events support our national honor, by the most vigorous exertions, without shrinking; but surely, in such a complicated war as this is, if we can make any equitable offers of a treaty to any of the parties, common prudence calls upon us to use our endeavors to unravel by negotiation, the combination of powers now acting against us." In this paragraph, I see the manifest marks of a mind that has not yet mastered its subject. True policy would have omitted everything in this letter, which should call up to the minds of the people the ideas of national honor. Every man in the world, who is thoroughly acquainted with the subject, knows that Great Britain never can obtain a peace without a diminution of her honor and dignity. It is impossible without miracles, and therefore the Englishman, who undertakes to plan for peace, must be convinced of this and take it into his plan, and consequently should avoid with the utmost caution every word, which should excite these ideas in the minds of the people. They stir passions which make them mad.

He should have avoided with equal solicitude every in.sinuation of a design to unravel, by negotiation, the combination of powers now. acting against Great Britain. This combination is in fact much more extensive, much more

letter writer had any

universal and formidable, than the idea or suspicion of. But if it had been no more extensive than France, Spain, and America, the impracticability of unravelling it ought to have thrown out this sentiment. By it he proposes by negotiation to bring those to dishonor themselves, who have certainly no occasion for it; at the same time that he stimulates others to cherish and preserve their honor, who have already lost it, and under an absolute necessity, sooner or later, of sacrificing it. By this

means, he only puts the confederates more upon their guard, and renders the attainment of his professed object, peace, impossible.

The next solecism in politics, which he commits, is undertaking to vindicate America from the charge of having sought and formed this confederacy. America wanted no such vindication; it is folly to suppose it a fault, for all mankind will agree, even his correspondents themselves, that it was wisdom and virtue. Surely another term must be given to popular ideas, before they will be brought to petition for peace.

Nor do I think it was prudent in him to hold up the idea, that America had proceeded with reluctance and regret to the Treaty. That this is true, I know and feel to this very moment; for although I had no such reluctance myself, those gentlemen with whom I had the honor to sit in Congress at the time will remember, that I had very good reasons to be sensible that others had. But how well soever he might be informed of the fact, and from what source soever he might draw his information, it was bad policy in him to hold it up, because he ought to have been equally sure, that America has now no reluctance to the treaty, nor any inclination to violate it. He ought not, therefore, to have held up a hope of this to the people.

Neither ought he to have flattered the people with hopes, that America would not form any perpetual alliance with France, nor that their limited alliance might be satisfied and discharged. The alliance already made is limited, it is true, to a certain number of articles, but not limited in its duration. It is perpetual, and he had no grounds to sooth the people with hopes, either that France would give up any of the articles of the treaty, or that America. would violate them.

This is an

He ought also to have avoided his insinuations, that America has been so much harassed by the war. idea so refreshing to the present passions of the people of England, that, instead of tending to dispose them to peace, it only revives their hopes of success, and inflames their ardor for war. That America has been harassed by the war is true, and when was any nation at war without being so? Especially, when did any nation undergo a revolution in government, and sustain a war at the same time without it? Yet, after all, America has not been so much harassed, or disastered, or terrified, or panic-struck from the beginning, as Great Britain has been several times in the course of it. But the most exceptionable passage of all, is this. "It is apparent to all the world, that France might long ago have put an end to that part of the war, which has been most distressing to America, if she had chosen so to do. Let the whole system of France be considered, from the very beginning, down to the last retreat from Savannah, and I think it is impossible to put any other construction upon it, but this, viz. that it has always been the deliberate intention and object of France, for purposes of her own, to encourage the continuation of the war in America, in hopes of exhausting the strength and resources of this country, and of depressing the rising power of America."

Upon this paragraph I scarcely know what remarks to make. But after deliberating upon it, as patiently and maturely as I can, I will clearly write my opinion of it; for my obligations to truth and to my country are antecedent to all other ties.

I am clearly and fully of the opinion, then, that the fact is true, that France might put an end to that part of the war, which has been most distressing to Americans;

and I certainly know the means were extremely simple and obvious, and that they were repeatedly proposed, and explained, and urged to the Ministry; and I should have had a terrible load of the guilt of negligence of my duty upon my conscience, if it had not been done while I had the honor of a commission to this Court. But, when the letter writer proceeds so far as to say, that it was to encourage the continuance of the war, in order to exhaust the strength and resources of Great Britain, I cannot accompany him, much less can I join with him in the opinion, that it was to depress the rising power in America. lieve, on the contrary, that France has not wished the continuance of the war, but that she has wished for peace. The war has been attended with too much loss and danger to France, to suppose, that she wished its continuance, and if she did not wish its continuance at all, she could not wish it to depress the power of America.

I be

She could not wish it, in my opinion, for this reason, because it is not the means to this end. It has a contrary tendency. The longer this war is continued in America, the more will America become habituated to the characters of the soldier and the marine. Military virtues and talents and passions will gain strength, and additional activity, every year while the war lasts; and the nore these virtues, talents, and passions are multiplied, the deeper will the foundations of American power be laid, and the more dangerous will it become to some or other of the powers of Europe; to France, as likely as to any other power, because it will be more likely to be ambitious and enterprising, and to aspire at conquests by sea and land.

This idea, however, deserves to be considered with all the attention that Americans can give to it; although I am

convinced by everything I see and read and hear, that all the powers of Europe, except, perhaps, the House of Austria, and I am not very clear in that exception, rejoice in the American revolution, and consider the independence of America as for their interest and happiness, in many points of view, both respecting commerce and the balance of Europe; yet I have many reasons to think, that not one of them, not even Spain, nor France, wishes to see America rise very fast to power. We ought, therefore, to be cautious how we magnify our ideas, and exaggerate our expressions of the generosity and magnanimity of any of these powers. Let us treat them with gratitude, but with dignity. Let us remember what is due to ourselves and to our posterity, as well as to them. Let us, above all things, avoid, as much as possible, entangling ourselves with their wars or politics. Our business with them, and theirs with us, is commerce, not politics, much less war. America has been the sport of European wars and politics long enough.

I think, however, that this letter writer was very much mistaken in his judgment, when he threw out this language. It could be meant only to excite a jealousy and a quarrel between France and America, or rather feed the Yorkshire people, and the people of England with a hope of exciting such a quarrel. This is not the way to come at a peace. They will never succeed in such a plan, and every attempt towards it is a false policy.

The next mistake is, the idea of a reconciliation and federal union with America. This must be intended to separate us from our allies, which this gentleman ought, before now, to have known is totally impracticable.

I have very little more relish for the notion of a truce.