tination. 7. Spain and the Batavian Repubiic are comprised in the present armistice.

This proposition certainly bore sufficient testimony of the most open and liberal dispo sitions towards a prompt conciliation: but it appeared that the British government had not at that period, the design to enter seriously into negociation, and that its only object was to gain time for Austria: for citizen Otto having insisted on an official answer, received the following note from Lord Grenville:

traordinary and minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty at the court of Vienna, by which note it appears to be the desire of his Britannic Majesty to see the war terminated which divides France and England, the undersigned is specially authorised to demand of the Ministers of his Majesty further explanations on the proposition transmitted by the court of Vienna; and as it appears impossible that, at the moment when Austria and England should take a common part in the negociations, France should be under a suspension of arms with Austria, and remain in a state of hostilities with England, the under-vernment that the proposition made by the signed is equally authorised to propose that a court of Vienna to fix at Luneville, the congeneral armistice should be concluded be- ferences for the proposed negociation respect tween the armies and fleets of the two states, ing a general peace had been acceded to by adopting, with respect to places besieged or the French government, nothing remains at blockaded, measures similar to those which present but to express the consent of his Mahave been adopted in Germany; as at Ulm, jesty to that proposition; and to declare in Ingolstadt, and Philipsbourg. The under-consequence, that a person duty authorised signed has received from his government the necessary powers to negociate and conclude this general armistice.

Отто.

Downing-street, 29th August, 1800. M. Otto having informed his Majesty's go

will be sent to Luneville by order of his Majesty, to unite himself with the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and France, as soon as the This note occasioned great emotion in the passports for such a minister and his suite shall British cabinet. Before an official answer be received; provided that the French gowas given to citizen Otto, M. George, Com-vernment should be disposed to make the nemissioner of the Transport Office, was sent to him, to ascertain his powers, and to enter upon a preliminary discussion with him on the elements of the negociation. It was in these conferences that M. Otto stated, that the negociations for peace would be held at Luneville; and repeated, that the British plenipotentiary would be admitted to them as soon as it was agreed that there should be a suspension of arms between France and England; which should be founded on that now existing between France and Austria, and be reduced to the following conditions:

cessary engagements, that the Plenipotentiary of his Majesty shall enjoy full liberty to communicate without restraint, and in the usual manner, by a courier with this country and those of his Majesty's allies.-As to the proposition for a general armistice by sea and by land between Great Britain and France, the King would rejoice at the moment, when he could with propriety adopt any measure whose immediate effect would be to put an end, at least for some time, to the calamities of war: but an armistice, applied to naval operations, having not in any instance been Article 1. There shall be a suspension of concluded between Great Britain and France, hostilities between the fleets and armies of in the course of their negociations for peace, the French Republic and those of Great or before the actual signature of preliminaries, Britain. 2. The ships of war and all trading consequently, a similar step cannot be consi vessels of both nations shall freely navigate dered as necessary to negociations; and from without being subject to any visit, and follow the disputes which would inevitably arise rethe usage established before the war. 3. Afspecting its execution, there is every reason to ter the 10th Fructidor, all the vessels of both nations which may be taken shall be restored. 4. Malta, Alexandria, and Belle Isle, shall be assimilated to Ulm, Philipsbourg, and Ingolstadt; that is to say, that all trading vessels, neutral or French, may take provisions thither. 5. The fleets which block Brest, Cadiz, Toulon, and Flessingue, shall re-enter into the ports of England; or, at least, keep cruising from the view of the coast. 6. English of ficers shall be dispatched directly to the three admirals who respectively command in the Mediterrancan, the fleet before Malta, and the blockade of Alexandia. They shall traverse France to arrive the sooner at their des

fear, that it would serve rather to obstruct than facilitate the success of those efforts which the two governments might make for the restoration of peace. Besides, it must be considered that the circumstances which accompany a naval war, are evidently not of a nature to admit of those nicely balanced arrangements, which are so readily established with regard to military operations, where the latter are suspended by a convention. It ap pears, then, at all events, to be premature to enter even into a discussion on this question, till, from the course of negociations, it may more clearly appear, that a satisfactory result may follow. But at all events, there can be

no positive decision on this point, till the of Egypt. If it be true that a long suspenFrench government has explained in whatsion of arms between France and England manner the principles of those regulations would be unfavorable to his Britannic Maadopted in the German armistice,with respect jesty, an armistice on the Continent would be to France, in an actual state of blockade, are of essential disadvantage to the French Reagplicable to the ports and maritime arsenals public; at the same time a maritime armistice of France, and its allies, actually blockaded would be, to the French government, a` by his Majesty's squadrons; so that stipula- pledge of the zeal of England to concur in tions analogous to those which have been the re-establishment of peace; and a contimade in regard to the military positions oc- nental armistice would convince the English cupied by the armies in Germany and Italy, government, that the efforts of France were might be fairly applied to the maritime forces sincere; and as the position of Austria is of the respective powers. GRENVILLE. now become such as to require a prompt conThus, by this note the British government clusion, the three powers would find, in their announced its intention of sending a pleni- distinct interests, predominating reasons to potentiary to Luneville; but, in the mean consent without delay to those sacrifices, time, refused to agree to the proposed ar- which may be reciprocally necessary to promistice. This arrangement was not admis-duce the speedy conclusion of their general sible, and citizen Otto was charged to assign and solid peace, which is the wish and hope his reasons by this note, which was sent to of the whole world. Отто. him from Paris:

London, 17th Fructidor, An 8. The undersigned, having communicated to his government the note dated the 29th of August, which his excellency, Lord Grenville had transmitted to him, is directed to submit to his excellency the following observations: The preliminaries of peace had been concluded and signed between his Imperial Majesty and the French republic, the intervention of Lord Minto, who demanded that his court might be admitted to take part in the nogociations, has prevented their ratification by his Imperial Majesty. The suspension of arms which took place on the continent, in the hope of a speedy peace, between the emperor and the Republic, will cease in effect the 24th Fructidor, since the Republic had sacrificed to the hopes of an immediate peace the immense advantages which it had derived from its victories. The intervention of England renders the question of peace with Austria so complicated, that it is impossible for the French government to prolong any further the armistice on the continent; unless his Britannic Majesty consents to render it common between the three powers. If then the Cabinet of St. James's continues to make common cause with Austria; and if its desire to engage in the negociation be sincere, his Britannic Majesty will not hesitate to adopt the proposed armistice. But if this armistice be not concluded before the 24th of Fructidor, hostilities will be renewed with Austria, and the First Consul will not consent with respect to that power, to any thing short of a complete and separate peace. To answer the explanations required relative to the armistice, the undersigned is directed to make known to his excellency, that the places which it is proposed to assimilate to those of Germany, are Malta and the maritime towns

The reasonings of this note were explicit, and the consequences demanded reflection. If England did not consent to sign a special armistice with France, that which existed with Austria, and was about to expire, would not be renewed. Austria, having no further means of resistance, must yield, and the peace would be concluded between France and Germany, without the intervention of England. The British government was sensible of the danger, but whether it did not receive a sufficient impression, or whether it thought that it had done enough, in manifesting for the court of Vienna, the appearances of an active friendship, without being found to give any further proofs; and contented itself with presenting, at the conclusion of a note extremely diffuse, the contre-projet of an armistice, from which none of those advanta ges would result to France, which she had a right to expect as a compensation for those which Austria would derive from the continental armistice: the note and the contreproject were conceived in the following terms:

Downing-street, 7th September, 1800. The undersigned has had the honour to lay before the King the official answer of the French government, which he received from M. Otto on the 4th instant; and also the project of of an armistice communicated on the same day. The spirit of that answer is unhappily but little consonant with those ap pearances of a conciliatory disposition which had before been manifested. If it be really practicable in the present moment to restore permanent tranquillity to Europe, this object must be effected by very different means than those of such a controversy as that paper is calculated to produce. Some reply is, however, indispensably necessary to the assertions there advanced, which if now passod

over might hereafter be considered as admit-posed to regulate the conditions of such an ted. The articles which an Austrian officer armistice, as far as the nature of the case will charged with no such commission, was per-allow, in conformity to the obvious and esta suaded to sign at Paris, do indeed appear to his Majesty but little calculated to terminate the calamities of Europe. But whatever be the tendency of the conditions which the French government has here specified, there can be no pretence for representing them as preliminaries concluded by Austria, or annulled by the intervention of his Majesty. The engagements by which the courts of London and Vienna have agreed not to treat except in concert with each other, were concluded before there was any question of these pretended preliminaries of peace. And the first intimations which his Majesty received of their signature were accompanied by the express declarations of his ally, that they were wholly unauthorized, and must be considered as absolutely null. The French government could indeed expect no other determination to be taken by his Imperial Majesty. The want of all powers or instructions for such a treaty, on the part of the Austrian officer, was at the time distinctly notified by him to those who treated with him, and is declared even on the very face of the paper which he signed. With respect, therefore, to the supposed demand of his Majesty to be admitted to those negotiations, nothing more is necessary to be said. The note delivered to M. de Thugot by Lord Minto, sufficiently explains the part which his Majesty is really disposed to take in any negotiation which may be regularly set on foot for general peace. The King has always been persuaded that the result of such a negotiation can alone effectually re-establish the tranquillity of Europe. Experience has confirmed this opinion; and it is only from the conviction of its truth that his Majesty has now been induced to waive his strong objections to the first proposal of a naval armistice, and to enter into the discussion of the conditions on which it may be established. His Majesty, judging from the experience of so many former negotiations, considers such an armistice as in no degree likely either to expedite or facilitate an arrangement of the direct interests of Great Britain and France. He views it in no other light than as a temporary advantage which it is proposed to him to yield to his enemy, in order to prevent the renewal of continental hostilities, and thereby to contribute to the conclusion of a general peace. And on this ground, notwithstanding the many disadvantages which he is sensible must result to this country from such a measure, he is resolved to give to his allies and to all Europe this new pledge of the sentiments by which he is actuated; provided that his enemies are dis

blished principle of such arrangements. This principle is, that the respective position of the two parties should remain during the continuance of the armistice such as it was at its commencement; and that neither of them should by its operation acquire fresh advantages or new means of annoying his enemy, such as he could not otherwise obtain. The difficulty of doing this with the same precision in the case of naval operations, as by land, has already been adverted to in a former note; and it constitutes a leading objec tion to the measure itself. But the French projet, instead of attempting to remove or lessen these difficulties, departs at once, and in every article, from the principle itself, although expressly recognized and studiously maintained in the continental armistice which is there referred to as the foundation and model of this transaction. It is proposed, in effect, that the blockade of the naval ports and arsenals of the King's enemies should be raised; that they should be enabled to remove their fleets to any other stations, and to divide or to collect their force as they may judge most advantageous to their future plans: the importation both of provisions and of naval and military stores is to be wholly unrestrain ed. Even Malta and the ports of Egypt, though expressly stated to be now blockaded, are to be freely victualled, and for an unlimited period, in direct contradiction to the stipulations of the German armistice respect ing Ulm and Ingolstadt, to which places it is nevertheless professed to assimilate them; and this government is expected to bind itself towards the allies of France even before any reciprocal engagements can be received from them; while, at the same time, all mention of the King's allies is, on the other hand, totally omitted. To a proposal so manifestly repugnant to justice and equality, and so injurious not only to his Majesty's interests, but also to those of his allies, it cannot be expect cd that any motive should induce the King to accede. The counter-projet which the undersigned has the honour to transmit to M. Otto, contains regulations in this respect more nearly corresponding with that principle of equality on which alone his Majesty can consent to treat. Even those articles are, in many important points, and particularly in what relates to the actual stations of his Majesty's squadrons, very far short of what his Majesty might justly demand from a reference to the general principle above stated, from analogy to the conditions of the continental armistice, or from the relative situation of naval force; and a confidence is re

To remedy the defects of this counter-projet, Citizen Otto was directed to present the following note, with a new projet for an armistice, in which the cabinet was studious to insert all the stipulations of the English projet, which were compatible with the interests of France.

It

according to the terms of this convention. | places of the second and third line which VII. This convention shall be ratified, and were in a bad state, in consequence of the the ratifications shall be exchanged within rapid march of the French armies having the term of ten days, or sooner, if the same not been foreseen. Thus Asoppo, Palmabe practicable. nova, Venice, Verona, and Lintz, had been neglected; every day their fortifications are repairing. Ulm, Ingoldstadt, although blockaded, are improving their means of defence; and it is the armistice which procures to them this advantage; for at the moment when those places were invested, the enemy thought only of besieging ours, and consequently London, 24th Fructidor, An 8. their own were not prepared for so early an The undersigned having transmitted to his attack. By the continental armistice, the government the note of his excellency Lord impression made by the victories of the French Grenville, dated the 7th of September, with armies diminish, their effects are weakened. the counter-projet which accompanied it, it Six months of repose would suffice to restore appeared to the First Consul, that the armi- the moral and physical strength of the Ausstice, as it was proposed by the British go-trian armies; to allow the conquered to revernment, was so contrived, as not to offer cover from the impression of ascendancy acany advantage to the French Republic; and, quired by the conquerors, and to make it consequently, could not compensate to it for necessary once more to regain that contingent the serious inconveniences which would re-superiority so well earned by the republic. sult to it from the continuation of the conti- It would also follow as a consequence of the nental armistice. Whence it follows, that continental armistice, that the kingdom of the counter-projet could only be admitted, as Naples, now a prey to every kind of calathe question might simply be to settle the mity, and containing all the seeds of insurpreliminaries of a particular arrangement be rection, might be re-organized, and furnish tween France and England, by a truce alike fresh resources to the enemies of France. particular to the two states: but the effect of is by means of the armistice, in a word, that the proposed maritime truce, being intended men are raising in Tuscany and in the marshes to serve as a compensation to the French Re- of Angona, that Austria is every where prepublic for the continental truce, the former paring new means of defence; that every ought to afford it advantages equal to the in- where she is meliorating her position, which conveniences which it derives from the lat-perhaps was desperate, whilst the advantages ter. The undersigned is therefore directed of the republic are diminishing or disappearto make two proposals, of which his Britan-ing. The First Consul has already made to nic Majesty may choose that may appear to him most consonant to the interest of his dominions, or to his continental relations. The first is, that the projet for an armistice be drawn up and admitted in terms analagous to those which have been proposed by the ministry of his Britannic Majesty, but solely under the supposition that this ar mistice should be independent of the events of the continent, and relative only to a separate negotiation to be immediately opened between the two powers. The second is, that his Britannic Majesty should continue to make common cause with the Emperor, but that, in that case, he should consent that the maritime truce may offer to the French Republic advantages equal to those secured to the House of Austria by the continental truce. And with this view the comparison may be easily settled. By the continental armistice the Court of Vienna acquires the means of re-organizing its armies, of converting into men, arms, ammunition of every kind, the subsidies paid to it by England; of fortifying and victualling its

the love of peace a sufficiently great sacrifice of those advantages: if he should continue to derive no benefit from them, it would no longer be moderation, but weakness; it would no longer be the means of arriving at the conclusion of peace, but that of perpetuating the war. Perhaps in the judgment of statesmen, the French government may have already too long delayed to avail itself of the contingency which was favourable to it; but it has only done so upon the positive assurances which had been given to it of a speedy and separate peace. At this moment, when the two allied courts insist upon a joint negotiation and a general peace, the French government is too well aware that so complicated a work is not to be accomplished in a few days, and it ought to avoid putting itself in a position which would be diametrically opposite to the acceleration of the negotiations, by giving to the inimical powers, and principally to Austria, a real interest to prolong the discussions, in order daily to acquire the means of appearing with greater advantage in the field of battle, and

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