of "capable of being used as a beverage," found in section 10327. By the common use of terms a thing may be "unsuitable" for use as a beverage, and still "capable" of use as a beverage, while if it is incapable of use as a bev erage it is certainly unsuitable for such use. We are of the opinion that the Legislature intended the word "unsuitable," in said section 10328, to have its usual and ordinary meaning, and that therefore, while Triner's Elixir is an intoxicating liquor, still, where it is manufactured, imported, sold, or kept for sale for other than beverage purposes, it is excepted from the operation of the prohibition law. The allegations of the complaint admitted by the demurrer bring this case within the exception in section 10328, and no question is presented upon this appeal as to how far and when public officers may be prevented by injunction from proceeding to prosecute criminal actions.

The demurrer was properly overruled, and the order appealed from is affirmed.

NOTE-Proprietary Medicine as Intoxicating Liquor.-In State v. Gregory, 110 Ga. 624, 82 N. W. 335, the rule was laid down that "if the liquor was so compounded with other substances as to lose its distinctive character as an intoxicant, and to be no longer desirable as a stimulating beverage, and was in fact a medicine, then defendant was not guilty." In the same state, a druggist who sold a proprietary medicine containing 23 to 25 per cent alcohol by volume, a small percentage of sugar and other solids, and a certain percentage of cascara, the mixture being intoxicating, violated the law, and could be enjoined from maintaining a liquor nuisance. State v. Andrews, Ia., 176 N. W. 637.

In Mason v. State, 1 Ga. App. 534, 58 S. E. 139, it was held that medicinal preparations, recognized as such by standard authority (such as the United States Dispensatory) and not reasonably capable of use as intoxicating beverages, are not ordinarily to be regarded as being within the meaning of the expression "intoxicating liquors." though such articles are liquid, contain alcohol, and may produce intoxication. Among such are mentioned tincture of gentian, paregoric, bay rum, cologne, essence of lemon, and wood alcohol.

However, in Kansas, in the case of State v. Miller, 92 Kan. 994, 142 Pac. 979, L. R. A. 1917F 238, Ann. Cas. 1916B 363, Jamaica ginger was held to be an intoxicating liquor, notwithstanding it has a medicinal use, the formula for its preparation is given in the United States Dispensatory, and it is there classified with lemon, vanilla, cinnamon, cloves, camphor, cologne, paregoric, wintergreen, and like tinctures, extracts, and essences.

Arbuthnot v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. Rep. 517, 120 S. W. 478, lays down the rule in this respect as follows: "Clearly the sheer fact that a formula to prepare a certain compound be found in the United States Dispensatory or like standard authority would not per se make it a nonintoxicat

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A lawyer puts into rhyme and rhythm for the Docket sentiments that will reach the hearts of many other sorely tried lawyers. He says:

Oh, for a steno, young and fair, with dark brown eyes and light brown hair; with an air about her frank and sweet, and with simple garb, but trim and neat; with tactful ways and winning smile, the waiting client to beguile; for one whose notes will all be plain, whose work will ne'er need doing again; for a steno young, and bright, and fair this briefworn lawyer makes his prayer; for a steno faithful as heart could wish, who'll tend the office while I go fish; for a neat little, sweet little, bright little joker, who'll stand off col lectors while I'm playing poker. But, failing all this, tell me where in the hell can I get a steno who knows how to spell?-C. & R.


Weekly Digest of Important Opinions of the State Courts of Last Resort and of the Federal Courts.

Copy of Opinion in any case referred to in this digest may be procured by sending 25 cents to us or to the West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn.







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v. Mid-City Trust & Savings Bank, Ill., 129 N. E. 498.

6. Application of Deposits.-A bank may apply deposits or such portion as may be necessary to the payment of a debt due it by the depositor, provided there is no express agreement to the contrary, and the deposit is not specifically applicable to some other particular purpose. Conner v. First Nat. Bank of. Sedrowoolley, Wash., 194 Pac. 562.

7. Bills and Notes - Joint and Several Obligors. Where stockholders in a corporation to prevent .suit to collect its note executed to the payee bank their joint and several note, they were bound as joint and several obligors on their note, and were not liable to the payee bank or to one of their number who paid the payee bank only in the proportion which the stock owned by them severally bore to the entire capital stock.-Holm v. Burnell, Cal., 194 Pac. 770.

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9. Right to Commission.-A broker, had a contract for a commission for furnishing a buyer who will buy at the agreed price, and who procured a buyer who entered into an enforceable contract for the purchase of the land. which was accepted by the vendor, can recover his commission without showing that the purchaser was able, ready, and willing to pay the agreed price, as he would be compelled to do if no binding contract had been made.-Williams v. Fraker, Ind., 129 N. E. 413. 46

59 27. 43 .8, 33 56

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1. Bailment-Novation.-Acceptance by lessor of personal property of rent from assignee of lessee with knowledge of the assignment does not prove a novation or a release of the lessee. -Wellman v. Conroy, Cal., 194 Pac. 728.

2.- Storage Charges.-Where the owner of personal property installs it in a rented building and departs for some place unknown leaving it in the building at the expiration of his lease, his conduct may be taken as an implied request for the owner of the building to store and care for the property.-Grice v. Berkner, Minn., 180 N. W. 923.


Bankruptcy-Ancillary Receivers. — Ancillary receivers in bankruptcy are officers of the court, not successors in title to the bankrupt, and are therefore not charged with the bankrupt's knowledge of the contract under which he obtained title to the property, possession of which the receivers acquired from the bankrupt, though they may be charged with knowledge of the identity of the property with that claimed, if it was sufficiently described, so that its identity could be determined from inspection. In re Fosgate, U. S. D. C., 268 Fed. 985.

4. Transfer of Property.-A transfer by an alleged bankrupt to a creditor of an automobile, which he had bought in good faith, and to which he had added accessories which he paid for, held a transfer of property and an "act of bankruptcy," within the meaning of Bankruptcy Act, §3a (2), Comp. St. § 9587, although the automobile had been stolen and he did not acquire the legal title.-In re Schenderlein, U. S. D. C., 268 Fed. 1018.


5. Banks and Banking-Acceptance.-As Negotiable Instruments Act, § 184, declares that the provisions applicable to bills of exchange apply to checks, and section 131 provides that acceptance of a bill must be in writing signed by the drawee, payment by drawee bank forged indorsement of a check is not an acceptance; for "payment" is the final act which extinguishes a bill, while "acceptance" is a promise to pay in the future, continuing its life, and must be in writing. Consequently the mere check payment of and stamping it "Paid" does not constitute an acceptance, create a liability of the drawee bank to


or the

true holder or payee.-State Bank of Chicago

10. Subsequent Agreement to Sell-Where the owner of property sold it by valid agreement made through an agent, her subsequent agreement with another to sell, made under the misapprehension that the first contract could not be enforced against her, cannot be enforced by the second purchaser, in order to prevent execution of the owner's promise to convey the property; the second purchaser having alone been responsible for the mistake.-Brown v. Hallgreen, Mass.. 129 N. E. 429.

11. Carriers of Goods-Delivery.-Under Bills of Lading Act, § 9 (Comp. St. § 8604e), providing that delivery is justified to a person in possession of an order bill by the terms of which the goods are deliverable to his order, or which has been indorsed to him, the act of the terminal carrier, after a shipment reached its destination, in striking out the original destination and substituting another, and delivering the shipment to another railroad for transportation to such new destination, on request of the party holding the bill of lading, constituted in legal contemplation a "delivery."-Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. J. F. French & Co., U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 195.

12.- -Insurance.-A provision in a bill of lading that the carrier liable on account of loss of or damage to property shall have the ful benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon, on or account of said property is valid, in the absence of fraud, or of any contract to the contrary with the insurer, and entitles the carrier to a deduction for insurance paid the shipper.-Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Blum., Miss., 86 So. 805.

13. Carriers of Passengers Contributory Negligence.-A boy 18 years of age boarding a crowded street car, which he could not enter, and standing on a step where he knew that there was only six inches clearance between the car and any other car that would pass on the next track, was guilty of contributory negligence.Schmidt v. West Penn Rys. Co., Pa., 112 Atl. 22.

14. Chattel Mortgages—Waiver.-The mere commencing, in a jurisdiction in which the property is not situated, of an action on a note secured by chattel mortgage, which was subsethe court having quently dismissed without acted thereon, does not waive the right to foreclose the mortgage, though prosecuting such action to judgment would waive such right un


der Code Civ. Proc. § 726.-Brice v. Walker. Cal.,
194 Pac. 721.

15. Commerce Interstate Commerce.-Oil be-
ing transported through this state to a point be-
yond its borders does not cease to be interstate
commerce because it may, as an incident of its
transportation through the pipe line, come in
contact with other oil,
thereby be contaminated.
and to
some extent
is merely an incident of the transportation, and
Such contamination
does not change the character of the oil as in-
terstate commerce.-Eureka Pipe Line Co. v.
Hallanan, W. Va., 105 S. E. 506.

16. Constitutional Law-Application of Police Regulation to Existing Contracts Does Not Impair Obligations.-The application of the prohibition of Code Supp. 1913, § 2110m, to an existing lease relieving the railroad of liability for negligent fire started in a building on its right of way, does not impair the obligation of contract, contrary to Const. U. S. art. 1, § D, since laws enacted under the police power are rendered invalid under that section, though they apply to existing private contracts.-Aetna Ins. Co. v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., Iowa, 180 N. W. 649.



17. -Eminent Domain.-Pub. Acts 1915, 131, creating the office of fire prevention commissioner and conferring upon him authority to have premises found to be especially liable to fire removed or remedied and repaired, torn down, demolished, materials removed, and all dangerous conditions remedied as the case may be, held not to violate Const. art 1, § 21, and article 11, § 8, as authorizing the taking of the owner's property without his consent and without compensation and not according to the law of the land; the destruction of property liable to fire being within the police power.-Jackson v. Bell, Tenn., 226 S. W. 207.

18.- -Increase in Hydrant Rates.-Increase by Public Service Commission of hydrant rates to be paid by city to water company on the company's surrender of its franchise, held not to impair the obligation of a contract between the company and the city fixing the rate to be paid, in violation of the state and the United States Constitutions; such contract having been entered into subject to the police power of the state to regulate the charges of a public utility company.-City of Washington, Ind., v. Public Service Commission, Ind., 129 N. E. 401.



19. Internal Revenue. Rev. (Comp. St. § 6352), providing for the forfeiture of any conveyance, etc., used in the removal, etc., of any goods or commodities with intent to defraud the United States of the tax thereon, applies to an automobile used in the unlawful removal of distilled spirits, though a seller of the automobile, who retained title for the unpaid purchase money, was without guilt, and the statute so applied does not violate Const. Amend. 5, relative to due process of law, as the thing forfeited is primarily considered the offender.Grant Co. v. United States, U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 189.


20.-Vested Right of Employers.-Employers of labor have no vested right to employ women or minors, and the Legislature in the exercise of its police power may take away whatever rights such employers ployers cannot attack Laws 1913, p. 602, creating have. therefore the industrial welfare commission, because it made no provision for notice to employers of hearings on the question of minimum wages for women.-Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, Wash., 194 Pac. 595.

21. Corporations the State."-That the sales manager of defend"Doing Business Within ant corporation once visited plaintiff's office in this state and solicited a purchase of lumber, which was confirmed by defendant's letter written from another state, does not constitute "doing business within jurisdiction to enable service of process on dethe state," required for fendant's president happening within the state, but not on defendant's business.-Sunrise Lumber Co. v. Homer D. Biery Lumber Co., N. Y., 185 N. Y. S. 711.

22. -Issuance of Stock for Past Services Held Illegal. For the majority stockholders to issue stock to themselves without any consideration therefor for past services was illegal and a

fraud on the corporation and the other stockholders.-Wilson v. Brown, Pa., 112 Atl. 1.

23. Liability for Unpaid Balance of Stock. -One who bought corporate stock with knowledge that it had been issued for property worth only 20 per cent of its par value, though it recited it was full paid, is liable to a creditor of the corporation for the difference between the par value of the stock and the value of the property for which it was issued.-Raleigh Inv. Co. v. Bunker, Mo., 227 S. W. 121.


Covenants -Building Restrictions.-Building restrictions requiring construction of firstclass residences on lots in subdivision consisting of some 800 lots held not unreasonable in excluding construction of church building therein.-Johnson v. Mt. Baker Park Presbyterian Church, Wash., 194 Pac. 536.


Executors and Administrators — Where an executor when sued in the court of Waste.ordinary for an accounting and settlement attached an itemized statement of receipts and disbursements to his answer showing numerous disbursements by checks without showing the character of the claims for which they were drawn, the remaindermen could not maintain an action for waste on an allegation that the answer in the .court of ordinary showed waste, as the mere failure to show the purpose of the checks was not evidence of waste.-Weaver v. McCullar, Ga., 105 S. E. 476.


Explosives-Escaping Gasoline.-If an oil company allowed gasoline to escape from its warehouse and run down the street, where it would probably come in contact with fire, sparks from a passing engine, or live ashes from a lighted cigar or cigarette dropped by a passerby, and an explosion occurred, the oil company would be liable though it had no connection with the conduct of third party who caused the fire, or control over him.-Newton v. Texas Co., N. C., 105 S. E. 433.

27.- -Municipal Regulations.-Police regulations as to the erection and use of buildings and other structures for the purpose of carrying on the business of selling and distributing kerosene, gasoline, and other petroleum products is within the governmental powers ordinarily possessed by cities and towns.-Stone v. Texas Co., N. C., 105 S. E. 425.

28. False Pretenses-Check With No Funds. -Intent to defraud is the gist of the offense under section 1, chapter 132, Laws 1919, where a check is given by a party on a bank which has no funds on deposit with which to pay it. It is not a violation of this section for one to give a check under such circumstances, where he does not obtain or attempt to obtain anything of value therefor; and a check so given in payment of a theretofore contracted account is not in violation of the statute.-State v. Davis, N. M., 194 Pac. 882.


Fraudulent Conveyances-Stock as Bonus.
-An antecedent general promise by a judgment
debtor to give a bonus to his employees was
ineffective, too general, and too indefinite to
warrant any recovery thereon by such employees
to render transfer of stock to them by him pur-
suant to such promise effectual as against his
judgment creditor.-Kineon
185 N. Y. S. 694.
v. Bonsall, N. Y..

30. Improvements
ments. Where in an action for land the defend-
Income from Improve-
ant is bona fide in posession under adverse claim
of title, the mesne profits are to be assessed
upon the value of the property as it stood when
the defendant's title accrued, and the plaintiff
is prohibited from recovering as mesne profits
the increase of income resulting from the im-
provements made by the defendant in good faith.
-Norris v. Richardson, Ga., 105 S. E. 493.



Insurance-Breach of Warranty.-Where
a policy of insurance makes the answers and
statements made in the application warranties,
constitutes them a part of the contract
of insurance, an untrue statement concerning
a matter of fact that is or ought to be within
the personal knowledge of the applicant consti-
tutes a breach of the warranty and renders the
policy void.-Mandoli
Knights and Ladies of Security, Mont., 194 Pac.
National Council of


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32. Delay in Payment.-Where the holder of an accident policy was killed by a third person who was the only eye-witness and claimed that the killing was in self-defense, the insurer had a legal right to litigate the question of whether insured lost his life as the result of an accident, and the exercise of such right did not constitute a vexatious delay in payment for which damage could be recovered.-Berryman v. Southern Surety Co., Mo., 227 S. W. 96.

33. Explosion.-Under policy exempting insurer from liability for loss caused directly or indirectly by an explosion, the insurer is liable if there was a fire in the building which caused the explosion, but is not liable if the building was destroyed by an explosion before the fire ensued.-Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Westmoreland, Tex., 227 S. W. 239.

34. Insurable Interest.-Two brothers who are engaged in business together as partners have an insurable interest in the lives of each other sufficient to sustain a joint policy on their lives payable to the survivor, and such policy is not a contract.-Bonistalli v. Bonistalli, Pa., 112 Atl. 7.

35. -Mutual Benefits.-In determining who is entitled to benefits in mutual benefit societies, the members of which contribute money which provides the funds from which benefits are paid, the courts will adopt a liberal construction of the by-laws of such society, so that effect may be given a certificate issued by such society to its members.-Sovereign Camp, W. o. W., v. Cole, Miss., 86 So. 802.

36. Internal Revenue-Delivery of Liquor in Bond.-Under Volstead Act, tit. 2, § 6, prohibiting the transportation, etc., of liquor without a permit, a collector of internal revenue, having the custody of liquor in a bonded warehouse, is not allowed to accept any money as taxes on such liquor from, or to affix and cancel stamps thereon, for or to deliver such liquor to, any persons except those who present to him a permit issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Corneli v. Moore, U. S. D. C., 268 Fed. 993.

37. International Law-Foreign Government Entitled to Appear and Claim Vessel and Challenge Court's Jurisdiction.-A foreign government, or, with its sanction, its accredited and recognized representative, is entitled to appear in a suit in admiralty against a vessel, claim the vessel, and raise the question of the court's lack of jurisdiction because of its control of the vessel.-In re Muir, U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 185.


38. Intoxicating Liquors-Illegal Transportation.- Volstead Act, tit. 2, § 26. providing for condemnation of vehicles used for transporting liquor illegally subject, however, to claims and liens of innocent parties, was apparently intended to cover the subject, and was less than Rev. St. § 3450 (Comp. St. § 6352), for forfeiture of vehicles used for transporting untaxpaid spirits, under which the rights of innocent owners or lienholders were forfeited, and therefore the Volstead Act repealed Rev. St. § 3450, so far as it applied to distilled spirits, notwithstanding section 35, tit. 2, of the Volstead Act, providing that inconsistent laws were repealed only to the extent of the inconsistency, and that regulations therein should be additional to the existing laws.-United States v. One Haynes Automobile, U. S. D. C., 268 Fed. 1003.

39. Landlord and Tenant-Repairs.-Where a landlord had assured his tenant, when notified the plastering was defective, that it was good for at least two years, the tenant was not bound to make the repairs and deduct the cost from the rent, but could continue to occupy the premises and can recover damages for injuries caused by the fall of the plaster.-Plescia v. Le Roy, La., 86 So. 824.

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Marriage-Disappearance of Former Husband. Where a woman, who had been married to a man much older than she, was informed about a month after her marriage that her husband had been killed, but learned no details and made no special effort to ascertain the truth, and married again less than 5 years after her first marriage, and lived with her second husband for 20 years without the first husband having been heard from, the facts that the woman was legally married when she contracted the second marriage and that she knew thereof, which are essential to an annulment of the second marriage, are not established, even without the aid of presumption favoring validity of marriages. -Smith v. Smith, N. Y., 185 N. Y. S. 558.

42. Master and Servant-Fall Due to Fainting. Where the fall from a window, which killed the employee, was caused by an attack of vertigo or fainting, but the vertigo or fainting was in no wise caused by his employment, his dependent mother has no claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law.Joseph v. United Kimono Co., N. Y., 185 N. Y. S. 700.

43. -Res Ipsa Loquitur.-Where plaintiff, a student motorman, operating a car making its first trip in the morning, was injured in a collision with another car at the foot of a hill because applications of the air brake by himself and his instructor failed to check the car, though one stop had been made by the use of the brake, he was not entitled to invoke the rule of res ipsa loquitur to raise an inference of the company's negligent ignorance concerning the defect in the brake, and thus save his case for the jury.-Memphis St. Ry. Co. V. Stockton, Tenn., 226 S. W. 187.

44. Monopolies-Sale of Mining Property As Attempt to Monopolize.-Evidence that a corporation produced only 22 per cent of the copper produced in the United States, without any showing of the world production, that the price of copper had greatly fluctuated all during the corporation's existence, so that control of prices by it was not established, and that it had not restricted the output, does not show that the corporation constituted a combination to monopolize, which would authorize an injunction against a purchase of additional mining property by it under Clayton Act, § 16 (Comp. St. § 8835a).-Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 209.


45. Mortgages-Parol Agreement. plaintiff conveyed land to defendant's testator as security, and assigned the bonds for reconveyance, as security, to a bank of which defendant was cashier, and agreed that defendant should collect the rents and apply them on the debts, parol agreements that, in order to obviate the difficulty of making titles to prospective purchasers, suits should be brought on the secured notes and the land sold and purchased by defendant, and that the title should still be held as security, and the old arrangement as to rents continued in force, though concerning lands, were not unenforceable.-Barley v. Turner, Ga., 105 S. E. 471.

46. Municipal Corporations—Sale of Property. -While at common law a municipal corporation could, unless restrained by its charter, dispose of its land and other property just as private individuals could, in this country it is generally held that a municipal corporation has no implied power to sell property which is devoted to public use; but property of which the public use has ceased, or which has never been devoted to a public use, may be sold by the municipality owning it, by virtue of its implied power.Head-Lipscomb-McCormick Co. v. City of Bristol, Va., 105 S. E. 500.

47. Physicians and Surgeons-Drugless Healers. Drugless Healers' Statute, § 4, subd. 2. providing for the issuance of certificates to healers, refers to a school of practice which operates through the mind of the patient, and whether the cure is secured by mental operations resulting from suggestions from the practitioner, or from reasoning between the practitioner and the patient, is of no importance; it not being the purpose of the Legislature in providing licenses for various systems of drugless healing that each practitioner might choose for

himself a name to describe his practice and be licensed under that name.-Wells v. State Board of Drugless Examiners, Wash., 194 Pac. 388. 48.

Railroads-Crossing Track on Public Domains. Though sheep grazing on the public domain are not trespassing when they cross a railroad track at a place other than a crossing, the railroad company has the exclusive right to the use of its tracks at that point, and the herder is at most mere licensee to whom the company owes no duty to keep a lookout.-Cummings v. Hines, Utah, 194 Pac. 901.

49. Interstate Commerce.-An order of a state Public Service Commission, requiring a railroad company to detour through trains between points in different states in order to pass through a particular city of 4,000 inhabitants, constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce, where such city had seven local trains each way, which met its reasonable requirements, and compliance with the order would add 10 miles to the route of the through trains and require the maintenance of 16 additional miles of track at the high standard essential for through trains.-St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission of State of Missouri, U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 192.

50-Liability to One on Right of Way.-A lumber company, operating a railroad, is not liable for injuries to one who was struck by a pole when a derailed truck, which was being loaded on a train, fell, whether the injured person entered the right of way from curiosity, or because it offered the most convenient route to his destination, where there was no evidence of fault or negligence on part of defendant's employees.-Phillips v. Bryceland Lumber Co., La., 86 So. 799.

51. Liability to Furnish Tank Cars. common carrier is not required to furnish tank cars to shipper.-Gustafson v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., Ill., 129 N. E. 516.

52. Negligence as to License. For a railroad company which has licensed telegraph employes to operate velocipede on its tracks to operate a switch engine backward without lights on rear of engine is negligence as a matter of law. Crosman v. Southern Pac. Co., Nev., 194 Pac.840.

53. Receivers Confederates in Transaction in Breach of Receiver's Trust Liable for Profits.Those who knowingly joined a receiver in an agreement to share the profits from the purchase by one of them of the property at a sale under trust deed to secure a note to the estate are jointly and severally liable with the receiver for all the profits resulting from that transactoin.-Jackson v. Smith, U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct.


54. Sales-"Divisible Contract."-The definition of "divisible contract" in Personal Property Law (Sale of Goods Act) § 156. as one in which the price for a portion of the goods less than the whole is fixed or ascertainable by computation, does not, in view of the fact that the term so defined is used only in section 88 and 89, referring to a destruction of goods sold and contracted to be sold, change the existing rule that the acceptance of a part of a shipment under a single contract was an acceptance of all.Stovisky v. General Footwear Co., N. Y., 185 N. Y. S. 760.


55. Use Not Evidence of Acceptance.Where furnace was built into and became part of the buyer's house, its continued use by the buyers was a circumstance to be considered on the issue as to whether it had been accepted, but was not conclusive evidence of acceptance, since the buyers were not required to forego the use of the furnace, which, though defective, was at the time a part of their dwelling.-Beuret v. Stahl, Ind., 129 N. E. 407.

56. Installments.-A contract for the sale of a stated quantity of wire rods to be delivered in three equal monthly installments, which provided for the establishment of credits to secure payment for each installment before delivery, is a single contract in its entirety, not a series of three separate contracts for each installment. -Vulcan Trading Corporation v. Kokomo Steel & Wire Co., U. S. C. C. A., 268 Fed. 913. 57. Measure of Damages.-Where ice company contracted that ice should be furnished


a dairy company on the contingency of the destruction of the dairy company's icehouse, the dairy company's successor cannot recover. for breach of such contract by the ice company, damages to its business from the ice company's failure to furnish ice, such damages not having reasonably been in the contemplation of the true parties, the measure of damages being the difference between the contract price and the market price of the ice when it should have been delivered.-Curtis v. Boston Ice Co., Mass., 129 N. E. 444.

58. Warranty.-In an action to hold defendant on an oral contract for the balance due on the price of an automobile which defendant agreed to pay by the sale of a sound horse. evidence held to show that title to the horse tendered by defendant to plaintiff did not pass to plaintiff; it not having been sound, as represented.-McNabb v. Juergens, Iowa, 180 N. W.

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60. Taxation Public Use. That defendant borough buying, for its electric plant, a water power and land on which was a gristmill. in plaintiff town, ran the mill, and received a trifling revenue therefrom, does not make the mill subject to taxation, defendant running it merely as an incident to maintaining the water power for the electric plant, the power having been granted to defendant's predecessor in title on condition that the mill should be kept fit for service, and plaintiff claiming that defendant could not hold the land and power without operating the mill; it thus being an inseparable part of the electric plant.-Town of North Haven v. Borough of Wallingford, Conn., 11 Atl. 904.

61. Trusts-Revocation of Will-Where husband and wife executed wills disposing of their property in accordance with a parol agreement theretofore entered into, and where wife in violation of such contract thereafter revoked her will, a trust will be impressed on her property in favor of the beneficiaries under will-Brown v. Johanson, Colo., 194 Pac. 943.

62. War-Congress May Authorize Seizure of Enemy Property With or Without the Help of a Court.-Congress had power to provide for immediate seizure in war times of property supposed to belong to the enemy, as it could provide for attachment or distraint, if adequate provision be made for a return in case of mistake; and, as it could authorize seizure in pais, it could also authorize it through help of a court, as under trading with the Enemy Act Oct. 6. 1917, § 17 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919. § 31151), giving courts jurisdiction to make necessary orders and decrees for enforcing the act.-Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, U. S. S. C., 41 Sup. Ct. 214.

63. Wills "Cash on Hand."-A will making bequests from "cash on hand," and others from the proceeds of executor's sale of "notes and accounts." construed to include money in the bank, represented by short-time certificates bearing interest, but subject to check and withdrawal in "cash which I may have on hand" and not in "notes and accounts."-In re Johnston's Estate, Iowa, 180 N. W. 740.


64.- -Misdescription of Land.-Devise to wife of "our twenty-two acre farm, section 27. Wheeler township, north of town," held not to fail because of misdescription in describing land Wheeler township, where the only farm owned by testator was a 22-acre farm north of the town, since it was clearly the testator's intention to devise such land, and since the misdescription of "Wheeler township" could therefore be ignored.-Hoefling v. Borsen, Ia., 180 N. W. 750.

65. Undue Influence.-On contest of a will for undue influence and mental incapacity of testator, evidence that decedent was a man of strong will and fixed opinions, and that when he made up his mind on a subject he would not change it. etc., held admissible.-In Richardson's Will, Iowa, 180 N. W. 639.


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