congress. 22 And no holding of the Commission can render lawful that which is of itself unlawful.23 On the other hand, the courts have no power to fix railroad rates, that power being vested in the Commission; and where the Commission acting in its administrative capacity establishes certain rates, the courts will not interfere unless some constitutional or natural right has been violated.24 Congress did not in the Act.

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and its amendments intend to vest administrative authority in the courts in the matter of fixing rates, but on the contrary committed the power to ascertain facts, and determine what is reasonable in regard to rates in view of such facts, to the Commission. 25

Topic C. Authority to Investigate Conditions

§ 1008. Investigation by the Commission.

There has been no doubt in the mind of the Commission from the very beginning, that it may investigate any supposed violation of the Act, even on its own motion. 26 Thus long before it had any powers in relation thereto it inquired as to division of alleged unlawful joint rates.27 And it held that its jurisdiction in this respect extends to a case of alleged unlawful prejudice and disadvantage to shippers of freight through the enforcement by carriers of regulations. 28 As the Act applies to the transportation of export and import traffic, the jurisdiction of the Commission over the course of all such traffic has always been clear.29 That the Commission may investigate any matters connected with the performance of transportation by carriers is seldom denied; and so long as the inquiry is confined to the officers of the company and the records of the company, it may well be that this is within the power of regulation of carriage subject to the Act. In Re Rates on Food Products, 30 the Commission claimed that it might enforce production of books of the carriers investigated. Although in Re Grand Trunk Railway,3 the Commission said that it might on its own motion investigate supposed violations of Act, it did not go to the

25 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 184 Fed. 118.

26 Re Atlanta & W. P. R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 461.

27 Warren-Ehret Co. v. Central Ry. of New Jersey, 8 Int. Com. Rep. 598.

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28 Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce and Merchant's Exchange v. Baltimore & O. S. W. Ry., 10 Int. Com. Rep. 378.

29 Re Export and Domestic Rates on Grain, 8 Int. Com. Rep. 214. 30 3 Int. Com. Rep. 151. 312 Int. Com. Rep. 496.

extent of claiming that it could compel testimony in such investigations from anyone in the United States who might have knowledge of the facts.

§ 1009. Limitation of its scope.

The Commission has declared frequently that its powers are confined to the enforcement of the Act, and do not extend to investigation of corporations generally. In China & Japan Trading Co. v. Georgia Railroad 32 is the significant statement that the Commission has no power to enforce the law generally as to the duties of carriers broadly speaking. In the Commutation Rate Case, it was pointed out that in sections 1, 2, 3, 4, and 15 are contained all the substantive law and machinery for public regulation of interstate carriers which the Commission possesses. In the opinion in the case entitled the New England Investigation 34 the Commission urged that the time had come when the national government should assume jurisdiction over railroads in so far as may be necessary to secure to the public proper service, saying that the Commission has fairly complete control over rates and over all practices which relate to the rate, but as yet no control whatever over the operation of the railroad or its physical maintenance. And as to the matter of expenditure and capitalization it has lately made several recommendations at the end as to powers which it felt ought to be added to its jurisdiction, as for instance in the St. Paul and Puget Sound Accounts.35

§ 1010. Jurisdiction of the federal Commission.

The extent to which a concern which has business subject to the Act is subject to being investigated as to other business carried on by it was brought out sharply in the recent case of the Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transportation Company.36 The defendant had

32 12 I. C. C. 241. 33 21 I. C. C. 428.

34 27 I. C. C. 560.

35 30 I. C. C. 280.

36 224 U. S. 194, 32 Sup. Ct. 436.

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