a line of steamers carrying freight and passengers on the Great Lakes and was a party to joint rail and water rates. Its business was of various sorts: (1) intrastate water transportation; (2) interstate water transportation; (3) intrastate joint water and rail transportation; and (4) interstate joint water and rail transportation. The Commission ordered this line (1) to keep accounts in same form as railways did; (2) to report all its business, both interstate and intrastate; (3) to make same reports as a railway; (4) to include receipts from certain amusement park the business of which was entirely intrastate. The Supreme Court sustained the order of the Commission in toto, saying that in order to regulate the interstate part of the business it must know it as a whole. And it is obvious that otherwise it would be impossible to tell whether reports as to interstate business were correct, as the accounts could be juggled between different books. In order to have effective regulation of interstate business there must be power to examine everything involved therewith, so reports may be required to both interstate and intrastate, public and private. This was brought out very clearly in another case, United States ex rel. v. Union Stockyards and Transit Company,37 recently decided by the Supreme Court in which the jurisdiction of the Commission over each and all of a congeries of corporations only one of which could be said to be directly engaged in interstate commerce.

§ 1011. Extent of its powers.

The Commission should not, however, attempt to extend its supervision over matters with which it can have no concern. Thus the Commission has no jurisdiction to determine whether the rights of a minority stockholder in one railroad absorbed by another have been infringed, where the purpose of the proceeding before the Commission is to obtain information for the complainant to determine whether, as a stockholder, it would be advisable 37 226 U. S. 286, 33 Sup. Ct. 83.

to bring a suit in equity for an accounting against the railroads involved. 38 Breaches of duty by a carrier otherwise than in relation to matters covered by the Act are wholly within the jurisdiction of the courts.39 The Commission has often said that it has no common-law or equity jurisdiction to adjust matters between parties, but only such authority over matters relating to service of the public as are prescribed in the Act.40 It follows that under no head of jurisdiction can this Commission take action in regard to the private rights and wrongs whether falling under the head of tort or contract." Any jurisdiction which the Commission has had heretofore in respect to the subject-matter covered by the anti-trust law has been altogether confined to the effect of the combination alleged, if any, in raising rates to an unreasonable level. 42 The Commission is a body of limited powers derived exclusively from the Act; it is a purely administrative body charged with specific administrative duties and invested with specific powers. Although the Act may be described as a general code for the regulation and government of railroads upon the subjects treated of therein, it cannot be contended that it covers all cases concerning transportation by railroad; and it does not purpose to cover any such extensive field. 44

43

§ 1012. Powers of State Commissions.

Some cases in the State courts of late years which have been liberal in support of the right of their commissions to supervise carriers in all their ways should be noted, however. It is natural to permit an administrative board, created to supervise quasi-public corporations to inquire 38 Manning v. C. & A. R. R., 13 I. C. C. 125.

39 Blume & Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 15 I. C. C. 53.

40 Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v. D. & T. Ry., 19 I. C. C. 356.

41 Ralston Townsite Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 22 I. C. C. 354.

42 Warren Manufacturing Co. v. So. Ry., 12 I. C. C. 381.

43 Kentucky Bridge Co. v. L. & S. R. R., 37 Fed. R. 567.

44 United States v. Transmission Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 43 L. ed. 259, 19 Sup. Ct. 85.

in a purely administrative way into the affairs and papers of such corporations subject to its jurisdiction; but it would be going to an extreme to permit such administrative inquiries to be extended into the affairs and papers of those private institutions with which the railroad company may do business. The right of the commission to inquire into the affairs of the carriers is strongly stated in some of these cases, but there is no suggestion that people can generally be compelled to testify as to their dealings of every sort with any carriers. 45 In regard to the scope of supervision the cases in the States have been very strong; thus it has been said that the action of a railroad commission in requiring reports was so within its administrative power that no appeal lay to the courts, as it would in a matter quasi-judicial. 46 In another case 47 the power of a State commission to require that all the accounts of the carrier relating to every phase of its business, interstate as well as intrastate, should be kept in such ways as should be prescribed was asserted. In still another case 48 the distinction between a general investigation and a quasi-judicial proceeding was clearly set forth; and the impropriety of enforcing duties as the result of a mere investigation was pointed out.

§ 1013. Proceedings belonging in the courts.

The Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over suits to recover damages for delay in the delivery of interstate shipments, so as to prevent the State courts from entertaining such actions; common-law actions of this sort even between carrier and shipper where the commerce is interstate still belong in the courts of law of the States or what otherwise would be normally the venue. 49

45 People v. Chicago, I. & L. Ry., 223 Ill. 581, 79 N. E. 144.

46 St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. State,

24 Okla. 805, 105 Pac. 351.

47 Railroad Commission v. Texas

& P. Ry. (Tex. Civ. App.), 140 S. W. 829.

48 In re Railroad Commissioners, 79 Vt. 53, 64 Atl. 233.

49 Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Knox, 177 Ind. 344, 98 N. E. 295.

The Commission is given jurisdiction only to hear complaints in regard to impropriety in rates; and the language of the Act in reference to complaints to the Commission must be construed as relating to those subjects which are within the jurisdiction of the Commission.50 A suit brought against an initial carrier to recover for loss or damage to an interstate shipment caused by a connecting carrier, under the provision of the Carmack Amendment, is not a suit for the violation of the Act, but is a suit for the value of property which may be brought in the courts of a State. Where an interstate carrier refused to accept shipments of liquor in Indiana consigned to destinations in prohibition counties in Kentucky, it was held that a bill in equity was properly filed in the courts to enjoin the carriers from refusing to accept such shipments without first resorting to the Commission, since the question involved was the validity of the prohibition law, over which the Commission has no jurisdiction, and did not present an administrative question within the scope of its power.

51

52

§ 1014. Testimony compelled in quasi-judicial proceedings. The powers of the Commission to compel testimony in proceedings under the Act first came before the Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson.53 The court recognized in this leading case that Congress had constitutionally prescribed rules to prevent unreasonable charges and unjust discriminations in interstate transportation, and, for the purpose of enforcing those rules, had conferred upon the Commission its power of investigation. Consequently it was said that it was a judicial function for the courts to compel answers to the Commission's inquiries within the scope of its power, be

50 Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Scott, 133 Ky. 724, 118 S. W. 990. 51 Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Piper Co., 52 Tex. Civ. App. 568, 115 S. W. 107.

52 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S. 70, 32 Sup. Ct. 189.

53 154 U. S. 447, 38 L. ed. 104, 14 Sup. Ct. 1125.

cause the statute created a duty upon the part of the witness to answer the questions, and as the duty to answer questions specified was capable of judicial enforcement, its enforcement would present a case within the meaning of the Constitution to determine whether what was asked was within the scope of the Commission's power, and whether the questions asked were pertinent to the investigation. The next time the powers of the Commission to summon witnesses came before the Supreme Court was in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird. 54 It was held in this case that the Commission had the right to investigate the issues formed, even if complainant had no interest, and that, as the information sought was relevant to the subject-matter of the complaint, it is not a valid objection to the admission of testimony, otherwise relevant and competent, that a third person is interested in it when the proceeding was being prosecuted under the complaint filed, and the testimony was offered with a view to its competency under the allegations made by the complainant. In both of these cases it will be noted the Supreme Court considered exclusively the right of the Commission to have the court's aid in compelling answers in quasi-judicial proceedings to questions which related to violations of the Act to Regulate Commerce; the Court did not have before it, and did not consider in either of these cases any contention that the Commission had any further power to summon witnesses to answer to miscellaneous questions in a general investigation under the Act.

§ 1015. Summoning witnesses in general investigations. There must not be in this matter any ignoring of constitutional limitations which, for the protection of personal rights, must necessarily be respected in all processes of law. In view of the Bill of Rights in the first ten Amendments to the Constitution it would seem to be be

54 194 U. S. 25, 48 L. ed. 860, 24 Sup. Ct. 563.