gard of our ancient traditions. The Commission is an administrative body essentially, not bound necessarily to the technique of judicial tribunals. But the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony, the more imperative the obligation to preserve those essentials of action in accordance with evidence adduced by which rights have immemorially been assisted or defended. The Commission is not justified in condemning rates and making revisions upon mere impressions and comparisons, but may act only upon facts and conditions duly established. In this light the right to hearing which the Act provides must be fully protected. Manifestly there is no hearing in any true sense unless the party knows what evidence is offered or considered and is given opportunity to explain and refute it. This is not merely a matter of proper construction of the Act, it is a right which comes from the Constitution itself.68 § 1021. Jealous protection of substantial rights. These are substantial rights that are thus jealously protected. In making an investigation on complaint of a shipper it has in the public interest the power disembarrassed by any supposed admissions contained in the statement of the complaint to consider the whole subject opened up by the complaint. The Commission in other words has combined in its constitution two functions; as an administrative body it may institute proceedings but it passes upon the matters thus brought before it quasi-judicially.69 As a practical matter the difficulties of conforming to these requirements are not great. If the Commission takes care to have read into the record the documents it wishes, if it puts forward for examination the investigators it has used, the 68 Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Feintuch, 191 Fed. 482. See particularly, United States v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. R., 226 U. S. 14, 33 Sup. Ct. 5. 69 Cincinnati, H. & D. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, conveniences are observed. Nobody objects to the Commission using its expertness in dealing with the facts in the record; the objection would be to the Commission giving judgment on evidence locked within themselves. All this is inconsistent with our notions of justice; by discretion we mean a judgment controlled by principles of law. We are not content in modern times with the sort of equity which the Chancellor originally evolved from his inner consciousness to deal with each case as it came before him. Still less will any people with the traditions of our race rest under proceedings of the order of the Star Chamber without being confronted with testimony against them.70 § 1022. Constitutional limitations upon the Federal Government. Neither Congress, nor any legislative or administrative board acting by its authorization, can competently establish rates for the transportation of property in interstate commerce that will not admit of the carrier earning such compensation for the services rendered as under all the circumstances is just and reasonable to it and to the public; for that would be depriving the carrier of its property without due process of law, and would be taking its property for public use without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."1 But any attack by carriers upon an order of the Commission reducing rates, on the ground that the lower rates prescribed are confiscatory will be unsuccessful, where it fails to show the amount of revenue necessary and sufficient for the maintenance of the petitioners as common carriers in the discharge of their duties to the public, and to what extent such revenue would be affected by the rates prescribed in the order complained of. If the change v. United States, 191 Fed. 37. 70 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 24 Sup. Ct. 563. See also Nashville Grain Ex 71 Missouri, K. & T. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 164 Fed. 645. cost of transporting a single commodity cannot be shown and it seems to be conceded that it is rarely possible to so do, then such other facts in lieu thereof as may make out a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution should be stated.72 These are generalizations as they are stated here; but the detail of these rules has already been given in such fundamental chapters as XVII, and the basis of asserting these rights receives full attention in Chapter XXIV. § 1023. Recognition of these by the Commission. If the present system of private ownership of railways is to be continued, sufficient inducement must be extended to private investors.73 The Commission recognizes that there is a limit below which revenue of railways cannot be reduced by public authority.74 And whether the result of an order will deprive carriers of fair return on their property must be considered before making any reduction in rates.75 The Constitution itself guarantees the carrier against confiscation of their property.76 But the unfavorable financial condition of defendant cannot lawfully be remedied by imposing unreasonable rates." The fact that the rate on a particular commodity could be reduced without impairing seriously the revenues of the carrier, standing alone, has little value and forms no basis upon which to determine reasonableness of rates.78 An advance may not be unreasonable, even though for ten years the carrier in question has regularly paid interest on total bonded debt, and recently paid dividends on its stock.79 Neither carrier nor Commission should disturb 72 Atlantic C. L. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 194 Fed. 449. 73 City of Spokane v. N. P. Ry., 15 I. C. C. 376. 74 In re Advances in Rates, Eastern Case, 20 I. C. C. 243. 75 In re Advances in Rates, Western Case, 20 I. C. C. 307. 77 76 City of Spokane v. N. P. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. 400. 77 Railroad Commissioners of Florida v. S. A. L. Ry., 16 I. C. C. 1. 78 Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. C., St. P., M. & O. Ry., 17 I. C. C. 189. 79 Morgan Grain Co. v. A. C. L. Ry., 19 I. C. C. 460. a long-standing system of rates without considering the effect on property interests; but when a rate is unlawful it should be corrected though it destroys existing property rights.80 80 Albree v. B. & M. R. R., 22 I. C. C. 303. CHAPTER XXII QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION § 1030. Provisions of the Act. 1031. Orders of the Commission. Topic A. Power to Order Changes § 1032. Power to fix rates originally denied. 1033. Decision of the Supreme Court. 1034. Powers established by later Amendments. 1035. No disturbance of reasonable rates. 1036. Basis of reasonable rates. 1037. Jurisdictional limitations upon rate revision. 1038. Working within legal bounds. 1039. How the Commission now views its function. Topic B. Reparation for Past Misconduct § 1040. Reasonableness of the established rate. 1041. Reparation in connection with relief. 1042. Concurrent jurisdiction over relief. 1043. Attitude of the courts. 1044. Wrongs outside Commission jurisdiction. 1045. Limitations upon its powers. 1046. Basis of Commission jurisdiction. 1047. Extent of its powers. Topic C. Jurisdiction of the Commission § 1048. Recovery based upon published rate. 1049. Effect of misquoted rate. 1050. Recovery of scheduled rate through legal proceedings. 1051. State courts deprived of jurisdiction. 1052. Scheduled rates conclusive in the courts. 1053. No reparation for misquoted rate. 1054. Liability for negligence in quoting rates. 1055. Limitations of this policy. § 1056. Reparation. Topic D. Findings of the Commission 1057. Bases of award by reparation. 1058. Extent of the jurisdiction. |